Government hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I have long said that you could fund the CAF to 4 percent of GDP, but we would still lag behind in NATO and be much the same where we are.

It's never the money, it's politics. It's procedures. It's the pork-barreling in our defence spending that makes us a paper tiger in NATO.

My only hope in all of this for the CAF and the GoC, whatever the political stripe that may be, is that it will rouse them out of the "Peace Dividend" slumber. The world has been unstable since 1945. We have used geography, proximity, and association as a Defence Policy ever since. ICBMs don't care how close to the U.S. or how far from Russia/China we are.

Don't give us a dime more, but let us spend money on defence like it matters. The fact we follow the same rules for purchasing a fighter aircraft as we do for buying office furniture for a Service Canada office is disgraceful. Don't treat defense procurement as a stimulus package for Canadian Industry. There I said it.

We spend so much money, time, and effort trying to get that money to stay in Canada; be it by awarding contracts to companies with no capability to produce items without first "retooling" and"developing the production lines", or by hamstringing perfectly competent and competitive bidders by forcing the project to be made in St. Margaret de Poutain de Champignon, QC because the ruling government either lost the seat in the election, or won it with promises.

We spend so much money and staff hours jumping through TBS regulations that are great for other departments, but are terrible for defence procurement. Some items you have to sole source, because there are technologies and capabilities no one else makes. By doing the bid process, you get companies clamoring for a project they can't deliver on, but because they tick the bright boxes on the score sheet....

I truly and honestly belief we need to split from PSPC and legislate that its not beholden to TBS, only to the PBO/PCO. The guiding principles of this new Defence Procurement department should be "Off the shelf, from somewhere else" if there isn't an industry in Canada.

BOOTFORGEN has demonstrated how well we do when we are able to actually get what we need, instead of lining the pockets of a Canadian company that got lucky.

That, but with tanks, fighters, ships, weapons systems....

 

[FSTO]

I have it in my head that Hellyer wanted us to be an organization similar to the USMC. Truth ? Or did I fabricate that ?

That is my initial assesment as well. Except he forgot that the Marines need the Navy to get to the fight.

 

[FSTO]

Don’t get me wrong; I don’t think that being CDS is by any means the be all to end all. Some have been complete bootlicks, others unimpressive, some influential.



Ah yes, forgot the third horseman of the RCN Apocalypse… Shame on me.


I don’t have any real insight/experience on a would-be post-integration Fleet Air Arm, but will say that from the green side, there is (or more accurately was) much visible bemoaning by FMC about the poor state of support by Air Command, and yet for the actual “Deeds, Not Words” bit, FMC threw aviation under the bus several tomes; first ‘giving’ the green CF-5s to Air Command (no meaningful pushback when AIRCOM stated they’d be transferring the CF-5s from 10 TAG to FG), then deciding to not fund the CH-147’s upgrade from C to D-models, which was followed with FMCS decision (it funded aviation at the time) to let the Chinook be decommissioned; then the infamous CH-146 purchase in 1992 (again, FMC still had the funding means and decision for tactical aviation).

So, while many will romanticize the “parent service as proponent for component aviation”, the reality (at least in the green side) was that environmental aviation is just one more card in the deck and doesn’t always (often) make the cut compared to core environmental capabilities.

Same within the RCN. There was always a fight between the Airdales and the Line Officers with the dasterdly submariners wanting a piece as well. Usually the Line Officers won, but as mentioned above their views were short-sighted as well.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Would that have more to do with HQ bloat ?

HQ bloat came, it seems to me, with the 2000s ... I watched, in absolute horror, as commanders were downgraded (and reduced in rank) and staff officers were promoted and given absolutely unnecessary and inappropriate authority.

The staff has two functions, and only two:

1. To assist the commander in the function of command by relieving her/him of detail; and
2. To assist subordinate formations, units and elements in carrying out their tasks by coordinating activities and, on the commander's behalf, reallocating resources, including time, as necessary.

