Decide Foriegn Policy

[Edward Campbell]

Thanks, dave.

Glorified Ape: please amend my comment to read "four to one".

 

[Glorified Ape]

Not at all!   If I have given that impression please accept my apologies.

I think you are at least half right.   I do not believe we should custom tailor our armed force for domestic operations, but ...

I assume that most people read many threads here on army.ca (and I do not even attempt to read them all) and would, therefore, be aware that I am a bit of a fanatic about reserves â “ not the militia, but reserves for forces which are committed to (generally) expeditionary operations.    Those reserve forces (two to one, in some cases: one unit having returned form overseas and being rested and reduced as people are posted out, sent on course, etc, the second overseas â “ on operations, and the third one gearing up to go overseas and replace the unit which is there) should have domestic operations standby taskings and they should train for it, too.

Some countries, notably France with it CRS, actually design and assign forces to domestic security and the French model means that you are correct when you suggest that the military does not have to be the only solution.   That being said, every country, even Costa Rica and Iceland must have some armed forces â “ even if they are not military forces to guarantee the domestic sovereignty of the country.   If there is no military then there must be a beefed-up RCMP which, also, cannot lose.

I hope that makes my point clear.

Crystal. I think you're right - some training on responding to domestic situations would be a good idea for the CF. A focus on beefing up the RCMP, with their already existing training, would be a good way to ensure we don't have to employ the military to put down emergencies that should be manageable by the RCMP. Considering we don't even have enough RCMP resources to properly monitor sections of the border on the St. Lawrence, it would seem there's a need for SUBSTANTIAL beefing.

 

[Edward Campbell]

This, from yesterday's Globe and Mail at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20050318.wco-manning19/BNStory/National/ is, I suppose, a bit of a cri de coeur and I, personally, agree with much of Manning's recitation of the problem; what I don't find, however, is anything much in the way of a solution.

Sleepless in Flanders fields

By PRESTON MANNING
Friday, March 18, 2005 Updated at 11:32 PM EST
From Saturday's Globe and Mail

If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.

John McCrae was the brave Canadian doctor, soldier and poet who penned those words after days and nights of death and tragedy at the First World War battle of Ypres. These days, he and his companions surely cannot rest â ” because the thing they most feared, even more than death itself, has come to pass. Canada's political leadership has broken faith with those Canadians who died in defence of freedom at home and abroad.

The problems lie deeper than the policies that have starved the Canadian military of money, equipment and personnel; deeper than the substitution of rhetoric at the United Nations for concrete action in support of freedom in specific situations; deeper than the decisions to opt out of the campaign to liberate Iraq or the North American missile-defence plan. Our forces' first problem is cowardice in high places. In 1989 on the Alberta Senate election campaign, I spent many hours with Stan Waters, one of the most courageous Canadians I have ever known. He'd joined the army in the Second World War and was a member of Canada's first paratroop group, jumping out of an aircraft at night behind enemy lines in Italy. Going on to participate in bloody battles in France and Germany, he rose to the rank of lieutenant-general and commanded the Canadian Armed Forces from 1973 to 1975. I asked Stan about his greatest fears as a soldier, expecting him to say something about stepping on a landmine or being blown to bits while dangling from a parachute. Instead he talked about the fear of cowardice in high places â ” finding himself under the direction of those who demanded bravery and self-sacrifice from others but demonstrated neither quality themselves.

When our highest political leadership left General Roméo Dallaire to twist in the wind while the United Nations Security Council did nothing to stop the genocide in Rwanda; when no defence minister, chief of defence staff, or deputy minister of defence in recent memory has resigned in protest over the decisions that have robbed Canada of its once substantial military capability; when our government's leaders failed to join with the those of Britain, Australia and the United States in toppling Saddam Hussein's inhumane regime; when that government equips our armed forces with antique helicopters and second-hand submarines; and when our government leaders make no effort to challenge the view that Canada should assume some responsibility for international peacekeeping but none for the harder, dirtier, more essential job of peacemaking without which there is no peace to keep â ” what word or phrase best describes the root cause of such failures?

The government's spin doctors may call it prudence, the diplomatic may call it timidity, but men who placed their lives on the line for freedom's sake would call it by a harsher name: cowardice in high places.

