Disruptive Thinking and How the iPad Changed Close Air Support in Afghanistan

[Loachman]

They gave us the standard gage used on today's railroad. :nod:

No, they did not. That is a complete internet fiction.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Having worked with the USMC, I find it fitting that they consider any kind of 'thinking' disruptive.  ;D

 

[cupper]

No, they did not. That is a complete internet fiction.

I'll give you partial credit. It does come from standard coal wagons used in Britain before locomotives were developed. The distance between wheels was set so that they fit in the center of the ruts of the old Roman roads through out Britain.

The myth states that Julius Ceasar standardized the distance between wheels on Roman chariots as the distance between the middle of each horse's posterior. There was never any standard on chariot wheel spacing, they simply built the carts to fit between the existing ruts in the roadways.

 

[GnyHwy]

As an Arty guy that specializes in this field, I am very interested in this topic, and have thought about this type of solution many times.  In general, this solution seems quite reasonable, but there are many potential drawbacks as well.  Afghanistan may be a bad example, and to assume that this is practical is naive.  We have been in Afghan for a bunch of years and yes, we do have some great digital maps of the area;  that is due to a lot of excellent work by GEO Techs and Image Techs across the board.  In a new area, we will not have this luxury at the outset.  Also, it is not cheap like someone has mentioned prior.

While this information is of great importance, it should not be assumed as accurate.  All maps have inaccuracies, and if not rectified, they may be highly inaccurate; unless these maps are validated and controlled at the highest level by GEO Techs, there is a great potential for error, and this error is may be quite grave.

That all said, I would be on board with this capability, but I am very skeptical; and so should anyone who may use this capability.  It is not as simple as some may think.

 

[cupper]

I understand the need to go by the systems rules and regulations of what equipment can be used in a given situation, but on the other hand, innovation needs to start somewhere.

 

[GnyHwy]

I understand the need to go by the systems rules and regulations of what equipment can be used in a given situation, but on the other hand, innovation needs to start somewhere.

Absolutely!  I just needed to bring the point forward that it is not nearly a simple as a lot may think.

 

[aesop081]

Maybe one day, we can use this stuff to make up a GRG (when one does not exist) on board the aircraft and transmit it to the FAC/JTAC/whomever on the ground for use. Or vice-versa.

I found myself having to make one up from scratch and having to "draw" it out on the radio ( i.e. "reference rout BRAVO group of 4 building to the NW, building closest to the road will be A1" kinda thing) supporting a USMC battalion. That was painfully long and still left room for confusion.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I wonder when 'innovative' replaced 'initiative' on the battlefield? Must have been shortly after Generals started listening to consultants.. 

 

[GnyHwy]

I found myself having to make one up from scratch and having to "draw" it out on the radio ( i.e. "reference rout BRAVO group of 4 building to the NW, building closest to the road will be A1" kinda thing) supporting a USMC battalion. That was painfully long and still left room for confusion.

That is the point I am trying to make.  I have made expedient maps also.  When made by an experienced person, it has value, but to assume that all can make this happen is very naive.

I wonder when 'innovative' replaced 'initiative' on the battlefield? Must have been shortly after Generals started listening to consultants.. 

Daft,  I here you, but I think that initiative wasn't replaced; it was supplemented, right around the time that useful information became timely.

We are all for innovation and initiative, but the perfect balance still remains elusive.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Then there is this problem that 'innovative' is frequently confused with 'high tech, or even 'sexy':

Camareo saved by a guy who will never get laid in its back seat

http://jalopnik.com/5714539/how-a-ham-radio-geek-fixed-the-camaro-convertible

 

[GnyHwy]

Then there is this problem that 'innovative' is frequently confused with 'high tech, or even 'sexy':

Camareo saved by a guy who will never get laid in its back seat

http://jalopnik.com/5714539/how-a-ham-radio-geek-fixed-the-camaro-convertible

I'm still agreeing with you, but that is why we need many persons that can keep up, and decipher this evolution.  It is faster that most can think.

An interesting statement I heard recently.  80% of the information available on the net or network has been created since 2008 (4years).

 

[Baz]

We They You are too risk averse.

The problem isn't that we are too risk adverse.  Its that we don't consider all the risks.

I remember being in an MHP meeting where I was the only operator.  Somebody (from the PMO, I think) said that the number one concern was flight safety.  I pointed out it wasn't, it's operational suitability.  If it was flight safety we'd park them all in the hangars and keep them shiny...

There is a tangible risk to not adopting new technology WHEN APPROPRIATE... the other side may adopt new tech or some other method to get around ours, and then you lose if you have to fight them, and you also become an ineffective deterrent.

