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GBAD - The return of 'FOBS'

Is C-UAS part of GBAD?


Between August 2023 and April 2024, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division was deployed across Iraq and Syria in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. During that time, state-sponsored militia groups launched over 170 attacks against a small network of coalition bases that 2/10 was responsible for defending. The brigade’s deployment represents the most recent and direct experience of any US Army unit defending against drone attacks and, consequently, an important set of lessons on countering and defending against rockets, missiles, and drones of all sizes.

The soldiers of 2/10 experienced a wide range of enemy attacks against conventional munitions, from rockets and mortars to cluster munitions and short-range ballistic missiles. But the enemy’s weapon of choice was the one-way attack unmanned aircraft system (OWAUAS). These drones were mostly little, propeller-driven, fixed-wing craft made of carbon fiber, metal, and plastic. They flew low, sometimes less than a hundred feet off the ground, and depending on the type, their wingspan was a few feet to a few meters. Their US military equivalents are between a Scan Eagle and a Shadow. These systems have no landing gear because they’re designed to land on their noses with a bang.


The low-flying, low-cost, highly accurate, and prolific drones are irresistibly effective. Despite their small size, one-way attack drones on the battlefield today have tremendous range. Small to mid-sized one-way attack OWAUAS can travel as far as 2,500 kilometers, distances more akin to land attack cruise missiles and ballistic missiles than any tube-based artillery. Their versatility, reach, cost, and precision will increasingly make them appealing options for any modern combatant, no matter its global stature or military size.

The soldiers of 2/10 were employed in a very distinct role, defending from established fixed sites with reliable connectivity, hardened bunkers, and air mobility that was limited by electromagnetic interference, adversary surface-to-air weapons, and political constraints but still only partially contested. Most importantly, 2/10’s fight was a purely defensive one. Even when some of the counter–unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) capabilities were designed to be mobile, they were employed as part of a static defense. The base defense operations centers were well established and operated in controlled environments.

The attacks were continual but measured, nothing like the artillery barrages that Russia employs in Ukraine or what we know is possible for drone swarms from a well-supplied enemy. The OWAUAS salvos against 2/10 came mostly in singles and doubles. Rockets and missiles came in sporadic batches, sometimes a little over a dozen at a time. The consistent but low volume attacks were by the enemy’s design under the unique circumstances of the conflict.
 
Is C-UAS part of GBAD?
I don't have access to the detailed SOR but in general terms it includes the following:

Requirements​

The majority of items to be acquired by this project will be fielded, commercial-off-the-shelf technology. The target threats are rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM) munitions, air to surface missiles (ASM) and bombs, and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS).

The Project will deliver an air defence system that will include the effector platform(s) (either guns, missiles, Directed Energy Weapon Systems, EW or a combination thereof), munitions, a sensor suite, fire control software and an integrated networked C4ISR system.

It will also be equipped with a training and simulation system that leverages modelling and simulation to provide realistic and immersive training.

In that respect, yes, C-UAS is part of the GBAD project requirement.

Note, however, the GBAD project is quite separate and apart from the UORs to provide equipment of each of a C-UAS troop and a VSHORAD troop for Latvia plus training equipment in Canada.

The GBAD project is for a long-term in-service capability of two batteries for the Canadian army while the two UORs are short term requirements to be filled for Latvia. They may very well end up consisting of different equipment in the end with the UOR equipment being divested when the GBAD capabilities come online. .... or not. Who really knows what happens to UOR gear these days?

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USMC close to fielding new AD system to replace Stingers...70km range with 20 x missiles per launcher.

The Skyhunter missiles mentioned n the article is the US version of the Israeli Iron Dome in case anyone is interested.
 
Per the UOR yes

Fair to guess that ultimately an Air Defence umbrella is going to have to accommodate everything form C-RAM (counter-rockets, artillery and mortars) through the full range of UAVs (Groups 1 to 5), through cruise and ballistic missiles, to helicopters and fixed wing aircraft (often indistinguishable from Group 4 and 5 UAVs)?