Let's not be deceived by the self-righteous claim that it actually took "courage" on the part of our government leaders to oppose the U.S. positions on Iraq or missile defence. Playing the anti-American card in Canada is the easiest political tactic in the book. It requires as much political courage to be critical of U.S. foreign policy as it does to be critical of U.S. health care (i.e., none at all).

Our forces' second problem is hypocrisy. If the Canadian government's position is that it is now committed to pacifism, it should say so and let Canadians pass judgment on that position. But to pursue pacifism in practice while still professing to be a military power committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Aerospace Defence Command is hypocrisy.

If Ottawa's position is that Canada should not participate in any armed intervention in the affairs of other states even if they grossly abuse human rights or try to acquire weapons of mass destruction, it should say so and let Canadians pass judgment on that position.

But to profess to be willing to intervene with UN Security Council approval, knowing full well the inherent incapacity of that body to act decisively in such situations, is hypocrisy.

If the Canadian government's position is that it is not in Canada's interests to participate fully in continental defence and that this task should be left primarily in American hands, then it should say so and let Canadians pass judgment on that position. But to pretend that Canada is deeply committed to North American defence when it is not, to take full advantage of American protection while at the same time issuing moralistic critiques of U.S. defence initiatives is hypocrisy.

For Canada's leaders to wear the poppy and lay wreaths on Remembrance Day when in reality they have dropped the torch thrown to them by defenders of freedom is a hypocrisy that robs those leaders of any moral authority to demand courage and self-sacrifice from others.

Our forces' third problem is that our leaders lack farsightedness. Was deferring the decision to rebuild Canada's military capacity each year for more than 10 years the farsighted thing to do? Was tying Canada's involvement in Iraq to UN approval, only to find the UN up to its ears in conflict of interest over the Oil for Food program, a farsighted thing to do? Has allowing Canada's political capital in Washington to erode over the past five years been farsighted?

The dominant characteristic of the decisions and actions of Canada's highest political leadership in all these areas has been short-run political expediency â ” detrimental to Canada's long-range interests.

Our government made the decision to opt out of the proposed continental missile-defence system on the short-sighted basis of what might fly (or not) in a minority Parliament and the next federal election campaign. The farsighted approach would have been for leadership on both sides of the House to build a bipartisan consensus on Canada's long-range interests in foreign and defence policy, including continental defence.

Our national political leadership needs to listen again to the voices from Flanders fields. The fallen beseech us to look beyond our immediate needs and comforts, to take up their quarrel with the foes of freedom and democracy, and to keep faith with those who sacrificed their all for that greater good.

Will we continue to accept cowardice, hypocrisy and short-sightedness? Or will we insist that courage, honesty, and statesmanship characterize the next government of Canada? Will John McCrae and his companions continue to have their sleep disturbed, or will they finally rest in peace in Flanders fields?

Preston Manning, a former leader of the Official Opposition, is a distinguished visitor at the University of Toronto, and a senior fellow at the Canada West Foundation and the Fraser Institute.

What, I wonder, does Manning counsel as a programme to instil the â ? courage, honesty, and statesmanshipâ ? which, I agree, should be the hallmarks of all governments, not just the next one.   Manning argues that politicians, on both sides of the aisle, should have built â ? a bipartisan consensus on Canada's long-range interests in foreign and defence policy, including continental defence.â ?   Yes, indeed! But where were the Conservatives?   They were hiding in the weeds, playing politics, trying to move their support in Québec from absolute zero all the way up to next to nothing.   They failed and in the process they failed a fundamental test of â ? courage, honesty, and statesmanshipâ ?.

I'm just a wee tiny bit tired of superannuated elder statesmen squawking about the falling sky.   If it is, indeed, falling then how does Preston Manning suggest that we shore it up?   What should be the pillars of our foreign policy?   How can we, should we display â ? courage, honesty, and statesmanshipâ ??   How do those values translate in, say, a 3D (diplomacy, development, defence) model of foreign policy?   How does one apply â ? courage, honesty, and statesmanshipâ ? to Welsh's 'model citizen' version of acting in the world?

Nice words; heartfelt but empty, I'm afraid.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

I'm just a wee tiny bit tired of superannuated elder statesmen squawking about the falling sky.

I would add elder academics (a la Granatstein) and elder military types (think Mackenzie) to that list.

