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FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure

Infanteer

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Switching gears.

Hypothesis and hypothetical scenario. Tanks are too expensive to maintain and operate in the numbers needed, and are mothballed.

How do you structure the Army? How does it stay relevant in areas where pacing threats are introducing new armoured systems?
 

dapaterson

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Prior to mothballing, can we at least upgrade to a single, common standard?
 

Infanteer

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No, because after mothballing, we will sell the A4s to a South American country (jungles or mountains, who needs 70 ton MBTs more?) and we'll put the A6s in the museums.
 

FJAG

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... One of the strengths of the Russians and Chinese armies that has often been mentioned is their mass. We may have better quality troops/weapons but they have greater weight of troops/firepower. Small but well armed units units using hit and run tactics could force the enemy to disperse their forces to deal with these attacks. That would allow our conventional units to take on their forces while their advantage of greater mass is diminished. ...
Don't know much about the Chinese organization at the brigade and below level but as for the Russians, do not forget that in general their manoeuvre battalions are significantly smaller than ours while their fire support is significantly larger.

Tank battalions are 31 tanks (10 per coy) with only some 151 personnel. Same for infantry battalions which also have only 37 IFVs (10 per coy) and 461 pers (including their mortar battery and weapons pl.

On the other hand a brigade's one tank battalion and three rifle battalions are supported by 2 x SP artillery battalions (36 tubes) ; 1 x rocket battalion ( 18 launchers); 1 x Anti-tank battalion ( 36 systems); and 2 x AD missile battalions (6 x SA 13; 6 x SA-19; 12x SA 15; 27 x SA-18 Manpads)

That should give folks a hint.

Switching gears.

Hypothesis and hypothetical scenario. Tanks are too expensive to maintain and operate in the numbers needed, and are mothballed.

How do you structure the Army? How does it stay relevant in areas where pacing threats are introducing new armoured systems?

Hypothetical answer.

If a manned tank is too expensive then conceivably so would be a remotely controlled or autonomous "tank" -- unless we use a small, lightly armoured chassis and built very cheaply as a multiple-shot but one-use expendable weapon system. In other words they are closer in concept to expendable munitions rather than reusable fighting vehicles.

Such systems would require less PYs to operate thereby greatly reducing recurring annual costs for a full unit. Maintenance and recovery and administrative support would also be greatly reduced on an annual basis and in combat. Effectively a unit operating such vehicles would be issued fully armoured and fueled (maybe even electric) replacement vehicles (perhaps in containers) the way that fuel and ammunition is supplied now.

There would need to be a limited form of replenishment to keep vehicles fueled, armed and serviced during non combat phases and to rearm and refuel those that do not end up being destroyed in a given engagement (such vehicles could be programmed to navigate themselves to a replenishment point when all ammo is expended). To reduce size and weight missiles would probably be the best form of armament although some might be armed with a suite of anti-personnel weapons such as grenade launchers and/or machine guns. (I prefer an either/or mixed fleet of anti-armour and anti-personnel rather than an all-singing and dancing single vehicle so as to keep the vehicles as small and uncomplicated as possible)

Such units would need to be tied in to existing UAV sensor systems and would probably also need to run their own UAV "eyes" probably mixed in with a suite of light to medium UAVs and loitering munitions. Targeting is remote controlled or AI once mature.

I still have some doubts as to offensive operations. It's one thing to engage and defeat enemy equipment, it's quite another to seize key terrain. Offensive ops will require combined arms operations with a robust infantry component. Until such time as we deploy robot-grunts, that means people in heavily armoured carriers/fighting vehicles to minimize casualties. Those have both a heavy maintenance burden as well as significant recurring annual costs which are difficult to avoid. Some of the vehicles within that organization should also be "tanks" to provide the traditional shock value and intimate direct fire support as well as the psychological element for our own troops and the enemy's. Using a common chassis for the "tank" and IFV would lessen the maintenance burden.