To my mind there is not a lot of room to invent artificial seams that might accommodate institutional silos. The threat environment appears to me to continuous - from bullets and bombs to jets and rockets.
 
CUAS is going to be housed in the STA Bty’s if the plan goes. Counter UAS = Counter Battery I guess
 
CUAS is going to be housed in the STA Bty’s if the plan goes. Counter UAS = Counter Battery I guess
The Latvian UOR CUAS is a component of AD but, as you say, the capability will be housed within the CS Regts in accordance with managed readiness. Since there is no PY increase associated with the UOR it will be practical to source the manning from within the Regt's STA battery rather than the gun batteries as they already have a heavy Latvia commitment.

The GBAD project provides AD capabilities (including C-UAS) consisting of a high mobility VSHORAD system and an Area C-RAM system to be housed within two batteries of 4 Regt (GS). The project includes additional PYs. I haven't heard of any selection of actual systems for the GBAD project and accordingly it is probably too soon to determine if the C-UAV capability that the overall GBAD systems will provide will be part and parcel to the two contemplated 4 Regt (GS) batteries or severable so that they can be employed by the CS Regts in a similar fashion to the UOR CUAS troops. My guess, and only a guess, is that it will.

C-UAS =/= counter battery (CB). C-UAS = counter uncrewed aerial systems. I concede the line is being blurred but I think the distinction is that CB attacks the delivery systems such as the launchers/guns while C-UAS (and for that matter C-RAM) attack the projectile/system in flight as it approaches its target.

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From my pew I am not seeing a difference between countering Group 4 and 5 UAVs and countering Fixed and Rotary wing aircraft and cruise missiles.

Equally, if you can counter 122 mm rockets, 152mm artillery and 81mm mortar bombs then you can probably counter Group 1, 2 and 3 UAVs.
 
The Latvian UOR CUAS is a component of AD but, as you say, the capability will be housed within the CS Regts in accordance with managed readiness. Since there is no PY increase associated with the UOR it will be practical to source the manning from within the Regt's STA battery rather than the gun batteries as they already have a heavy Latvia commitment.
That makes a lot of sense, a M777 requires a fair sized gun crew to use effectively, and things like HLTA already make it hard enough without stripping out more pers for CUAS, or at least that's how things were the last time I worked on a gun line... I don't think the rounds or gun have gotten lighter since 2007.
 
Now I know the leopard 2A4 turrets are old, so let's repurpose the hulls for GBAD, let's ask Finland for their experience with the marksman.

View attachment 85696
I prefer this..

996f_980x500.png
 
I haven't heard of any selection of actual systems for the GBAD project and accordingly it is probably too soon to determine if the C-UAV capability that the overall GBAD systems will provide will be part and parcel to the two contemplated 4 Regt (GS) batteries or severable so that they can be employed by the CS Regts in a similar fashion to the UOR CUAS troops. My guess, and only a guess, is that it will.


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The gov has released a list of qualified suppliers here. So far the contender LM Canada with Diehl, MBDA, Raytheon and SAAB.
 
Looks like Rheinmetall has put the new Skyranger 35 turret on a leopard 2 chassis. Sounds like a new contended for GBAD has joined the battle. Would be a good way to repurpose older leopard 2A4 hulls.

I guess that I have to ask why?

Rheinmetal has already developed a Skyranger 35 option for the Lynx and the Boxer.

Rheinmetall-%E2%80%93-Lynx-KF41-3.jpg
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Is this a way of getting folks who do not have or are not planning on Lynx but do have Leo 2s to go for the system based on compatible chassis? A Leo strikes me as overkill.

:unsure:
 
I guess that I have to ask why?

Rheinmetal has already developed a Skyranger 35 option for the Lynx and the Boxer.

Rheinmetall-%E2%80%93-Lynx-KF41-3.jpg
images


Is this a way of getting folks who do not have or are not planning on Lynx but do have Leo 2s to go for the system based on compatible chassis? A Leo strikes me as overkill.