Dave

 

[Edward Campbell]

There is a good editorial in today's Globe and Mail at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20050321/ETORIES21/TPComment/Editorials

It is long so I will not repeat it here; it is not a subscriber only item so army.ca members can go read it for themselves.

Here is one excerpt, however, which is germane to this discussion.   I have reordered the items for clarity but all the words belong to the Good Grey Globe's editorial board:

Leaner government. Better relations with the United States. A more competitive economy. Here are three obvious, conservative themes for the Tories to take into the next election. All the party needs now is some leadership ...

"¢ Mr. Harper must make it his obsession to campaign for tight fiscal control, not outdo the Liberals in promised spending, as he did in last year's election campaign.

"¢ If Canada is to play a bigger role in the world, as Prime Minister Paul Martin says it should, it needs the ability to send Canadian peacekeepers and relief resources to troubled parts of the globe. Ottawa needs to put its military where its mouth is, and the Conservatives should keep saying so till they're Tory blue in the face.

"¢ The Conservative Party should be against wasteful and misguided subsidies to individual businesses (a point they made at the convention despite some bleating about Bombardier from their Quebec wing), but in favour of lower taxes, lower barriers to foreign investment, freer trade, less burdensome business regulation and better post-secondary education.

I think the Globe is spot on but I also think that life is not so simple for those in political parties - if they adopt the Globe's sensible proposals to DO something then they will have to figure out how to form a government, and survive non-confidence motions - without any base of support from Québec or much of the Greater Toronto and Greater Vancouver areas.

But, at least it sounds like a plan and saying that Ottawa does need â ?... the ability to send Canadian peacekeepers and relief resources to troubled parts of the globe. Ottawa needs to put its military where its mouth is, and the Conservatives should keep saying so till they're Tory blue in the faceâ ? is a a good start and it is a lot more than Preston Manning was willing to say.

On the other hand, the Globe and Mail is not famous for being a supporter of the New Conservative Party.

 

[Infanteer]

I would add elder academics (a la Granatstein) and elder military types (think Mackenzie) to that list.

Granted, but at least many of the academics (say, the CCS21C) and elder military types (MacKenzie's testimony to the Senate Standing Committee on Defence) are willing to provide potential solutions to the mix.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Fair enough - I guiess I have become jaded by the same ol same ol-ness of their rants commentary.

Dave

 

[Edward Campbell]

In my sketch of A New Foreign Policy for Canada I proposed that we should, as a matter of policy, adopt a concentric circle system of defence measures, beginning with surveillance of our own territory, territorial waters and airspace and expanding through continental defence, to expanded military roles in the North Atlantic, Caribbean and the Pacific Rim.

I would like to expand these policy thrusts into something more militaristic as befits contributions to army.ca.   My 1st DRAFT outline of some of the things which I think ought to be in a defence policy review is below.   The footnotes are my own thoughts and comments.

I need to emphasize that this is not a DRAFT White Paper; that is a much more comprehensive document which must develop, and price, concrete plans, including numbers and force structures, etc.   This is a policy, essentially a political, document which underlies a White Paper which is a plan â “ imperfect though it may be.

It is this sort of policy and my proposed New Foreign Policy (attached to: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/17947/post-182791.html#msg182791 ) which led me to conclusions such as those I offered at: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25365/post-136769.html#msg136769 and elsewhere.

 

[tomahawk6]

To my mind a country that wants to have a prominent role in the foreign policy arena that country needs to have sufficient military capability to make a potential enemy take pause. Foreign policy and defense policy are not mutually exclusive. They have to compliment one another. Most of the time diplomacy works because of the threat of military action is always in the background. Most countries when the chips are down do not want to face off with a major military power. Countries that might want to oppose another but are militarily weak might now do so using asymetric warfare which can take the form of terrorism or may use other means to attack another's economy [internet attacks or target one's trading partners].

If a country has plenty of money it can play a prominent role through the use of well placed foreign aid. Training assistance to countries that one seeks to influence is another good way to go. Every country has its own priorities and interests which drive its policies and provides the funds necessary to pursue those policies. But if domestic priorities overshadow its foreign interests then it will be difficult to be taken seriously when the it comes time to face down an over reaching dicatator or to prevent a smaller country from poaching one's fish.

