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Drones, the Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the USAF

It never ceases to amaze me that Sweden, a country that hasn't been in a war since 1814, officially declared its neutrality in 1939, has 1/4 of the population of Canada and a defence budget of a little more than 1/2 of Canada's (albeit 2.4% of its GDP) is able to maintain a viable defence industry for all three services.

:unsure:
 
CCA - Disposable F35s or Reusable Tomahawks?
That is like saying Tank - Fast Clydesdale or slow thoroughbred?

How about seeing CCA as its own capability, rather than comparing it to weapons systems designed to do something completely different

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The U.S. Navy is touting the U.S.-Australian MQ-28 Ghost Bat ‘loyal wingman’ type drone program as a model for future industrial partnerships, while confirming continued U.S. military interest in the drone. The fact that the Navy is now speaking about this is notable, on the one hand because the MQ-28 has so far been seen primarily as a program of interest for the U.S. Air Force, and on the other because the Navy is currently still working to define its carrier-based Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) plans.

As of 2022, the RAAF said it wanted to acquire at least 10 MQ-28s by the end of 2025, at which point it would begin flying them operationally. Last month, Boeing provided an update on the program, pointing to plans for a series of flight-test demonstrations later this year, which will include MQ-28s teaming with crewed assets, such as E-7 Wedgetail and F-35 stealth fighter, to complete operationally relevant missions. As of March of this year, the test team had recorded 100 test flights.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force has also said it will make use of a Ghost Bat for testing purposes, with the design serving as what it describes as a “technology feeder” for the service’s CCA program.

there is evidence that the Navy is currently interested in cheaper and more disposable CCAs than the Air Force, which is pursuing a much higher-end capability with unit costs in the tens of millions. That would appear to count against the MQ-28, which is a larger and more expensive design.

Lockheed Martin Lightning II F-35 - Unit Cost, MTOW, Range, Speed - 82.5 MUSD, 31,800 kg, 2200 km, Mach 1.6

General Atomics YFQ-42 - 25-30 MUSD, ???? kg, 1600 km, Mach 0.95
Anduril Fury YFQ-44 - 25-30 MUSD, 2270 kg, 1600 km, Mach 0.95

Boeing Ghost Bat MQ-28 - 8-10 MUSD, ???? kg, 3700 km, Mach 0.9

Kratos Valkyrie MQ-58 - 2-4 MUSD, 2722 kg, 5600 km, Mach 0.85

Raytheon Tomahawk BGM-109 - 2-4 MUSD, 1600 kg, >1600 km, Mach 0.74

......

What can you do today and what might you be able to do tomorrow?

USAF is chasing what you might be able to do. The USMC, RAF and RAAF seem more focused on what can be done today.

....

Weird thought.

USMC Rogue Fires Battery rigged to launch Kratos MQ-58.
Battery needs to reload.
New rounds launched from extreme range and parachute into the Battery.
Battery checks rounds, refuels and relaunches them at targets up to 5600 km away.
 
I can see why the Navy is less interested in eating up deck space with CCA drones.

They might be more interested in self-deploying long range munitions that the carrier force can spot for.
 


And Kratos building a low cost, reusable, Mach 5 missile carrier on its own nickel.

Cold Lake to Comox at Mach 5 = 1124 km at 6174 km/h = 11 minutes
Cold Lake to Alert at Mach 5 = 2588 km at 6174 km/h = 25 minutes
Bagotville to Alert at Mach 5 = 2799 km at 6174 km/h = 27 minutes
Bagotville to Goose Bay at Mach 5 = 927 km at 6174 km/h = 9 minutes
 
Meanwhile the US Army is looking at how to counter aerial threats of all sorts.


Think about a missile defense system arrayed around Los Angeles controlled remotely from 250 mi. away at Nellis AFB, Nevada.

As the operational implications of President Donald Trump’s Golden Dome initiative sink in, U.S. Army officials are beginning to grasp the challenges inherent in deploying a remotely controlled, minimally staffed underlayer of terminal defenses covering the entire homeland.

“We have to think about doing business differently to counter the mass array of threats that might likely be realized in that type of scenario when we talk about Golden Dome for America,” Maj. Gen. Frank Lozano, the Army program executive officer for Missiles and Space, told the Fires Symposium at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on April 8.

Concurrent activity


And I have to believe that solutions like this are part of the future.


Civil systems that can lock in military effectors when appropriate. Co-operative Engagements?
 
And meanwhile, in Greece....

