Helicopter/Cyclone discussion (split from HMCS Fredricton thread)

[NavyShooter]

It took 3 years for me to find out from a CPO1 who was on the BOI that the LS we lost in 2005 was not a suicide, it was an accident. 


2 years ago, I bumped into a sailor who was there that night - he had never heard the outcome of the BOI.  I brought him up to speed.  The Navy has....challenges....when it comes to distributing knowledge to the lowest levels that may need it.

 

[FSTO]

Cough [Protecteur Fire] cough....

Yes, where is that? Should it not be front and centre at DC Schools Kootenay and Galiano?

 

[FJAG]

That's not really the Navy way; we bury and overclassify so that BOI, tech investigations etc never see the light of day.

Not just the Navy way but the Army too.

Back in the 1970s when the German Army started using Shilo they fired a few hundred 105mm tank HEAT-T rounds but stopped shortly after because of a high dud rate. Since then they fired exclusively 105mm TPT (Target Practice Tracer,) an inert projectile almost physically identical to the HEAT-T except for colouring.

In 1980 a scrap yard worker in Winnipeg died in an explosion as he was cutting a scrap shell delivered to the yard after a range sweep. A BOI was held and a civilian Fatalities Inquiry was conducted and established the circumstances that in fact some 105mm HEAT-T blind rounds were on the ranges.

In 1998 another worker died at a Winnipeg scrap yard as he was cutting a 105,, HEAT-T blind in half with metal shears.

I was retained in 2000 as counsel for the Federal Republic of Germany at the Fatalities Inquiry for this second death (a second BOI was also held). What was remarkable is that notwithstanding the clear evidence established by the first BOI was that no one at range control or in the ammunition chain at Shilo was aware of the fact that the first explosion had been a German 105mm HEAT-T and that such rounds had ever been fired in Shilo. (Instead the generally accepted lore was that the first blast had been a Canadian 105mm Howitzer projectile) Each range sweep thousands of 105mm TPT rounds would be found scoured of paint and no one was checking to see if any of them were a 105mm HEAT-T blind. (Incidentally a post explosion re-examination of the scrap at the yard found an additional 12 105mm HEAT-T, one 84mm HEAT, one 90 mm HEAT, one 81mm mortar (with unknown filling) one 90mm (with unknown filling) and one 105 mm smoke canister.)

Back around 1985 or 6 I also sat as president of a BOI respecting two reservists killed when their 106mm recoilless rifle jeep rolled over. We completed all the interviews and within a month had the board report finished (including a draft letter for release to the families) and forwarded to FMC HQ. It took one year before FMC headquarters finally released a summary of the findings.

:cheers:

 

[Underway]

There are things to be learned from the air safety program.  But it has its drawbacks as well.  God forbid one questions the wisdom of the air safety program on board ship, even when it negatively impacts operations or refits to the ship.

 

[Kat Stevens]

Not just the Navy way but the Army too.

Back in the 1970s when the German Army started using Shilo they fired a few hundred 105mm tank HEAT-T rounds but stopped shortly after because of a high dud rate. Since then they fired exclusively 105mm TPT (Target Practice Tracer,) an inert projectile almost physically identical to the HEAT-T except for colouring.

In 1980 a scrap yard worker in Winnipeg died in an explosion as he was cutting a scrap shell delivered to the yard after a range sweep. A BOI was held and a civilian Fatalities Inquiry was conducted and established the circumstances that in fact some 105mm HEAT-T blind rounds were on the ranges.

In 1998 another worker died at a Winnipeg scrap yard as he was cutting a 105,, HEAT-T blind in half with metal shears.

I was retained in 2000 as counsel for the Federal Republic of Germany at the Fatalities Inquiry for this second death (a second BOI was also held). What was remarkable is that notwithstanding the clear evidence established by the first BOI was that no one at range control or in the ammunition chain at Shilo was aware of the fact that the first explosion had been a German 105mm HEAT-T and that such rounds had ever been fired in Shilo. (Instead the generally accepted lore was that the first blast had been a Canadian 105mm Howitzer projectile) Each range sweep thousands of 105mm TPT rounds would be found scoured of paint and no one was checking to see if any of them were a 105mm HEAT-T blind. (Incidentally a post explosion re-examination of the scrap at the yard found an additional 12 105mm HEAT-T, one 84mm HEAT, one 90 mm HEAT, one 81mm mortar (with unknown filling) one 90mm (with unknown filling) and one 105 mm smoke canister.)

Back around 1985 or 6 I also sat as president of a BOI respecting two reservists killed when their 106mm recoilless rifle jeep rolled over. We completed all the interviews and within a month had the board report finished (including a draft letter for release to the families) and forwarded to FMC HQ. It took one year before FMC headquarters finally released a summary of the findings.

