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Government hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

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I have long said that you could fund the CAF to 4 percent of GDP, but we would still lag behind in NATO and be much the same where we are.

It's never the money, it's politics. It's procedures. It's the pork-barreling in our defence spending that makes us a paper tiger in NATO.

My only hope in all of this for the CAF and the GoC, whatever the political stripe that may be, is that it will rouse them out of the "Peace Dividend" slumber. The world has been unstable since 1945. We have used geography, proximity, and association as a Defence Policy ever since. ICBMs don't care how close to the U.S. or how far from Russia/China we are.

Don't give us a dime more, but let us spend money on defence like it matters. The fact we follow the same rules for purchasing a fighter aircraft as we do for buying office furniture for a Service Canada office is disgraceful. Don't treat defense procurement as a stimulus package for Canadian Industry. There I said it.

We spend so much money, time, and effort trying to get that money to stay in Canada; be it by awarding contracts to companies with no capability to produce items without first "retooling" and"developing the production lines", or by hamstringing perfectly competent and competitive bidders by forcing the project to be made in St. Margaret de Poutain de Champignon, QC because the ruling government either lost the seat in the election, or won it with promises.

We spend so much money and staff hours jumping through TBS regulations that are great for other departments, but are terrible for defence procurement. Some items you have to sole source, because there are technologies and capabilities no one else makes. By doing the bid process, you get companies clamoring for a project they can't deliver on, but because they tick the bright boxes on the score sheet....

I truly and honestly belief we need to split from PSPC and legislate that its not beholden to TBS, only to the PBO/PCO. The guiding principles of this new Defence Procurement department should be "Off the shelf, from somewhere else" if there isn't an industry in Canada.

BOOTFORGEN has demonstrated how well we do when we are able to actually get what we need, instead of lining the pockets of a Canadian company that got lucky.

That, but with tanks, fighters, ships, weapons systems....
 
Easier to understand and comply with than most NDHQ policies, even if it is in the language of the elder gods.
My favourites are conflicting policies that tell you to do the opposite, and funding/available resources that supports neither option. And the OPIs are legacy acronyms that no longer exist with no forwarding info, so you can't figure out who to ask.

I've stared into the void of PMCD, and found I had no mouth to scream with! MM and DRMIS on top of that means that I have no soul left for Cthulu. Somedays a 3B release into a customer service job seems like a welcome relief.
 
Ph’nglui mglw’nafh Cthulhu R’lyeh wgah’nagl fhtagn.
I had to
Google That Shit GIF by MOODMAN
 
Regarding AEW, if you’ll indulge me hitting the crack pipe for a moment, is there significant parts and maintenance commonality between P-8 Poseidon and E-7 Wedgetail? I understanding both to be derivatives of somewhat different versions of 737NG?
 
Regarding AEW, if you’ll indulge me hitting the crack pipe for a moment, is there significant parts and maintenance commonality between P-8 Poseidon and E-7 Wedgetail? I understanding both to be derivatives of somewhat different versions of 737NG?
That’s been the selling point.
 
I’ll go out on a limb and guess that was a local maintenance problem, likely failing to securely latch something designed to easily open up for access.
I am not an aviator by any means, but Boeing has had some incredible problems with cutting corners and poor worksmanship for a while now. I would be unsurprised if this was related.
 
E-7 is based on a 737-NG700ER, which is a modified NG700, in that it has an NG800 wing with greater fuel capacity than the original NG700. Essentially it’s a variant earlier than the P-8A, which is based on an NG800 with a -900 wing. Main point of interest is a very significant amount of common parts between the -7 and -8, so there could reasonably be in-service support efficiencies achieved in operations. 👍🏼
 
E-7 is based on a 737-NG700ER, which is a modified NG700, in that it has an NG800 wing with greater fuel capacity than the original NG700. Essentially it’s a variant earlier than the P-8A, which is based on an NG800 with a -900 wing. Main point of interest is a very significant amount of common parts between the -7 and -8, so there could reasonably be in-service support efficiencies achieved in operations. 👍🏼
Kinda like all kinds of cars do. Like 68 Barracudas having common parts with Darts, etc.
 
It’s called “will my posting to Location X be randomly pulled while I’m driving there?”
"No life like it..."

"The adventure starts here..."

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Pfffffffttttttt...and people say recruiters lie...
 
I’ll go out on a limb and guess that was a local maintenance problem, likely failing to securely latch something designed to easily open up for access.

It seems the key issues are far more profound, and should probably steer us away from considering Boeing as a supplier:


Why Boeing’s Problems with the 737 MAX Began More Than 25 Years Ago

Aggressive cost cutting and rocky leadership changes have eroded the culture at Boeing, a company once admired for its engineering rigor, says Bill George. What will it take to repair the reputational damage wrought by years of crises involving its 737 MAX?

Once again, Boeing’s 737 MAX is back in the headlines.

After two crashes that killed 346 people in 2018 and 2019 and five years of ensuing design changes and regulatory scrutiny, the 737 MAX is grounded again after a mid-air blowout of a fuselage panel on January 5. After loose bolts were discovered on other MAX 9s, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded the planes and opened an investigation into whether MAX is safe to fly, accompanied by a stern warning, saying, “This incident should have never happened, and it cannot happen again.”

Boeing has also experienced repeated problems in design and production with its newest jumbo jet, the 787 Dreamliner. Such frequent, repeated crises point to a deeper issue than isolated engineering mishaps. The underlying cause of these issues is a leadership failure that has allowed cultural drift away from Boeing’s once-vaunted engineering quality.

Why Boeing’s Problems with the 737 MAX Began More Than 25 Years Ago - HBS Working Knowledge
 
It seems the key issues are far more profound, and should probably steer us away from considering Boeing as a supplier:


Why Boeing’s Problems with the 737 MAX Began More Than 25 Years Ago

Aggressive cost cutting and rocky leadership changes have eroded the culture at Boeing, a company once admired for its engineering rigor, says Bill George. What will it take to repair the reputational damage wrought by years of crises involving its 737 MAX?

Once again, Boeing’s 737 MAX is back in the headlines.

After two crashes that killed 346 people in 2018 and 2019 and five years of ensuing design changes and regulatory scrutiny, the 737 MAX is grounded again after a mid-air blowout of a fuselage panel on January 5. After loose bolts were discovered on other MAX 9s, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded the planes and opened an investigation into whether MAX is safe to fly, accompanied by a stern warning, saying, “This incident should have never happened, and it cannot happen again.”

Boeing has also experienced repeated problems in design and production with its newest jumbo jet, the 787 Dreamliner. Such frequent, repeated crises point to a deeper issue than isolated engineering mishaps. The underlying cause of these issues is a leadership failure that has allowed cultural drift away from Boeing’s once-vaunted engineering quality.

Why Boeing’s Problems with the 737 MAX Began More Than 25 Years Ago - HBS Working Knowledge
There really isn’t another ASW aircraft option in the west…
 
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