- Reaction score
- 3,032
- Points
- 1,260
E.R. Campbell said:
Following up on this, here's what's in the final version - I leave forum readers to judge whether "misled" is too harsh a term to apply (as was done by MSM):
- Reaction score
- 3,032
- Points
- 1,260
- Reaction score
- 7,693
- Points
- 1,160
Seems like an awful lot of references to the F-35 (as in "an F-35 Secretariat") for a government that might be considering an alternate platform to the F-35. I would say the F-35 colours are still firmly nailed to the Government's wall.
As to the 25 BCAD cost of the project.....we are back to G2G's 1/3-1/3-1/3 rule. 1/3 Capital, 1/3 Maintenance, 1/3 Operations.
9 BCAD = Capital
16 BCAD = Capital + Maintenance
25 BCAD = Capital + Maintenance + Operations
At bottom end the project cost could be presented as less if only capital cost of the airframes were considered (the way most arms purchases are presented in the international press).
At the top end you could march cheerfully forward to infinity using my well-used "grandfather's axe" analogy. If we suppose that this is the "last manned fighter" but then discover 50 years down the road that we still need manned fighters then you do what they are doing to the B-52s and rebuilding everything but the serial number.
In the middle - as Mr. Dunne pointed out on the article about Challengers - the cost of providing aerial security demands runways, hangars, pilots, technicians, inspectors, bureaucrats, ground security personnel regardless of whether it is F-35s or SE-5As in the air.
If the comparison is to be fair then one should ask what the comparable cost of maintaining an Air Cap with expeditionary capability has been to Canada over the previous 25 years, but priced in future dollars.
Anybody have the number for Acquisition, Ops, Maintenance and Upgrades for a fighter/strike/recce capability since 1987?
As to the 25 BCAD cost of the project.....we are back to G2G's 1/3-1/3-1/3 rule. 1/3 Capital, 1/3 Maintenance, 1/3 Operations.
9 BCAD = Capital
16 BCAD = Capital + Maintenance
25 BCAD = Capital + Maintenance + Operations
At bottom end the project cost could be presented as less if only capital cost of the airframes were considered (the way most arms purchases are presented in the international press).
At the top end you could march cheerfully forward to infinity using my well-used "grandfather's axe" analogy. If we suppose that this is the "last manned fighter" but then discover 50 years down the road that we still need manned fighters then you do what they are doing to the B-52s and rebuilding everything but the serial number.
In the middle - as Mr. Dunne pointed out on the article about Challengers - the cost of providing aerial security demands runways, hangars, pilots, technicians, inspectors, bureaucrats, ground security personnel regardless of whether it is F-35s or SE-5As in the air.
If the comparison is to be fair then one should ask what the comparable cost of maintaining an Air Cap with expeditionary capability has been to Canada over the previous 25 years, but priced in future dollars.
Anybody have the number for Acquisition, Ops, Maintenance and Upgrades for a fighter/strike/recce capability since 1987?
So the AG JSF Program costs are $25 billion over 36 years . . . $694.44 million/year
The DND JSF Program costs are $15 billion over 20 years . . . $750.0 million/year.
This AG report is great news . . . the cost per year keeps dropping
I wonder if the AG will now report other departments costs in 36 year chunks as well, so we can have a same:same comparison.
The CBC would be well north of a $50 billion cost . . . have they told Parliament this or are they "hiding" the real cost?
The DND JSF Program costs are $15 billion over 20 years . . . $750.0 million/year.
This AG report is great news . . . the cost per year keeps dropping
I wonder if the AG will now report other departments costs in 36 year chunks as well, so we can have a same:same comparison.
The CBC would be well north of a $50 billion cost . . . have they told Parliament this or are they "hiding" the real cost?
- Reaction score
- 3,032
- Points
- 1,260
If that's the life expectancy of whatever's being purchased, one would think that makes sense.Haletown said:
Oldgateboatdriver
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 1,667
- Points
- 1,010
Crantor said:
You mean the AG has no balls ???
- Reaction score
- 4,690
- Points
- 1,160
The AG's report, after review by and 'correction' by DND says: "Also, we observed that National Defence told parliamentarians that cost data provided by US authorities had been validated by US experts and partner countries, which was not accurate at the time. At the time of its response, National Defence knew the costs were likely to increase but did not so inform parliamentarians."
