The "total force" idea that was represented by the "10/90" plan (units composed of 10% Regulars and 90% Res) failed and was scrapped back in the 90's. It was disliked and mistrusted by Regulars and Res alike, although it offered some interesting ideas for increased Res readiness. One problem that faced us then (and would certainly face us now) was the very high "bill" this represented for RegF cadre: it was too high for such a small Regular Army. Not even the US Army can afford that idea: neither the USARNG nor the USAR has such a high proportion of Regulars (actually, AFAIK the ARNG has none at all--their fulltimers are all the equivalent of our Class B or C Res)
But, what has survived and actually improved is another interpretation of "total force" or what the US calls "One Army": the practice of giving Res soldiers more and more of an operational role, improving training and equipment, giving the Res a voice in the internal councils of the Army and taking Res issues into consideration in all the aspects of running the Army. In comparison to the Militia that I knew in 1974 when I joined as a Private, the Army Reserve today is well ahead in all of those areas. We are not even on the same planet IMHO. In 1974, except for a tiny number of Res who went to places like Golan as individuals to do fairly menial tasks, the Res were not used for ops. They were not deployed for domestic operations as a rule. The idea that Res could deploy overseas in commanmd positions was unknown. There was little or no discussion of "readiness" in Res units and certainly no meaningful attempt to integrate the Res into any Army op readiness cycle (if we had even had one in those days...)
So, my answer would be that while some ideas of Total Force died off, most of the more realistic and important ones have survived.
Cheers.