In an article posted on the Ministry of Defence’s website, Minister of National Defence Nikos Dendias described Achilles Shield as having “anti-missile, anti-aircraft, anti-drone, anti-ship and anti-submarine” capabilities — capabilities that would allow naval ships and fighter jets that currently do homeland defense to instead operate farther from Greek territory.

Dendias did not share additional details about Achilles Shield, but Army Recognition reported earlier this month that the program is valued at €2.8 billion ($3 billion) and the future system could be operational in 2027.

 

UK/NZ co-operation on drones and counter-drones.

....

Interesting commentary about artillery no longer being the lead casualty producer. First time since WW1.

...


Here's a thought about tanks. Tanks were invented to transport a payload over rough terrain, using brute power to over come friction.

Drones overcome friction by flying over the terrain. Tanks transported gunners, guns and 6 lb bullets. Drones attach motors to 6 lb bullets and fly themselves to the target.
 
There's a certain parallelism here with the revolution in military affairs (RMA) that surfaced after Gulf 1 in 1991 and its reliance on technology. Kosovo added to concepts such as smart weapons delivered by the air force entirely eliminated the need for artillery.

One needs to recall that until UAVs were delivered to the front lines at a massive scale in Ukraine, artillery for the better part of two years was the top killer on the battlefield. Even once UAVs came in large quantities the lessons learned coming back were that UAVs were lost at high rates before reaching their targets and the combination of coordinated UAV strikes with artillery strikes provided the highest lethality.

Also what one needs to be mindful of is that C-UAV was and still is in its infancy. UAVs are basically fragile, fair weather systems. An artillery projectile is not fragile and is an all weather system.

I think it would be absolutely stupid to ignore UAVs, en masse, as an important weapon system to have in one's toolbelt. It would be equally stupid to throw all one's eggs into the UAV basket. There needs to be balance while the usual song and dance between offensive and defensive capabilities plays itself out.

🍻
 
There's a certain parallelism here with the revolution in military affairs (RMA) that surfaced after Gulf 1 in 1991 and its reliance on technology. Kosovo added to concepts such as smart weapons delivered by the air force entirely eliminated the need for artillery.

One needs to recall that until UAVs were delivered to the front lines at a massive scale in Ukraine, artillery for the better part of two years was the top killer on the battlefield. Even once UAVs came in large quantities the lessons learned coming back were that UAVs were lost at high rates before reaching their targets and the combination of coordinated UAV strikes with artillery strikes provided the highest lethality.

Also what one needs to be mindful of is that C-UAV was and still is in its infancy. UAVs are basically fragile, fair weather systems. An artillery projectile is not fragile and is an all weather system.

I think it would be absolutely stupid to ignore UAVs, en masse, as an important weapon system to have in one's toolbelt. It would be equally stupid to throw all one's eggs into the UAV basket. There needs to be balance while the usual song and dance between offensive and defensive capabilities plays itself out.

🍻
I also wonder how different things would look if one side was able to gain air superiority/supremacy over the front. Russian glide bombs were pretty effective against Ukrainian positions when lobbed from a distance. How much more effective would precision munitions be in disrupting the front? When the front is fairly static short-range FPV's can range across or behind the enemy lines without much risk of disruption. If the front is under continuing risk of air attack or if air superiority allows the enemy to maneuver - forcing enemy drone operators to keep on the move - their impact may be greatly reduced.

The key I think might be to focus on capabilities that allow our forces to keep moving as well as AD capabilities against larger UAV's. Forcing the defenders to keep relocating will make short range UAV's less effective as they are more difficult to control while on the move (and while trying to avoid being targeted by aircraft/UAVs). The defender will then have to rely on larger systems controlled from further from the front which being larger are easier to detect, are fewer in quantity and easier to target with conventional AD systems.
 
A couple of articles, US Army and US Air Force, tending towards the least cost solution.


The Air Force in particular has been trending towards the exquisite. Now they are starting to edge back towards the "good enuff". They are starting to appreciate the value of mass.

70% solutions. A Harvard business article some years ago pointed out the difference between the Infantry/Marine officer and the Air Force/Navy officer. The latter was conditioned to minimize risk and do what they could to protect the national investment in the kit issued to them - planes and ships. Conversely the infanteer was conditioned to accept loss and act in the absence of complete situational awareness. They were content to go with 70% solutions and not wait for the 100% solution to be offered to them on a platter.

Perhaps there is a developing mass of "good enuff" supporters in the US Air Force (the Navy too?) that sees the benefit of throwing more targets at the enemy than the enemy has bullets. Start disregarding the loss rates.