So if you say say something that you know to be untrue (inaccurate) and if you fail to tell something you know to be true what should we call that? I say that DND, in the persons of successive DMs and CDSs misled parliament and I say that DMs and CDSs ought to fired for misleading parliament. Maybe Mr. Fonberg and Gen Natynczyk did not do that actual misleading, maybe they weren't even in the loop at the critical time, but they are now and both need to be responsible for the past and present actions of the Department (DND) and the organization (the CF) they lead - maybe Natynczyk should fire a couple of two and three star RCAF generals on his way out but, in my opinion, military honour and professional integrity cannot be restored until both Fonberg and Natynczyk resign (preferably) or are fired.
P.S. My first dealing with information for ministers came when Brian Mulroney was PM and I am well aware that ministers often prefer to be kept in the dark, especially re: details that run counter to their preferences, but I am also aware that officials have a sworn duty to inform the ministry and parliament - misleading cabinet and/or parliament is a grave breach of responsibility.
So if you say say something that you know to be untrue (inaccurate) and if you fail to tell something you know to be true what should we call that? I say that DND, in the persons of successive DMs and CDSs misled parliament and I say that DMs and CDSs ought to fired for misleading parliament. Maybe Mr. Fonberg and Gen Natynczyk did not do that actual misleading, maybe they weren't even in the loop at the critical time, but they are now and both need to be responsible for the past and present actions of the Department (DND) and the organization (the CF) they lead - maybe Natynczyk should fire a couple of two and three star RCAF generals on his way out but, in my opinion, military honour and professional integrity cannot be restored until both Fonberg and Natynczyk resign (preferably) or are fired.
P.S. My first dealing with information for ministers came when Brian Mulroney was PM and I am well aware that ministers often prefer to be kept in the dark, especially re: details that run counter to their preferences, but I am also aware that officials have a sworn duty to inform the ministry and parliament - misleading cabinet and/or parliament is a grave breach of responsibility.
Oldgateboatdriver
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 1,667
- Points
- 1,010
How did it go again in "yes Minister":
Who decided that I should not be told?
Nobody Minister, its just that no one decided to tell you.
What's the difference?
To actually make the decision to not tell a Minister something is a heavy burden for an official, whereas simply not telling him is standard practice.
Who decided that I should not be told?
Nobody Minister, its just that no one decided to tell you.
What's the difference?
To actually make the decision to not tell a Minister something is a heavy burden for an official, whereas simply not telling him is standard practice.
‘Overly confident’ DND failed to properly assess F-35 costs: auditor
daniel leblanc OTTAWA— Globe and Mail Update Tuesday, Apr. 03, 2012
Article Link
National Defence gambled on the F-35 fighter jet without running a fair competition, all the while lacking any cost certainty or any guarantee the plane could replace the current fleet of CF-18s by the end of the decade, the Auditor-General says.
The $16-billion plan to purchase a fleet of Lockheed-Martin F-35 jets could cost $25-billion over the project’s lifespan, yet it was done in unco-ordinated fashion among federal departments, with key data hidden from decision-makers and parliamentarians.
The scathing report by the Auditor-General will fuel a political headache for the Harper government, which has ignored years of opposition attacks on the matter and which was fully committed to the F-35 until a few weeks ago. The Conservatives have put together a plan to review the process and could ultimately select another fighter, but the report raises a number of questions about the 2010 announcement to skip a tendering process and directly buy a fleet of 65 stealth F-35s, which are still in development.
Michael Ferguson, who is launching his 10-year tenure as Auditor-General with this report, is particularly harsh on DND’s handling of the purchase, going back to the 2006 decision to formally sign on to the U.S.-led project.
“National Defence did not exercise the diligence that would be expected in managing a $25-billion commitment,” Mr. Ferguson said in a news release. “It is important that a purchase of this size be managed rigorously and transparently.”
Given cost increases and production delays in the F-35 program, the Auditor-General is raising concerns about DND’s plans to phase out its CF-18s by the end of the decade.
“Briefing material did not inform senior decision makers, central agencies, and the Minister of the problems and associated risks of relying on the F-35 to replace the CF-18. Nor did National Defence provide complete cost information to parliamentarians,” the report said.
The report added the $16-billion estimate for the cost of the project was “likely underestimated,” given it was established “without the aid of complete cost and other information.”
