- Reaction score
- 17,705
- Points
- 1,010
A richly deserved series of honours and awards. I am reliably informed that this was probably the finest piece of seamanship displayed within the RCN since World War 2.
Engine Room Fire in HMCS Protecteur
- Thread starter Edward Campbell
- Start date
Halifax Tar
Army.ca Fixture
- Reaction score
- 11,915
- Points
- 1,260
BZ Upstanding seamanship and courage.
J
jollyjacktar
Guest
I am disappointed to see some left off the recognition lists. The EO, CMO and CHT for starters. They would have had a major role in the actual DC fight for PROs life...
- Reaction score
- 6,966
- Points
- 1,140
As with any situation that arises, not all that deserve offical recognition get it.
In my opinion the HTs that made the crappers on the jungle deck are the real heroes. Had some of the most plesant movements of my life in the gentle NELY trade winds off the north coast of Oahu.
In my opinion the HTs that made the crappers on the jungle deck are the real heroes. Had some of the most plesant movements of my life in the gentle NELY trade winds off the north coast of Oahu.
- Reaction score
- 28,537
- Points
- 1,090
Ten years ago today. Thoughts and prayers to all those onboard, their families and loved ones.
- Reaction score
- 2,540
- Points
- 1,190
And we still await a public report with baited breath.
OldSolduer
Army.ca Relic
- Reaction score
- 16,092
- Points
- 1,260
Yes even though I am not a sailor I would really like to see the report....
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
- Reaction score
- 33,561
- Points
- 1,160
Has there actually not been one?
I remember reading some pretty detailed accounts of what happened, I think from documents that could be accessed via DND's website, that I thought an official report had been made public?
(It's been a while tho...)
Either way. BZ times 10 to the crew!
- Reaction score
- 17,705
- Points
- 1,010
Nope. The BOI has never been publicly released, AFAIK.
- Reaction score
- 6,500
- Points
- 1,040
It may have been finally redacted to an unclass version for internal use, but that is still a bit sketchy. But absolutely zero lessons learned, and because the details of the BOI weren't available some of the recommendations that made sense on the AOR design (1960s steam plant) but are completely useless on the JSS design were implemented. We're still doing all the same things that lead to the stars aligning for the PRO fire, with some of the same baseless fears about not wanting to activate the AFFF because you might damage equipment.
The one saving grace is that generally a lot of people have taken the orders to activate the fitted systems for a confirmed fire to heart so when it's available people are usually pushing the button instead of asking for permission. The downside is with a lot of defects the fitted systems are less reliable and frequently don't have the remote operation available, or have been found to not actually work. We are on pace to have about half the fires the USN has a year on an absolute scale, so the hull to hull comparison is really, really poor for some kind of 'per capita' baseline.
On the plus side the class A live fire trainer is finally going out for RFP this year (project INFERNO) and hoping to break ground on the concrete pads to drop the containerized trainers on next year. Should also come with stuff like extra bunker gear, proper decontamniation and actual NFPA bunker gear laundry equipment, some extra environmental controls to clean the smoke and runoff water to future proof it, and hopefully things like some new civilian positions to get dedicated instructors/maintainers from retired fire fighters. This will close off that PRO BOI recommendation, and should also help with the knowledge gap we have in the Snr FFs on ship now that we've removed firefighters and killed the HT trade on all the things they used to do for the portable FF equipment.
In general, the list of who got medals for that vice who didn't get medals or commendations is not a good reflection on the RCN. AFAIK the personnel that stayed in the MCR to safely shut down the steam plant despite the floor literally melting beneath their feet never got anything (other than some photos with their boot prints in the tile). And instead of actually court martialling a few scapegoats so they at least got due process, they had their careers quietly crucified.
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
- Reaction score
- 33,561
- Points
- 1,160
I wonder what that 'confidential briefing note' contained
HMCS Protecteur's electrical system flagged as 'dangerous and unsafe'
Cause of the Feb. 27 engine-room fire aboard HMCS Protecteur still being investigated
National Defence was warned a year before the devastating fire aboard HMCS Protecteur that the electrical system, main engine controls and navigation system aboard both of the navy's supply ships were on their last legs — and prone to catastrophic failure.
