Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

[dapaterson]

And therein lies the rub - there is nobody to stand watch over the organizational integrity of the CF.  What mechanisms can prevent unwarranted growth of organizations.  "A few Captains here an a Major there" doesn't seem like much, but it adds up quickly, and pretty soon we have to bounce troops around the fill up a battalion.  I read a CANFORGEN from a few weeks back that just authorized 19 additional CWO positions for various reserve formations.

Incorrect.  Those positions have existed for years (on the Army side, I know first had that they date back to at least 2003, but I suspect much farther back - some were probably the District CWOs prior to the stand-up of CBGs in the mid 90s).  The CANFORGEN approaved them as senior appointments / key positions and thus gave the incumbents and previous occupants an entitlement to the pay that goes along with that status.

No new positions involved at all.

 

[Haggis]

Those postions have been there for years. They are now formally recognized, and most are Class A.

ALL are Class A.  This CANFORGEN simply brought those already existing P Res CPO1/CWO Senior Appointments (SA) formally onto the CF Senior Appointments List (SAL), with position numbers.  It also retroactively paid members who now hold and who have previously held those positions - back to 01 Sep 06 - the proper rates on par with thier Reg F counterparts.

That same CANFORGEN also authorized backpay for MWOs in CWO positions who were promotable from their COS date.

No, it did not.  The only back pay authorized was for CPO1s/CWOs who have held Senior Appointments since 01 Sep 2006.  Once a CPO1/CWO leaves the SA, pay at that level ceases one year after that date and s/he reverts back to CPO1/CWO Pay Level 7A.

 

[Haggis]

The CANFORGEN approved them as senior appointments / key positions and thus gave the incumbents and previous occupants an entitlement to the pay that goes along with that status.

There are no approved P Res CPO1/CWO Key Positions at this time.  Some have been discussed but none are approved.

 

[McG]

Some interesting ideas coming from the Army, Navy & Air Force name change thread:

Some of the opinion-ation out there:

Douglas Bland, chairman of Defence Management studies at Queen's University, fears the name designation could be the beginning of a fissure that could become a headache for future governments. Future defence ministers could find themselves facing off against divided air force, navy and army leaders "trying to exert their influence on defence policy in the interest of their service."

(….)

National Post, 16 Aug 11

There is a simple, cost effective solution to the problem Prof. (LCol (ret'd)) Bland sees:

1. Create proper unified (joint) combat commands: Maritime Command with organic maritime air ~ and I don't care what colour uniforms the aircrew and ground-crew wear or whether they are pilot officers or sub-lieutenants, flight sergeants or PO1s, and Mobile Command with organic army aviation ~ and I still don't care about suit colour or ranks;

2. Create appropriate specified (single service) combat commands like air operations command; and

3. Create appropriate unified (multi-service) support 'agencies' or groups like "Materiel Group" and the Supplementary Radio System; then

4. Put all those commands and groups and agencies under the direction of the joint defence staff in NDHQ, with operations being under the control of the DCDS; and

5. Degrade the ranks of the CNS, CGS and CAS to RAdm/MGen and make them "professional heads of service" with specific responsibilities for doctrine, individual training and equipment requirements.

This is long overdue - we should perhaps stop referring to ECSes and instead refer to FGCSes - Force Generation Chiefs of Staff.  There is no reason for training organizations like the RCN, CA and RCAF (who do not conduct operations) to be commanded by 3* officers; primacy of operations should make them 2* officers, with a single, unified operational command, a single, unified support command and the VCDS as Chief of Staff  as the only three 3* officers.

That also removes the "meeting of equals" perspective in some senior fora - and means that the VCDS can order the FGCSes to do things, where now they get "directions" or "recommendations" that are, on occasion, casually ignored.

I'm not certain that Douglas Bland's future is really a new course.  I suspect defence ministers already find themselves facing off against divided air force, navy and army leaders "trying to exert their influence on defence policy in the interest of" their environment.

 

[Infanteer]

Incorrect.  Those positions have existed for years (on the Army side, I know first had that they date back to at least 2003, but I suspect much farther back - some were probably the District CWOs prior to the stand-up of CBGs in the mid 90s).  The CANFORGEN approaved them as senior appointments / key positions and thus gave the incumbents and previous occupants an entitlement to the pay that goes along with that status.

No new positions involved at all.

ALL are Class A.  This CANFORGEN simply brought those already existing P Res CPO1/CWO Senior Appointments (SA) formally onto the CF Senior Appointments List (SAL), with position numbers.  It also retroactively paid members who now hold and who have previously held those positions - back to 01 Sep 06 - the proper rates on par with thier Reg F counterparts.

Thank you for the clarification on that - I was a little confused by the CANFORGEN as I knew reserve CBGs and the LFAs already had people filling those roles.

