F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

[Kirkhill]

And some recent pilot reviews....

http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1694252-report-fighter-pilots-assess-flying-the-f-35

 

[SupersonicMax]

I wholeheartedly agree that our Government needs to give guidance to the military in terms of what it is expected to do in the short, medium and long term and what kind of infrastructure will be provided to accomplish the mission.  This is what will drive our requirements in terms of aircraft capabilities which, in turn, will drive our procurement.  Assuming we maintain the same mission sets as we do now (NORAD, DCA, CAS/AR, Self-Escort Strike), in the 5 fighters we are offered, it would be foolish NOT to go with the F-35.  If you remove Self-Escort Strike, AR and DCA, a 4th Gen fighter becomes more palatable. 

 

[Harrigan]

2) I think the way you phrased the first bullet of your takeaways from the speech doesn't give full justice to the capability of a fully-integrated, high-level network-enabled sensor-strike element in the cyber/physical battle space.  It's not simply that F-35 receives C2 and ISR information to help build SA -- the F-35 is an integral part of the collection/dissemination/action-space.  It's multi-directional - receive, transmit, share, extend, enhance.  The other fighters are not nearly as deeply integrated into the 5th Gen battlespace.

G2G,

Your point is a fair one. My limited understanding is that the F35 is a step above even the F22 on that front.

Harrigan

 

[Loachman]

http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a22341/f-35-stealth-infrared/

The F-35 in Infrared Shows Why the Fighter Is So Stealthy

​The hot fighter stays cool to heat-reading sensors.​

By Kyle Mizokami

AUG 15, 2016 

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter's stealthiness is clearly reflected in the plane's flat, faceted surfaces, designed to direct away as much radar energy as possible. But radar isn't the only way to detect a plane.

Another example is the infrared radiation generated by heat sources. An infrared sensor delicate enough to read the differences in emitted heat can paint an "image" of an object approximate to that using visible light.

You can bet that lots of work has been done to minimize the F-35's infrared signature as well. FLIR Systems, maker of forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensors, pointed its cameras at a F-35B Joint Strike Fighter at the Farnborough Air Show recently. Notice how localized the heat is on the F-35B, confined mostly to the engine exhaust and a small area around the exhaust nozzle:

Now, compare this to a recent exhibition by U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, FL, involving U.S. Army MH-6 Little Bird and MH-60 special operations transport helicopters. The helicopters generate a white-hot plume of air and the areas on the aircraft near the exhaust ports - and the engines - read hot as well.

Now consider that the MH-6 is driven by a single T63-A-700 engine generating 425 shaft horsepower while the F-35's F135 afterburning turbofan engine generates around 29,000 shaft horsepower. It's clear lot of work has been done to make the Joint Strike Fighter's infrared signature much, much smaller than earlier aircraft. Exactly what kind of work is obviously classified.

 

[Good2Golf]

Looks like the Ruskie engineers need to pull out the slide rule and tweak the Su's IRST if they want to maintain EO/IR B(unaided)VR capability against the 35...

 

[CougarKing]

Meanwhile in Japan...

JASDF releases images of first F-35
Gareth Jennings, London -
Source:IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
15 August 2016

The first F-35 for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) is seen at the Fort Worth production
facility ahead of the commencement of flight trials and delivery. Source: Japan Air Self-Defense Force

 

[MarkOttawa]

Lots of radar stuff:

America's F-22 and F-35 Stealth Fighters vs. Russia's S-300, S-400 and S-500: Who Wins?
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-f-22-f-35-stealth-fighters-vs-russias-s-300-s-400-s-17394

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

F-35C, Growler, Super Hornet. E-2D:

New U.S. Naval Aircraft Integrating for Longer Range Operations
https://news.usni.org/2016/08/19/new-u-s-naval-aircraft-integrating-longer-range-operations

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Good2Golf]

Lots of radar stuff:

Mark
Ottawa

An oft-forgotten aspect; the "detect versus engage" dichotomy that (good) stealth creates.  The difference between an F-117 and F-35's RCS makes the likelihood of high Pk engagement less likely than it was over Serbia in 1999.