A major element in major military purchases in Canada is the potential for regional industrial benefits. However, in this case, the government was only told of “the most optimistic scenario,” leaving doubts about the actual benefits that will flow to Canadian companies.
“We are concerned, because these projections were used to support key decisions related to Canada’s participation in the [Joint Strike Fighter] Program and the purchase of the F-35 aircraft,” the report said.
Ottawa embarked on a sole-sourced process in 2006 to purchase the F-35, ignoring four other existing aircraft that might have proven to be safer choices. However, the Public Works department – which is responsible for the actual acquisition – was only fully involved in the process by late 2009.
“[Public Works] did not demonstrate due diligence in its role as the government’s procurement authority,” the report said.
In fact, Public Works only received the “statement of operational requirement” for the new fighters in August 2010, while the government had already signaled its intention to buy the F-35s the previous month.
“Practically speaking, by 2010, Canada was too involved in the JSF Program and the F-35 to run a fair competition,” the report said.
In his news release, Mr. Ferguson added: “[DND] did not acknowledge that the decision to purchase the F-35 was well underway four years before it was officially announced.”
Overall, the Auditor-General said that DND has been “overly confident” in its strategy to buy new fighter jets.
The report comes as the department is struggling to complete other major military procurements, including its 2004 decision to purchase Sikorsky helicopters, which were also still being developed, to replace the current fleet of Sea Kings. The new helicopters have yet to be delivered.
Civil aviation, border controls and debt
Other chapters in the report included the following findings:
» On federal oversight of civil aviation, Transport Canada received praise for implementing a new surveillance system. However concern was expressed that the department is not collecting important risk factors such as the financial health of an aviation company. Concerns were also raised about the level of documentation produced by inspectors.
The Auditor-General’s report states that “we also found that many fewer inspections are done than planned. This is significant considering that only the companies and the operations areas considered to be of higher risk are selected for inspection in any given year.”
» On border controls on commercial imports, the audit’s findings are largely favourable. The report notes that there is a need for a clearer agreement between Canada Border Services Agency and Health Canada on how to handle health-related products at the border.
» On the federal government’s management of interest-bearing debt, the report says the Department of Finance uses “a sound process.” However the Auditor-General says Ottawa needs to do a better job of clearly explaining how much of the federal debt is related to its pension obligations to public servants.
The federal debt for 2010-11 stood at $801.8-billion, of which $146.1-billion is obligations to public sector pension plans. This debt is largely because prior to 2000, the federal government did not set aside money in a separate fund to cover its pension obligations. The C.D. Howe Institute has argued that Ottawa should use a different accounting method, which would then value its unfunded pension liabilities at about $227-billion. The Auditor-General’s report does not weigh into that debate.
end
daniel leblanc OTTAWA— Globe and Mail Update Tuesday, Apr. 03, 2012
Article Link
National Defence gambled on the F-35 fighter jet without running a fair competition, all the while lacking any cost certainty or any guarantee the plane could replace the current fleet of CF-18s by the end of the decade, the Auditor-General says.
The $16-billion plan to purchase a fleet of Lockheed-Martin F-35 jets could cost $25-billion over the project’s lifespan, yet it was done in unco-ordinated fashion among federal departments, with key data hidden from decision-makers and parliamentarians.
The scathing report by the Auditor-General will fuel a political headache for the Harper government, which has ignored years of opposition attacks on the matter and which was fully committed to the F-35 until a few weeks ago. The Conservatives have put together a plan to review the process and could ultimately select another fighter, but the report raises a number of questions about the 2010 announcement to skip a tendering process and directly buy a fleet of 65 stealth F-35s, which are still in development.
Michael Ferguson, who is launching his 10-year tenure as Auditor-General with this report, is particularly harsh on DND’s handling of the purchase, going back to the 2006 decision to formally sign on to the U.S.-led project.
“National Defence did not exercise the diligence that would be expected in managing a $25-billion commitment,” Mr. Ferguson said in a news release. “It is important that a purchase of this size be managed rigorously and transparently.”
Given cost increases and production delays in the F-35 program, the Auditor-General is raising concerns about DND’s plans to phase out its CF-18s by the end of the decade.
“Briefing material did not inform senior decision makers, central agencies, and the Minister of the problems and associated risks of relying on the F-35 to replace the CF-18. Nor did National Defence provide complete cost information to parliamentarians,” the report said.
