Germany & France to jointly develop Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) - AKA "Leopard 3"

[Underway]

Check out tanknutdave's website.  He does an excellent job breaking down why certain tanks are designed the way they are.  Mainly the Challey but heck, he's British so he knows people....

Essentially the M1 is all about engagement speed and hitting power emphasis, kill the enemy before they kill you.  The British have excellent armour and it has shown in their tank survivability rates in similar conditions to US M1 in Iraq.  The Leo generally has longer range and more efficient fuel consumption.  It has better strategic and tactical mobility than the Challenger or the M1, and are probably the least logistically complicated.  Leclerc is similar to the Leo in that regard.  The French are all about mobility and have a tendency to have heavy guns on lighter armour even in their recce elements.

But unless you put them all into some sort of tank Olympics then it's really just minor variations on a theme.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Check out tanknutdave's website.  He does an excellent job breaking down why certain tanks are designed the way they are.  Mainly the Challey but heck, he's British so he knows people....

Essentially the M1 is all about engagement speed and hitting power emphasis, kill the enemy before they kill you.  The British have excellent armour and it has shown in their tank survivability rates in similar conditions to US M1 in Iraq.  The Leo generally has longer range and more efficient fuel consumption.  It has better strategic and tactical mobility than the Challenger or the M1, and are probably the least logistically complicated.  Leclerc is similar to the Leo in that regard.  The French are all about mobility and have a tendency to have heavy guns on lighter armour even in their recce elements.

But unless you put them all into some sort of tank Olympics then it's really just minor variations on a theme.

And 'perfect' is the enemy of 'good enough'

“Quantity has a quality all its own.”  Joseph Stalin

 

[vonGarvin]

So much freedom! 

Ack, thanks.

As far as doctrine is concerned it seems like a good fit design wise anyways.  The French and Germans emphasize mobility over firepower and protection in their tanks, so at least that's a match.

At the start of the Second World War, the French had some of the most well-protected tanks on the planet.  The Germans were good with mobility, but their best tank wasn't even theirs: the Pz 38 (t) was probably the most reliable one they had.  But some of the French heavy tanks were damn near unstoppable. 

Unless you had one of these:

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Unstoppable and almost unfightable as well. The French command was just not prepared for a fluid war, even through they had the forces to do so. apparently the British in their original positions were well prepared to defend against a Panzer led attack with supporting aircraft, but never had the chance to establish themselves after they moved.

 

[McG]

The German tank advantages did not relate to the traditional firepower, mobility and survivability triad of tank design.  The German tank advantage was in radios (they had them while the vast majority of French tanks did not) and doctrine.

... But, I don't think a modern EuroTank is being designed to refight the last Franco-Prussian battles.

 

[Underway]

Why are we rehashing 60+ Year old tactics and doctrine like it has any bearing on today's military?  It really doesn't at all. MCG has an excellent point.  The Leo 3 will likely be designed to deal with new Russian tank designs.

So to advance the topic what are the big changes in the way Russians are using tanks and armour?  From what I can see dealing with active countermeasures will be a thing, also it looks like the new Russian APC/IFV will be very heavy relative to their previous doctrine.  More on a Puma or CV90 level if not more armoured.

It's going to be interesting how doctrine and design evolve to deal with that.  Perhaps a larger gun calibre, as that has been rumoured by the Germans before.  Or the addition of their own active defence system.  Certain,it a more integrated C2 system and targeting system based upon the newest technology.

 

[vonGarvin]

Do you really think that tactics, etc have changed that much in 60 years? In 60 decades? Newsflash: they haven't.

Schwarzkopf's operations in Iraq in 1991 differed little from Hannibal Barca's at Cannae.  The difference was mainly scale.

 

[Lumber]

Do you really think that tactics, etc have changed that much in 60 years? In 60 decades? Newsflash: they haven't.

Schwarzkopf's operations in Iraq in 1991 differed little from Hannibal Barca's at Cannae.  The difference was mainly scale.

Tactics haven't changed much in 60 years because we haven't had any wars between major powers in that time. We haven't seen how useful an MBT would be in a large scale, open conflict between two first world armies.

On the one hand, MBTs would be an easy target for a/c and attack helicopters. On the other hand, both sides would be quick to try and eliminate the enemy's a/c and helos. It takes a lot longer to train pilots and build modern a/c, and their are lot more tanks. Maybe MBTs are more vulnerable today, but maybe our airforces are too expensive and complicated. Perhaps after the first few air-air engagements, there wouldn't be much air cover left, and the MBT would reign supreme again?