 

[Haggis]

Thank you for the clarification on that - I was a little confused by the CANFORGEN as I knew reserve CBGs and the LFAs already had people filling those roles.

No problem.  I'm from NDHQ and I'm here to help.

 

[Infanteer]

Some interesting ideas coming from the Army, Navy & Air Force name change thread:National Post, 16 Aug 11I'm not certain that Douglas Bland's future is really a new course.  I suspect defence ministers already find themselves facing off against divided air force, navy and army leaders "trying to exert their influence on defence policy in the interest of" their environment.

Agreed; I found Bland's comment off the mark.

As for the ideas of presented above, I find Edward's just a bit confusing.  What would be the purpose of a 3* "Mobile Command" and a 2* "Canadian Army" existing at the same time?  Is a "Mobile Command' and empty HQ a la CEFCOM?  Are we just scrambling the egg further here?

The idea of a 3* Unified Joint Force Commander is a good one, one we will likely see, and one that has a proven track record.  I believe the principle of Force Gen/Force Emp is sound.

Finally, I don't get what reducing the ECS to 2*s is meant to accomplish.  We talk of the primacy of operations; Force Generation is, hand in hand with Force Employment, Operations.  While 10-15% of the military is deployed to Afghanistan or whereever, the other 85-90% is preparing itself for the next task.  Cutting out the feet of the guys who raise 90% of fighting forces does not seem to be a good move.

 

[dapaterson]

No problem. We're from NDHQ and we're part of the bloat.

Fixed that for us...

 

[dapaterson]

Finally, I don't get what reducing the ECS to 2*s is meant to accomplish.  We talk of the primacy of operations; Force Generation is, hand in hand with Force Employment, [/i]Operations[/i].  While 10-15% of the military is deployed to Afghanistan or whereever, the other 85-90% is preparing itself for the next task.  Cutting out the feet of the guys who raise 90% of fighting forces does not seem to be a good move.

How is giving the Canadian Army Commander, who commands roughly a division's worth of field troops, the rank of a division commander "cutting out the feet"?  The argument "the Army Commander must be a 3* because he's always been a 3*" holds no water. 

 

[Haggis]

Fixed that for us...

I don't consider myself part of the bloat.  I think I peform a useful function here.

However, I rarely own up to even being from NDHQ.  So my statement, being an admission of such, is akin to an addict admitting to an addiction.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I think we you are too wrapped around the force employment/force generation axle.

It may be an important distinctions in large forces but I'm not sure that it needs to apply to smaller forces.

I agree the two functions exist and I agree that they are distinct but I'm not persuaded they need separate organizations.

Since our focus is shifted back to the 1960s we might look back a bit:

1. In the old RCN the C2 system was fairly simple and robust; force employment and force generation were both managed, through a single organization, by the CNS in Ottawa. There were, in the regular force, one recruit school, one officer training centre, two big professional and trades training schools, two dockyards, two main supporting bases, sundry 'systems' (medical, communications, etc) and two fleets;

2. The Canadian Army was organized geographically – four regional commands – each responsible for almost everything within their boundaries, including schools and combat units. A single commander generated forces for the entire army and employed the combat forces in his geographic command area. There were some interesting 'overlaps:' Comd 3CIBG in Gagetown 'commanded' a R22eR battalion when it was in Gagetown on exercise; otherwise the R22eR battalion in Valcartier was owned by Comd Eastern Command. The exception was Comd Canadian Army Europe – a BGen – who was also Comd 4CMBG; he had no force generation duties; and

3. The RCAF had separate force generation and force employment structures. Air Training Command was big and important: it had many stations, schools and flying squadrons.

The three systems all made sense, all had been 'tested' in big and small wars, and all worked well enough.

I, personally, would like to see a fairly 'pure' unified command structure:

1. Four geographic joint commands: Pacific, Western, Eastern and Atlantic with a separate JHQ and Signal Unit lodged in one of the command areas – ready and able to deploy on fairly short notice anywhere in the world to command an expeditionary force. Each joint commander would both generate forces and employ them on domestic operations;

2. A few, a very few, NDHQ controlled units, groups and agencies if Ottawa is convinced that a geographic commander cannot or should not have cross boundary responsibilities; and

3. A big, integrated NDHQ (in Shilo, which is near the middle of the country?) with a joint staff to manage all operations – expeditionary and domestic.

But, I expect that everyone (except, maybe, the RCN) would object and, having lived through the destruction of our joint experiment (AKA the creation of Air Command) I do not have confidence in Ottawa's ability to create a simple, robust C2 structure. Thus I propose a couple of big, joint combat commands (Maritime and Mobile Commands) and one or two single service specified commands (Air Operations Command) for force employment and all the rest for force generation – probably with some sort of (wasteful) geographic sub-structure to create more vacancies for over-ranked, under-worked GOFOs.