:unsure:
I'm just a weather guy, but I can see two reasons.

1) A mission kill on a Leo 2 Skyranger turret is less likely to be a mobility kill due to the heavier armour, meaning the vehicle can fall back for repair under its own power. (?)

2) As you mentioned, if you have Leos but not Lynx, it's a standard conversion that allows you to have tracked GBAD with parts commonality with vehicles they will be supporting as well as with other allied countries.
 
Looks like Rheinmetall has put the new Skyranger 35 turret on a leopard 2 chassis. Sounds like a new contended for GBAD has joined the battle. Would be a good way to repurpose older leopard 2A4 hulls.
If the hulls have life yet, would it not make more sense to refurbish and marry to new turrets to get A7/A8's?
 

Directed Energy won't save you. There are not going to be enough M-SHORADs and MADIS in the near term. The need is for ManPADS and Walls of Lead.

the Army is working to procure and field directed-energy and high-power microwave air defense systems. Unfortunately, these are plagued by unrealistic expectations of their capabilities and employment—and remain locked in an expensive research and development cycle. To be sure, the Army should be actively pursuing solutions for the next war—solutions that might not be fielded for years to come. But it must balance that procurement with the imperative of meeting current demands. With recent video demonstrating the first fully autonomous drone kill in Ukraine, it is increasingly clear that those current demands are high, and the Army must be able to meet them tomorrow, not in twenty years.

In the meantime, there is no stop-gap capability for the Stinger missile, which has been out of production for two decades, has been planned to be phased out for years, and contains core electronics that have become obsolete. The Army hopes to select a vendor to go into replacement production for a new man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) in five years, an absurdly long time to wait for basic air defense protection given that highly capable MANPADS are available right now from our allies.

the Army intends to stand up four new air defense battalions, developed around the Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) system, bringing the total number of M-SHORAD battalions in service to eight. If these battalions are aligned with the Army’s maneuver divisions, division commanders would have somewhere around forty-four vehicles to provide tactical air defense across their maneuver brigades, as well as engineer, aviation, and sustainment brigades.

This is simply not enough butter for the bread. With only forty-four vehicles, maneuver commanders at the tactical level have little likelihood of benefiting from the M-SHORADs’ aerial coverage, let alone even seeing one of these unicorn systems. In keeping with the current utilization of the highly limited air defense systems available, division and brigade commanders will likely keep around half this number well behind the FLOT (forward line of own troops) to protect tactical operations centers and brigade support areas in order to maintain command-and-control and sustainment nodes, further reducing the number of M-SHORAD systems available to be attached to maneuver units.

So-called drone guns have seen mixed effectiveness in Ukraine for a variety of reasons, leading to them being largely abandoned by both sides in favor of other, cruder methods.

....

With these shortcomings in both procurement and employment of the Army’s future air defense programs, there is currently a critical capabilities gap that any enemy equipped with even basic sUAS can exploit. The Army must invest in an immediately employable antiaircraft wall-of-lead system for use at the tactical level.


...

So lots of machine guns and auto-cannons along with really cheap ManPADS.

....

Lots of these?


View attachment 81823 Bushmaster Agnostic Gun Truck






The gun is the same gun selected for the US Army's M-SHORAD LAVs.

View attachment 81824

A pair of Agnostic Gun Trucks mounted in Toyotas with a M-ACE cuing system in the rear.


And here is the VAMPIRE system


View attachment 81825

The missile is the APKWS version of the 70 mm Hydra, which is also deployed on the Apache and used as a low cost alternative to the Hellfire for lower value, lighter targets.

The Ukrainians are finding them quite effective against both small aerial and ground targets.



These are the types of systems that I could see deployed on LAVs, BvS10s, PickUp Trucks and MRZRs in optionally manned configurations as well as dedicated UGVs.

And supplied to Infantry Battalions for their Weapons Coys as alternatives to LAVs and Bradleys if the primary objective is to hold and defend ground.


 
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