Not necessarily - combined with the recent Monocle purchase (and the price they paid) it shows knowledge has been replaced by ignorance and/or incompetence (or some sort of nepotism).
And the extant maturity of other CAF organizations to get their poop in a group, at least for some of the smaller-scale procurements that politicians don’t immediately see as own-riding cash cows to be pursued assiduously.
I was hoping once combat operations in Afghanistan ended in 2011, the folks with multiple tours were the ones who would stay in & pave the way forwards for the CAF.Dammit if they monos were good enough for me they are damn well good enough for you!!
In WW1 Canadians were in the forefront using tech and innovation to lead the way.
Sadly it sounds like we don't care.
Rotary Wing guys have always been on the cutting edge of NVG's.And the extant maturity of other CAF organizations to get their poop in a group, at least for some of the smaller-scale procurements that politicians don’t immediately see as own-riding cash cows to be pursued assiduously.
I first flew with AN/AVS-501s (a CAN-specific build of US Gen II AN/PVS-5C) back in ‘91. I think they had a FOM of between 600-800, crappy for sure, but than no NVGs and a single landing light as the alternative. I was very happy to get in with Gen III tubes subsequently: AN/AVS- later ANVIS-6, -9, Pinnacle -9 and ‘some other models.’ All to say that op and tech requirements were established, applicable staff work done to ensure life-cycle support for the systems as well as supporting systems like focussing devices and maintenance equipment, and a recurring update program to assign applicable capital funding for fleet turnover and expansion. It isn’t rocket science, but it does take organizations to form up their paths and commit to them in an informed and progressive manner. Not to become a continual nag about the Army’s challenges with sorting things and getting in with them (light forces, anybody?), but I’ll nag about the fact that the army does enjoy a good long stare at its belly button and whining when others move on in contemporary technology. As KevinB and others noted, the CA’s NV program writ large is….or has…room to improve. Good Lord, if the AF has had NV sorted for 30+ years, can it really be that hard?
Which these days shouldn’t be the case, at all.Not necessarily - combined with the recent Monocle purchase (and the price they paid) it shows knowledge has been replaced by ignorance and/or incompetence (or some sort of nepotism).
Clearly you never worked in DLRWhich these days shouldn’t be the case, at all.
If I’m the person who is either in charge, or directly advising the person in charge, of what to purchase to enhance our NV capabilities (Army wide, or perhaps something trade specific) - and I’m woefully out of my knowledge base…there is nothing wrong with reaching out to allied organizations and discussing with them what has worked well/not well for them, and asking for advice based on their experience.
There used to be a vast gap between CANSOF and the rest of the Army -- a lot of gear was viewed as "Special" by Regular Army and ignored - without realizing that 99% of "Special" kit is only special due to initial expense - and that it has equal employment utility across the Force.Ignorance, in this case, shouldn’t exist. We each have more access to information, discussion forums, and reviews about tech available at our fingertips.
If we want to bring ourselves up to speed on something quickly, and truly bring a useful capability to bear - reach out and ask an allied unit for feedback/advice based on their experience.
Heck, even reach out to some of the CANSOF types and their network of contacts for feedback.
The ignorant most often don't know they are ignorant...Ignorance isn’t really acceptable, in my opinion anyway, when it comes to these things.
You always know morale hasn't hit rock bottom and people still care when they rant -- as for when the bitching stops - that's when you worry, as they have gotten into plotting...Anyways. Lunch break is over, and also my random rants.
Aw! But building a new HQ would have been actually achievable in the timelines and within our comfort zone. Bonus points if we had put it in the greater Montreal area and the formation patch incorporated the quadruple arrows, just so that we can officially go full circle right back to where we started.Back to F2025 it self, it would appear they went back to the drawing board a bit to redo COA3, now it's COA 3.1 and 3.2, the 6th Div HQ is gone in both cases
Good start. Call me again when three or four more are gone.Back to F2025 it self, it would appear they went back to the drawing board a bit to redo COA3, now it's COA 3.1 and 3.2, the 6th Div HQ is gone in both cases
Just search Force 2025 of ACIMS, it's all available for anyone to view. It is app constantly changing, the decision brief will occur before the end of the year with an announcement on Jan about what the future will be.Can anyone share where one might be able to find these COAs?
The Leslie plan called for fewer HQ. And while Hillier is known for his ‘big honkin’ ship’ comment - I don’t think he was a proponent of even more HQ’s either.Aw! But building a new HQ would have been actually achievable in the timelines and within our comfort zone. Bonus points if we had put it in the greater Montreal area and the formation patch incorporated the quadruple arrows, just so that we can officially go full circle right back to where we started.