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

Canadian foreign policy and military policy must be linked into a cohesive whole. We give money one place, that won't accept troops, send troops another place, that never gets rebuilt.  It is pointless.  We should only send aid to further our foreign policy.  If we wish to support democracy, then our aid will be tied to guarantee's of certain minimum standards by recipient gov'ts.  If the nations getting aid do not have the will not permit international oversight, they get nothing.  No more toy's for warlords.  If our troops are sent to keep or make the peace, then follow them with our aid workers, our engineers, our medical staff and police to build and train the infrastructure to leave a lasting and viable region behind us, a legacy of Canadian involvement.  Let us start our aid to nations that are trying to keep afloat, and stop throwing money at lost causes.  In Africa, there are dozens of nations that are already lost; money spent there may as well be thrown away, no possible funding can put them back together again.  Spend money on the nations that are trying to make a go of it.  Use our diplomats to explore the option of using Canadian troops and police to train local forces to the standards necessary to defend the small pockets of Africa that really are trying to be "developing" nations.  Likewise, do not be afraid to send peacekeepers to help keep the peace along the borders of nations trying to survive against the internal problems of their neighbors spilling over their own borders.  Peacekeeping can mean the defence of a nation from problems spilling over from its neighbors, it does not have to be only in civil wars, and unresolvable border disputes.  There are places in the world, in Asia, Africa, the Caribean, and South/Central America where Canadian aid would be welcome, where Canadian civil, police, and military aid could turn the corner for a country poised between development and dissolution.  Aid to countries that have a future leaves a legacy of nations with debts to Canada, and whose people and leaders are disposed to listen to Canadian views, and mayhap even follow our lead in international affairs.  Canada will not be a superpower, but we have the ability to become a major influence in individual nations in troubled areas, we can shift the balance in many regions if we use trade, diplomacy, military and civil aid to further a single objective.  By treating each type of aid in isolation, we get full effect from none of them.

 

[Edward Campbell]

DFAIT ran a public policy discussion during Jan/Feb of this year.  There were over sixty submissions â “ fewer actual contributors as several contributed more than once.

Here is the DFAIT staff's summary from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/securitysummary-en.asp :

From January 24 to February 25, 2005, Canadians were invited to share their thoughts on Canadian and global security through the Canadian International Policy site. Webcast interviews with various experts on the topic were hosted on the site to stimulate and inform the debate. In all, 60 responses were received, with an average length of 500 words. Participants included academics, students, representatives from the NGO community and other Canadians. Below is a summary of their key arguments:

In general, participants championed the allocation of more resources to Canadian intelligence, security, diplomatic and military agencies. This reflects a larger consensus on the need for a more proactive Canadian approach to domestic and global security threats.

Below is a summary of some of the major questions, disagreements and recommendations that emerged during the debate:

Root causes of terrorism

"Disparity is the most important security issue facing all of us. The unequal distribution of resources and the inefficient systems of redistribution place more than half of the world's population in desperate conditions. Desperate people do desperate things to remedy their suffering."

Participants felt that Canada could play an important role in anticipating and reducing threats to global security by addressing the root causes of terrorism.

The notion that poverty and global inequality were catalysts for terrorism was widely held, with one notable exception. Supporters of this idea felt that Canada should devote greater resources and expertise to global poverty reduction, while abandoning unfair trade practices that sustain global economic disparities. Canada, it was suggested, should also play a leadership role by forgiving the debt of the world's poorest countries.

Several participants viewed the Israeli-Palestine conflict as a central cause of terrorism. One individual argued that disregard for international law in this conflict by western powers demonstrated to Muslim communities that the present legal framework would not protect them. This double-standard was identified as a root cause of efforts to overthrow the existing international order through violent means. To remedy this, the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel was described as essential. It was also recommended that Canada serve as a staunch advocate of the fair and consistent application of international law. On this last point, one participant lamented what he viewed as the recent abandonment of Canada's balanced voting record in the UN General Assembly with regard to Israel.

