Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

[dapaterson]

We're not talking about combat power, we're talking about institutions.  Canada has a 2* to handle all that combat power should it be employed - Comd 1 Div.

The CLS is responsible for the combat resident in the Brigades, but he is also responsible for the numerous institutional organizations.  In the case of the Commander of the Army, his rank is comensurate with his responsibilies as the commander of an institution, not the combat power he can wield at this moment.

Ah, but if his support responsibilities are handed off to a joint support organziation that would better balance resources across the CF (and reduce the overall CF supprot tail), and his schools were handed off to a training organization, where he would have only an advisory capacity, we're back to a 2* to force generate Land Forces, with a narrower, more focussed mandate to boot.

Besides, with the current Army HQ dictating to LFAs which company is to deploy we don't have even a "div" level Army HQ - more like an insecure Brigade HQ calling the shots from Ottawa.  Getting them to think and act like a Div HQ would be a step up, not a step down.

 

[Infanteer]

Ah, but if his support responsibilities are handed off to a joint support organziation that would better balance resources across the CF (and reduce the overall CF supprot tail), and his schools were handed off to a training organization, where he would have only an advisory capacity, we're back to a 2* to force generate Land Forces, with a narrower, more focussed mandate to boot.

Then he wouldn't be an Army Commander - he'd be a Div Commander and a 2* would be appropriate.  In either case, he is still a Commander and not a staff officer.

 

[dapaterson]

In either case, he is still a Commander and not a staff officer.

In either case he is both:  Commander of the forces under his command, and the senior land advisor to the CDS.  (The staff role gets lower billing when the CDS has an Army background, which isn't always a good thing - CLS should be more on top of the current Army than the CDS).

 

[McG]

There are a lot of building blocks missing, but is this roughly what some are proposing:

 

[Infanteer]

Interesting chicken scratch.  Change the name of "Training Group" to "Canadian Defence Academy" and add CMP to cover Joint Pers, and I think you've got it covered.

This seems propose getting rid of the ECS all together - something going further than Hellyer's reforms ever did....

 

[vonGarvin]

Why are "Doctrine" and "Validation" separate from training? 

Sorry, but I just see scratches.  Convoluted scratches that make little sense at 2033 on a Tuesday evening.


I'm afraid I prefer something I proposed much earlier.  If I had the energy, I'd look for it.

 

[McG]

Why are "Doctrine" and "Validation" separate from training? 

The validation (of force structures, procedures, equipment and other capability building blocks) is not a training function.  It rightly belongs under the purview of capability development but as a separate entity from (and therefore not emotionally attached to the products of) concepts, doctrine and requirements.  LFTEU is an example of a unit that fills an aspect of validation.  Training validation is a separate (or perhaps a subset) function - this could remain within the training group.

Doctrine is also under capability/force development for reasons I have previously stated:

The whole force development process in the Army is structurally impaired against being done right.  Creating and maintaining capabilities requires drawing on concepts, equipment, doctrine, and force structures - all of these things need to be developed in concert.  Doctrine will only be marginal (at best) if it fails to consider & exploit the potential of modern technology.  At the same time, equipment that is incompatible or ill-suited to doctrine will weaken the overall force.

While the force development & requirements folk are not in the same building, at least they are in the same city (basically).  However, with DLCD and doctrine in Kingston, the two halves of the Army's force development brain are not even close enough to sit together over coffee every other week & ensure they are working in the same step.

With equipment it stands out more because the wrong answer gets dumped on the troops & they have to make it work (or there is nothing & the troops still have to make things work).  When the doctrine side is missing, the troops make their own (which is a lot easier that fabricating vehicles, weapons & other kit in the field).  However, it seems to me that signs of the doctrine ball being dropped are plenty to be found.  The Infantry platoon & company doctrine is so badly out of date that it is hidden and not even available on the AEL.

Where capability/force development is not properly synchronized, we see things like the VCDS killing major projects like ALAWS because the army has no coherent doctrine around which to explain the purchase.  Where capability/force development is conducted across separated stovepipes, we see DLR pers drafting junk doctrine to justify equipment or DLFD pers directing the procurement of equipment with no explicable role.

When the field army runs into problems that require a fast & coherent response from the national headquarters, the solution is to create new ad-hoc organizations (like the CF C-IED TF) with PYs to do what should already be happening in existing staffs ... except that it is not because those staffs are so physically separated that good communication is not happening at the working levels.