The report added the $16-billion estimate for the cost of the project was “likely underestimated,” given it was established “without the aid of complete cost and other information.”
A major element in major military purchases in Canada is the potential for regional industrial benefits. However, in this case, the government was only told of “the most optimistic scenario,” leaving doubts about the actual benefits that will flow to Canadian companies.
“We are concerned, because these projections were used to support key decisions related to Canada’s participation in the [Joint Strike Fighter] Program and the purchase of the F-35 aircraft,” the report said.
Ottawa embarked on a sole-sourced process in 2006 to purchase the F-35, ignoring four other existing aircraft that might have proven to be safer choices. However, the Public Works department – which is responsible for the actual acquisition – was only fully involved in the process by late 2009.
“[Public Works] did not demonstrate due diligence in its role as the government’s procurement authority,” the report said.
In fact, Public Works only received the “statement of operational requirement” for the new fighters in August 2010, while the government had already signaled its intention to buy the F-35s the previous month.
“Practically speaking, by 2010, Canada was too involved in the JSF Program and the F-35 to run a fair competition,” the report said.
In his news release, Mr. Ferguson added: “[DND] did not acknowledge that the decision to purchase the F-35 was well underway four years before it was officially announced.”
Overall, the Auditor-General said that DND has been “overly confident” in its strategy to buy new fighter jets.
The report comes as the department is struggling to complete other major military procurements, including its 2004 decision to purchase Sikorsky helicopters, which were also still being developed, to replace the current fleet of Sea Kings. The new helicopters have yet to be delivered.
Civil aviation, border controls and debt
Other chapters in the report included the following findings:
» On federal oversight of civil aviation, Transport Canada received praise for implementing a new surveillance system. However concern was expressed that the department is not collecting important risk factors such as the financial health of an aviation company. Concerns were also raised about the level of documentation produced by inspectors.
The Auditor-General’s report states that “we also found that many fewer inspections are done than planned. This is significant considering that only the companies and the operations areas considered to be of higher risk are selected for inspection in any given year.”
» On border controls on commercial imports, the audit’s findings are largely favourable. The report notes that there is a need for a clearer agreement between Canada Border Services Agency and Health Canada on how to handle health-related products at the border.
» On the federal government’s management of interest-bearing debt, the report says the Department of Finance uses “a sound process.” However the Auditor-General says Ottawa needs to do a better job of clearly explaining how much of the federal debt is related to its pension obligations to public servants.
The federal debt for 2010-11 stood at $801.8-billion, of which $146.1-billion is obligations to public sector pension plans. This debt is largely because prior to 2000, the federal government did not set aside money in a separate fund to cover its pension obligations. The C.D. Howe Institute has argued that Ottawa should use a different accounting method, which would then value its unfunded pension liabilities at about $227-billion. The Auditor-General’s report does not weigh into that debate.
end
- Reaction score
- 7,693
- Points
- 1,160
Para 2 of the AG's report:
In humble opinion "Estimation has been Situated".
"National Defence has been a partner since....."
Wrong.
"Canada, or The Crown in right of Canada, or The Government of Canada has been a partner since..."
MOU 1997 Chretien/Williams/Murray or Baril
MOU 2002 Chretien/Williams/Henault
MOU 2006 Harper/Ross/Natynczyk
15 years of project. Government of Canada. National Defence. Industry Canada. NO PRE-EXISTING Manual. ( Not surprising for a unique effort that tried to solve the problems associated with all previous attempts at procuring aircraft across NATO).
My sense is that PWGSC is arguing for turf - saying that they weren't at the party soon enough and they could have done a better job.
What was the disconnect amongst PWGSC, DND and Industry Canada (not to mention DFAIT) prior to 2006 that they weren't all at the table from the get go? Whose cabinet was responsible for wrestling goats?
In humble opinion "Estimation has been Situated".
"National Defence has been a partner since....."
Wrong.
"Canada, or The Crown in right of Canada, or The Government of Canada has been a partner since..."
MOU 1997 Chretien/Williams/Murray or Baril
MOU 2002 Chretien/Williams/Henault
MOU 2006 Harper/Ross/Natynczyk
15 years of project. Government of Canada. National Defence. Industry Canada. NO PRE-EXISTING Manual. ( Not surprising for a unique effort that tried to solve the problems associated with all previous attempts at procuring aircraft across NATO).