However, the problem with using an iPad in the cockpit (and I would vehemently argue against it unless the risks are considered) are much more than EMI, or even than Technical Airworthiness:
- Inappropriate DANGEROUS use: ie low level nav on a system not tested to that level can very easily get you in trouble:  crews aren't trained to understand the different in projections and datums of electronic maps to make sure they don't screw it up
- Over expectancy that the system is operationally correct
- Attention: playing with a fancy iPad while you fly into the water (I know a USN H-3 pilot who lost two firends because they were trying to figure out the ASN-123 during a departure from the dip)
- Supportability... you spend a bunch of MR money on your iPads, which rapidly become indispensable, but then 2 years later when the people that did it move on you bitch to the LCMMs because there are no spares
- Software supportability... yes the software works as advertised... but a couple of years later the maps it depends on are no longer available and there is no upgrade path, as an example
- and yes EMI, but I know for a fact you can do a full sweep on a Sea King in less than a week

The procurement and TA (technical airworthiness) process is inherently broken.  however, the  answer isn't to go around it, its to fix it.

It starts with the SOR.  Alan Williams says the SOR is broken, that it isn't properly done, but he misses the point.  The SOR should not be a contractual document, it should be a living, operational document, hence the O in Statement of Operational Requirements.  As the threat and need evolves so should the SOR.  IOT&E determines the delta between the SOR and the delivered capability (even if the SOR has matured and the need has changed).  FOT&E determines the gap as the threat/needs evolves, and allows intelligent decisions to be made as to the priorities for Weapon System Improvements.  The SOR itself is determined from overall defence guidance (when are we going to have another White Paper?), assigned roles, and assessed threats.

Advanced Weapon Systems, being software driven, are inherently an evolutionary activity, but the procurement system, with its "Requirement over the wall mentality," doesn't recognize that.  The challenge is to properly prioritize and control the issues, to avoid the good ideas club taking over, which has to happen at the SOR level to provide guidance, and then at all levels of the change management process.

Williams also says that the thought that new equipment is cheaper is a myth, but again he misses the point.  We ignore our fleets on the whole, and put all our eggs in the basket of the replacement.  Of course it is more expensive, because it holds entire new capabilities.  If it was just a replacement it would be cheaper to operate.

The TA checklist, last time I heard, is 52 items long.  This is a result of everytime someone made a mistake a new step has been added, plus there are some empires that got it bloated.  There hasn't been a rationalization of what we are trying to accomplish, which is to minimize the risk in operations, and to get the best bang for the available buck (a sure way to defeat a nation is to let military spend run amok, ask the Soviets).

We also need to actually understand, at the highest levels, what OT&E is for.  It is an actual check to see if the equipment is operationally suitable, and what needs to be fixed in order to make it so, not an afterthought.  We should have a central OT&E unit, for each environment, that reports directly to the environmental chief, and fleet OT&E units would be dets.  In the Air Force this would make them an equal to AETE.

When ADM(Mat) was created PWGSC didn't exist... now we have two empires clashing with each other.  Although the US system is FULL of problems, they make procurement a service chief issue.  I'd like to see ADM(Mat) go away.  Make the environmental chiefs responsible for all aspects of FG including equipment requirements and acceptance, with the the actual procurement done by PWGSC.  Which implies the majority of the uniformed pers would be in the environmental chiefs.

With the new Federal IT strategy I'd also like to see ADM(IM) go away and be replaced with a "Cyber" Command... sort of a Communications Command with more operational focus, for the same reasons.  But we don't need both...

Finally, we have so few trained and experienced people left to do this work, and aren't creating more.  When I did SANC (which in large part is to lay the ground work) a few years ago I  already had a robust experience level.  The course was somewhat idsconnected from the reality...  AAOC as become a catch all course for OT&E, procurement, DT&E to some extent, software management, software acceptance, etc, etc for operators.  This are all separate specialties, and should be sub-specialties in occupations.  Some of them shouldn't be operators at all, we should actually train our engineers to assist the operators, not tell them they are wrong...


OK, but we aren't going to fix that system, but understanding its shortcomings allows us to use it to our (as operators) advantage:
- first, most operator complaints are never written up, or written up properly.  The UCR and SOCD system is what it is, but learn to use it properly
- once you have identified an issue, get the CoC to understand and support it
- follow an age old military axiom: selection and maintenance of the aim.  This avoids the procurement sides biggest concern: scope creep.
- identify both the risks incurred and those avoided and document.  Get the technical side to help, because there are things you don't understand.  Once you have them, document how you are going to mitigate them.
- make sure there is a way your need will live on past your departure.  These things normally take time.
- this is the most critical step: get command (which is by definition the operational side), as high as you can, to support your idea and accept the risks.  Remember, at the end of the day the technical side can only identify the risks, it is up to the operational side (at the appropriate level) to accept them..
- encourage others to tear holes in your ideas, because you can either figure out it was a bad idea, or you can fix the holes.  Especially during OT&E (whether official or not).