I see the service chiefs as being staff officers – pure and simple – with responsibilities, as I said, for doctrine, individual training standards and equipment requirements. But those responsibilities, especially for doctrine, make them, dfe facto, the professional heads of their respective services.

 

[Infanteer]

How is giving the Canadian Army Commander, who commands roughly a division's worth of field troops, the rank of a division commander "cutting out the feet"?  The argument "the Army Commander must be a 3* because he's always been a 3*" holds no water.

He commands more than a "division's worth of troops".  He commands 3 Reg Force Brigades, 10 Reserve Brigades (which, when you go to the numbers, are probably equivalent to 3-4 Brigades) as well as a substantial Training system with numerous schools and training centers.  That is almost 3 "Divisions" worth of formations which roughly equals a Corps - traditionally commanded, incidently, by a 3*....

Your rough accounting holds no water.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Further to force generation: around 1950 the Canadian Army did the biggest forge generation exercise ever, general mobilization à la 1914/165 and 1939/40 excepted, without the sort of 'force generation' staff structure we have today. It absolutely dwarfs anything dreamed of (even wet dreamed of) by the CF in the 1990s or 2000s. The existing three infantry regiments (The RCR, PPCLI and R22eR) were trebled in size (from one battalion to three, each) and six new battalions were raised: two each Canadian Infantry (later Canadian Guards), Canadian Rifle (later QOR of C) and Canadian Highland (later Black Watch) battalions. That was done by a relatively small AHQ and from within the post-war geographic command structure.

When the current mess structure can do half of that I'll agree it's worth its hire ~ until then I think we have a too top heavy, overly bureaucratized C2 superstructure with too many staff officers in too many HQs doing way too much useless work.

I believe we have infantilized the officer corps – moving more and more work out of the hands of unit officers and COs and into the hands of bureaucrats, mainly because our (my generation and the generation we trained) risk aversion levels are way too high. If the 'old' Canadian Army, without automation and with very small HQs and an antiquated C2 system could treble, even quadruple itself in size in three or four years then I suggest there is nothing wrong with the 'old' system and it bears a long, hard look before we import anything else from the big boys down South.

 

[Monsoon]

Further to force generation: around 1950 the Canadian Army did the biggest forge generation exercise ever, general mobilization à la 1914/165 and 1939/40 excepted, without the sort of 'force generation' staff structure we have today. It absolutely dwarfs anything dreamed of (even wet dreamed of) by the CF in the 1990s or 2000s. The existing three infantry regiments (The RCR, PPCLI and R22eR) were trebled in size (from one battalion to three, each) and six new battalions were raised: two each Canadian Infantry (later Canadian Guards), Canadian Rifle (later QOR of C) and Canadian Highland (later Black Watch) battalions. That was done by a relatively small AHQ and from within the post-war geographic command structure.

To be fair, the army of the 1950s was in a position to benefit from a vast pool of trained and experienced post-WWII veterans, so the "force generation" was already done for them by the WWII mobilization (which I don't think many people would characterize as streamlined or efficient). The effort needed to create these new battalions was almost literally a mere matter of advertising the intent to hire trained soldiers in the local newspapers.

 

[daftandbarmy]

He commands more than a "division's worth of troops".  He commands 3 Reg Force Brigades, 10 Reserve Brigades (which, when you go to the numbers, are probably equivalent to 3-4 Brigades) as well as a substantial Training system with numerous schools and training centers.  That is almost 3 "Divisions" worth of formations which roughly equals a Corps - traditionally commanded, incidently, by a 3*....

Your rough accounting holds no water.

I have to agree. The geographical considerations involved are vast as well.

 

[Old Sweat]

To be fair, the armyof the 1950s was in a position to benefit from a vast pool of trained and experienced post-WWII veterans, so the "force generation" was already done for them by the WWII mobilization (which I don't think many people would characterize as streamlined or efficient). The effort needed to create these new battalions was almost literally a mere matter of advertising the intent to hire trained soldiers in the local newspapers.

There were ample stocks of supplies in the system, and the army was able to raise two brigade groups for Germany, although only one deployed, as well as another brigade group for Korea and to provide reinforcements for the latter, and to replace the two deployed brigade groups a year later. I read somewhere that the veterans, who were quite happily engaged in the baby boom, did not return to the colours in the numbers expected. Thus, it was their "kid brothers" in their late teens and early twenties who filled the ranks in the expanded Canadian Army. (It's nice to be able to capitalize the second word again!)