G2G


 

 

[NavyShooter]

If I understand correctly (and I'm way out of my lanes...so feel free) the F-117 was not so good at the multi-aspect stealth, so seen from the sides, it was not as stealthy?  Compared to the F-35, which is possibly better at multi-aspect?  So instead of having to drive towards the radar directly, you can be a crossing target and still maintain a low level of observability.

Or I could have been misled.

NS

 

[MarkOttawa]

By an F-15E Strike Eagle Weapons Systems Officer and an F-22A Instructor Pilot--lots also on F-22 and B-2 plus working with non-stealth planes:

Computing the Value of Stealth: It’s Not That Simple
http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/computing-the-value-of-stealth-its-not-that-simple/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

As the F-35 matures there's still pesky LockMart:

F-35 Follow-On Plan Takes Shape
...
The Pentagon is already looking ahead at what’s next for the fifth-generation fighter jet. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO), along with the three U.S. military services and eight international partners, is well on its way to establishing a modernization effort for the JSF, dubbed Block 4. The incremental Block 4 updates are expected to follow a recurring cycle: a software update every two years and a hardware update every four. This approach will allow the F-35 to keep up with technology improvements while managing the hardware retrofits on a realistic schedule, says Diane Wathen, the JPO’s director of follow-on modernization.

The stakeholders earlier this year settled on a wish list of capabilities to be included in the first two increments of Block 4, planned for 2020 and 2022. That list is moving through the formal requirements process, with approval by the Pentagon’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council expected this fall, says Wathen. The improvements are intended to focus on enhancing mission areas, including close air support, electronic warfare and adding or upgrading weapons capabilities, according to Wathen.

Key to the modernization effort is the addition of new and improved weapons, which will enable the F-35 fleet to keep pace with the threat to the end of the century. Additions in Block 4.1 are planned to include an advanced AIM-9X variant, the dual-mode GBU-54 laser-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition and the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) C-1, which will allow the Navy to strike moving maritime targets. Initial integration of Small-Diameter Bomb II (SDBII), which adds a tri-mode seeker, will be in 4.1, with full integration in 4.2.

As the program moves to follow-on modernization, the international partners will start incorporating their own weapon systems, Wathen says. Norway will integrate the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), the U.K. will add the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (Asraam), and Turkey wants its precision-guided Stand-off Missile (SOM-J) [have to see about those Turks]...

A crucial change coming in Block 4 will be the JPO’s effort to wrest control of the program from contractor Lockheed Martin. The government needs to own the technical baseline for the program, explains Wathen, adding that the office is looking at “the appropriate places to ensure we obtain government-purposed rights.” The Pentagon also wants to take the reins for the test program: Right now, Lockheed has greater responsibility for the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) effort...
http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-35-follow-plan-takes-shape

Mark
Ottawa 

 

[MarkOttawa]

F-35, Hornet and Super Hornet--and 6th-gen after?

Why America Shouldn’t Build Sixth-Generation Manned Fighters
...
Brig Gen Raymond Franck (USAF Ret) is Professor Emeritus at the Air Force Academy.  He has also served at the Naval Postgraduate School.  He has written and published multiple works on defense acquisition and military innovation.

Professor Bernard Udis (Professor Emeritus, Colorado University at Boulder) has a wide reputation for expertise on international defense affairs and defense acquisition.  His published work includes three books and numerous articles in scholarly journals on defense industries, defense management practices, and military power.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-america-shouldnt-build-sixth-generation-manned-fighters-17444

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Kirkhill]

As the F-35 matures there's still pesky LockMart:

Mark
Ottawa

Mark -

1961 - M16

2016 - M4

55 years later and still the same rifle.....  ;D

 

[MarkOttawa]

Still a bit buggy:

Lockheed F-35's Cybersecurity Flaws Cited by Pentagon Tester
...
Cybersecurity weaknesses in Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 are among “many unresolved deficiencies” hobbling the costliest U.S. weapons program as production of the fighter jet ramps up, the Pentagon’s top tester said.