This type of more traditional combined arms unit would also be heavily supported during an attack by the expendable weapon systems described above so that fewer of the traditional "tanks" are needed.

I'll leave aside the need for massive indirect fire support because I know most of you infantry and tank types would rather not think about that. 😁 More importantly, that wasn't the question.

Hypothetically

🍻
 

CBH99

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Switching gears.

Hypothesis and hypothetical scenario. Tanks are too expensive to maintain and operate in the numbers needed, and are mothballed.

How do you structure the Army? How does it stay relevant in areas where pacing threats are introducing new armoured systems?
This is actually a really good question, and has my gears turning.

and a very relevant question, since even if we don’t mothball the tanks, we won’t be able to deploy them in sufficient numbers to really change the outcome of a peer vs peer conflict. (Even in an all out conflict, does 40 or so Canadian tanks arriving by ship a month later, really change much?)


- Increase firepower to the LAVs. If the US can slap a 35mm onto their Stryker, we can too damnit. Or larger.

- Introduce a highly efficient ATGM capability to the LAV, or TAPV, and dismounted to the troops. (Tank units hate it when ATGMs start raining down randomly on their positions. And it doesn’t take many successful hits to make a tank unit combat ineffective.)

- Add a generous amount of loitering UAVs to all units. No inter-service pissing matches. We care about results, not whether the member operating it is wearing a blue or green T-shirt. (Manufacture them in Canada. Cheap and easy to use. Can destroy a target once found. Worked wonders against Armenia recently)


0.02
 

CBH99

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I'll leave aside the need for massive indirect fire support because I know most of you infantry and tank types would rather not think about that. 😁 More importantly, that wasn't the question.

Hypothetically

🍻
Actually quite the opposite! Being able to call in artillery to attack enemy in the open, cover a tactical retreat, or pummel certain grids to “shape” the fight in the way we want - is very much something we thought of all the time. Believe me on that!

Outside of our FOB we established which routes and areas were most likely to be used by the enemy to attack us, and had our mortars zeroed in.

Artillery support - whether it was on patrol and provided by the big guns, or while in base provided by the mortars - were very important to all of us.

(To the mysterious senior powers that be, maybe not so much?)


- If mothballing the tanks, the mandatory trade off would be an equal number of platforms for long range fires.

- Or 75% trade for long range fires, 25% for cheap suicide drones. Either way, we don’t mothball the tanks without getting something of equal or more value in return.


Another 0.02
 

GR66

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WRT all these unmanned vehicles and swarms of UAVs being envisioned. What does control of these look like in a situation with unrestricted electronic warfare?

Could an enemy effectively shut these down with some kind of brute force EM blocking technology? I'm totally uneducated on these things so have no idea. Presumably such a tactic would prevent their own use of those parts of the EM spectrum as well, but they may be willing to take that hit if they are stronger on the lower end of the tech scale.

Would this give an advantage to a side that is willing to make use of fully autonomous AI weapon systems that don't need comms to keep a human in the loop?
 

PuckChaser

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UAVs. Lots of UAVs … and missile based anti-tank artillery.
How do you control those UAVs in an EM-denied environment? Sure you can program them to fly around, but without that electronic tether you're not able to get real time video or employ weapons systems with them.
 

IRepoCans

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I am not sure if I am a fan of multiple small coys, because that ultimately leads to much smaller platoons that lack the capacity to carry certain capabilities and in turn the mass capable of sustaining a handful of casualties before being rendered ineffective. Plus I don't see how we'll manage to train and develop all these junior officers in a timely manner to support the concept, and I doubt we'll effectively employ our NCOs as well.

Especially when we could simply just take existing structures and adapt them to be far more capable of operating in a distributed manner, such as: giving the individual rifle company more organic assets that would usually be attached. This in turn could see certain capabilities pushed down to the platoon depending on their means of movement (mechanized platoons should have ATGMs organic to it, whereas ATGM could be within a coy level detachment / section in a light company). Which in turn make the platoons more suited to operating slightly more distributed than normal with a lot more teeth to bear.