An assertive US foreign policy was also seen as a mobilizing force for international terrorists. Respondents recommended that Canada maintain a distance from the US fight on terrorism and the war in Iraq, worrying that these were fueling the resolve of antagonists to resort to terrorism in retaliation


Finally, failed and failing states were portrayed as incubators for extremism and international terrorism. One participant warned that we must not confuse poor states with failing states, although the two may overlap. As a response to the problem of failed and failing states, Canada's 3D approach (diplomacy, development and defense) was seen as appropriate, yet in need of greater resources to be successful.

The role of multilateral institutions in security

Most respondents felt that multilateralism should be a key component of Canada's approach to security. The eDiscussion gave rise to several proposals on how the multilateral system might be reformed to best address security issues:

One recommendation suggested integrating NATO forces into the UN, affording the latter the military tools it requires to address threats to global security.

Another participant advocated EU representation on the UNSC to reflect deepening EU integration. This would involve removing the current European veto-holding members and replacing them with an EU member to avoid the overrepresentation of EU states in a reformed Security Council. Averting such an imbalance was deemed fundamental to the legitimacy of the any Canadian policy of multilateralism in the area of security.

Finally, concerns were also raised that the L20 would not differ substantively from an enlarged, 15-member UNSC. Instead, it was recommended that Canada engage in ad-hoc multilateral coalitions with like-minded countries such as the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands. These coalitions could leverage their credibility and positions as ideas-brokers to develop and advance innovations such as a treaty on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

The above notwithstanding, multilateral institutions were depicted by some as ill-suited to the task of managing global and Canadian security. One participant described multilateralism as "self-marginalizing," suggesting it fosters indecision, while compromising Canada's ability to act as a leader in the struggle against global security threats. Another participant chastised the UN for being "irredeemably corrupt" and inefficient.

Full service military vs. robust peacekeeping force

"In order to deal with the threats that Canada now faces, post-9/11, such as terrorism .it is necessary not only to deal with the root causes that allow terrorism and terrorist thinking to thrive but also to have the capacity to deal with threats that may occur in spite of diplomacy, humanitarian aid, economic assistance."
 
Participants agreed on the need for a more robust Canadian military.  Hard power was viewed as an essential complement to soft power and was described as crucial to the credibility of Canadian ideas on security such as R2P. There was, however, disagreement on the shape that a revitalized Canadian military should take.

While some participants argued that Canada should create a full-service military, others felt that involvement in a full-scale conventional war is unlikely. Critics of a full-service Canadian military saw it as too expensive and out of step with Canadian public opinion on defense. They went on to describe Canadians as reluctant about military spending in general but proud of their role as international peacekeepers. In line with this, they felt Canada should focus its military investments in rapid-response peacekeeping units, while maintaining specialized combat brigades that could be quickly deployed to 'hotspots' around the world when peacekeeping forces prove inappropriate.

Internal Security

On Canadian domestic security, participants suggested improvements in immigration, refugee and consular services, to enable the efficient identification of high-risk individuals. It was felt that current staffing provisions are inadequate to process the volume of applications. In addition, one participant commented on the need for the government to better engage Canadian citizens in its efforts to identify threats.

Technological innovations such as a DNA registry of Canadians, or a national identity card with biometric features were also proposed. Finally, "cyber-terror" and "cyber-crime" were viewed as areas requiring a more concerted response. 

Global trends

Throughout the eDiscussion, participants underlined the significance of external factors affecting Canadian security. The issues they anticipated include: 1) tensions between immigrant communities and citizens of their European host countries, 2) the long-term impact of HIV/AIDS on African states and 3) major demographic shifts issuing largely from Chinese and Indian migration. Participants stressed the need for the Canadian government to understand the possible security threats and attendant policy implications of these emerging issues.

BMD

"Like NPT, BMD could be used as a tool to limit proliferation and intimidation through inclusion and transparency."

Most of the eDiscussion occurred before the government's decision not to participate in the US BMD proposal. Consequently, many comments focused on whether or not Canada should participate. Several participants worried that BMD would spur an arms race that would imperil global security. The technical effectiveness of BMD technology was called into question by most participants who commented on missile defense, yet, despite this, there seemed to be some support for the proposal.