“The limited and incomplete F-35 cybersecurity testing accomplished to date has nonetheless revealed deficiencies that cannot be ignored,” Michael Gilmore, the director of combat testing, said in a prepared statement for a House Armed Services panel hearing Wednesday [Aug. 24].

Gilmore’s analysis that the F-35 program “is at a critical time” expands on previous reports on the risks inherent in building the planes even as they’re still being developed. A more optimistic assessment of the fighter’s progress will be offered to the House panel by Air Force Lieutenant General Christopher Bogdan, who heads the Defense Department’s F-35 program office. Bogdan, like Defense Secretary Ash Carter, has said that the F-35 is on the right path after surmounting earlier obstacles.

The F-35 program “is executing well across the entire spectrum of acquisition, to include development and design, flight test, production, fielding and base stand-up, sustainment of fielded aircraft, and building a global sustainment enterprise,” Bogdan said in prepared testimony.
Mission Software

“Our most significant technical concern is the development and integration of mission systems software,” as each aircraft has about 8 million lines of code, Bogdan said.

The aircraft is proving its capabilities, Bogdan said, reaching 50,000 hours of flight last month. He said that included about 26,000 hours for the Air Force’s model, 18,000 for the Marine Corps version and almost 6,000 for the Navy’s, he said.

While the Marine Corps declared last July that its version of the F-35 had an initial operational capability and the Air Force plans to do so by December, Gilmore said in his statement that the F-35 “remains immature and provides limited combat capability.”

Gilmore said “the program is working to resolve the many issues it confronts, but my assessment is that the F-35 program will not be ready for” combat testing until mid-2018 at the earliest, about a year later than planned [emphasis added]. He said in his annual report on major weapons in January that more than 500 planes would be built before the tests are completed in 2019...

The Air Force, which is buying the biggest share of F-35s, has insisted that the program office and Lockheed fix five of the most severe software deficiencies inherited from the Marine version before it declares an initial operational capability.

The latest software delivered last month “was so unstable that productive flight testing could not be accomplished” so “the extent to which the significant outstanding deficiencies are being addressed thus far is still to be determined,” Gilmore said.

Once combat testing of the F-35 begins, Gilmore said, it will be compared against the F-16 for destroying enemy radar and the F/A-18 for other surface attacks. It’s comparison with the aging A-10 Warthog for close-air support was previously disclosed.
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-03-23/lockheed-f-35-s-cybersecurity-flaws-cited-by-pentagon-s-tester-im4y5nwk

Mark
Ottawa

 

[CougarKing]

An update on South Korea's own F35 program:

Defense News

Korea F-35A Program Coming Together
By: Wendell Minnick, August 25, 2016
TAIPEI, Taiwan – Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $7 million contract for providing the multispectral database for the upcoming delivery to South Korea of 40 F-35A Lightening II stealth fighters with conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) capability.

The contract was awarded Aug. 23 by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the Foreign Military Sales program. The  US Naval Air Systems Command in Maryland will handle the contract.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[AlexanderM]

Someone is not happy.

http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/26/politics/f-35-fighter-jet-problems-gilmore-memo/index.html

 

[Kirkhill]

Once upon a time, many years ago, a young food scientist working in quality control was alerted to an issue on a production line by an equally keen (but attractive) line inspector.

The earnest young food scientist perceived that the line inspector was correct and the food scientist shut down the production line at 1 o'clock in the morning.  A phone call was made to the food scientist's boss who requested that the food scientist be put on the phone.

The line was re-started. 

I suspect these things will be dropping bombs before operational testing is complete.

 

[CougarKing]

Semi-related:

Business Insider

Here's when an F-15 is better than an F-22 or an F-35

    Alex Lockie

In a recent interview with Business Insider, Justin Bronk, a research fellow specializing in combat airpower at the Royal United Services Institute, revealed why the F-15, originally introduced four decades ago, is still more useful than either the F-22 or the F-35 in certain situations.