My sense is that PWGSC is arguing for turf - saying that they weren't at the party soon enough and they could have done a better job.
What was the disconnect amongst PWGSC, DND and Industry Canada (not to mention DFAIT) prior to 2006 that they weren't all at the table from the get go? Whose cabinet was responsible for wrestling goats?
- Reaction score
- 7,693
- Points
- 1,160
Back and still grindin' and fumin'
In what way is this different from the advantage that Rafale gains from working with the French Air Force and that the French Government gains from Rafale. How about EADS with the Brits, Jerries and Italians? How about the US with Lockheed?
Essentially this programme seeks/sought to bring nations like Canada, Australia, Denmark and Turkey, who couldn't afford to build/develop aircraft of their own, into the programme early, have them take on some limited development risk (much the same way as they would with any of their domestic defence contractors) and have some input into assuring that the finished vehicle will be adjusted, modestly to fit their requirements.
Does anybody suppose that after Canada installs shipbuilding capacity, hires staff, designs ships and gets the first hulls in the water that they will do anything other than buy the ships that the yards are producing?
What? They are then going to go and run a competition with Meko and Fincantieri and then decide not to buy the domestically produced product?
The reason there is no rule book is that nobody has done it this way before.
In what way is this different from the advantage that Rafale gains from working with the French Air Force and that the French Government gains from Rafale. How about EADS with the Brits, Jerries and Italians? How about the US with Lockheed?
Essentially this programme seeks/sought to bring nations like Canada, Australia, Denmark and Turkey, who couldn't afford to build/develop aircraft of their own, into the programme early, have them take on some limited development risk (much the same way as they would with any of their domestic defence contractors) and have some input into assuring that the finished vehicle will be adjusted, modestly to fit their requirements.
Does anybody suppose that after Canada installs shipbuilding capacity, hires staff, designs ships and gets the first hulls in the water that they will do anything other than buy the ships that the yards are producing?
What? They are then going to go and run a competition with Meko and Fincantieri and then decide not to buy the domestically produced product?
The reason there is no rule book is that nobody has done it this way before.
- Reaction score
- 1
- Points
- 430
Kirk, I agree with all your previous statements, and I can tell that this hits a bit of a sore spot for you.
Exactly, does the current AG think that we would have gotten all the necessary information to make informed decisions if we hadn't participated? This information is highly proprietary and it certainly ain't free. We're all-in the way I see it.
The only problem with this statement is that it does employ Canadians. Perhaps, we should have went it alone on the JSF and designed another Avro Arrow. We all know how well that turned out.
Your right, it probably is a first for collaboration at this level. Another problem is that the rules and processes that we are being held to right now, were likely very different at the outset.
Let's get this crap over with and commit already. Let me see... partners with the US and AUS; or partners with France or Italy. Oh, that's a tough one.
Kirkhill said:
Exactly, does the current AG think that we would have gotten all the necessary information to make informed decisions if we hadn't participated? This information is highly proprietary and it certainly ain't free. We're all-in the way I see it.
Kirkhill said:
The only problem with this statement is that it does employ Canadians. Perhaps, we should have went it alone on the JSF and designed another Avro Arrow. We all know how well that turned out.
Kirkhill said:
Your right, it probably is a first for collaboration at this level. Another problem is that the rules and processes that we are being held to right now, were likely very different at the outset.
Let's get this crap over with and commit already. Let me see... partners with the US and AUS; or partners with France or Italy. Oh, that's a tough one.
- Reaction score
- 7,693
- Points
- 1,160
iper:Ach, Ferguson's a tcheuchter! He got my sassenach blood up.
By comparison here is the Dutch Auditor's report on exactly the same matter as it pertains to the F-16/JSF
Monitoring the Replacement of the F-16
- Reaction score
- 7,693
- Points
- 1,160
And here's the UK House of Commons report on "state of play".
Note section 5 of the report on Partner Countries where it states partners' wishes and intentions and how intentions are adjusted as the information on the project develops.
With firm information decisions can be finalized. When nothing but estimates are available then you may as well stick with plan A until you know something better.
Otherwise you get stuck in the position the UK government is in:
F-35B. No wait F-35C. No maybe F-35B after all...... Oh what the heck. We'll let you know in a few months time.
