Guns or Drones or Both?

[Kirkhill]

Drone Wall To Defend Europe? Russia's Neighbors Looks To Thwart Potential Invasion By Boosting Its Eastern Flank

An outmanned and outgunned Ukraine has continued to put up resistance against Russia for over three years now, based on continuous innovation in drone technology. Impressed by the drone tech, European countries are facing a hard choice – whether to invest in a ‘Drone Wall’ or in artillery to...

www.eurasiantimes.com

Pro

A German firm is proposing that a drone wall consisting of 100,000 HX-2 combat drones could “prevent a land invasion of the continent once and for all”. Seeking cost-effective solutions for bolstering Europe’s defense, Torsten Reil, co-head of the German start-up Helsing, claimed that AI-equipped flying helpers, developed by his company, could offer sufficient protection.

“100,000 HX-2 combat drones would prevent a land invasion of the continent once and for all,” Reil wrote on social media.

Company co-founder Gunbert Scherf has called for building a “drone wall” along NATO’s eastern border that runs about 3,000 kilometers long. He contended that such a wall could be “erected within a year.”

Con

However, the naysayers take the claim with a pinch of salt. European defense experts contend that only 100,000 drones cannot address Europe’s security woes and cannot replace soldiers and artillery.

The scepticism around drone technology also stems from the susceptibility of unmanned aerial vehicles to electronic warfare. Ukraine has been deploying a mix of attack UAVs, ranging from light and heavy bomber drones to First Person View drones. The use of fibre-optic drones by Ukrainian forces is not yet ubiquitous. (I wonder what those pictures of fibre would look like if they were ubiquitous?)

Observations

A recent report by the Royal United Services Institute, titled “Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War,” enumerates the significant limitations of tactical UAVs.

“Between 60 and 80% of Ukrainian FPVs fail to reach their target, depending on the part of the front and the skill of the operators. Of those that do strike their targets, a majority fail to destroy the target system when striking armoured vehicles. The success rate in wounding infantry is high,” the report states. Reports indicate that drones are responsible for an estimated 70-80% of deaths and injuries in the conflict, according to the New York Times.

Personal comment - a hit rate of 20-40% (the inverse of the 60-80% miss rate) doesn't sound so bad to me. Especially compared to many of the alternatives.
Apparently armoured vehicles need a bigger bomb but the effect on infantry seems impressive. That would seem to mean armoured vehicles are more likely to survive the advance but be stripped of their infantry making them more vulnerable to ATGMs.

Ukrainian conclusions. (Drones and Guns)

The RUSI report also includes input from Ukrainian military personnel seeking more artillery in conjunction with drones, as artillery can be effective even in adverse weather conditions and can be deployed effectively.

Drones are most effective in combination with artillery, the report’s authors found. UAVs serve as forward observers, correcting fire and improving the strike efficiency of artillery systems.

German conclusions. (Drones and Conventional Forces)

The German parliament has been exploring the concept of a drone wall to bolster NATO’s eastern flank defense by purchasing combat drones. But: For “credible deterrence and defense,” in addition to drones, “large weapon systems such as battle tanks, combat aircraft, artillery, and ships are still necessary,” says a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense.

In line with its strategy, Germany is establishing an armored brigade of up to 5,000 soldiers. The brigade will be positioned in Lithuania near the border with Belarus, an important ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Baltic conclusions. (Drones and Conventional Forces)

The Baltic states, closer to Russia, are more apprehensive of an attack by Moscow. They are investing heavily in building deterrence. Lithuania announced in July 2024 that it would allocate approximately 200 million euros for various types of drones by 2030. (Lithuania has a population of <3 million - Canadian equivalent 4.5 BCAD in the next 5 years)

Estonia is also working on upgrading its drones and anti-drone systems. Akin to Ukraine’s domestically produced First-person-view drones, Estonia is working on short-range loitering munitions under the project “Angry Hedgehog.”

The drones will be equipped with custom warheads and will have a range of nine miles. The AI-equipped drones will be guided by artificial intelligence to guide them through the last mile to the target to outmanoeuvre Russian jamming.

The cost will be under 1,000 euros, and will be battle-tested by delivering 1,000 of them to Ukraine. In late March, the Estonian Ministry of Defense announced a €100 million package of support for Ukraine, which includes drones, boats, and medical equipment.