:cheers:

This is why we are now required to put two perf charges on any full bodied item that we find during clearance ops.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

FJAG was that a Seaforth Jeep that rolled, I seem to recall them losing one of their people that way?

 

[FJAG]

FJAG was that a Seaforth Jeep that rolled, I seem to recall them losing one of their people that way?

No. This was a Manitoba Militia District (at the time) accident in Saskatchewan on the Trans Canada heading back from Dundurn to Winnipeg. If I remember correctly one was from the RWpgRif and the other from the FGH.

:cdnsalute:

 

[SeaKingTacco]

There are things to be learned from the air safety program.  But it has its drawbacks as well.  God forbid one questions the wisdom of the air safety program on board ship, even when it negatively impacts operations or refits to the ship.

I have been involved in more than few discussions of this nature, over my flying career. Lets just say that the average Naval Officer doesn’t know what they don’t know about the implications of air operations at sea. They are, however, usually supremely confident that it isn’t a big deal. Since it is literally our necks in the noose, the MH Folks take the technical readiness of a ship to receive an aircraft seriously. Perfect is actually the standard.

Nothing negatively impacts naval operations at sea like an aircraft accident. Just ask FRE.

 

[FSTO]

Lets just say that the average Naval Officer doesn’t know what they don’t know about the implications of air operations at sea. They are, however, usually supremely confident that it isn’t a big deal.

So what can the Navy and Maritime Air do together to change this mindset?
I have some suggestions but they would take time, money, and a structural change to the training system that I doubt would be well received by the holders of the current silos.

 

[Jc066]

I, for one, wish Mr Byers would stick to what his UBC profile suggests he is actually knowledgeable in;  there is no indication he's flown or crewed so much as a paper airplane so not sure how a person with his education and experience is dubbed an 'expert' in anything aviation-related.

Example:

Having flown 'just a few hundred feet above the water' and had emergencies happen at low level before, I can assure him, from personal experience, that is not a factual statement.

:2c:

I have not been following this thread heavily nor in the news. I did contact the det cheif and passed my condolences along to all members in the det.

EITS, is this who is being quoted in the media?

 

[Lumber]

Edited to add: Maybe I should be more explicit why it bugs me.  Speculating on a single web forum is one thing, but there are other's doing the exact same thing on national media.  What that does is create a public misconception about what happened, and when the reality is established it doesn't have the public interest anymore, so the public believes they know.  This leads to understandings like discussed above about the S-92 crash; the public believes that Sikorsky acted maliciously and the helicopter was lost due to that and the cause was simply it lost all it's oil and then didn't fly 30 more minutes, when the reality is much more nuanced.  I can't correct the national press and certainly not the internet, but I choose to try to influence the little corner of it I hang out in (and by the way, trust, because of the expertise here, which is exactly why I don't want the expertise eroded).

This is a reason that I believe the CDS decision to not release preliminary crash information is the right one.  Wait until the report is done and all the rocks have been turned over.  Then inform the families of what happened, then the public.  This way forward feels right.

Cough [Protecteur Fire] cough....

Taken together, could the lack of institutional knowledge of the Protecteur fire potentially be the corollary of the first two statements?

It's not just the public that loses interest in events. I am certain that most of the navy, and many in the military, were very eager to know what happened aboard PRO... at least at first. Then weeks turned to months, then months turned to years, then more years, until finally a Youtube video started popping up around facebook military circles (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DOndHotWq1c), but few people actually watch it (even those in the navy/CAF at wide) because they've lost interest. And so, the lessons that could have been learned are lost, because no one wanted to talk about it until the final, official report was released (actually, was it ever released? I've never seen anything).

 

[Baz]

Taken together, could the lack of institutional knowledge of the Protecteur fire potentially be the corollary of the first two statements?

It's not just the public that loses interest in events. I am certain that most of the navy, and many in the military, were very eager to know what happened aboard PRO... at least at first. Then weeks turned to months, then months turned to years, then more years, until finally a Youtube video started popping up around facebook military circles (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DOndHotWq1c), but few people actually watch it (even those in the navy/CAF at wide) because they've lost interest. And so, the lessons that could have been learned are lost, because no one wanted to talk about it until the final, official report was released (actually, was it ever released? I've never seen anything).

Understood, but they can't tell us what happened until they know what happened.  In the early days of an investigation, all you have is some facts, not the whole cause. It doesn't help anyone to promulgate a partial investigation; as a matter of fact, it may be counter-productive (see the discussion ref the Newfoundland offshore S-92 incident above). In the extreme case, it helps span conspiracy theories.