The difference between Canada and the rest? The rest don't have the same logistical antipathy to carrying two sets of spare parts and as a result aren't in the situation where the need to do a block exchange of aircraft. They are capable of covering gaps and adjustments as new aircraft come on line.
Canada's situation wouldn't be nearly as dire if 50% of the fighter fleet had been refreshed at 15 year intervals. Just as our Navy wouldn't be in its current situation if its hulls had been refreshed on a similar timeline.
Stuff the opposition.
Note section 5 of the report on Partner Countries where it states partners' wishes and intentions and how intentions are adjusted as the information on the project develops.
With firm information decisions can be finalized. When nothing but estimates are available then you may as well stick with plan A until you know something better.
Otherwise you get stuck in the position the UK government is in:
F-35B. No wait F-35C. No maybe F-35B after all...... Oh what the heck. We'll let you know in a few months time.
The difference between Canada and the rest? The rest don't have the same logistical antipathy to carrying two sets of spare parts and as a result aren't in the situation where the need to do a block exchange of aircraft. They are capable of covering gaps and adjustments as new aircraft come on line.
Canada's situation wouldn't be nearly as dire if 50% of the fighter fleet had been refreshed at 15 year intervals. Just as our Navy wouldn't be in its current situation if its hulls had been refreshed on a similar timeline.
Stuff the opposition.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 110
Ok , here is a bit from ``WIRED`` magazine December 14, 2011. Thank you, Mr. David Axe and associates for their cooperation in advance with the copy and paste feature, e.g. (I found it interesting and I hope you do too)
``The 196th and final F-22 Raptor has rolled out of Lockheed Martin’s factory in Marietta, Georgia. That means yesterday marked an end to more than 14 years of production for what’s widely considered the most fearsome jet fighter in history. And also one of the costliest.
So what’s the cost? As little as $137 million per jet and as much as $678 million, depending on how and what you count. The thing is, the best way of calculating the F-22′s cost may be the most abstract. But any way you crunch the numbers, the world’s best dogfighter has also been one of the most expensive operational warplanes ever.
Over the years, the Raptor’s cost has been the subject of intense debate in the Pentagon, the White House, Congress and the media. But advocates and critics tend to quote different figures to serve their various agendas. Fans of the twin-engine fighter usually refer to the “flyaway cost” — that is, how much Lockheed charged the government to piece together each Raptor after all development has been paid for. In other words, just construction spending.
By that reckoning, each of the last 60 F-22s set the taxpayer back $137 million, only slightly more than the roughly $110 million apiece Americans pay for a new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter — a plane specifically designed to be “affordable,” whatever that means. (All figures are in roughly constant dollars.)
Haters cite “unit cost,” which includes development and production spending divided by the number of jets built. F-22 production and development, including currently approved upgrades, totals $74 billion, resulting in a unit cost of $377 million.
And just because the last Raptor left the Marietta factory doesn’t mean the unit cost is fixed at $377 million. If the Air Force ever gets around to adding a long-planned-for datalink, the unit cost could increase slightly. Tweaks to prevent future groundings — like those that occurred this year — would also push the unit cost up.
By contrast, the F-35′s unit cost should stabilize at around $157 million, owing to a massive 2,443-plane production run. That’s assuming the Joint Strike Fighter doesn’t get canceled or curtailed following revelations of new design flaws.
There’s a third way to calculate the F-22′s burden on the taxpayer. “Lifecycle cost” adds up the price of fuel, spare parts and maintenance during the jet’s projected 40-year lifespan. The Government Accountability Office estimates it will cost $59 billion to fix and fly the F-22s until they retire. If you add unit cost and per-plane lifecycle cost, you get the total amount the United States spends to design, produce and operate a single Raptor: a whopping $678 million.
F-35 lifecycle plus unit cost, assuming nothing else goes wrong? $469 million, according to Air Force figures quoted by the GAO.
The fourth and final approach to calculating the Raptor’s price takes into account its effectiveness. It’s a trickier measurement. But it might be the best one to consider. It asks: How much value does the U.S. government get from its investment in F-22s?
While it’s undetectable in isolated flyaway, unit and lifecycle cost figures, value is inarguably important. A cheap used car that never leaves the driveway is, in a real sense, more expensive than a car you pay sticker price for and drive every day.