According to the Estonian Defense Ministry, the country will allocate 220 million euros (approximately $238 million) for loitering munitions between 2024 and 2027. (Estonian population of 1.37 million - 10.3 BCAD in the next 3 years. At 1000 euros a piece that equates to about 220,000 Estonian munitions or 6,380,000 Canadian ones)

Drone operators from Ukraine have started training Estonia’s volunteer Defense League (Kaitseliit) beginning in May. Estonia announced a new dedicated drone warfare unit for the Defense League in May 2025.

And the counters

Besides shoring up their strike drone capabilities, the NATO countries that share a border with Russia, namely Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are also working on anti-drone technologies to protect themselves against Russian swarm drones.

These countries have come together to create an interconnected system of detection devices and defenses, commonly referred to as the Baltic Drone Wall.

Over USD 12 million has been earmarked for the project, consisting of autonomous surveillance systems powered by AI and counter-drone systems. The goal is to have an impregnable border with Russia that cannot be breached by a drone without being detected and destroyed.

Based on the relative investments it seems to me that the locals are betting on it being more effective to kill people than to kill drones. They seem to be betting on the best defence being a good offence.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Both always, because like the "bomber will always get through", technology changes and your uber weapon can become a dud.

 

[Kirkhill]

Both always, because like the "bomber will always get through", technology changes and your uber weapon can become a dud.

When do guns become a dud technology?

Notion about countering AFVs once the infantry have been stripped away.

The Malloy T650 has a lifting capacity of 300 kg and an range of 80 km (empty) and 30 km (max load).
FOG-Missiles (Fibre Optic Guided - Missiles) have ranges of up to 60 km so a FOG version of a T650 doesn't seem unreasonable.

300 kg = 25x 12 kg Javelins with a 5 km range or 6x 50 kg Brimstones with a 40 km range and an active, autonomous seeker effective against moving targets.

Army unveils drone that fires laser-guided missiles — and can fit in a car boot

THE Army has unveiled a jet-powered drone that fires laser-guided missiles and fits in the back of a Land Rover. The Hydra 400 concept can carry three devastating Brimstone missiles like those blit…

www.thesun.co.uk

 

[Kirkhill]

Army experiments with integrating attack drones into artillery formations

New division formation design includes HIMARS, howitzers, and one-way UAVs.

www.defenseone.com

DivArty

HIMARS Battalion (and is PRSM a Div or Corps asset at >1000 km)
M777 Battalion (150 km Ramjets?)*

????? Battalion

• Mortars
• 105s
• launched defects, (sic presumably it is supposed to be "launched effects")
• loitering munitions,
• first-person drones,

The concern is having enough rounds to feed all of these systems.

“In particular, both production rates and price points associated with some of our critical munitions that are out there for our big frames and our big platforms … and based on what has happened in Israel and Iran and the expenditures that are there, what's happened in Ukraine. Our magazine depth right now is not where it needs to be.”

That includes missiles for the Patriot air defense system, he said, as well as Tomahawk cruise missiles the Navy fired off during the Red Sea conflict against the Houthis. The military now needs infrastructure to quickly ramp up production.

In a crisis, the Army may need to jump from producing 500 Patriot missiles a year to 10,000, as an example, and it will need to happen in days rather than months.

*

Sceptre ramjet-powered 155 mm artillery ammo: long range and high accuracy Silicon Valley-style from Tiberius Aerospace - EDR Magazine

With a manpower of around 20 people, all of them scientists and engineers, Tiberius Aerospace adopts the Silicon Valley approach.

www.edrmagazine.eu

 

[Kirkhill]

Estonia's tiny army

1.8 mio population

1 Div with 2 Brigades (more than 50% reserves)
And a bunch of willing helpers in the Estonian Defence League

Estonian Land Forces - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

6x HIMARS
12x CAESAR 155s
36x K9 Thunder 155s

120mm Mortars at Battalion
81mm Mortars at Company

Long Range UAV battery equipped (probably) with Harops and Mini-Harpies from Israel

Estonia plans loitering-munitions unit to hunt enemy air defenses

Inspired by the wars in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, the new battery may be NATO’s first.

www.defenseone.com

UAVs and C-UAVs at all levels down to the Section.

