Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)

[GK .Dundas]

Based on Russia's approach to the Crimea and other places, they are probably already occupying our arctic territories and we don't even know they are there.

Why not the Luftwaffe did it and we never knew about it until the early nineties.

 

[a_majoor]

For the Russians or Chinese (or even the Americans) to succeed they mearly have to block or disrupt "our" access to arctic resources, rather than immediatly attempt to extract and exploit them on their own. In fact, the scenario Chris Pook wrote upthread is fully in keeping with Chinese "Unrestricted Warfare" doctrine; there is no immediate means of determining who or what is behind the action, there are enough factions within Canada to exploit the situation and utterly paralyse the GoC and the Chinese can gain credit by coming in after 15-18 months to "broker" some sort of agreement. As for access denial for extracting our own resources, one only has to look at attempts to isolate Albertan oil. We know American groups like the Tides Foundation have spent @ $300 million on anti oilsands campaigns, who knows how much the Saudis or other hostile nations may have contributed or abetted these efforts as well? Going in and physically blocking or disrupting physical infrastructure serves the same purpose and is more dramatic.

Similarly, the United States (our closest friend and ally) does not recognize our claim that the North West Passage is internal waters. Should global warming ever happen for real, an ice free North West Passage would cut travel time from Asia to europe considerably, and I rather doubt that Chinese container ships are going to bother with tiresome Canadian regulations if they chose to believe that the NW passage is internatinal waters.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Read a book over the weekend by Mark Devore published by the US Army's electronic publishing office called "When Failure Thrives" regarding airborne forces in the USA, USSR and UK. Following a study of airborne theories and operations during WW2 he examines the airborne forces of those three countries in the post-WW2 period. He makes the point that airborne forces were conceived to execute "vertical envelopment." This was a failed innovation as it never really worked out during the war. He examines the path that airborne forces took following the war from an institutional perspective. In the USSR airborne forces were their own independent branch and thus continued to thrive despite their dismal WW2 performance. In the UK the airborne forces were not really institutionalized and withered following the war. He argues that the US took a middle road with less institutionalization than the USSR but with a sufficeint airborne bureaucracy to survive despite not really having a role.

Devore argues that any military organization that faces obsolescence can adopt one of three survival strategies. First, it can invest in new technologies and tactics that enable it to continue to execute its core mission. He uses the USAF's adaptation to the North Vietnamese air defence system as an example. Second, the organization can seek new roles using the same capabililties. The USMC did this in the 1930s when they switched from being the US's Latin American police force to amphibious operations. Lastly, it can rely on elite status or nostalgia to survive.

Devore argues that the US military maintains too large of an airborne capability that can be justified by past or anticipated performance. He argues that the US airborne forces survived and indeed thrived by seeking the forced-entry role combined with having key Army leaders who came from the airborne forces. The forced-entry role, for Devore, is not something to base such a large force around and he makes the point that combat jumps have become exceedingly rare and those in recent times have been primarily for show.

I think that we can see some of Devore's thesis at play in Canada. We certainly see people seeking roles for airborne forces and also appealing to its elite status. The level of institutionalization is, however, quite low meaning that our forces are kept at fairly low levels.

I imagine that Devore's work will cause some arguments in the US. It is a fairly short read and is easily accessible on the internet. As such I think its works a read.

Cheers

 

[Blackadder1916]

Read a book over the weekend by Mark Devore published by the US Army's electronic publishing office called "When Failure Thrives" regarding airborne forces in the USA, USSR and UK.  . . .

. . .  It is a fairly short read and is easily accessible on the internet.

http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/CSI/CSIPubs/WhenFailureThrives.pdf

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Perhaps better to define them as “Airmobile” with parachuting as subset? Each nation creates a “airmobile” unit based around its actual capabilities, for us that would be Griffon-Chinook-C130J-C-17.  We can advise our allies what we can bring to the fight and what speed and how long they can be sustained.

I think Entebbe and Fort Eben-Emael were brilliant uses of “air mobile” Also Glider ops in Burma, not to mention some of the heli assaults in Vietnam

 

[dapaterson]

I particularly enjoy the discussion on page 70ff about Insights for Policymakers: "…[I ]nstitutionally strong military organizations rarely engage in critical reappraisals of their utility and are often successful at preserving themselves long after their core mission has become obsolete."

Reads a lot like the Shirky principle: "Institutions will try to preserve the problem to which they are the solution"

EDIT: formatting.

 

[Old Sweat]

I think Entebbe and Fort Eben-Emael were brilliant uses of “air mobile” Also Glider ops in Burma, not to mention some of the heli assaults in Vietnam

The examples cited above were largely against light to nil resistance, some of the Vietnam examples excepted. Daylight assaults by glider especially were frankly blood baths. Crete comes to mind, but Operation Varsity, the airborne assault across the Rhine, also had heavy casualties. The glider-borne British 6 Airportable Brigade lost more troops killed in the few hours of the fly-in than in its tour in Normandy.