If you're not actually engaged in combat or support operations then you ought to be doing those two things, well ... otherwise you don't belong in the Army.

Everything else is busywork.

 

[Kirkhill]

Don’t get me wrong; I don’t think that being CDS is by any means the be all to end all. Some have been complete bootlicks, others unimpressive, some influential.



Ah yes, forgot the third horseman of the RCN Apocalypse… Shame on me.


I don’t have any real insight/experience on a would-be post-integration Fleet Air Arm, but will say that from the green side, there is (or more accurately was) much visible bemoaning by FMC about the poor state of support by Air Command, and yet for the actual “Deeds, Not Words” bit, FMC threw aviation under the bus several tomes; first ‘giving’ the green CF-5s to Air Command (no meaningful pushback when AIRCOM stated they’d be transferring the CF-5s from 10 TAG to FG), then deciding to not fund the CH-147’s upgrade from C to D-models, which was followed with FMCS decision (it funded aviation at the time) to let the Chinook be decommissioned; then the infamous CH-146 purchase in 1992 (again, FMC still had the funding means and decision for tactical aviation).

So, while many will romanticize the “parent service as proponent for component aviation”, the reality (at least in the green side) was that environmental aviation is just one more card in the deck and doesn’t always (often) make the cut compared to core environmental capabilities.

All that had to happen was putting wings on a Leopard. Problem solved.

 

[Kirkhill]

That is my initial assesment as well. Except he forgot that the Marines need the Navy to get to the fight.

They still do. But the USN buys the Marines ships that will take them to the fight.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Same within the RCN. There was always a fight between the Airdales and the Line Officers with the dasterdly submariners wanting a piece as well. Usually the Line Officers won, but as mentioned above their views were short-sighted as well.

There is a story floating around that the reason the Airforce was given NavAir was the result of a study.
Wait for it ......it wasn't a sturdy of how to make the most effective use of Maritime air .
It was a study that showed that a higher percentage of Naval Aviators were getting more ship commands then surface warfare types. And it looked like it would continue into the future.
Ouch?

 

[FSTO]

There is a story floating around that the reason the Airforce was given NavAir was the result of a study.
Wait for it ......it wasn't a sturdy of how to make the most effective use of Maritime air .
It was a study that showed that a higher percentage of Naval Aviators were getting ship commands then surface warfare types. And it looked like it would continue into the future.
Ouch?

True, and many submariners (since command of a sub was LCdr position) became very effective surface ship commanders (a Cdr position).
So yes, it was all about egos and short sightedness.

 

[FSTO]

They still do. But the USN buys the Marines ships that will take them to the fight.

Gator Navy is still run by the Navy, the Marines get to ride in them.

I think we're saying the same thing.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Gator Navy is still run by the Navy, the Marines get to ride in them.

I think we're saying the same thing.

Isn't Marine an acronym for My Ass Rides In Navy Equipment?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Lol I had google heliporter

Just woke up and I am thinking General Brock invented the Helicopter in 1812? Must have more coffee....

 

[Kirkhill]

Gator Navy is still run by the Navy, the Marines get to ride in them.

I think we're saying the same thing.

We is.

Although I was thinking more about Canadian Admirals and Big Honking Ships.

In an Expeditionary Force the Navy transports the Army and the Air Force that supports the Army while providing cover to the Navy.

In a Canadian Domestic Force the Police are supported by the Army which is co-located with the Police or transported by the Air Force which supplies support and cover to the Police and the Army.

The Expeditionary Force is a tool of Global Affairs.
The Domestic Force is a tool of Public Safety.

 

[OldSolduer]

Global Affairs.

Does that include Members of Parliament having affairs with foreign nationals.....

 

[dimsum]

There is a story floating around that the reason the Airforce was given NavAir was the result of a study.
Wait for it ......it wasn't a sturdy of how to make the most effective use of Maritime air .
It was a study that showed that a higher percentage of Naval Aviators were getting more ship commands then surface warfare types. And it looked like it would continue into the future.
Ouch?