How Estonia is becoming a hotbed for drone warfare

Projects include experimental loitering munitions that cost a fraction of U.S. equivalents.

www.defenseone.com

Among the projects linked to Ukraine is the “Angry Hedgehog,” a plan to field a domestically produced short-range loitering munition similar to Ukraine’s first-person-view drones.

The drones will have a custom warhead and a range of up to nine miles, said Hanniotti. They will be equipped with artificial intelligence to guide them the last mile to a target, an increasingly popular countermeasure against Russian jamming.

Hanniotti said the drone will cost under 1,000 euros, and use European-manufactured components. It will undergo further tests in June 2024, and Estonia also aims to deliver 1,000 of them to Ukraine to test their use in combat. Formal fielding may occur next year.

Unknown number of Blue Spear Anti-Ship Missile Batteries.

----------------

Air Defence (Under the Air Force?)

1 Billion Euro LRAD System (Patriot Type) to be ordered
400 Million Euros for 3 MRAD Batteries (IRIS-T)

Air Defence (Army)

2 VSHORAD Battalions (1 per brigade)
Armed with a total of

98 ZU-23-2 23mm guns
209 Mistral SAMs
5 Giraffe

 

[Furniture]

Estonia's tiny army

1.8 mio population

1 Div with 2 Brigades (more than 50% reserves)
And a bunch of willing helpers in the Estonian Defence League

Estonian Land Forces - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

6x HIMARS
12x CAESAR 155s
36x K9 Thunder 155s

120mm Mortars at Battalion
81mm Mortars at Company

Long Range UAV battery equipped (probably) with Harops and Mini-Harpies from Israel

Estonia plans loitering-munitions unit to hunt enemy air defenses

Inspired by the wars in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, the new battery may be NATO’s first.

www.defenseone.com

UAVs and C-UAVs at all levels down to the Section.

How Estonia is becoming a hotbed for drone warfare

Projects include experimental loitering munitions that cost a fraction of U.S. equivalents.

www.defenseone.com

Unknown number of Blue Spear Anti-Ship Missile Batteries.

----------------

Air Defence (Under the Air Force?)

1 Billion Euro LRAD System (Patriot Type) to be ordered
400 Million Euros for 3 MRAD Batteries (IRIS-T)

Air Defence (Army)

2 VSHORAD Battalions (1 per brigade)
Armed with a total of

98 ZU-23-2 23mm guns
209 Mistral SAMs
5 Giraffe

Their leaders grew up in the USSR, and USSR 2.0 is right on their border. It makes sense for them to take defense very seriously, particularly compared to a country last invaded in 1812-1814.

 

[Kirkhill]

Their leaders grew up in the USSR, and USSR 2.0 is right on their border. It makes sense for them to take defense very seriously, particularly compared to a country last invaded in 1812-1814.

I'm fascinated by the notion of, apparently, building their army, or at least the professional bit, from the artillery out. Both Napoleonic and Soviet.

I am also intrigued by the way they are spreading the money around.

They secured their coastline with dedicated missiles on wheels.

Air Defence has moved to a priority spend over manned aircraft. Patriot? LRAD and IRIS-T MRAD (3 Batteries) - total spend of about 1.5 BCAD.

Like the coastal missiles that makes sense for a city state in a vulverable location. No space to trade for time.

And apparently the 23mm guns in the manoeuvre brigades are expected to be dual function - keeping the skies clear and managing ground threats. They are all held, along with the ManPADS in two separate battalions, one per brigade. They are supported by 5 Giraffe radars (2 per battalion?).

As they are building their artillery they have bought 9 batteries of 6 units each - 6 tracked and 3 wheeled.

All 9 batteries seem to be, currently, held centrally under one regiment responsible for learning the new kit, developing tactics and training new gunners, both regular and reserve.

Those then can be formed up as three battalions - two tracked with 18 K9s each, 1 bn per brigade for direct support, and a separate mobile divisional reserve on wheels of 12 CAESARs and 6 HIMARS.

That wheeled reserve, I am guessing, could be tasked to support the ground battle, the coastal batteries or the air defence wing.

Fire support includes 120mm mortars for the infantry battalions, 81s for the companies and an assortment of recoilless rifles, including CG84s and AT4s scattered throughout, just like the UAVs. FOOs and MFCs all get UAVs.

They are standing up a LAM battery of Harops and Harpies whose primary mission appears to be SEAD as well as considering a separate UAV unit built on Ukrainian lines with ISR, Attack and CUAS capabilities, including EW.

