Could the T-72 Work?
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Gunner: what's this from?
I'll believe it when I see it. Descriptions of Russian equipment are always somewhat suspect in my books. IMHO, the FCS is much more important than being able to throw rounds into the breach, and that's always been where the Russians have fallen short. The gun may theoretically be able to get off seven rounds a minute, but can it hit anything? The standard old Soviet 125 mm main gun isn't without its problems and (to my knowledge) has never been capable of successfully engaging an M-1 or Challenger, especially over frontal arc.
I don't believe that the Russians are at the point in their crew training where they're able to do as the US and UK does: have the gunner independently engage a target while the crew commander is laying on a new target with a separate sighting system. This makes for very fast and accurate engagements, using an FCS system that rarely misses first round. The Russians can practice all they want, but unless (1) they adjust tactics to permit more independent vehicle action and (2) have junior soldiers that they're willing to trust with independent engagements, they'll always fall short.
My 2 cents, as usual.
TR
I'll believe it when I see it. Descriptions of Russian equipment are always somewhat suspect in my books. IMHO, the FCS is much more important than being able to throw rounds into the breach, and that's always been where the Russians have fallen short. The gun may theoretically be able to get off seven rounds a minute, but can it hit anything? The standard old Soviet 125 mm main gun isn't without its problems and (to my knowledge) has never been capable of successfully engaging an M-1 or Challenger, especially over frontal arc.
I don't believe that the Russians are at the point in their crew training where they're able to do as the US and UK does: have the gunner independently engage a target while the crew commander is laying on a new target with a separate sighting system. This makes for very fast and accurate engagements, using an FCS system that rarely misses first round. The Russians can practice all they want, but unless (1) they adjust tactics to permit more independent vehicle action and (2) have junior soldiers that they're willing to trust with independent engagements, they'll always fall short.
My 2 cents, as usual.
TR
Michael Dorosh
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2Bravo said:
Ah, but Fireflies were only on a scale of 1 per 4-veh troop in Normandy, for Canadian units, and the SAR, as a recce regiment, apparently didn't get theirs until they had been in action for several weeks? The number increased to 2 per troop in 1945 IIRC.
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It sounds like a blurb from Strategypage.com, a source that is often more than a little suspect.
TangoTwoBravo
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Michael,
Indeed the Firefly was limited to 1 per Tp until later in the war. I think that a total of 600 were produced out of the thousands of Shermans used by the Commonwealth armies. Even on that scale it gave UK/Canadian tank units an advantage not available to the US Army. The US Army had the tank destroyer doctrinal straightjacket. Still, my point was that the Sherman was inferior one on one to the Panther (with the possible exception of the Firefly) and I was trying to make sense of the analogy.
As an aside, roughly half the German tank strength in Normandy was the Mark IVH. While its gun was superior to the standard Sherman it was certainly vulnerable in turn to Allied tanks.
All,
When looking at any tank vs tank comparison (such as could the T72 work) it is useful to consider the whole picture. Equipment (gunnery, FCS, comms, reliability, crew layout, protection), crew training, tactics and the employment of combined arms must all be considered. The situational advantages of terrain and tactical dispoistion (defending, advancing etc) also play a big part. Of course, numbers must also be looked at. Can superiority in numbers overcome technical and tactical inferiority?
Cheers,
2B
p.s. One "armoured" campaign that is often studied is the Western Desert from 1940 to 42. People often focus on the various tanks and upgrades to look for reasons for superiority in a given battle. I think that the biggest single influence was tactical methods. The Germans had a coherent combined arms doctrine while the British did not (although it did improve). German tanks would sometimes withdraw from contact and draw the British tanks after them. British tank units at the time had very little organic supporting arms. The Germans would draw the British onto their anti-tank screen (PAK Front) based on 50mm and 88mm guns. British armour, lacking proper supporting arms would then be at a severe disadvantage. This was made worse by the lack of HE for many British tank cannons of the time. British tank doctrine had been negatively affected by inter-branch squabbles between the wars. Tanks and anti-tank guns are accurate and have a high rate of fire. A large force of armour moving unsupported in the open can be quickly brewed up by a small, well disposed force. I'd hate to rely on numbers alone, although I guess it can be nice to have company in the kill zone.
Indeed the Firefly was limited to 1 per Tp until later in the war. I think that a total of 600 were produced out of the thousands of Shermans used by the Commonwealth armies. Even on that scale it gave UK/Canadian tank units an advantage not available to the US Army. The US Army had the tank destroyer doctrinal straightjacket. Still, my point was that the Sherman was inferior one on one to the Panther (with the possible exception of the Firefly) and I was trying to make sense of the analogy.
As an aside, roughly half the German tank strength in Normandy was the Mark IVH. While its gun was superior to the standard Sherman it was certainly vulnerable in turn to Allied tanks.
All,
When looking at any tank vs tank comparison (such as could the T72 work) it is useful to consider the whole picture. Equipment (gunnery, FCS, comms, reliability, crew layout, protection), crew training, tactics and the employment of combined arms must all be considered. The situational advantages of terrain and tactical dispoistion (defending, advancing etc) also play a big part. Of course, numbers must also be looked at. Can superiority in numbers overcome technical and tactical inferiority?
Cheers,
2B
p.s. One "armoured" campaign that is often studied is the Western Desert from 1940 to 42. People often focus on the various tanks and upgrades to look for reasons for superiority in a given battle. I think that the biggest single influence was tactical methods. The Germans had a coherent combined arms doctrine while the British did not (although it did improve). German tanks would sometimes withdraw from contact and draw the British tanks after them. British tank units at the time had very little organic supporting arms. The Germans would draw the British onto their anti-tank screen (PAK Front) based on 50mm and 88mm guns. British armour, lacking proper supporting arms would then be at a severe disadvantage. This was made worse by the lack of HE for many British tank cannons of the time. British tank doctrine had been negatively affected by inter-branch squabbles between the wars. Tanks and anti-tank guns are accurate and have a high rate of fire. A large force of armour moving unsupported in the open can be quickly brewed up by a small, well disposed force. I'd hate to rely on numbers alone, although I guess it can be nice to have company in the kill zone.