 

[Underway]

Do you really think that tactics, etc have changed that much in 60 years? In 60 decades? Newsflash: they haven't.

Schwarzkopf's operations in Iraq in 1991 differed little from Hannibal Barca's at Cannae.  The difference was mainly scale.

Newsflash...they are completely different and those who fail to adapt to new tactics and new technology are destined for the trash heap of history.


Air power has changed things significantly since WW2, guided munitions, night fighting and modern communications.  Hell, there was no such thing as a Main Battle Tank in the Second World War.  APCs were brand new, and not even specific builds.  Special forces were barely in their infancy.  Even artillery tactics have changed.  I'll give you the pro words may have been the same but how you fix an opponent with air power is not the same tactic as fixing an opponent with swordsman.

 

[blacktriangle]

Just wait until space is weaponized. Once tanks can be taken out from orbit, I think I'd be spending on ASAT capabilities and PGM countermeasures vice a new generation of tanks...

(not to mention EW, Cyber and all that good stuff)

 

[Infanteer]

Newsflash...they are completely different and those who fail to adapt to new tactics and new technology are destined for the trash heap of history.


Air power has changed things significantly since WW2, guided munitions, night fighting and modern communications.  Hell, there was no such thing as a Main Battle Tank in the Second World War.  APCs were brand new, and not even specific builds.  Special forces were barely in their infancy.  Even artillery tactics have changed.  I'll give you the pro words may have been the same but how you fix an opponent with air power is not the same tactic as fixing an opponent with swordsman.

Newsflash...not really.  Most of what we do today comes from 1944 (fireplanning, combat team/battlegroup, air-land integration).  All those things you mentioned existed to some extent in the Second World War - while scale and scope may change, the principles remain the same.  The key point is that the general system of tactical employment, one built on a paradigm of firepower and manoeuvre that came out of the latter parts of the First World War, is still essentially the same - see Stephen Biddle's Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle.

 

[McG]

Fall Gelb still saw tanks designed and organized along concepts of light/cavalry with high velocity cannons for fighting other tanks or of medium/infantry with large low velocity cannons for supporting the assault.  Sponson guns were not uncommon, radios were uncommon, penny packeting was accepted, air support was unproven, and the employment of tanks did not generate the sort of tank battles that would offer insightful lessons today.  The lessons of those battles were at an extreme a fundamental level and we would be better served looking at historical examples that did build on these lessons (unless we are considering tanks without radios or penny-packet doctrine, and then we could look back to see the problems)

If we really want to look at the Second World War as an exercise for developing a modern MBT, then lets at least look at Barbarossa and after  At least by the time the Germans and Russians started to battle it out, the technology and tactics were developing to abandon bad practices seen in France and to reflect many of the fundamentals we still view as characteristic of armour and armoured warfare.

But be careful here too.  Designing a tank to win or re-win at Kursk may not result in a war winner today. 

Shaped-charge cluster munitions in masses rocket artillery strikes can deliver a beating to an armoured unit that would have been unimaginable in 1944.  Top attack missiles can launch EFPs to kill jockeying tanks in full defilade ... and a few "smart" artillery rounds are suggested to be capable of the same.  So, is the historical emphasis on armour over the frontal arc and above a 1 m line still relevant?

Do advances in UAVs, thermal optics, ground moving target radar, and night vision have implications for tank design and doctrine?

 

[Infanteer]

Sponson guns were not uncommon, radios were uncommon, penny packeting was accepted, air support was unproven, and the employment of tanks did not generate the sort of tank battles that would offer insightful lessons today.  The lessons of those battles were at an extreme a fundamental level and we would be better served looking at historical examples that did build on these lessons (unless we are considering tanks without radios or penny-packet doctrine, and then we could look back to see the problems)

The Germans didn't have tanks with sponson guns, their tanks were generally equipped with radios, they didn't penny-packet tanks as a matter of course, and their air support system was proven by this time, so your comments are not accurate.  The fact that the Germans employed this.  You are right in saying that the "lessons learned" are fundamental (mass armour) and not specific (how to avoid a hellfire), but that is the point I was trying to make - the fundamentals are still all there, and comments stating that 1940 offers no lessons are simply not true.

The real kicker is that the Battle for France was largely decided by an infantry battle that took place at the Meuse Crossing.  It was this fight that enabled the large scale manoeuvre of formations to take place.