Most of the infantry, and the gunners for that matter, are made up of volunteers and conscripts.

The professional infantry gets the CV90s and is formed into a Scout battalion. The rest of the regs are the core around which the volunteers, reserves and conscripts are to form. They have to train and organize their trenchmates.

As you say, they are motivated to take things seriously. They will have no choice when the battle comes to them.

 

[Kirkhill]

Ukraine’s milestone shows drones prevent defeat, but don’t secure victory

Drone innovation is speeding up, but war has not followed. Is this the future?

www.defenseone.com

Drones don't secure victory.

But.

Do they prevent defeat?

The Maxim Gun permitted the thinning of lines. It allowed for fewer riflemen to hold the lines. The unused riflemen could be rested and husbanded for reaction and the assault.

The Lewis gun brought the advantages of the Maxim to the assaulting force, adding weight of fire without adding people.

How many people are being rested and husbanded as a result of the presence of "drones" and "uncrewed" platforms?

 

[Kirkhill]

75th Rangers with 5 km FPVs and 5 to 10 lb EFPs

Army Rangers are testing out drones as anti-tank weapons

The tests have included fitting small drones with explosively formed penetrators, an anti-tank weapon that fires a slug of high-density metal.

taskandpurpose.com

These types of drones are cheap to replace and, “The cost per kill is hugely elevated when we have FPVs killing $5-6 million tanks,” said Master Sgt. Andrew Heater, the regiment’s technology and mobility division chief.

Over the past 18 months, the regiment has conducted a series of experiments with FPVs that have included fitting small drones with explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, a type of anti-tank weapon that Shiite militias in Iraq used against U.S. troops, Heater told reporters during Hegseth’s visit to Benning.

“I would comfortably say that, yes, we’ve played with stuff that can penetrate armor, depending on the thickness,” Heater said.

“We have nearly completed 100 lethal drone strikes within the Ranger Regiment,” Wright told reporters on Thursday. “Half of those drone strikes have been in a training environment, alongside Rangers 250 meters from the frontline trace during maneuver live-fire ranges.”

And the kicker

It is possible that the U.S. military could eventually use FPVs as a substitute or replacement for artillery, Heater said.

“Kind of what we saw in the lessons learned from Ukraine is this became a viable solution because they ran out of artillery,” Heater said. “It’s a lot easier and cheaper to source materials to make this, and you’re packing it with Army common explosives, rather than producing 155mm shells at the cost that is per shell.”

3rd Inf Div, 1 ABCT with UAVs and EW

The Army wants more drones, electronic warfare tech. This unit is the guinea pig.

The 3rd Infantry Division is moving soldiers into specialized teams focused on drones and electronic warfare threats.

taskandpurpose.com

173rd IBCT DIY

173rd Airborne builds its own FPV drone lab to get around procurement wait

Each small drone, compared to "steerable mortars," is made in-house with soldiers building them themselves to then train with them.

taskandpurpose.com

And keeping swarms in the air in jammed skies

Atomic clocks may keep Air Force drone swarms flying without GPS

A new Air Force project aims to replace vulnerable satellite signals with atomic clock technology for next-generation drone swarms.

interestingengineering.com

 

[FJAG]

And the kicker: "It is possible that the U.S. military could eventually use FPVs as a substitute or replacement for artillery," Heater said. . . . “Kind of what we saw in the lessons learned from Ukraine is this became a viable solution because they ran out of artillery,” Heater said. “It’s a lot easier and cheaper to source materials to make this, and you’re packing it with Army common explosives, rather than producing 155mm shells at the cost that is per shell.”

This is an example of an individual who is looking at a 5 km infantry field of view with blinders on and not having a hot clue beyond that.

The drones they are using are in fact a form of artillery, specifically anti-tank artillery but of a size and at a scale that light infantry can use. He's entirely overlooking weather conditions, the artillery's various other uses (besides killing a single tank such as area disruption, neutralization, smoke, illumination, etc), and the battlefield's extended depth well beyond five kilometres that artillery strikes at. This is someone with bags of experience at the company and perhaps battalion level but who can't see the brigade, much less the divisional, fight.