The Americans did it with the Rangers (which I detailed below); and, the Brits with their Royal Marines fighting Commando units (with their mix of close and stand off companies) and SFSG (which have a fire support platoon that can employ MMG, HMG and ATGM in each strike coy). I imagine there are other none SOF organizations that have pushed more down to the coy level; operate in a distributed manner; and, are focused on striking and defeating peer and near peer entities.

Ranger Rifle Company (Which there are four of in each manoeuvre bn for a total of twelve rifle coys)
Company HQ: Usual make-up​
Anti-Tank Section: Three two-man AT teams, one for each platoon​
Fire Support Element:​
  • FSO, FS NCO, and FS specialist for the coy HQ
  • One FO and RTO for each platoon
Medical Section:​
  • Two medical NCOs at the coy HQ
  • One medical NCO and enlisted medic for each platoon
3 x Ranger Rifle Platoons:​
  • Platoon HQ: PL, PSgt, RTO
  • 3 x Rifle Squad: One SL, two four-man fire teams
  • MG Squad: One SL, three two-man gun teams
Habitual attachments from the HHC:​
  1. Sniper Section: Three two-man sniper teams, one for each platoon
  2. Recce Team: Six pers
  3. Mortar Section / Squad (60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars)
All of which can be moved in their modified Strykers, various light weight ground mobility platforms in the absence of / or in concert with air transport; or as dictated by the tactical situation.
 

FJAG

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Actually quite the opposite! Being able to call in artillery to attack enemy in the open, cover a tactical retreat, or pummel certain grids to “shape” the fight in the way we want - is very much something we thought of all the time. Believe me on that! ...
I did say it half facetiously but while you are bang on about the folks outside the wire understanding and appreciating the firepower provided, the folks who run the twin towers in Ottawa were and continue to be highly reticent to allocate PYs or to fund new equipment or to transfer some of the essential capabilities to the reserves in any meaningful way.

The current artillery structure is fairly well set up and equipped to handle another COIN operation like Afghanistan (so long as the Taliban do not get any UAV assets and everyone operates the way they did fifteen years ago) Anything else we're in a world of hurt. We have not kept pace with either new technologies or the new threats.

🍻
 

FJAG

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How do you control those UAVs in an EM-denied environment? Sure you can program them to fly around, but without that electronic tether you're not able to get real time video or employ weapons systems with them.
That really is where the next systems arms race will be as measures and counter measures and counter-counter measures will proliferate.

Back in the 70's we first started thinking seriously about EMP and how to make electronics survivable. By the 90s we pretty much made any emitting system like radars a target while designing radar resistant stealthy products. To the best of my knowledge none of those things are perfect even yet.

We have a long way to go in securing those technologies and in providing for an adequate analogue fallback. That doesn't mean we shouldn't work on the needed systems and concepts while simultaneously making them proof or upgradeable against counter measures.

I never thought we'd have driverless cars either. It seems the technology is getting better every day. On the other hand the more we develop AI and autonomous weapons the closer we get to Skynet. :oops:

🍻
 

PuckChaser

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But in the context of going full bore to replace tanks with UAVs, until we have the counter to the counter-measure of EA on our communications links, we basically give ourselves 0 capabilities in the medium term. At least with manned vehicles, a sub-unit commander can be given orders verbally and given mission command so they can operate once rounds start flying and the EM spectrum is denied.

We also have the closest thing to 0 Land EW capability, it's stuck in a Afghanistan "good enough" mindset. If we're planning on a fight in the Baltics, we're not going to fare all that well.
 

Kirkhill

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Don't know much about the Chinese organization at the brigade and below level but as for the Russians, do not forget that in general their manoeuvre battalions are significantly smaller than ours while their fire support is significantly larger.

Tank battalions are 31 tanks (10 per coy) with only some 151 personnel. Same for infantry battalions which also have only 37 IFVs (10 per coy) and 461 pers (including their mortar battery and weapons pl.