On a more serious note, a COA that incorporated “more division headquarters” was probably never going to fly. The Leslie plan talked about fewer Div HQ, down to two I think, and in the old days for quite some time brigades reported directly to St Hubert with no intermediate HQs.
I still like Kevin's COA 4: 2 Div each of 3 Bde - all Bde mixed Reg and Res.Good start. Call me again when three or four more are gone.
I'll be interested in seeing how they plan to juggle that - particulalry the TBG structures.
Currently there are 49 Res F infantry battalions. The COA 3 structure calls for 19 Res F Infantry TBG/battalions with 2 x RFL 1 companies and 1 x RFL 2 company each but still under 10 x Bde HQs. Quite frankly at that rate the Maritimes, Quebec and the Prairies could be reduced to one brigade HQ each, Ontario to two with the Maritimes and Quebec as one division, Ontario and the Prairies as another and all the Reg F brigade groups to one division.
Under COA 3 arty goes from 16 regiments plus three independent batteries to 10 TBGs; armour goes from 19 Res F regiments to 7 TBGs; 10 CERs and 10 Svc Bns and 10 Sigs Regts stay at 10 each. Each of these could easily be amalgamated into 5 TBGs each.
Ta Da - 3 division HQs, 4 Reg F brigades and 5 Res F ones. Those HQ PY savings alone would provide the 2-300 PYs being sought to add to the instructor cadres.
I quite dislike the basic COA 3 concept primarily because it puts all the Reg F brigades under one division while the Res F brigades are under separate ones. This breaks the linkage between Reg F and Res F brigades and their shared geographic training establishments. Strangely that is not listed as a disadvantage for COA 3.
The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group, or CAST, was a Canadian Forces battle group dedicated to the rapid reinforcement of Norway in the event of a land war in Europe. The Group was based on a mechanized infantry brigade, supported by two Rapid Reinforcement Fighter Squadrons equipped with Canadair CF-5 fighters and a variety of supporting units. Manpower varied between 4,800 and 5,500 troops depending on how it was counted. CAST formed in 1968 as part of a widespread realignment of Canadian forces in Europe, and disbanded again in 1989 when the Forces were recombined into larger battalion sized group in West Germany.
a ... formation roughly the size of the European portion of 4 CMBG would be deployed to Norway given one month's notice by the Norwegian government.
CAST consisted of three major components; the three mechanized infantry battalions of the 5 CMBG, two Rapid Reinforcement Fighter Squadrons with 10 CF-5 fighters each, an artillery regiment and an armored reconnaissance squadron. In total, CAST contained about 5,500 men in the combined force. Their battle plan was known as Operational Plan BORAL. BORAL relied on the Norwegians supplying the required roll-on/roll-off sealift capability, while Canadian commercial aircraft would be commandeered to move in advanced parties.
In the case of a war, CAST would be joined by similar-sized units from the United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force and US's 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade.
Planning started in the summer of 1984 and it was found the Operational Plan BORAL was sketchy at best - it had never been developed to any sort of operational level. Further, it became clear that "NDHQ planners… were addressing a large scale joint/combined exercise for the first time…" Planning dragged on, and BRAVE LION was not ready for deployment for a full two years, a worrying development for a system designed to be rapidly deployed in a short war. The required sealift capability was not available, and additional commercial ships from West Germany, England and Panama had to be chartered.
The main infantry sections and supporting units were in place in 7 days, but the mechanized forces and equipment were not unloaded until the 22nd day - the majority of time allotted to the entire war (30 days). There was no plan to test or provide for a strategic withdrawal, which many commented would leave the troops stranded.
Militarily, the forces proved entirely capable once they arrived, carrying out operations until they returned in October. The only notable event was the crash of a CH-137 Kiowa helicopter than resulted in three minor injuries. Small portions of the force, notably heavy trucks, were left in Norway to avoid having to ship them in the future.
However, the entire mission structure behind the combat sections was generally considered a failure. Logistics support was cobbled together from several different existing groups, while the extensive logistics experience that was part of Headquarters Canadian Forces Europe was not called upon. Further confusion ensued over the role of the Canadian naval forces in the exercise; planning did not call for any Canadian ships to be dedicated to the mission as they were expected to be part of a much larger NATO antisubmarine effort. However, it was clear that the mission would require naval support, especially if opposed at landing, and such support had never been arranged. Finally, traditional rivalries between the land and air forces led to a division of effort between helicopter and fighter support that was never addressed.