So consider this: since the F-22 entered service in 2005, every other operational warplane in the U.S. arsenal has seen action in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya or other conflict zones. But the tiny fleet of pricey F-22s, optimized for ultra-rare dogfighting missions, missing key upgrades and frequently grounded, hasn’t flown a single combat sortie.
That should be the real source of buyer’s remorse.``
__________________________________________________________________________
I add that we are choosing the F-35, doing so soon likely and expecting to pay less than the superior fighter jet, F22 Raptor.
I trust that the Air Force leadership choose those F35`s for all the right reasons and not just for cutting costs.
WoW, these multi-million dollar purchases are heady items, aren`t they?
EME-GLEN out
``The 196th and final F-22 Raptor has rolled out of Lockheed Martin’s factory in Marietta, Georgia. That means yesterday marked an end to more than 14 years of production for what’s widely considered the most fearsome jet fighter in history. And also one of the costliest.
So what’s the cost? As little as $137 million per jet and as much as $678 million, depending on how and what you count. The thing is, the best way of calculating the F-22′s cost may be the most abstract. But any way you crunch the numbers, the world’s best dogfighter has also been one of the most expensive operational warplanes ever.
Over the years, the Raptor’s cost has been the subject of intense debate in the Pentagon, the White House, Congress and the media. But advocates and critics tend to quote different figures to serve their various agendas. Fans of the twin-engine fighter usually refer to the “flyaway cost” — that is, how much Lockheed charged the government to piece together each Raptor after all development has been paid for. In other words, just construction spending.
By that reckoning, each of the last 60 F-22s set the taxpayer back $137 million, only slightly more than the roughly $110 million apiece Americans pay for a new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter — a plane specifically designed to be “affordable,” whatever that means. (All figures are in roughly constant dollars.)
Haters cite “unit cost,” which includes development and production spending divided by the number of jets built. F-22 production and development, including currently approved upgrades, totals $74 billion, resulting in a unit cost of $377 million.
And just because the last Raptor left the Marietta factory doesn’t mean the unit cost is fixed at $377 million. If the Air Force ever gets around to adding a long-planned-for datalink, the unit cost could increase slightly. Tweaks to prevent future groundings — like those that occurred this year — would also push the unit cost up.
By contrast, the F-35′s unit cost should stabilize at around $157 million, owing to a massive 2,443-plane production run. That’s assuming the Joint Strike Fighter doesn’t get canceled or curtailed following revelations of new design flaws.
There’s a third way to calculate the F-22′s burden on the taxpayer. “Lifecycle cost” adds up the price of fuel, spare parts and maintenance during the jet’s projected 40-year lifespan. The Government Accountability Office estimates it will cost $59 billion to fix and fly the F-22s until they retire. If you add unit cost and per-plane lifecycle cost, you get the total amount the United States spends to design, produce and operate a single Raptor: a whopping $678 million.
F-35 lifecycle plus unit cost, assuming nothing else goes wrong? $469 million, according to Air Force figures quoted by the GAO.
The fourth and final approach to calculating the Raptor’s price takes into account its effectiveness. It’s a trickier measurement. But it might be the best one to consider. It asks: How much value does the U.S. government get from its investment in F-22s?
While it’s undetectable in isolated flyaway, unit and lifecycle cost figures, value is inarguably important. A cheap used car that never leaves the driveway is, in a real sense, more expensive than a car you pay sticker price for and drive every day.
So consider this: since the F-22 entered service in 2005, every other operational warplane in the U.S. arsenal has seen action in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya or other conflict zones. But the tiny fleet of pricey F-22s, optimized for ultra-rare dogfighting missions, missing key upgrades and frequently grounded, hasn’t flown a single combat sortie.
That should be the real source of buyer’s remorse.``
__________________________________________________________________________
I add that we are choosing the F-35, doing so soon likely and expecting to pay less than the superior fighter jet, F22 Raptor.
I trust that the Air Force leadership choose those F35`s for all the right reasons and not just for cutting costs.
WoW, these multi-million dollar purchases are heady items, aren`t they?
EME-GLEN out
Colin Parkinson
Army.ca Myth
- Reaction score
- 9,971
- Points
- 1,160
Wonder what they will do if they hold an open and transparent competition and the F-35 wins....
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 160
Colin P said:
They will cry...
But I think it will come down to whether or not a new SOP will be written, and what, if any, details they may leave in or out of it.
Similar threads