One individual suggested that a refusal to join BMD would imply that Canadians were not serious about ensuring continental security, thereby souring relations with the US. Others, however, saw the exclusivity of the BMD proposal as its major fault. While the accuracy of BMD technology was cited as a major drawback, these individuals felt that, pending assurances regarding BMD technology, Canada should advocate the inclusion of all countries with nuclear and/or ballistic threat capabilities into a missile defense shield - and the exclusion of certain "rogue states" such as North Korea and Iran. They argued that a shared missile defense system would diminish strategic arms competition, while increasing the ability of member states to persuade would-be nuclear powers to forego such capabilities.

Foreign Affairs Reply to Summary

The above summary of views presented during the eDiscussion on Security has been received within Foreign Affairs Canada and is currently being reviewed by policy planners.

Their response will be posted on the Canadian International Policy site in late March. It will provide Canadians with reactions to the summarized ideas and background information on current Canadian initiatives/approaches on security.

Although it is now early April, the Department's response promised by late March is still missing in action.

 

[Acorn]

Foreign policy by poll is just as effective as military strategy by poll. We all know that opionins share a charateristic with a certain body orifice.

Acorn

 

[bossi]

... Although it is now early April, the Department's response promised by late March is still missing in action. ...

Hmmm ... I wonder if this is a good, or a bad thing ... ?
http://www.canada.com/national/nati....html?id=2cdf17f1-2b38-46ee-89b5-ab2504625b99
PMO lets global policy author go
OTTAWA - Jennifer Welsh, the Saskatchewan-born author and Oxford scholar recruited by Prime Minister Paul Martin to salvage Canada's much-delayed international policy review, has parted company with the Prime Minister's Office. ...

 

[Edward Campbell]

There are two articles in Today's Globe and Mail which are germane to a foreign policy discussion.  I have posted both below.

The first, authored by a distinguished quartet proposes, inter alia:

"¢ A timetable for reaching the 0.7-per-cent official development assistance/GNP target, preferably by 2015. I agree this, see my comments and paper near the top of this thread.

"¢ Endorse the emerging norm of the "responsibility to protect" as part of a continuum from prevention of conflict to reaction to severe abuses to rebuilding. I am, at best, reluctant to endorse this and I think I may be actively opposed.  My basic sense of human decency - I have a wee bit - bumps up against my respect for history.  Our 'modern' view of sovereignty has been around since the Peace of Westphalia - which happened, to Europe, at about the same time as 'we' gave effect to a vital constitutional principle by lopping off King Charles' head.  I am reluctant to toss out models which have served fairly well for over 350 years and replace them with one of Pink Lloyd Axworthy's 'ideas'.

Those favouring R2P should consider the questions Simpson poses in the second article:

What constitutes a "failed state"?

If the world community can define one, what should it do?

With specific regard to Canada, Simpson asks: And for Canada, with its large Haitian diaspora? If the world community can define one, what should it do? Could we do something more? With what, however, given our military capabilities, stretched aid budget and demands for more for, say, Darfur and AIDS in Africa?

Martin is vote buying when he talks to the Haitian diaspora in Montreal.  Are we really ready or able to colonize Haiti?  I think not and I hope not.

 

[Edward Campbell]

From the Globe and Mail at:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20050608/COREFORM08/TPComment/?query=Eight+steps+to+UN+reform


Eight steps to UN reform
Our plan can work if world leaders act for the common good, say international experts GARETH EVANS, JOHN ENGLISH, GORDON SMITH and FRASER CAMERON

By GARETH EVANS , JOHN ENGLISH and GORDON SMITH AND FRASER CAMERON

Wednesday, June 8, 2005 Page A17

When world leaders meet at the United Nations in September for the five-year follow-up to the Millennium Summit, they will have a rare political opportunity, one that comes once in a generation. On the table will be Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. The UN and the conduct of international relations would be truly transformed if the report's package of reforms were adopted.

Perhaps inevitably, UN members are divided on the report's recommendations. Some are apprehensive that change will constrain their power and dilute their influence. Others feel the status quo is unsustainable. Some worry about undermining the principle of national sovereignty and lowering the normative barriers to unwarranted interference in internal affairs. Others fear there will be too little intervention and the wretched will be left to suffer what they must. None of these problems are simple, and addressing them will not be business as usual. Leaders will be sitting down in New York with the moral obligation to rise above narrow interests and act for the common good. That's what leaders are for.

Only they have the crosscutting authority to resolve inter-institutional and interdisciplinary issues beyond the mandates of existing international organs and portfolios of individual ministers. Frank dialogue and problem-solving by the leaders can bring impetus and coherence to the reform imperative.