On the other hand a brigade's one tank battalion and three rifle battalions are supported by 2 x SP artillery battalions (36 tubes) ; 1 x rocket battalion ( 18 launchers); 1 x Anti-tank battalion ( 36 systems); and 2 x AD missile battalions (6 x SA 13; 6 x SA-19; 12x SA 15; 27 x SA-18 Manpads)

That should give folks a hint.



Hypothetical answer.

If a manned tank is too expensive then conceivably so would be a remotely controlled or autonomous "tank" -- unless we use a small, lightly armoured chassis and built very cheaply as a multiple-shot but one-use expendable weapon system. In other words they are closer in concept to expendable munitions rather than reusable fighting vehicles.

Such systems would require less PYs to operate thereby greatly reducing recurring annual costs for a full unit. Maintenance and recovery and administrative support would also be greatly reduced on an annual basis and in combat. Effectively a unit operating such vehicles would be issued fully armoured and fueled (maybe even electric) replacement vehicles (perhaps in containers) the way that fuel and ammunition is supplied now.

There would need to be a limited form of replenishment to keep vehicles fueled, armed and serviced during non combat phases and to rearm and refuel those that do not end up being destroyed in a given engagement (such vehicles could be programmed to navigate themselves to a replenishment point when all ammo is expended). To reduce size and weight missiles would probably be the best form of armament although some might be armed with a suite of anti-personnel weapons such as grenade launchers and/or machine guns. (I prefer an either/or mixed fleet of anti-armour and anti-personnel rather than an all-singing and dancing single vehicle so as to keep the vehicles as small and uncomplicated as possible)

Such units would need to be tied in to existing UAV sensor systems and would probably also need to run their own UAV "eyes" probably mixed in with a suite of light to medium UAVs and loitering munitions. Targeting is remote controlled or AI once mature.

I still have some doubts as to offensive operations. It's one thing to engage and defeat enemy equipment, it's quite another to seize key terrain. Offensive ops will require combined arms operations with a robust infantry component. Until such time as we deploy robot-grunts, that means people in heavily armoured carriers/fighting vehicles to minimize casualties. Those have both a heavy maintenance burden as well as significant recurring annual costs which are difficult to avoid. Some of the vehicles within that organization should also be "tanks" to provide the traditional shock value and intimate direct fire support as well as the psychological element for our own troops and the enemy's. Using a common chassis for the "tank" and IFV would lessen the maintenance burden.

This type of more traditional combined arms unit would also be heavily supported during an attack by the expendable weapon systems described above so that fewer of the traditional "tanks" are needed.

I'll leave aside the need for massive indirect fire support because I know most of you infantry and tank types would rather not think about that. 😁 More importantly, that wasn't the question.

Hypothetically

🍻

We used to disparage the Russian system because it was all teeth and no tail. Their troops, in our view, were designed to be consumed. Use the company, battalion, regiment, division until it needed to be replaced. On the other hand our large divisions were supposed to be sustainable in the field. But I doubt that anybody really thought of a Division lasting more than a couple of weeks in a high intensity environment without having to be withdrawn and rebuilt.

Somewhere along the line though, we stopped laughing at the Division supplying Pizzas and Coke machines like the Americans and started expecting that.

It the Russians were all teeth and no tail we seem to have shifted to all tail and no teeth.

WRT Technology

Technology in some fields, like UAVs, is mature enough to have an impact on the battlefield. In my view that impact is to continue the drive to dispersion. That dispersion makes it harder to deploy and support and create effects from heavy forces. Which, in turn, makes it harder to generate an offence.

For reference I don't see the difference between a smart munition and a UAV regardless of the means of launching. The Air Domain is the most easily exploited and the easiest one for "robots" to "navigate" and it is "universal". It has application in the Ground, Marine and Space Domains.