I find it interesting that one of the leaders in the "drone" races is a company that has made a career out of supplying low cost targets that mimic the actions of the multi-million dollar / billion dollar aircraft. The mimics are designed to be cheap enough that they can be shot out of the sky and not destroy the budget.

The US Army now seems to be emphasizing the production of thousands of targets that can be used to challenge its platoons. They don't need intelligent targets. They just need bullet traps that will engage its own troops guns until they run out of ammunition. Then they can send in the smart munitions.

....

Looking back from here I suggest that the Tomahawk presaged the death of the manned aircraft. In my view all of the CCA variants are now just long range derivatives of the Tomahawk. Tomahawk defined the compact profile that permitted numbers to be carried in and launched from multiple platforms. They solved the problem of navigation over long distances (1500 km). They solved the problem of not only precise delivery to a co-ordinates but also the ability to discriminate between targets in the target area using millimeter wave active radar homing. And they did that for under 2 MUSD a copy.

Now the problems are to increase the range and the speed. And to mix and match them with decoys and bullet traps.

10 F35Bs cost 1 BUSD.
1 BUSD will buy 500 Tomahawks/Kratos CCAs.

And the money saved on pilots, ground crews, ships and airfields will pay for an awful lot of MALDs, AIM120s and SDBs that can be carried by those CCAs.

...

Machine guns, grenades and mortars didn't put the guns out of business but it did change the role of the guns (howitzers instead of field guns) and the role of the bombardiers (some of them flew and some of them learned how to use radios).
 
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Kratos Valkyrie - 2-4 MUSD - no runway, no pilot.

Three hardpoints at 600 lb each, one under each wing and one internal.

AIM-120 = 1 MUSD, 356 lb, 180 km range
MALD J = 30 to 300 KUSD, 286 lb, 900 km range
GBU-53/B = 100 to 200 KUSD, 208 lb, 74 km range
Brimstone = 100 to 200 KUSD, 110 lb, 60 km range

Now envisage a Mach 5 recoverable carrier with a cost of about 2-4 MUSD and a 5000 km range.
 
A couple of articles, US Army and US Air Force, tending towards the least cost solution.


The Air Force in particular has been trending towards the exquisite. Now they are starting to edge back towards the "good enuff". They are starting to appreciate the value of mass.

70% solutions. A Harvard business article some years ago pointed out the difference between the Infantry/Marine officer and the Air Force/Navy officer. The latter was conditioned to minimize risk and do what they could to protect the national investment in the kit issued to them - planes and ships. Conversely the infanteer was conditioned to accept loss and act in the absence of complete situational awareness. They were content to go with 70% solutions and not wait for the 100% solution to be offered to them on a platter.

Perhaps there is a developing mass of "good enuff" supporters in the US Air Force (the Navy too?) that sees the benefit of throwing more targets at the enemy than the enemy has bullets. Start disregarding the loss rates.

I find it interesting that one of the leaders in the "drone" races is a company that has made a career out of supplying low cost targets that mimic the actions of the multi-million dollar / billion dollar aircraft. The mimics are designed to be cheap enough that they can be shot out of the sky and not destroy the budget.

The US Army now seems to be emphasizing the production of thousands of targets that can be used to challenge its platoons. They don't need intelligent targets. They just need bullet traps that will engage its own troops guns until they run out of ammunition. Then they can send in the smart munitions.

....

Looking back from here I suggest that the Tomahawk presaged the death of the manned aircraft. In my view all of the CCA variants are now just long range derivatives of the Tomahawk. Tomahawk defined the compact profile that permitted numbers to be carried in and launched from multiple platforms. They solved the problem of navigation over long distances (1500 km). They solved the problem of not only precise delivery to a co-ordinates but also the ability to discriminate between targets in the target area using millimeter wave active radar homing. And they did that for under 2 MUSD a copy.

Now the problems are to increase the range and the speed. And to mix and match them with decoys and bullet traps.

10 F35Bs cost 1 BUSD.
1 BUSD will buy 500 Tomahawks/Kratos CCAs.

And the money saved on pilots, ground crews, ships and airfields will pay for an awful lot of MALDs, AIM120s and SDBs that can be carried by those CCAs.

...

Machine guns, grenades and mortars didn't put the guns out of business but it did change the role of the guns (howitzers instead of field guns) and the role of the bombardiers (some of them flew and some of them learned how to use radios).
The Houthis have shot down some 29 Predator type drones, a cheap decoy to suck up their missile stocks would be useful.
 
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