We believe that, with the requisite statesmanship, many of the Secretary-General's recommendations can be adopted. The way forward is a package approach, in recognition that generating agreement entails give and take.

We recommend that leaders agree to:

1. A timetable for reaching the 0.7-per-cent official development assistance/GNP target, preferably by 2015. With respect to the Millennium Development Goals, we endorse the "quick wins" actions identified by the independent UN Millennium Project (free bednets as protection against malaria mosquitoes; an end to primary-school user fees; the three-million-patients target for AIDS anti-retroviral treatment; expansion of school-meals programs, soil-nutrient replenishment, and national campaigns to reduce violence against women). But the bednet shortage in Africa alone is vast, and a lot more community resolve (including the Group of Eight) will be required for this to be a "quick win."

2. An international finance facility, enabling front-loading of official development assistance, necessary for infrastructure investments. This innovative action would facilitate the provision of the requisite finance for development.

3. Guidelines on the use of force. The Security Council should come to a common view on guidelines (not criteria) for intervention -- that is, "the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the proposed military action, whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat, whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand, and whether there is a reasonable chance of success." It is now increasingly accepted, including in Africa, that development and security are interdependent, and that both repose on human rights.

4. Endorse the emerging norm of the "responsibility to protect" as part of a continuum from prevention of conflict to reaction to severe abuses to rebuilding.

5. Accept the definition of terrorism by the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that "in addition to any actions already proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."

6. Action with respect to civilian nuclear fuel-cycle technology, especially guarantees of supply of the fissile material necessary for peaceful nuclear uses in return for making the Optional Protocol mandatory, as part of a package including "negative security assurances," the fissile material cutoff treaty, and extension of the moratorium on test explosions. Such a package should provide both a fair and balanced outcome and enhance everyone's security.

7. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Democracy Fund and the Human Rights Council, as recommended by the Secretary-General.

8. Action on regulating the marketing of arms and negotiation of an instrument on illicit brokering. Combined with effective export controls on small arms, the harmonization of national regulation of arms brokers and a mechanism to "name and shame" those involved in illicit exploitation of natural resources, these steps will prevent or diminish the carnage caused by future conflicts.

We believe that concerted action in these eight areas to be in the national interests of all member states and in the common, global interest at the same time. Only leaders can make it happen. In New York, they will be bolstered by the aspirations of humanity.

Gareth Evans, a former Australian foreign minister, is president of the International Crisis Group. John English, a senior professor of history and political science at the University of Waterloo, is executive director of the Centre for International Governance Innovation. Gordon Smith, a former deputy minister of foreign affairs, is executive director of the Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria. Fraser Cameron is director of studies at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre.

 

[Edward Campbell]

From the Globe and Mail at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20050608.wxcosimp08a/BNStory/specialComment/


Hello, my name is Haiti and I really need your help

By JEFFREY SIMPSON

Wednesday, June 8, 2005 Updated at 8:08 AM EDT

From Wednesday's Globe and Mail

We have become accustomed in recent years, especially since 9/11, to hear of "failed states" --breeding grounds for instability and terror where governments cannot ensure the safety of citizens. These failed states are over there somewhere: in Africa or Central Asia or the Middle East.

It turns out, however, that one state that just about qualifies as a "failed state" is almost next door: Haiti, a country racked by violence, endemic poverty and drug trafficking, ills that have persisted and even grown worse despite a United Nations military and police presence and hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign aid, including $180-million pledged over two years from Canada.

Next week in Montreal, Canada has convened a meeting of donor countries and the transitional Haitian government to discuss how things are evolving in that country as it prepares for anticipated elections this fall. If participants are honest, the update will be sobering, even frightening. If these elections don't work, or don't happen, then don't count out the possibility of Haiti's temporarily becoming a United Nations protectorate.

Anybody tempted by optimism concerning Haiti should read the May 31 report on Haiti from the Brussels-based and highly credible International
Crisis Group (http://www.crisisgroup.org). It's a look at Haiti on the eve of the elections and a year after the launch of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, with 6,200 troops (the largest number being from Brazil) and 1,300 police officers, about 100 of whom are Canadians, now on the ground.