Submarine robots are not dissimilar to aerial robots except for the major issue of the communications barrier. That drives a move towards more autonomy. On the other hand, given that comms in the Air Domain are not guaranteed then the autonomy required in the Submarine Domain would probably serve the Air Domain equally well.

For the Land Domain, I don't see Isaac Asimov Robots, or even Ripley Exoskeletons and Heinlein Drop Pods anywhere on the horizon. I do see vehicles with reduced crewing requirements. But those vehicles need to be cheap, provide long range situational awareness to the crew and their team-mates, be able to communicate node to node and be designed to focus the protection on the crew and not the weapon.

I still have some doubts as to offensive operations. It's one thing to engage and defeat enemy equipment, it's quite another to seize key terrain. Offensive ops will require combined arms operations with a robust infantry component. Until such time as we deploy robot-grunts, that means people in heavily armoured carriers/fighting vehicles to minimize casualties. Those have both a heavy maintenance burden as well as significant recurring annual costs which are difficult to avoid. Some of the vehicles within that organization should also be "tanks" to provide the traditional shock value and intimate direct fire support as well as the psychological element for our own troops and the enemy's. Using a common chassis for the "tank" and IFV would lessen the maintenance burden.

I think you are right about offensive actions and the need for heavy forces. But CBH99 is also right about the ability to deploy them in a timely fashion.

So the first element, surely must be to buy time to deploy the heavies by creating the siege conditions they are designed to break?

That means we assume the enemy, being the aggressor, has the element of surprise on their side when launching an offense. So our first imperative is to stall and/or break that offence. That means delivering munitions rapidly, over long distances, to defeat the elements around which the offence is built. Currently we are concerned about Russian tanks being massed and countering them. Smart Munitions and UAVs seem to be a viable combination.

That same combination will make it hard for our own troops to manoeuver once the enemy force is stalled, the siege is established and our own heavies are deployed and concentrated. That suggests to me that our APCs need to be heavily armoured and protected by a light, radar guided gun with a rapid slew rate and lots of ammunition. I don't think a 33/35/40/57 mm gun to defeat similarly armed is the requirement for an infantry transporter. I think a rapid slew ROWS with a 5.56 Minitat for knocking down munitions at the last minute (Phalanx, Trophy, CRAM) has more value in creating space for the deployment of own troops.

Keep the big gun vehicles separate from the infantry carrying vehicles and minimize their crews. If a 1-2 man 155mm SPH, or MRLS is possible then a 1-2 man 35-120mm DFS vehicle with onboard ATGMs must be possible.

And yes by all means - massive indirect fire support (and ground based air defence)

But that means wise use of available PYs.

M777s with 10 man crews are not wise.

Each 10 man crew could field:

An Archer/Rheinmetall style 155mm SPH with a two man crew
A HIMARS with a two man crew
A Wiesel style 120mm mortar with a three man crew
A FOO team with a three man crew

The HIMARS and the SPHs are big enough that they can accommodate their own MRT teams and tools.

And for GBAD?

1623514769414.png

1623514809054.png

NASAMS and SkyShield - 13 PYs = 1x M777 and a Command Team.


And GR66 has it right for me, wrt small companies. By all means retain the conventional configuration in the symmetric brigades. (1x Arty, 1x Combined Arms, 2x LAV)

But leave the 3rd Battalions open for experimentation - for rapid deployment on the dispersed battle field - something between the conventional force and the special force but equipped to stall an enemy advance and establish the siege.

For me that means lots of smart munitions capable of taking out lots of ground vehicles. Yes, lots of ATGMs, but equally lots of laser designators to direct munitions launched by other partners.
 
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Kirkhill

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WRT Comms and Navigation in a GPS denied environment - fortunately there has been some thought given to that.






Apparently the navigation systems seem to fall back on "dead reckoning" (Inertial Navigation Systems), refined by terrain following and celestial navigation, a bit of electro-optical formation flying, and a bit of bayesian analysis (each unit calculating its own position and the swarm averaging its result).

Targeting can be by optical recognition against on board data, or by ground designation or by observer.