Drones add value at many levels. There definitely need to be these short range weapons that can be used within a rifle battalion, but the concept of using artillery FPV drones and loitering munitions, guns and rockets is well beyond questioning. The mix of each may still be debated intelligently but the fact is that the combined close and deep fight using various fires resources, electronic sensors, EW and MI resources is essential in an LSCO.

Typical example of an interview of someone who can't think beyond his own skill set.


This next article, OTOH, is definitely a step in the right direction especially if tied directly into a divisional fires structure which also ties in with all other target acquisition resources.

3rd Inf Div, 1 ABCT with UAVs and EW: - The division is also testing a brand new formation of just over 100 soldiers called a multi-effects company “to integrate what we deemed kind of the four most important technology categories,” Blatherwick said. Within this company, they’re experimenting with platoons that are each focused on electronic warfare, UAS, counter-UAS, and loitering munitions.

I think the scope is a bit small though.

I'm getting more and more accepting of a surveillance and target acquisition (STA) artillery regiment within the divisional artillery brigade that allows fusing electronic sensors across the division with organic EW and MI cells.

As an example we already have a 4 GS Regt with a Multi-role radar battery and an SUAS battery. What's needed is a robust EW battery(squadron) and a central targeting coordination centre composed of gunners, MI specialists and EW specialists who can rapidly convert sensor input to an appropriate response.

Separate and apart from this, but part and parcel to the divisional artillery brigade, would be a divisional general support regiment which delivers deep fires by way of batteries of rockets and long range-long endurance loitering munitions. This is on top of close support regiments, at the scale of one per manoeuvre brigade, which, with their ever increasing range, can also deliver fires crossing over from the close to the deep areas.

The key to all of this is a highly functional comms network to tie these sense and act functions into a comprehensive whole.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is an example of an individual who is looking at a 5 km infantry field of view with blinders on and not having a hot clue beyond that.

The drones they are using are in fact a form of artillery, specifically anti-tank artillery but of a size and at a scale that light infantry can use. He's entirely overlooking weather conditions, the artillery's various other uses (besides killing a single tank such as area disruption, neutralization, smoke, illumination, etc), and the battlefield's extended depth well beyond five kilometres that artillery strikes at. This is someone with bags of experience at the company and perhaps battalion level but who can't see the brigade, much less the divisional, fight.

Drones add value at many levels. There definitely need to be these short range weapons that can be used within a rifle battalion, but the concept of using artillery FPV drones and loitering munitions, guns and rockets is well beyond questioning. The mix of each may still be debated intelligently but the fact is that the combined close and deep fight using various fires resources, electronic sensors, EW and MI resources is essential in an LSCO.

Typical example of an interview of someone who can't think beyond his own skill set.


This next article, OTOH, is definitely a step in the right direction especially if tied directly into a divisional fires structure which also ties in with all other target acquisition resources.



I think the scope is a bit small though.

I'm getting more and more accepting of a surveillance and target acquisition (STA) artillery regiment within the divisional artillery brigade that allows fusing electronic sensors across the division with organic EW and MI cells.

As an example we already have a 4 GS Regt with a Multi-role radar battery and an SUAS battery. What's needed is a robust EW battery(squadron) and a central targeting coordination centre composed of gunners, MI specialists and EW specialists who can rapidly convert sensor input to an appropriate response.

Separate and apart from this, but part and parcel to the divisional artillery brigade, would be a divisional general support regiment which delivers deep fires by way of batteries of rockets and long range-long endurance loitering munitions. This is on top of close support regiments, at the scale of one per manoeuvre brigade, which, with their ever increasing range, can also deliver fires crossing over from the close to the deep areas.

The key to all of this is a highly functional comms network to tie these sense and act functions into a comprehensive whole.

You didn't disappoint.

Cheers.

 

[Kirkhill]

@FJAG

Setting apart the frivolities, I agree with you.

 

[FJAG]

I've been struggling with the concept of where to put the STA resources available these days and trying not to load up the arty brigade just because I'm a gunner. As a result I had left a good bit of STA and loitering munitions with the CS regiments.

The more that I take a look at the sensor capabilities and the more that I'm accepting the brigade as a manoeuvre element which is best left to deal with fighting the close fight the more I think that the CS regiments should be as simple a delivery system as possible.