Shaped-charge cluster munitions in masses rocket artillery strikes can deliver a beating to an armoured unit that would have been unimaginable in 1944.  Top attack missiles can launch EFPs to kill jockeying tanks in full defilade ... and a few "smart" artillery rounds are suggested to be capable of the same.  So, is the historical emphasis on armour over the frontal arc and above a 1 m line still relevant?

Do advances in UAVs, thermal optics, ground moving target radar, and night vision have implications for tank design and doctrine?

Depends on what sort of doctrine we are talking about - individual/small unit employment or larger scale combined arms employment.  Mass supporting fire, whether delivered from a rocket launcher or an airplane, was a danger that existed in 1944.  Look at the trouble and attrition rates the Germans experienced in trying to mass armoured forces in Normandy.  For every UAV, thermal, radar, night vision, or shape-charge measure that was going to render tanks obsolete, technology has been quite good at producing a counter-measures.  Thus the offensive/defensive balance is largely maintained and the fundamental principles discussed in Biddle's book remain the same.  This is why his OA of both France 1944 and Iraq 1991 produce similiar outcomes.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Also the role of SOF forces in the opening phases are often forgotten.

 

[McG]

The Germans didn't have tanks with sponson guns, their tanks were generally equipped with radios, they didn't penny-packet tanks as a matter of course, and their air support system was proven by this time, so your comments are not accurate. 

The French did have these faults in their tanks, both countries did follow the Infantry vs Cavalry tank design models, and air support value was not mutually accepted.  The end state is that the invasion of France is too immature to be the preferred model to analyze  and deduce the design evolutions that should go into a next generation tank today.

Depends on what sort of doctrine we are talking about - individual/small unit employment or larger scale combined arms employment. 

Both of these need to be considered in defining the requirements of a next generation battle tank.

Mass supporting fire, whether delivered from a rocket launcher or an airplane, was a danger that existed in 1944.  Look at the trouble and attrition rates the Germans experienced in trying to mass armoured forces in Normandy. 

Just imagine how much more those losses would have been under the effects of DPICM where the direct strike of unitary warheads is no longer required for a total kill.

For every UAV, thermal, radar, night vision, or shape-charge measure that was going to render tanks obsolete, technology has been quite good at producing a counter-measures. 

Nobody is saying tanks will become obsolete any time soon.  But, if we are discussing the next generation of battle tank, then the lessons will be found in more modern combat where tanks have competed with these threats.  If we are going to look to the Second World War for examples, then let's look to the Eastern front where tanks fought on both sides having taken aboard the lessons of the French collapse (where only one side used tanks and air support effectievely).

 

[jollyjacktar]

And so, ergo, the more things change the more they stay the same.  I do wonder, however, if we will really see a modern day Kursk engagement between two first nation or peer opponents one day?  Who really has the numbers for a really big ding dong nowadays?

 

[Infanteer]

The end state is that the invasion of France is too immature to be the preferred model to analyze  and deduce the design evolutions that should go into a next generation tank today....But, if we are discussing the next generation of battle tank, then the lessons will be found in more modern combat where tanks have competed with these threats.

We're talking past each other.  The conversation was on the Maginot line, operational deployments of formations and general armoured employment.  None of this really matters on modern tank design features, which probably means that the discussion following TechnoViking's tangent is worthy of a split.

 

[McG]

Actually, I believe it was the Leo 1.  Originally, the Brits were looking into it as well, but pulled out leaving it a French/German program until the French pulled out as well.  AMX 30 was their product, and the Leo 1 was the German, with the British L7 gun.

George,
It looks like you were thinking of the Europa-Panzer; it was an effort by France and Germany to run a competition between manufactures and select the best tank for both countries.  I understand the competition started with a French and three German companies, but later Porsche entered from Italy.  Porsche won, and both countries built their own tanks.

 

[George Wallace]

George,
It looks like you were thinking of the Europa-Panzer; it was an effort by France and Germany to run a competition between manufactures and select the best tank for both countries.  I understand the competition started with a French and three German companies, but later Porsche entered from Italy.  Porsche won, and both countries built their own tanks.

Could be.  The number of times some of these nations and/or companies start joint ventures and then dissolve is some times confusing after time has passed. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

Could be.  The number of times some of these nations and/or companies start joint ventures and then dissolve is some times confusing after time has passed.

It's a European tradition to mess up joint projects like this, viz:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurofighter_Typhoon