Comms are also possible by optical line of site comms (laser) from node to node in the net created by the swarm. If you can see one part of the swarm you can communicate with the entire swarm assuming the maintain line of sight with each other. Equally if one of the swarm can see you, or a land mark, it can locate the entire swarm.
 

FJAG

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... I don't think a 33/35/40/57 mm gun to defeat similarly armed is the requirement for an infantry transporter. I think a rapid slew ROWS with a 5.56 Minitat for knocking down munitions at the last minute (Phalanx, Trophy, CRAM) has more value in creating space for the deployment of own troops.

Keep the big gun vehicles separate from the infantry carrying vehicles and minimize their crews. ....
See, that jives in with my own thoughts. This is why I disagree with things like one weapon system for both AT and AD. A missile might be a missile but the two roles are so distinct that one crew with one weapon system becomes too complex to do both jobs (the old jack of all trades master of none concept)

I'm a firm believer that one should have two different systems/vehicles for carrying infantry and providing fire support. That was the original concept for Stryker - maximize internal room for dismounts and minimize the vehicles weapon systems to the bare minimum needed for defence of the vehicle. Unfortunately the Bradley principle of hanging all sorts of weapons system into or onto the turret slowly undermined that concept. IMHO the sole role of the APC should be to transport the dismounts as quickly and safely as possible to where they will be of use. The crew commander should focus on that. Let specialty direct fire systems/vehicles handle the mounted fire fight.

Unfortunately economics will always rear their head. It's cheaper (both in dollars and manning) to add an ever more complex all singing and dancing turret to the APC (thus making it an IFV) then to add yet another fleet of specialty vehicles and crews to the team.
...And GR66 has it right for me, wrt small companies. By all means retain the conventional configuration in the symmetric brigades. (1x Arty, 1x Combined Arms, 2x LAV)...
My biggest problem with "small companies" is that they do not have enough resources in and of themselves. By the time that you add in an AT capability, and an AD capability, and a scout capability (whether vehicular or UAV), and a fire support team, and a mobility team (engineer or pioneer), and a command team, and a sustainment element you start to have a fairly large sized organization.

Sure, you can use a building block principle for adding those elements from a central pool but that only adds the inefficiency of creating on-the-fly ad-hoc teams without any great reduction in team size.

I'm not by any stretch of the imagination defending the current company/battalion structure (things have changed entirely too much since I did that type of stuff for a living) but until something significantly superior comes along, I'm happy to fine tune it rather than throwing it under the bus for something unproven. I do think, and have thought for quite some time, that an experimental brigade (and in a pinch even a battle group) would be a fine idea.

🍻
 

Brad Sallows

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$0.02:

Tanks are too expensive to maintain and operate in the numbers needed, and are mothballed.

So the two main capabilities lost are anti-tank and DFS. (I suppose Canada doesn't have much else to fill either right now.)

How do you structure the Army?

More indirect fire units. More AD to protect the indirect fire units. More drone counter-air. More aviation. Infantry force organized around support weapons (mortar, anti-tank, direct fire, MG) for the <800m battle. (Differently for close terrain.) Everything under armor (proof against fragments and .50 cal and below, maybe resistant to 20-25mm) for movement.

Probably just blew through "too expensive to maintain and operate", though. Much of the stuff needed is costly and complex, if it is any good.
 

Kirkhill

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See, that jives in with my own thoughts. This is why I disagree with things like one weapon system for both AT and AD. A missile might be a missile but the two roles are so distinct that one crew with one weapon system becomes too complex to do both jobs (the old jack of all trades master of none concept)

I'm a firm believer that one should have two different systems/vehicles for carrying infantry and providing fire support. That was the original concept for Stryker - maximize internal room for dismounts and minimize the vehicles weapon systems to the bare minimum needed for defence of the vehicle. Unfortunately the Bradley principle of hanging all sorts of weapons system into or onto the turret slowly undermined that concept. IMHO the sole role of the APC should be to transport the dismounts as quickly and safely as possible to where they will be of use. The crew commander should focus on that. Let specialty direct fire systems/vehicles handle the mounted fire fight.