 

[ueo]

Based on the author's conclusions, the question now becomes one of can Canada afford, in every sense of the word, any airborne capability beyond the present SAR role. We don't seem to have any military will to retain this capability as it appears that computers, drones etc are far sexier. Politically I cannot see any government making a decision to utilise any form of "entry" ops due to the manpower costs coupled with to PR problems. Also as discussed elsewhere the one remaining option is employment in the North. Not as forced entry ops but in airfield creation ops. In my mind a specific engineering problem. For proponents of the option lets deal realistically with the availability of resources including manpower as well as the probability of our becoming involved in any symmetrical battle  space. MHO only.

 

[Kirkhill]

I particularly enjoy the discussion on page 70ff about Insights for Policymakers: "…[I ]nstitutionally strong military organizations rarely engage in critical reappraisals of their utility and are often successful at preserving themselves long after their core mission has become obsolete."

Reads a lot like the Shirky principle: "Institutions will try to preserve the problem to which they are the solution"

EDIT: formatting.

Paras, Rifles, Fusiliers, Grenadiers, Dragoons, Carabiniers...... (Tanks)

By the way the Marines have been around for 350 years - doing basically the same stuff:  swanning around on Her Majesty's Ships and doing whatever they are told to do.

Edit to add: Guards - but they know what their job is: Stop people killing Her Majesty.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

It shows you though that when used correctly they can achieve significant results. As for Crete, could the Germans have captured it any other way, what would have been the cost of a amphibious operation? I think what airborne could do was oversold. As for Glider losses, I think the majority of Allied losses in Sicily were due to friendly fire.


Glider ops in Burmahttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Ag9Ft__KuA

 

[Kirkhill]

The examples cited above were largely against light to nil resistance, some of the Vietnam examples excepted. Daylight assaults by glider especially were frankly blood baths. Crete comes to mind, but Operation Varsity, the airborne assault across the Rhine, also had heavy casualties. The glider-borne British 6 Airportable Brigade lost more troops killed in the few hours of the fly-in than in its tour in Normandy.

But company/battalion sized insertions, either where the enemy was not or where surprise was possible, were successful.  Pegasus Bridge and the first day of Market Garden come to mind. Even the D-Day night landings. Bruneval.

Throwing in gliders, in daylight,  behind aircraft that took minutes to cross the line of sight of a single anti-aircraft gun, was not a recipe for success.

Throwing in paratroopers for days on end after the locals knew they were coming was equally counter-productive.  Pace Crete and Arnhem.

 

[Old Sweat]

I "fast read" the publication, so my comprehension is even more limited than usual. My feeling is that there is place for small scale airborne operations, but massive drops are frankly non-starters. The US forces have the capability to drop one brigade, but maintain a much larger force. That, I submit, is too large to fail in the short term and too small to succeed in the longer haul against any serious opposition.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

It shows you though that when used correctly they can achieve significant results. As for Crete, could the Germans have captured it any other way, what would have been the cost of a amphibious operation? I think what airborne could do was oversold. As for Glider losses, I think the majority of Allied losses in Sicily were due to friendly fire.


Glider ops in Burmahttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Ag9Ft__KuA

The author of the book I mentioned gives a study of WW2 airborne operations, including Crete. He calls Crete a Phyrrhic success where the cost of success was too much. Indeed, that operation essentially ended German airborne operations. His analysis of major airborne operations indicates more failures than successes.

 

[Baz]

Similarly, the United States (our closest friend and ally) does not recognize our claim that the North West Passage is internal waters. Should global warming ever happen for real, an ice free North West Passage would cut travel time from Asia to europe considerably, and I rather doubt that Chinese container ships are going to bother with tiresome Canadian regulations if they chose to believe that the NW passage is internatinal waters.

The US doesn't consider any full passage through the Northwest Passage international waters.  There is no passage through that is always wider than 24nm, which means some of it is de facto Canadian Territorial waters. Although there are a lot of different passages, the closest is Lancaster Sound, Barrow Straight, McClure Strait which narrows possibly only once near Resolute.

They don't recognize our 1986 Declaration of Straight Baselines, which makes all of it Canadian Internal Waters.  However, as they have not actually contested or challenged it then it could become recognized.

What they do claim is that it is an International Straight, and that therefore transit passage is enjoyed (think Straights Of Gibraltar, etc).  This would mean they would not have to ask permission; certain rules of the EEZ would still apply (esp Environmental).  However, the rules for International Straights are deliberately vague; they refer to "Straights Used For International Navigation" which alludes to they need historical precedent, but they don't formally define them.  Canada believes there is no precedent for the Northwest Passage, the US does.

This http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98836.pdf is a relative recent statement of their position.  Note they say it is an International Straight, and make no justification; that is so that there position is that it is a fact.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The author of the book I mentioned gives a study of WW2 airborne operations, including Crete. He calls Crete a Phyrrhic success where the cost of success was too much. Indeed, that operation essentially ended German airborne operations. His analysis of major airborne operations indicates more failures than successes.

There's a quote by Patton somewhere where he suggests that Airborne Forces would have been better employed under the direct command of Army Commanders, where they could be fully integrated into the ground based  battle plan.

I can see that, and assume that 'A Bridge Too Far' wouldn't have suffered as much from the failure of the cavalry to arrive soon enough.