Bottom line, you can make the system work, but it takes ingenuity and hard work... bitching doesn't accomplish anything.

We did all of these things (poorly at times, and a lot of mistakes were made, hopefully resulting in "lessons learned") with the Sea King Augmented Surface Plot (ASP) project, which is a transitional project to get from the Sea King.  The realization was made that we weren't, as operators, getting ready for Cyclone.  The best tool we had, the Sea King itself, wasn't optimized for the current environment, and it was too expensive and too late to do that by traditional means.  Therefore, we identified the Operational Risks involved (an actual decrease in the aircraft capability, which it turns out did not materialize but in fact an operational increase occurred), identified the risk mitigated (difficulty in transition), and identified and mitigated the Technical Risks.  The result is a fleet fit of ASP is ongoing, which is in essence two tactical laptops with simple but effective nav, radar, AIS, and imagery interfaces and custom software.

We also did the exact same thing for NVGs, which are also being fleet fit, for mitigating transitional risk.

An interesting side benefit of is the Sea King is actually much more effective than it was a few years ago.


That certainly turned into a rant... maybe I should get around to putting it in a Service Paper.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Very well said, Baz.

 

[Kirkhill]

..... The SOR should not be a contractual document, it should be a living, operational document, hence the O in Statement of Operational Requirements.  As the threat and need evolves so should the SOR.  IOT&E determines the delta between the SOR and the delivered capability (even if the SOR has matured and the need has changed).  FOT&E determines the gap as the threat/needs evolves, and allows intelligent decisions to be made as to the priorities for Weapon System Improvements.  The SOR itself is determined from overall defence guidance (when are we going to have another White Paper?), assigned roles, and assessed threats.....

That is probably the single most sensible thing I have read with regards to ANY type of procurement, but in particular government procurement.

Changes to the SOR are not just driven by threats and needs.  They are also driven by the compromises forced by available technologies and, occasionally, inherent incompatibilities.

When the client defines his wants to the suppliers in the civvy world they go back to the office, look at the proposals, compare the pluses and minuses and then go back to the suppliers to ask if their systems include the other guys pluses ---- and how about your minuses?

The supplier will then respond with one of three answers:

Ours does what theirs does, we just didn't mention it in the sales blurbs
We can add that capability
We can't do that because we do this other thing differently and it doesn't allow us to do such and such.

The process becomes iterative (Thank you Colonel Boyd) as the client adjusts needs and wants to timeline and dollars.  The client ultimately decides which comprises can be lived with.  The vendors decide which compromises they can live with.  An agreement is reached.

All this happens behind close doors and in one on one communications.  Usually the client won't tell the vendors the other guy's numbers as the client wishes to maintain a bargaining edge but actually that concern is vastly over stated as most vendors understand the other guy's solutions and costs as well as they do.

The problem I am finding with government contracts is that there is no capability to take part in that give and take before the contract is signed. 

Everything is committed to paper far too early in the process.  Wants become contractual obligations long before it is determined if:
they are actual wants;
or actually needs that can be worked around by either the supplier or the client;
or indispensible needs;
or simply - regardless of how indispensable they might appear - unaffordable.

This early commitment results in countless man hours being wasted trying to develop new and untried solutions, or simply trying to find a solution that doesn't exist.  As a result projects run long, suck up more budget (either the client's or the vendor's) than provided for, deliver a product that fails to live up to expectations even when standards and obligations are met, and generate far more acrimony than necessary.

How much simpler it would be if the original "research" phase allowed meaningful discussion about dollars and capabilities.

Unfortunately that would ultimately result in a spec being written that would limit the number of potential suppliers.  Sometimes that results in only one supplier being short-listed.  More usually the procurement agent will keep at least a faint hope alive for the runner up just to ensure that the "winner" doesn't get too cocky.

(Hmm ??? - F35 declared "winner" - but actually all the negative press from the opposition, the runners-up, the press etc - all serve the Government's procurement agenda by keeping LockMart's feet to the fire and driving the best commercial deal possible -Does the Government really want the F35 issue to go away just yet?  They have another 3 years to the next election - But I digress)

The point is that Baz is right.  Flexibility needs to be maintained right through the implementation, delivery and commissioning phases of the project. No project will be able to deliver all of the early wants.  Compromises always have to be made. 