If we are ever going to get to the point of effective capability development, then the Army's force development efforts need to be put under a single roof ... that means DAD belongs in the Land Staff under COS(Strat) and not in LFDTS.  Little empires like the C-IED TF need to be dissolved and replaced with tiny staffs that draw on the permanently established functional experts in DAD, DLR, DLCD, etc.

I still believe that capability development, and not training systems, is the place that doctrine belongs.

I'm afraid I prefer something I proposed much earlier. 

I am not even sure what I think of the organization myself - it's a rough attempt to capture an more functionally structured CF that I think others are proposing.  In theory it might be functional, but in practice there would be a decade of serious growing pains at best.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Ah, but if his support responsibilities are handed off to a joint support organziation that would better balance resources across the CF (and reduce the overall CF supprot tail), and his schools were handed off to a training organization, where he would have only an advisory capacity, we're back to a 2* to force generate Land Forces, with a narrower, more focussed mandate to boot.

Besides, with the current Army HQ dictating to LFAs which company is to deploy we don't have even a "div" level Army HQ - more like an insecure Brigade HQ calling the shots from Ottawa.  Getting them to think and act like a Div HQ would be a step up, not a step down.

The units of the Canadian Army come from somewhere, and the Army Commander is the man responsible for that. Giving our schools to a Joint organization with an Army 2 Star 'advising' is madness. The Schools and units of the army are a heavy responsibility certainly warranting an LGen.

 

[dapaterson]

The Schools and units of the logistics branch are a heavy responsibility certainly warranting an LGen.

Slight edit, but there are thousands of log sodliers supporting the CF as well.  So should we set up a distinct training command for them, and set aside another 3* to command it?

Where do we draw the line?  Are we willing to look within our fiefdoms as well as outside for bloat and excess?

In a zero sum game where the personnel numbers must add up to 70, 30 and 25, where can we best use those resources?  If we are limited in the number of GOFOs, where can we best use them?

"Because it's always been that way" is a reason to march soldiers, bayonets fixed, in smart parade square order into the prepared fields of fire of enemy machine guns in France.  It's not necessarily an optimal way to organize ourselves today.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Slight edit, but there are thousands of log sodliers supporting the CF as well.  So should we set up a distinct training command for them, and set aside another 3* to command it?

Where do we draw the line?  Are we willing to look within our fiefdoms as well as outside for bloat and excess?

In a zero sum game where the personnel numbers must add up to 70, 30 and 25, where can we best use those resources?  If we are limited in the number of GOFOs, where can we best use them?

"Because it's always been that way" is a reason to march soldiers, bayonets fixed, in smart parade square order into the prepared fields of fire of enemy machine guns in France.  It's not necessarily an optimal way to organize ourselves today.

Please don`t quote me and change my words within the quote box. You can try to make your point without doing that. Even though you mention your edit it is still misleading.

In any case, perhaps you missed where I said Schools and units. I am not just talking about the schools being the reason for having a LGen Army Commander, so your question about where do we draw the line doesn`t make sense to me. My point on the schools was that they are important and need to be under the purview of the Army Commander, not some joint agency. The CDA and its subordinate organizations can continue to look after core CF and joint training. I am also not arguing about tradition or marching into machineguns, so I am not getting why you put that in.

The Canadian Army, RCN and RCAF are the main pillars of the Canadian Forces, and they need to be led by 3 leaf level commanders. I believe that services and branches matter, not because of tradition but because they provide Canada with its combat power.

 

[Edward Campbell]

If you want three stars chiefs of staff who also 'command' their services then why not something like this?

MND

DM
Various functional groups led by ADMs

CDS ****
VCDS *** – general 'common' (2nd and 3rd line) support functions incl e.g strategic C3
DCDS *** – joint operations staff
Special Operations Group
JTF2
CFSOR
SO Tac Hel Sqn
CNS ***
Pacific Fleet **
Ships
Air Group
Dockyards
Bases
Schools
Reserve Divisions
Atlantic Fleet **
Ships
Air Group
Dockyards
Bases
Schools
Reserve Divisions
CGS ***
Western Command **
1 CBG (incls Tac Hel Sqn)
Bases and Training Areas
Schools
Area Hqs
Reserve Brigades
Common (1st and 2nd line) support elements
Central Command **
2 CBG (incls Tac Hel Sqn)
Bases and Training Areas
Schools
Area Hqs
Reserve Brigades
Common (1st and 2nd line) support elements
          Joint Expeditionary Force HQ and Signal Unit
Eastern Command **
3 CBG (incls Tac Hel Sqn)
Bases and Training Areas
Schools
Area Hqs
Reserve Brigades
Common (1st and 2nd line) support elements
CAS ***
Air Combat Command **
Fighter Group *
Maritime Air Group *
Air Transport Command **
Transport Group *
SAR Group*
Tactical Aviation Group
Air Training Command **
Support Command **

There need to be, of course, a few more three stars: CAMILREP NATO, Deputy Commander NORAD, etc and several more two stars but, surely, we can make fewer admiral and generals manage our slowly shrinking/static/slowly growing forces?