The F-15 is a traditional air-superiority fighter of the fourth generation. It's big, fast, agile, and carriers lots of weapons under the wing where everyone can see them. For that last reason, it's terrible at stealth, but the other side of the coin is that it's perfect for intercepting enemy aircraft.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[Kirkhill]

Someone is not happy.

http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/26/politics/f-35-fighter-jet-problems-gilmore-memo/index.html

Further to DOT&E relationship with the operational forces -

Canada has apparently followed the US lead and decided to procure the Blackjack RQ-21A UAV.  This unit has been purchased and operated by the US Navy and the US Marines.

Here is what DOT&E has to say about the RQ-21A  http://navy-matters.blogspot.ca/2016/07/rq-21-blackjack.html

The detachment equipped with RQ-21A is not effective in supporting the ground commander’s mission because of an inability to have an unmanned aircraft arrive on station at the designated time and remain on station for the duration of the tasked period. During the IOT&E, the RQ-21A-equipped unit provided coverage during 68 percent of the tasked on-station hours (83.8 of 122.7 hours).

The electro-optical/infrared sensor provides accurate target locations. While the Capabilities Production Document does not specify a threshold value for sensor point of interest accuracy, Marine Corps guidance indicates that 100 meter accuracy is sufficient to support tactical operations. RQ-21A provides a 90-percent circular error probable target location error of 43.8 meters. Such accuracy is sufficient to support targeting in a conventional linear battlefield, but does not support targeting in a dense urban environment that requires more accurate target locations.

The RQ-21A sensor does not meet one of the two target classification Key  Performance Parameters (KPPs) established in the Capabilities Production Document. The electro-optical sensor does not provide a 50 percent probability of correct classification for 1-meter linear objects (weapons or tools). The infrared sensor does meet the 50 percent threshold probability for correctly classifying 3-meter objects (vehicle chassis type) by demonstrating 100 percent correct classification.

The communications relay payload limits the commanders’ tactical flexibility and mission accomplishment. It is constrained to a single frequency in each of the two radios that are set before launch. Once airborne, operators cannot change frequencies.  …

The recessed, nose-mounted electro-optical/infrared payload requires circular orbits over the top of the target to maintain continuous coverage and positive target identification. The use of offset orbits results in the fuselage blocking the payload field of view for significant periods of time. These offset orbits resulted in auto-track break locks and loss of positive identification of high-value targets. There are orbit shapes that would allow RQ-21A operators to maintain continuous coverage of a target, but the current RQ-21A operating system limits operators to circular orbits.

The RQ-21A is not operationally suitable. The RQ-21A demonstrated a Mean Flight Hour Between Abort for the System of 15.2 hours versus the 50-hour requirement. Because of aircraft reliability, overall system availability did not meet the 80 percent KPP threshold (demonstrated value equals 66.9 percent).  [Emphasis added]

The average time between overhaul of the propulsion modules was 48.9 hours, which does not meet the manufacturer’s stated 100-hour capability.

The RQ-21A Naval Air Training and Operations Standardization manual is missing important information regarding mission computer logic. This lack of information is especially critical during emergencies where operators are unaware of which conditions enable/disable various aspects of aircraft functionality. This lack of system operations information contributed to the loss of an aircraft during the first IOT&E flight.

Extended logistics delay times and production quality control issues contributed to the system’s poor reliability and availability. In six instances, aircraft spent time in a non-mission capable status while awaiting spare parts. Incorrectly assembled/configured components received from the manufacturer increase the maintenance time to repair or replace components, resulting in reduced mission availability.

The system has exploitable cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

In other words, in my view, a typical QA assessment.  It delineates all the things that are not up to contract spec or that could have been done better.  Meanwhile operations continue to use the kit to the limits of its capabilities and, likely, will modify the kit and adjust procedures over time to get the best out of it they can.

I am probably a pretty poor example of a project manager.  I have delivered lots of projects over the years.  I can honestly say that I have never had a clean bill of health on any project even after the project had been signed over and the client was making money from using the kit.  There is always something that can be done better - and that is sold on the next project.