A few citations from the ICG report convey its flavour. It opens: "Haiti is ensnared in a deep political, social and economic crisis, despite 7,400 UN military and police peacekeepers and the resumption of multilateral aid." Law enforcement is "virtually non-existent." Drug trafficking is rampant, and spawns gang violence. The police force is "seriously discredited, corrupt and allegedly involved in criminal activities and serious human rights violations." In Port-au-Prince, the capital, "life is characterized by constant fear of organized crime, urban gangs, police violence, sniper attacks on civilian and UN targets, and kidnappings."

This week, The New York Times described in gruesome detail how kidnappings, or fear of them, pervades Port-au-Prince. The newspaper also reported that, since Saturday, the French honorary consul has been shot dead, and at least 10 people have been killed after gunmen chased police officers into a market and set it alight. Diplomats estimate that six to 12 kidnappings occur daily. Canada, the United States and a handful of other countries have told all but essential personnel to leave and warned their nationals not to visit the country.

What constitutes a "failed state"? If the world community can define one, what should it do? These were among the issues recently analyzed by a special UN panel that tried to define "failed states" and recommend steps to prevent states from falling into that category. Haiti could be a test case. Which raises the question: What can the world community do, since what it has done thus far -- pledging $1-billion in aid and organizing the UN stabilization mission -- hasn't worked. Would a multinational protectorate work, along the lines of Australia taking temporary charge of the Solomon Islands?

Chances are, the international community won't go that far, the problems of Haiti being so intractable. The U.S. is preoccupied with bigger problems. For the Europeans, Haiti is far away. For the Latin Americans, it's a sad but not dangerous case. And for Canada, with its large Haitian diaspora? If the world community can define one, what should it do? Could we do something more? With what, however, given our military capabilities, stretched aid budget and demands for more for, say, Darfur and AIDS in Africa? But, without taking anything away from these tragedies, Haiti is in our own backyard.

Prime Minister Paul Martin, to his credit, has tried jawboning. He went to Haiti soon after becoming Prime Minister and urged national reconciliation. He convened another meeting last December of Haitian government officials and Haitian diaspora in Montreal, where he again told them that reconciliation was essential. He's raised the Haitian problem at other meetings and announced $180-million in aid. It's hardly his fault the situation has become worse.

What's to be done? Canada will bring people together next week in Montreal, hoping to keep the Haitian election timetable intact and praying that, from those elections, something remotely resembling a stable government emerges that can at least take control of an increasingly lawless place. The prospects of success, at least for now, look slim at best.

 

[Reccesoldier]

What constitutes a "failed state"?

If the world community can define one, what should it do?

The moment (if) the UN does define such a thing then it will enter the great abiss with other words like genocide which is not spoken for fear of having to live up to the lofty resolutions passed on said subject.  :

 

[Acorn]

The "world community" cannot define Terrorism. How can we expect it to define a failed state?


Acorn

 

[Infanteer]

How can we define "failed state" when the majority of the world's societies have little or no cultural conception of the state?

 

[jmacleod]

Canadian politicians, particulary the for life natural governing Party, define "policy" by what appears
in Canadian media. The Liberal Party, with the notable exception of the Trudeau years has no real
intellectual depth, nor does the rank and file yearn for anything but election victory - but there are
problems. A recent study by the Fraser Institute cites anti Americanism (and anti Israelii bias)in the
CBC. Have often cautioned friends in the US and Israel that they have no friends in the CBC, where
news is "motivated" - it is indeed a haven for the socialist, left wing, anti conservative graduates
of Universities in Canada whose curriculums are far from the main stream of traditional Canadian
values, and many tenured professors are war resistors and draft dodgers from the Viet Nam War
whose perspectives of the United States is colored by their histories. I think the CBC carefully recruits
those who agree with a perspective of the world through CBC colored glasses - and this reflects
in reaction by the Liberal government, who are supported by the largely "liberal" media in Canada
- Globe and Mail, Halifax Herald, CTV - the net result, shallow foreign policies, designed to maintain
the liberal media's preception of Canada, as a kindly, do gooder type of society, epitomiized by the
various voices of CBC reporters and commentators - one known in our offices as "ms. menopause"
Twenty plus years ago, Canada was a better country - my rant for today. MacLeod