 

[Edward Campbell]

To be fair, the army of the 1950s was in a position to benefit from a vast pool of trained and experienced post-WWII veterans, so the "force generation" was already done for them by the WWII mobilization (which I don't think many people would characterize as streamlined or efficient). The effort needed to create these new battalions was almost literally a mere matter of advertising the intent to hire trained soldiers in the local newspapers.

Only partially true: it was five or more years since the end of the war and while there was, still, a lot of 'kit' in the bins, not yet sold off as surplus, and while many veterans and serving militia members did, indeed, rejoin, many 'new' men enlisted, too, but most, vets and new men alike, required at least some training - if only 'refresher' training for some. So, a training scheme was needed and schools had to be beefed up before soldiers could be put through.

But my point is that a large and complex force generation exercise - larger and more complex than anything attempted since - was executed successfully, without much fuss and bother, by dint of hard work within the existing 'old' system; so, maybe, our current fascination with force generation aims to solve a problem that doesn't (have to) exist.

 

[dapaterson]

He commands more than a "division's worth of troops".  He commands 3 Reg Force Brigades, 10 Reserve Brigades (which, when you go to the numbers, are probably equivalent to 3-4 Brigades) as well as a substantial Training system with numerous schools and training centers.  That is almost 3 "Divisions" worth of formations which roughly equals a Corps - traditionally commanded, incidently, by a 3*....

Your rough accounting holds no water.

The Canadian Army's Reg F combat power with enablers, is roughly 10K; the P Res has a trained strength of roughly 15K; boiled down to combat power, it would provide about another 10K (or so).  Grouping those into real formations with full-up Bns and Bdes (vice the 13 paper shells we play with), and accounting for div-level troops and we could field three bdes of about 5.5K each, plus div troops of about 2500.  While slightly overstrength for a Div, it's woefully understrength for a Corps.

There are the remaining elements - LFDTS and the ASGs - but the ASGs should not be a Div Comds responsibility.  The ASGs could be punted to the CF support command to streamline the Army Commander's responsibilities.  The environmental training organizations could be consolidated and some further "jointness" enabled.  Currently, "joint" training for officers happens at BMQ as an OCdt, then not again until JCSP as a Maj/LCol.  NCMs have joint BMQ as Pte(R), then their next formal "joint" course is the Intermediate Leadership Program (ILP) to be promoted WO.

(Tangent:  Interesting that we see NCM jointness beginning at the Pl level, by officer jointness only at the Bn level)


and re: Geography:  Poor excuse that certain parts of the Army love to trot out.  Either we believe our Cols and LCols are capable of command and control, or we are not training them properly.  Remember: the Army does not command domestic operations - forces assigned to the operational commander do.  Responsbility for maintaining some sort of Regional HQs falls to that operational commander.  In a three full-strength, all-up Bde model, we could have a Bde West / Bde Central / Bde East construct, with commanders in Edmonton, Toronto, and Quebec City.  They have cars, trucks, and (if they ask nicely) Tac Hel to see the units in their AOR.  Those Bde Comds would have subordinate commanders who can be responsible as well.

 

[Infanteer]

The Canadian Army's Reg F combat power

We're not talking about combat power, we're talking about institutions.  Canada has a 2* to handle all that combat power should it be employed - Comd 1 Div.

The CLS is responsible for the combat resident in the Brigades, but he is also responsible for the numerous institutional organizations.  In the case of the Commander of the Army, his rank is comensurate with his responsibilies as the commander of an institution, not the combat power he can wield at this moment.

 

[Infanteer]

1. Four geographic joint commands: Pacific, Western, Eastern and Atlantic with a separate JHQ and Signal Unit lodged in one of the command areas – ready and able to deploy on fairly short notice anywhere in the world to command an expeditionary force. Each joint commander would both generate forces and employ them on domestic operations;

This makes for an interesting debate - one of the qualms with the Land Force Area system is that it "Balkanizes" the Army and that we should move to a single Div to handle all Reg Force Brigades (and a corresponding Res Div).

Going on this, would it be prudent to "balkanize" further and devolve ships and airplanes into Regional Fiefs?  I don't see a real way to do this with the Fleets, so in essence, your proposal only really chops 1 and 2 Can Air Div up amongst the Areas.

I see the service chiefs as being staff officers – pure and simple – with responsibilities, as I said, for doctrine, individual training standards and equipment requirements. But those responsibilities, especially for doctrine, make them, dfe facto, the professional heads of their respective services.

I don't understand this argument.  Why is a Service Chief a "staff officer" because his legitimate command duties are based in Canada?  How would a "staff officer" ECS enforce any sort of of uniform doctrine or training requirements on four joint fiefs?  This line of logic states that COs and Brigade Commanders are also "staff officers" responsible for the training and equipment within their organizations.