The unusually blunt assessment was contained in a four-page confidential briefing note prepared by the former head of the navy as he was about to retire last year.
The document, from former vice-admiral Paul Maddison, was prepared as the Harper government debated whether long-promised replacement vessels would take priority at the assigned shipyard in Vancouver — or a new coast guard heavy icebreaker.
Maddison noted that the power generators were showing their age and that replacement parts were no longer available for both Protecteur and her sister ship HMCS Preserver, which were ordered replaced by the former Liberal government a decade ago.
There had been failures of the turbo generators that caused ship-wide blackouts and loss of propulsion, creating "dangerous" conditions for a ship at sea.
OldSolduer
Army.ca Relic
- Reaction score
- 16,092
- Points
- 1,260
I am shaking my head here just reading this. Kick the fucking can down the road and still sweet fuck all.I wonder what that 'confidential briefing note' contained
HMCS Protecteur's electrical system flagged as 'dangerous and unsafe'
Cause of the Feb. 27 engine-room fire aboard HMCS Protecteur still being investigated
National Defence was warned a year before the devastating fire aboard HMCS Protecteur that the electrical system, main engine controls and navigation system aboard both of the navy's supply ships were on their last legs — and prone to catastrophic failure.
The unusually blunt assessment was contained in a four-page confidential briefing note prepared by the former head of the navy as he was about to retire last year.
The document, from former vice-admiral Paul Maddison, was prepared as the Harper government debated whether long-promised replacement vessels would take priority at the assigned shipyard in Vancouver — or a new coast guard heavy icebreaker.
Maddison noted that the power generators were showing their age and that replacement parts were no longer available for both Protecteur and her sister ship HMCS Preserver, which were ordered replaced by the former Liberal government a decade ago.
There had been failures of the turbo generators that caused ship-wide blackouts and loss of propulsion, creating "dangerous" conditions for a ship at sea.
I reckon that sailors lives don't matter.....right?
OldSolduer
Army.ca Relic
- Reaction score
- 16,092
- Points
- 1,260
One of them is undergoing a Court Martial, is he not?
He was too busy to care about ships.....
- Reaction score
- 6,500
- Points
- 1,040
@daftandbarmy For some context, that was around when they were deciding on how to sequence the builds at VSY. The RCN is great at saying everything is awesome most of the time, unless it benefits them to say everything is not awesome so we need our ships now.
Weirdly after 40+ years a high pressure steam turbo alternator had reliability issues and had been obsolete for a few decades at that point, so was a lot of high cost custom work to keep them going. The whole control system was an interesting electro-mechanical-pneumatic system that looked like a museum piece but worked well.
Didn't actually have anything to do with the fire, was more of a BN on general reliability and the likelihood the ship would be able to stay operational due to reliability issues.
That was a fun one to feed info into though, we had to dig up a whack of big invoices, things like long lead time repairs, lack of part availability etc.
Weirdly after 40+ years a high pressure steam turbo alternator had reliability issues and had been obsolete for a few decades at that point, so was a lot of high cost custom work to keep them going. The whole control system was an interesting electro-mechanical-pneumatic system that looked like a museum piece but worked well.
Didn't actually have anything to do with the fire, was more of a BN on general reliability and the likelihood the ship would be able to stay operational due to reliability issues.
That was a fun one to feed info into though, we had to dig up a whack of big invoices, things like long lead time repairs, lack of part availability etc.
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
- Reaction score
- 33,561
- Points
- 1,160
I got a good run down from one of my troops who just happened to be along for the ride on a 'Tiger Cruise' and ended up helping out in various ways, like shifting gear/ hoses around etc.
He was very impressed with the way the RCN handled everything...
... which is quite a compliment coming from an Infanteer, of course
- Reaction score
- 6,500
- Points
- 1,040
Nah, learning lessons is for suckers, we just write them down and bury them under overclassifications and need to know. You should be able to ATIP the PRO BOI now as well as the fire investigation.
Our actual LLs for DC and FF comes from USN, RAN, and countries like the Norwegians and others that openly publish the investigations. The info from the Helge Ingstad for example has been outstanding, but the McCain collision, Westralia and a few others also come to mind. We tried to formalize some LL into actual changes from the FRE fire and some got done, the rest are still sitting incomplete due to lack of institutional interest.
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