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Infanteer: that was a very fine post. I must admit that I have had to do a bit of thinking (but only a bit.....it's quite strenuous...).
After my post (the one you quoted), I got to wondering how accurate my thoughts about the USMC were. I called the Senior Marine here in the HQ(a Col of Marines), and went to see him for a bit to chat about all this. I feel confident now that I am pretty close to the mark. Regardless of that, I believe you have made some excellent points, which I will comment on.
I think you are right. The shameful attempt to hide Medak Pocket exemplifies this at its worst.(However, I believe that has since been more than put right by Her Excellency the GG.) WRT your comment on the present role of TFK, let's be very careful not to appear in any way to denigrate our soldiers, who are at this moment in a potentially lethal environment, should the threats of the ACF to disrupt the Presidential election materialize. Being in Kabul is NOT being in Nicosia. However, in principle I agree with you that we should have stayed with OEF: we would be very welcome and could do well.
OK-I'm with you now. On the latter point I talked specifically with the Col about the Marine claim of "every Marine a rifleman". While he stated that a Marine Infantryman go on to take more training after Basic, he was confident that CSS marines could fight and not just in perimeter defense. What they could not do, he said, would be to be highly proficient in Infantry tactical leadership if they were, say, a truck company or a supply unit. However, he expected that they could fire all the company weapons and execute basic tactics. He also pointed out that the US Army, after the Jessica Lynch incident, has embarked on a crash course of combat training for its CSS troops; something the Marines would not have to do.
You are on to something here. However, you might be interested to know that when I was in Quantico 96-97, one of the biggest complaints of the US types was that their public neither understood nor supported them. I laughed out loud.
This is the false belief that the world will only demand of us what we are ready and willing to give.
In my chat with the USMC Colonel today, we agreed that although the USMC is four divisions strong, its operational focus is the MEU(SOC) or in other words a battle group. So, we can play in that game too, if we have the will, and we focus on the goal.
My point exactly.
After my post (the one you quoted), I got to wondering how accurate my thoughts about the USMC were. I called the Senior Marine here in the HQ(a Col of Marines), and went to see him for a bit to chat about all this. I feel confident now that I am pretty close to the mark. Regardless of that, I believe you have made some excellent points, which I will comment on.
Despite the fact that we train to fight wars, and by all accounts of our allies, are very capable when we are fielded to do so, the Canadian public still views the CF as some sort of Peacekeeping Force. In order to pander to public perceptions of the Military, the government puts out defence policies that advocate "peacekeeping brigades", purchases equipment that is vital for "peacekeeping missions", and tends to avoid warfighting in Iraq or in the Pashtun mountains and instead ops to be the police force for the Mayor of Kabul, Hamid Karzai.
I think you are right. The shameful attempt to hide Medak Pocket exemplifies this at its worst.(However, I believe that has since been more than put right by Her Excellency the GG.) WRT your comment on the present role of TFK, let's be very careful not to appear in any way to denigrate our soldiers, who are at this moment in a potentially lethal environment, should the threats of the ACF to disrupt the Presidential election materialize. Being in Kabul is NOT being in Nicosia. However, in principle I agree with you that we should have stayed with OEF: we would be very welcome and could do well.
This is what I was aiming at with no mission. I don't doubt that many good soldiers have questioned their commitment to the forces due to the fact that they see their mission of warfighting, their sense of purpose, constantly overridden by an oblivious Canadian public and a docile Government. I bet you guys have said, "Why the heck should I give a rats *** about staying fit and practicing platoon fighting drills, I'm just getting deployed to Bosnia for ROTO 31 to go sit in coffee shops..." Of course this is an exaggeration, but there are many in the Forces, especially in the CS and CSS, that probably do not possess the requisite stamina and capabilities to operate beyond a mature theater in a peacekeeping mission (Case in point: I remember a news story about the trouble 1 SVC Battalion was having prior to deployment on OP APOLLO).
OK-I'm with you now. On the latter point I talked specifically with the Col about the Marine claim of "every Marine a rifleman". While he stated that a Marine Infantryman go on to take more training after Basic, he was confident that CSS marines could fight and not just in perimeter defense. What they could not do, he said, would be to be highly proficient in Infantry tactical leadership if they were, say, a truck company or a supply unit. However, he expected that they could fire all the company weapons and execute basic tactics. He also pointed out that the US Army, after the Jessica Lynch incident, has embarked on a crash course of combat training for its CSS troops; something the Marines would not have to do.
Due to the amphibious warfare background that engenders them as the "go-to-guys", I would argue that the Marines in particular know that they are at the tip of the spear of US foreign policy. What is also important is that the US public knows this, respects this, and supports this. I would argue that this characteristic is not as strong in Canada, even though we operate under the same sort of "fire-brigade" role.
You are on to something here. However, you might be interested to know that when I was in Quantico 96-97, one of the biggest complaints of the US types was that their public neither understood nor supported them. I laughed out loud.
I agree that "niche rolling" the Forces is the wrong direction. The more you specialize your force to some target, the more irrelevant it becomes in the face of contingencies other then that which one's niche. As well, this increases the variety of asymmetrical vulnerabilities present in ones force structure, giving potential badguys more ways of of striking at us (Tanks, we are peacekeepers, who needs tanks?!?).
This is the false belief that the world will only demand of us what we are ready and willing to give.
I'm a big fan of the way the Marines do things as well. They are a truly joint force (what the CF tried and failed to do with Unification) that intergrates land, naval, and air assets into a combined arms warfighting team. The MEU(SOC) offers a combined arms approach that perhaps the CF could guide its force structure off of.
In my chat with the USMC Colonel today, we agreed that although the USMC is four divisions strong, its operational focus is the MEU(SOC) or in other words a battle group. So, we can play in that game too, if we have the will, and we focus on the goal.
This is relevent to Canada because we have been an expeditionary force since the Boer War.
My point exactly.
And I believe we can do it. Some will immediately lean back from the precipice, protesting: "Oh-the politicians will never allow that". I say we can do it , intelligently and with well thought out justifications, and actually get them onside. This is a huge leadership challenge, but we are getting a higher percentage of our senior leaders with op experience, including with our Allies, than at any time for decades. Cheers.Agree. We must build our Forces to fit our uniquely Canadian situation.