Unfortunately those latter phases requiring the greatest compromises are the phases where the trust between client and supplier will be tested.  That trust is built during the initial Research and Discovery phase of the project.  Not when the dollars have been committed.

It is better to get as many compromises ironed out as early as possible before the contracts are signed.

('Nudder Tangent: Development is a four letter word in my vocabulary - as in "We will develop a solution". In the words of the ancient mariners "There lie Dragons".)

Sorry Baz - I ranted your rant. 

But right now I am living a provincial project as a supplier.....

Edit:  In the civvy world I have spent 3 years, 3 budget cycles, negotiating million dollar contracts that are delivered in three to six months with a greater than 90% satisfaction level.  In the government world an equivalent contract was let in 3 weeks and the delivery period appears indeterminate at this time as sub-contractors of various skill and experience levels, engaged directly by the government on separate contracts are included in the discussion.

The original 3 week contract assessment?  Driven, IMHO, by two things:

Two years - up or out.
March Madness.

 

[Disenchantedsailor]

Ok I have to weigh in given my former job in the military.  When they can make an off the shelf IPAD that is undetectable to the enemy I will jump on board.  But given that any off the shelf transmitter can be DF'd with very primitive kit purchased at radio shack this initiative in its current form unneccesarrily puts soldiers lives at risk. Therefore at this time the risk to lives is greater than the benefit.  There are ways to make this not the case but of course this is not the place for that discussion.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Ok I have to weigh in given my former job in the military.  When they can make an off the shelf IPAD that is undetectable to the enemy I will jump on board.  But given that any off the shelf transmitter can be DF'd with very primitive kit purchased at radio shack this initiative in its current form unneccesarrily puts soldiers lives at risk. Therefore at this time the risk to lives is greater than the benefit.  There are ways to make this not the case but of course this is not the place for that discussion.

You think that with my radar, transponder, TACAN, radar altimeter, radios, etc, etc, you cannot DF me?!

I don't think an iPad will make a difference in any military aircraft cockpit, in terms of detectability. 

I'm all for initiative and innovation.  It doesn't need to be the iPad, there are other solutions out there.  But it is definitely worth looking into.  Carrying literally 40 lbs of paper in a tiny cockpit isn't all that practical. Carrying an iPad (or the like) with a few back up sheets of papers would be way more ideal.

As far as suitability of the iPad, my only concern would be the inability to scroll with gloves on...

 

[Baz]

You think that with my radar, transponder, TACAN, radar altimeter, radios, etc, etc, you cannot DF me?!

I don't think an iPad will make a difference in any military aircraft cockpit, in terms of detectability. 

I'd have to agree that in an aircraft it would be the least of my worries as well.  There are iPad like devices that deliberately don't have wireless capabilites.  However, in an aircraft just turn them off.  Contrary to popular thought aircrew are very good at following regulations, and if the operating instructions says leave the wireless capabilites off they will, or they'll lose their categories.  That falls squarely into the area of risk mitigation.

I'm all for initiative and innovation.  It doesn't need to be the iPad, there are other solutions out there.  But it is definitely worth looking into.  Carrying literally 40 lbs of paper in a tiny cockpit isn't all that practical. Carrying an iPad (or the like) with a few back up sheets of papers would be way more ideal.

As far as suitability of the iPad, my only concern would be the inability to scroll with gloves on...

It is being looked into.  Although I don't currently know the status of it there is a RCAF Omnibus project looking at paperless cockpits.  In addition to making the aircrew's life easier it also makes distributing FLIPs and ensuring they are current more efficient.

I think it may, and should, look more like:
http://www.cmcelectronics.ca/pdf/tacview.pdf
or maybe
http://apac.getac.com/products/E100/E100_overview.html

CMC came to see us at Shearwater with the Tacview, nice peice of kit, but a little expensive.


By the way, I'm supportive of what they did in the Cobra.  It seems like they properly did all the steps, just in an unorthodox way.  That should be supported.  It also seems they had the expertise to evaluate the risks pro and con.

One way of mitigating support risks (both hardware and software) is to limit a project in time and scope.  Would it be better, and in the end more cost effective, to rapidly and repeatedly field much cheaper equipment, knowing that it had a limited lifespan?  It might force lifecycling a little more quickly?

It is somewhat ironic that if you said to any of the support types that enforce the current rules that you were going to force them to use a 5 year old computer they would freak, but it is common that our tactical computers are 25 years old, and some of them pushing 40.  Yes, there are reasons for it, but still ironic.

 

[aesop081]

but it is common that our tactical computers are 25 years old, and some of them pushing 40.  Yes, there are reasons for it, but still ironic.

My wrist watch has more computing power than my Aurora GPDC.