That sounds like the most MARS/NWO thing I've heard in a while.

I'd 100% believe that to be true.

 

[FSTO]

That sounds like the most MARS/NWO thing I've heard in a while.

I'd 100% believe that to be true.

Snide remarks aside. We as a force suffer so much because of egos and agendas. Like the unwritten rule that you have to a ring knocker to be CDS.

 

[KevinB]

Snide remarks aside. We as a force suffer so much because of egos and agendas. Like the unwritten rule that you have to a ring knocker to be CDS.

I always assumed that was MAD related. If you tried to be a strong CDS and restructure the CAF that one of your classmates would burn you out with tales from one’s history at school.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Like the guy in Four Weddings and a Funeral?

"I was at school with his brother Bufty. Tremendous bloke. He was head of my house. Buggered me senseless. Taught me things about life."

 

[WLSC]

I always assumed that was MAD related. If you tried to be a strong CDS and restructure the CAF that one of your classmates would burn you out with tales from one’s history at school.

I heard the words Incestuous self liking ice-cream about those fine institutions

 

[daftandbarmy]

Snide remarks aside. We as a force suffer so much because of egos and agendas. Like the unwritten rule that you have to a ring knocker to be CDS.

Are you sure it's unwritten? The increase in the % of Officers trained through RMC was a stated 'culture change' policy post-Somalia, even though it was more expensive and, paradoxically, perhaps resulting in more sexual assault issues in recent times:

Developing Strategic Lieutenants in the Canadian Army

The office of the auditor general reviewed the Royal Military College to ensure the insitution’s value for money and compliance with federal legislation, and concluded in 2017 that the college was an expensive way to produce officers.

Focusing on efficiencies and costs, however, obscures the college’s role as an engine of reform for the officer corps and fails to realize the value of institutions that foster officership.

The recommendations of the various reports provide a checklist to measure progress over time. In 2005, Cowan noted the connections between the Canadian Armed Forces and the Royal Military College had strengthened, the CDS and service leaders frequently visited the college, and college leaders realized the desirability of increased utility to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.

Thus, some of the recommended reforms were being implemented at that time. Nonetheless, the idea of using the RMC as the engine of reform for the Canadian officer corps was never fully realized. Cowan stated this effort was . . . the one that got away. It was to go from 25% of officer intake to approximately 35-40%.

While events in Saint Jean help take some of the pressure off, ultimately, what we need to understand is the original reasoning. This was essentially cultural. There are 110 universities in Canada, but we only control the culture in one of them. If you want to evolve the culture of the officer corps through an institution at the input end of the spectrum, you need to broaden the flow through that institution.

While the percentage grew to approximately 28 to 29 percent of the officer intake in 2005, it remained short of the target. The SSAV noted the percentage in 2012–13 was approximately 25 to 27 percent of intake, with RMC graduates comprising 55 to 57 percent of the general and flag officers in the Canadian Armed Forces.

This number should not be interpreted as a sign the core curriculum was producing generals. In 2012–13, the majority of the general and flag officers had over 25 years of service, which meant they were commissioned in the mid- to late-1980s. Royal Military College graduates were retained longer or progressed faster than peers commissioned by other means. Exactly why this phenomena occurred is not easily determined.

https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3134&context=parameters

 

[Brad Sallows]

If you want to evolve the culture of the officer corps through an institution at the input end of the spectrum, you need to broaden the flow through that institution.

Works great, if the culture doesn't go sideways.

 

[dapaterson]

Post-Somalia culture change for the CAF was the introduction of the Degreed Officer Corps (recommendation #10 of the report to the PM on the Management and Leadership of the CAF from Feb 1997); there was no explicit direction that it should be delivered via ROTP-MilCol.

That said, Ramsey Withers and others saw that recommendation coming, and did their best to situate RMC as a preferred delivery method for the degreed officer corps.