My last struggle is as to whether or not any STA elements should remain with the CS Regt. In the past I gave them an LCMR/HALO radar troop, an MUAV troop (think of it as the regiment's air OP) and a moderate range/endurance loitering munitions launch troop. I previously had the higher STA elements (MRR and SUAS) in a single STA battery of the GS regiment.

The option is to integrate those CS regiments' STA elements into the divisional STA regiment and be deployed as the div STA regt sees fit. It's advantage is that the CS regiment does not have to concern itself with any element of the CB fight whatsoever; it becomes a div role - close and deep.

This really needs wargaming and a much better understanding of the maturity of the comms network. The effectiveness of a totally integrates system is highly dependent on comms. My gut tells me to leave STA in the CS regiment. If things degenerate like in Ukraine, the separation of the close fight and the deep fight is more defined and stable then when the fight is more mobile. Also, I like a bit of redundancy.

I know a couple of guys who do wargaming for DND for a living now and run this past them.

 

[Kirkhill]

I've been struggling with the concept of where to put the STA resources available these days and trying not to load up the arty brigade just because I'm a gunner. As a result I had left a good bit of STA and loitering munitions with the CS regiments.

The more that I take a look at the sensor capabilities and the more that I'm accepting the brigade as a manoeuvre element which is best left to deal with fighting the close fight the more I think that the CS regiments should be as simple a delivery system as possible.

My last struggle is as to whether or not any STA elements should remain with the CS Regt. In the past I gave them an LCMR/HALO radar troop, an MUAV troop (think of it as the regiment's air OP) and a moderate range/endurance loitering munitions launch troop. I previously had the higher STA elements (MRR and SUAS) in a single STA battery of the GS regiment.

The option is to integrate those CS regiments' STA elements into the divisional STA regiment and be deployed as the div STA regt sees fit. It's advantage is that the CS regiment does not have to concern itself with any element of the CB fight whatsoever; it becomes a div role - close and deep.

This really needs wargaming and a much better understanding of the maturity of the comms network. The effectiveness of a totally integrates system is highly dependent on comms. My gut tells me to leave STA in the CS regiment. If things degenerate like in Ukraine, the separation of the close fight and the deep fight is more defined and stable then when the fight is more mobile. Also, I like a bit of redundancy.

I know a couple of guys who do wargaming for DND for a living now and run this past them.

Or....

Add the STA battery to the Brigade Cavalry/ISR unit.

 

[FJAG]

Or....

Add the STA battery to the Brigade Cavalry/ISR unit.

A bit too limiting, I think. I see the main Cavalry force as a regiment and as a divisional asset and designed to not only sense but also fight using primarily artillery assets and, to an extent their own anti-armour and AD systems. Their sensors would definitely be linked into the the divisional targeting system and they would receive fires from the whole of the divisional artillery as appropriate for the targets.

At best I'm also seeing a small cavalry squadron as part of the brigades' armoured regiment which works somewhat like the divisional cavalry regiment but closer in and a lower scale

One of the things that's always an issue is where do the FSCC/FOO resources come from for recce/cav? Even today, a three battalion brigade does not have an FSCC/FOO tactical group for the armoured regiment. That was always one of the fun things as a FOO was switching back and forth between units during different phases of an exercise. Recce was always quite good on calls for fire but cavalry appears to act more like a guard than a screen these days and there may be a need for a full arty tactical group to come from somewhere to work with the divisional cavalry regiment.

 

[KevinB]

I want the STA/ISR in the Div FIRES Bde, as the gun/rockets can use that info instantly. Also feeding DIV G2/G3, and the Bde staff being able to draw relevant data as needed as well. The FOO/JTAC's will also be able to push/pull data to FIRES.

For a LSCO, the Div is the maneuver unit - and so I don't see the need for Brigade Recce/Cav. The Bde has Infantry Mud Recce from the Inf BN's or CAB's for their portion, but beyond that - the Div is doing the work. In the Armored Bde context I don't see much of a need for a cavalry squadron, as one can chop a CAB (or parts thereof) to do to a screen as needed.

@FJAG that is the primary reason I favor a Bty for each maneuver BN, if you have 3 Inf, 1 Armor - you need 4 CS Bty for the Artillery.
You then need 1 CS Arty BN for each of your Bde's, and any Div Maneuver Subunit (Cav/Recce Squadron, I like the term Combined Arms Recce Squadron - or CARS) and ideally a Rocket GS BN as well.