Unfortunately economics will always rear their head. It's cheaper (both in dollars and manning) to add an ever more complex all singing and dancing turret to the APC (thus making it an IFV) then to add yet another fleet of specialty vehicles and crews to the team.

My biggest problem with "small companies" is that they do not have enough resources in and of themselves. By the time that you add in an AT capability, and an AD capability, and a scout capability (whether vehicular or UAV), and a fire support team, and a mobility team (engineer or pioneer), and a command team, and a sustainment element you start to have a fairly large sized organization.

Sure, you can use a building block principle for adding those elements from a central pool but that only adds the inefficiency of creating on-the-fly ad-hoc teams without any great reduction in team size.

I'm not by any stretch of the imagination defending the current company/battalion structure (things have changed entirely too much since I did that type of stuff for a living) but until something significantly superior comes along, I'm happy to fine tune it rather than throwing it under the bus for something unproven. I do think, and have thought for quite some time, that an experimental brigade (and in a pinch even a battle group) would be a fine idea.

🍻

Distressing. We are approaching points of agreement. We'll have to work on that. :)

Agreed on the economics. The only real solution is to accept that we will have to make do with Made in Canada solutions. That, however, includes most US manufacturers and Rheinmetall. Not a bad set of catalogues to work from in my opinion.

My biggest problem with "small companies" is that they do not have enough resources in and of themselves. By the time that you add in an AT capability, and an AD capability, and a scout capability (whether vehicular or UAV), and a fire support team, and a mobility team (engineer or pioneer), and a command team, and a sustainment element you start to have a fairly large sized organization.

See, I think we are seeing the role of the "small companies" differently.

I don't see them as Close Combat Infantry at all. I see them as skirmishers operating at one remove from the enemy. I don't see "adding" an AT capability. I see an AT capability as their "raison d'etre" with AT weapons integral to their section structure. CG84s with CGLPs, Javelins etc. Heavy on machine guns. Mounted on vehicles that can be deployed in large numbers by air. Certainly with a local defence AD capability.
No scout capability. The whole unit is a scouting/screening unit. Any "company" can be tasked to the point, the flanks or the reserve.

Fire Support Team? If you mean an ANGLICO type team then absolutely. If you mean big guns, maybe not, unless mounted on light, air deployable vehicles (and 1 gun per C17 is not what I am suggesting).

And a mobility team? More of a counter-mobility team. More C4 than D9s. The unit should learn to work with the terrain rather than trying to adjust the terrain.

And of course the Command Element is integral, throughout.


I am looking for something that could handle The Retreat from Mons rather than Passchendael.

And something that might be organized along the lines of the First Special Service Force or early Commandos.

The Brigade's own SOF unit that specializes in conventional warfare but is available as an adjunct to CANSOFCOM when the situation demands.
 

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Funny. Going back and re-reading my last.... I just realized I have not described an infantry unit at all. What I have described is an air-portable light recce unit....one that can operate mounted, and dismounted with helo support.

Not so much FSSF as early SAS/LRDG.
 

FJAG

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Funny. Going back and re-reading my last.... I just realized I have not described an infantry unit at all. What I have described is an air-portable light recce unit....one that can operate mounted, and dismounted with helo support.

Not so much FSSF as early SAS/LRDG.
In a lot of ways what you are describing from a doctrinal concept is one of the two UK Strike Brigades. While I've been looking, I haven't found very much on how that brigade or the units in it function other than the basis will be two cavalry regiments with Ajax (right now still Scimitar and Challenger) and two infantry battalions with Boxer (right now still Warrior). Beyond that there is still a lot of experimentation being worked out with how these elements will operate.

Personally I dislike any organization that selects the equipment first and then tries to figure out what to do with it. But at least one of the brigades is designated a "Strike Experimentation Group" so that's a positive sign.

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