• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Death Traps; The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War Two

3rd Herd

Army.ca Veteran
Inactive
Reaction score
0
Points
410
Book Review​

Belton Y. Cooper's book "Death Traps; The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War Two has been re-released and is an interesting look at the five hundred and eighty percent casualty rate suffered by the US 3rd Armored Division. Mr Cooper served as a member of the maintenance battalion of the aforementioned division whose duties included the responsibility of compiling the combat loss reports and the movements of reinforcements back to the forward positions. I found his book to be interesting for several reasons, the first being the unheard of casualty rates. Secondly, he provides information on an aspect of warfare rarely touched upon, what happens to the destroyed/damaged vehicles. Additonally, Cooper fully explains the advantages and disadvantages of American armor verses those of Germany and the internal politics that formed the American armored doctrine. The American super tank is covered by both photographs and written explanations including the one and only combat incident. The book closes with the discovery of German test sites and the reestablishment of German industry. Yet again proof that the strategic bombing campaign was not as successful as many claim it was. There are also two excellent appendices, the first reiterating the Sherman verses Panzer arguments and the second concerning the 'up protecting' and 'up gunning' of the Sherman tank. The third appendices covers the field deployment of an American armored division. The down side to the book is that Cooper tends to repeat his arguments through out the book and has followed the literary format of noted author Stephan Ambrose who I do not particularly enjoy. That aside his book is still a interesting read on the shaft behind the sharp point in world war two armored combat.
 
I assume the five hundred and eighty percent casualty rate is for tanks (and perhaps other vehicles) as the author served in the maintenance battalion.
 
Old Sweat said:
I assume the five hundred and eighty percent casualty rate is for tanks (and perhaps other vehicles) as the author served in the maintenance battalion.

Yes you are correct the casualty rate is for tanks only. The  M2, M4, M26 and T2 recovery tanks.
 
A Canadian/Commonwealth loss comparison from South Albertas, Graves, Donald, Robin Brass Studio, Toronto,1998.

"Between 8 February and 10 March, the seven armoured brigades (four British, two Canadian,and one Polish) which fought in the Rhineland lost a total of 385 tanks. The heaviest losses incurred by a single brigade were those of the 4th Canadian Division, which lost 98 tanks between 25 February and 10 March". As for the South Albertas, "during the same period the Regiment lost 61 tanks, a casualty rate that was about one hundred percent of its tank strength..."

Additionally,"the South Albertas received 204 AFVs of all types between 1 August 1944 and 4 May 1945-a replacement rate of 283% of its war establishment or authorized strength."(p.326)

As with Cooper, Graves highlites the issue of exactly how many tanks were lost given the return to battle of AFVs repaired and returned to service. In one circumstance a particular tank commander had three tanks shot out from under him in a single day.

 
Uhhh... call me simple but: how can you have a 580% casualty rate?

If all of your resources are = 100% then I truly do not see how you can lose more assets than what you have in the 1st place.
 
If the unit was supposed to have (i.e.) 100 tanks as part of their TOE, then that means they lost a total of 580 tanks?
 
Whether its good or bad would depend on how long it took to accomplish that and the scale of losses... I guess over a couple of years of heavy fighting, 580% might not be bad for a small unit, but pretty costly for larger units.  How many tanks were in a US armored div at that time? 
 
Heh

While the Allies were fighting with Shermans and the Germans were fighting with Pz IIIs IVs and Tigers - their little guns just couldn't engage the germans at long range (like the germans could).  You'd end up with complete troops being knocked out before they could start fighting back.

I can easily believe 580% losses

However, with the US / Canada / UK industrial complex behind the war effort, new tanks could be pushed forward in record time.
 
wasn't one Sherman per troop a Firefly with the British 17 pounder gun? More than a match for the Mk4, Panther & Tiger. Also, don't forget the Germans were usually hull down or in prepared positions where they sprung ambushes so it wouldn't have mattered too much if both sides had identical tanks.

Did Canadian armoured units operate any other tanks in NW Europe? Churchill? Comet? Cromwell?

 
Firefly was a "staple" in UK & Cdn formations a short while after D Day
but the 17 pounder was a Brit gun design and the US had a problem in instaling em in their Shermans.

Canada used, for the most part, Shermans, Churchills, Ram I & II, the Grizzly (Sherman variant) AND the Skink (sherman with quad 20mm Hispano Suiza).
 
The allies were able to sustain loss/damage/replacement that high due to a greater industrial complex and higher overall manpower base. As well, as the allies were on the advance (for the most part) they could recover and repair or cannibalize damaged tanks - whereas any vehicle lost to the Germans in the retreats of 1944 was most likely gone forever. The allies, most particularly the Americans though, had a far greater logistical capability than the Germans (actually a key failing of the Wehrmacht). For all their mechanization, the Germans just never built a robust logistical tail.

As for the advantages and disadvantages of the Firefly - it really wasn't the great panacea for all. The 17 pdr cannon gave it greater range and penetration, and the ability to take on the larger/heavier German tanks, but there were drawbacks. The Firefly's had a slower rate of fire, and the tank chassis itself still suffered from the same problems - high profile, vertical sides, thin armour, petrol engine. The canon itself also had to be laid on its side to be adapted into the turret. Though I've not the expertise to be definitive, I would also suspect that the German optical sights were qualitatively better than the Sherman's (I've heard it mentioned before - but no hard comparative facts). Sure - the Firefly could now engage out past 1000m on a good day - but could it hit anything reliably?

Furthermore, the battles in Normandy, in the bocage and the breakout from the bocage, saw the Germans using their armour for ambush and flanking, not great frontal assaults, or massed force on force tank battle. In this regard, the Germans would lie in wait, eliminate the Firefly per troop first (if possible), and then pick off the remaining tanks. The Germans also excelled at anti-armour ambushes with the 88mm gun (such as the PaK 43).

All in all, the Firefly helped to level the playing field somewhat, but there weren't sufficient quantities to make a huge difference, and the Firefly itself was never more than a short term stopgap measure.
 
The Ram never saw combat (apart from OP vehicles).  It is interesting that the Dutch concreted them hull down used them as pill boxes during the cold war.


 
The Rifleman said:
The Ram never saw combat (apart from OP vehicles).  It is interesting that the Dutch concreted them hull down used them as pill boxes during the cold war.

A testament to the gun, if not the basic tank design
 
It may have been the free factor, as the Ram could only mount the 6-pounder due to the diameter of its turret ring.

As for the Firefly, according to Report No. 14 by 1 Canadian Field Research Section, 14 June 1945, the 17-pounder had accuracy problems and a hit on a target as large as a tank at ranges greater than 1000 yards.
 
Back
Top