So a 3 CAB Bde would get a 3 Bty CS BN at Div
A 2 Bde Div would get 3 CS BN's (1 / CAB and 1 for the CARS) and a BN of HIMARS.
The HIMARS BN wouldn't get FOO/JTAC's but you'd have 9 FOO/JTAC parties to support 7 maneuver units (I like to give the Bde Engineers a FOO, and two for the Recce Squadron.

 

[Kirkhill]

I have been considering my disconnects, those areas where I am living with underlying assumptions I am not conveying well or at all.

One assumption that I have taken on board is the primacy of the guns.

Two references:

Never send a man when you can send a bullet.

The British Army should be another projectile to be fired by the Royal Navy.

Setting aside the service references these two statements have led me to seeing no difference between a bullet and a soldier, between a missile and brigade.

Both of them are dispatched by government to create an effect at a given place for a limited period of time. Both effects are ephemeral. They are not permanent.

With that with in mind, and coincidentally following historical order of precedence, I put the infantry at the tail end of my planning priorities.

Command needs to be in communication with its sensors so that it can decide how to act and communicate intent to its effectors.

An F18 with a Harpoon.
A Patriot PAC3.
A HIMARS PrSM.
A KSSIII with a Tomahawk.
A RCH155 Battery
A Cavalry Squadron
An Infantry Brigade
An Engineer Squadron
A Transport Company
A Field Ambulance
A SAR Team.
Reserves.

All effectors.
Tools in the tool box.
Available for the commander to employ.

One commander.
Many effectors.

 

[FJAG]

@KevinB.

That's more or less where I've been heading. My lighter organization has two manoeuvre brigades each with one armoured regiment and two combined arms battalions. I'm staying away from a combined arms battalion structure for the time being because I think it is too difficult to administer and maintain for 30/70 units scattered across urban areas as opposed to on Texas mega-bases. They will combine for exercises the way our organizations do now.

The one nod that I'm giving to the combined arms concept is that the armoured regiment will have a CS squadron similar to the two infantry battalions with a recce troop, an ATGM troop and a mortar troop. In addition, while rifle companies and tank squadrons will be smaller (100 folks tops) there will be four of them in each unit. (Note that this requires an increase in the artillery tactical groups to four FOO parties - in part that will happen through reducing the size of FOO parties from 6 to 4)

In the artillery brigade there will be an SP regiment to support each of the two manoeuvre brigades. Each of which will have three 6-gun 155 SP batteries and a medium-range loitering munitions battery (two launcher troops and one LCMR/HALO/MUAV STA troop) plus sufficient tactical groups for their respective brigade.

I'm thinking of one general support regiment comprised of 1 x 155mm CS battery complete with its tactical group for the divisional cavalry regiment; 2 x HIMARS batteries; and 1 x long-range loitering munitions launcher battery. (Note that I think that one CS SP battery as sufficient for the cavalry regiment as it provides a large enough tactical group and DS fires. During its fight, the cavalry regiment will undoubtedly have priority call on the entire GS regiment and will receive reinforcing fires from the two CS 155 SP regiments)

The brigade will have one STA/targeting regiment comprised of 1 x SUAS battery; 1 x MRR battery; 1 x EW squadron and a targeting coord centre

Last but not lease, an AD regiment. That's outside the scope of this thread so I don't want to go mixing apples and oranges here.

 

[FJAG]

9 FOO/JTAC parties

You know, I've been mulling over this whole FOO/JTAC thing. We've been training FOOs as FACs ever since my day when it was darn simple training and didn't take much more brain work than a fire mission supplemented by a glib tongue and the ability to think in three dimensions from two viewpoints.

That was worthwhile during the GWOT where air power was plentiful and AD close to non existent. One thing we learned during that time is - Hey. You can trust NCOs to do this job and do it well. Since then Ukraine has taught that GWOT type of CAS isn't healthy for aircraft.

I'm starting to come down on the side of removing JTAC training from FOOs all together and having the artillery train just FOO parties - with an understanding of the use of air but not the complex and costly job of training them for what will be a two year posting and gone.

My thought now is simply to have a JTAC cell within each CS regiment - say 4 to 7 teams, all NCOs on 4 year postings (minimum) - and have them allocated out by the OpsO as a resource to attach to a given bn/regt FSCC when air is available. Let the FSCC determine where to deploy them from there.