 

[armyvern]

Slight edit, but there are thousands of log sodliers supporting the CF as well.  So should we set up a distinct training command for them, and set aside another 3* to command it?

Where do we draw the line?  Are we willing to look within our fiefdoms as well as outside for bloat and excess?

In a zero sum game where the personnel numbers must add up to 70, 30 and 25, where can we best use those resources?  If we are limited in the number of GOFOs, where can we best use them?

"Because it's always been that way" is a reason to march soldiers, bayonets fixed, in smart parade square order into the prepared fields of fire of enemy machine guns in France.  It's not necessarily an optimal way to organize ourselves today.

Sure there are purple supporting the CF, but they are still career managed by the purple branch.

Just as the army, air force, and navy career manage their own "hard" trades ...

If we don't require a loggie 3* to manage the purple world in the big picture, surely we don't need the others.

Unless we go to 3 seperate merit lists (Army, Navy, Air) for our purple people ... then someone with some authority to push and protect us from being consumed/passed by by the big three "real" enviornments must continue to exist. Why shouldn't he wear the same rank as those managing less in one of the "official" 3 enviornments?

 

[Infanteer]

If you want three stars chiefs of staff who also 'command' their services then why not something like this?

Except for the merged Dotcoms, that looks somewhat similar to today.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Except for the merged Dotcoms, that looks somewhat similar to today.

How many L1s today?

Even counting the ADMs in the DM's domain and accounting for e.g. a MilPers something or other, I think my model has less than a dozen L1s.

 

[McG]

My point on the schools was that they are important and need to be under the purview of the Army Commander, not some joint agency.

There is some precedent suggesting that environments do not need to own the schools responsible for their occupations’ individual training.  Currently within CTC, the Canadian Army provides all career training for at least ten RCAF managed occupations and one "purple."  I think it would be more accurate to say that Army schools should be under the Army Commander as opposed to saying they must be under the Army Commander.

 

[ArmyRick]

CTC consist of the Infantry school, armour school, artillery school and the tactics school. What purple and air force trades do all their career training there? The engineering school is not part of the CTC.

 

[McG]

CTC consist of the Infantry school, armour school, artillery school and the tactics school. What purple and air force trades do all their career training there? The engineering school is not part of the CTC.

You are at least 4 years out of date.
CTC consist of the Infantry school, armour school, artillery school, the tactics school, CFLAWC, LFTEU, CFSEME, CFSCE and (yes) CFSME.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

There is some precedent suggesting that environments do not need to own the schools responsible for their occupations’ individual training.  Currently within CTC, the Canadian Army provides all career training for at least ten RCAF managed occupations and one "purple."  I think it would be more accurate to say that Army schools should be under the Army Commander as opposed to saying they must be under the Army Commander.

There are certainly trades from outside the Army that have people completing training at Army schools (I can think of some engineer types at CFSME and some technicians at CFSCE). I would not use those technical trades, however, as support for an argument that "hard-Army" branches should be placed under a Joint training organization outside the Army command.

 

[Old Sweat]

I served in the Canadian Forces School of Artillery in Shilo when it was part of Training Command. The arrangement worked, but it was convoluted and the relationship with the user, ie Mobile Command, was not as close as it should have been. This was in the early days of integration before the single uniform began to make its way to the masses, so many of our masters in Training Command did not understand the army or why we need to do team training. After all, that was the purpose of the OTU. Maybe that has coloured my thinking, and hopefully the flag and general officers are more aware of the needs of each of the services, but I still shudder at the memory of a general clad in light blue saying he thought the army had too many different weapon systems, and major economies could be realized by eliminating some of them.

 

[Gunner98]

I served in the Canadian Forces School of Artillery in Shilo when it was part of Training Command. The arrangement worked, but it was convoluted and the relationship with the user, ie Mobile Command, was not as close as it should have been.

I was working in the RCA Battle School when it closed and became the Western Area Training Centre Artillery Detachment Shilo.  Timing was different but the chain of command was no less convoluted and the relationship with the user - Canada-wide Reg and Res force units was not as close as it could have been...and the Merry-go-round goes round and round.