 

[Underway]

I have been involved in more than few discussions of this nature, over my flying career. Lets just say that the average Naval Officer doesn’t know what they don’t know about the implications of air operations at sea. They are, however, usually supremely confident that it isn’t a big deal. Since it is literally our necks in the noose, the MH Folks take the technical readiness of a ship to receive an aircraft seriously. Perfect is actually the standard.

Nothing negatively impacts naval operations at sea like an aircraft accident. Just ask FRE.

Don't get me wrong.  I get it.  I've flown in the Cyclone over water and can easily see how one minor issue could have lead to an accident.  This opinion isn't developed off hand.  It's from hours of discussion and back and forth with Air Dets, on deployment, sea training and just generally being curious.  As an engineer, I and ask engineering things, and want to know why things are the way they are.  There are factions in both that vigorously defend their turf.  The Air Forces (most likely used to "dumb" Naval Officers) automatic reply to any question or suggestion for change is a resounding "NO".

The Cyclone, fortunately, is changing that as all the old logic and publications are under review for the aircraft.  I'm also in the PMO now working with the airforce quite a bit on their requirements, and there is quite a bit up for review/discussion and re-evaluation as the new ships are designed.

There are things that are needed for air safety, and there are things that are nice to have.  And a lot of the nice to have's/preferences are presented to the frigates as must-haves (as I'm discovering in PMO).

 

[Lumber]

Understood, but they can't tell us what happened until they know what happened.  In the early days of an investigation, all you have is some facts, not the whole cause. It doesn't help anyone to promulgate a partial investigation; as a matter of fact, it may be counter-productive (see the discussion ref the Newfoundland offshore S-92 incident above). In the extreme case, it helps span conspiracy theories.

Ok, but perhaps instead of waiting for final, approved, and fully vetted reports, they could continuously divulge major details as soon as they become available. They could come out and say (as soon as they have the inf) that: "We've established it is not x, so it could still be y or z", or would "y or z" be leaving it open to too much speculation?

 

[Underway]

Taken together, could the lack of institutional knowledge of the Protecteur fire potentially be the corollary of the first two statements?

It's not just the public that loses interest in events. I am certain that most of the navy, and many in the military, were very eager to know what happened aboard PRO... at least at first. Then weeks turned to months, then months turned to years, then more years, until finally a Youtube video started popping up around facebook military circles (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DOndHotWq1c), but few people actually watch it (even those in the navy/CAF at wide) because they've lost interest. And so, the lessons that could have been learned are lost, because no one wanted to talk about it until the final, official report was released (actually, was it ever released? I've never seen anything).

Yah you can find it on the DWAN.  The engineering community is all over it, especially at DC School and Sea Training. 

 

[SeaKingTacco]

So what can the Navy and Maritime Air do together to change this mindset?
I have some suggestions but they would take time, money, and a structural change to the training system that I doubt would be well received by the holders of the current silos.

Those are not easy questions. MH aircrew used to be better at Naval doctrine. But, we got busy learning a new helicopter. Naval Officers used to be better at flight ops, but fewer and fewer ships had HELAIRDETs, so the institutional knowledge got lost as people advanced through the system with no exposure to flight ops.

For the aircrew, the Maritime Warfare Standard course was great. But it seems to be gone now. I have long advocated that one aircrew attend each serial of the ORO course. That would go along way to fixing the knowledge issues on both sides.

For the Naval Officers, (NWOs and Engineers), we seem to handle most of their air ops training by OJT. Good luck with that if you never get sent to a ship with a HELAIRDET. Most of the problems we have seen lately are on the Engineering side. Aside from the frigates just getting old, entire regimes of inspections and certifications have just been lost or forgotten. And, contrary to what the RCN hopes for, they cannot wish away inspections and certifications (or documenting those inspections. If it wasn%u2019t documented, it never happened) with Airworthiness implications. All CAF (notice I did not say RCAF) Airworthiness issues are ultimately a Ministerial responsibility. They are not in a Service Chief Silo. So, maybe, airworthiness needs to be taught to NWOs and Naval Engineers.

Another issue I have noticed is command tour length. It is too short. Some COs drive their ships like they stole them for 18-24 months with no thought to long term engineering implications, because it is the only shot they are getting at Command. They do not allocate enough time for preventative maintenance in the Opsked (to say nothing of engineering drills), so that bow wave just builds from CO to CO until the ship just becomes a piece of crap and is either unrecoverable or really expensive to fix. The Engineers, in the mean time, just give up or go work for a civvy company.

It is not all bad. The submarine force has a safety and engineering culture very much like in the RCAF. If we could get the surface fleet to come onboard with the same culture, we would be in better shape.

My 2 cents, anyway.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Yah you can find it on the DWAN.  The engineering community is all over it, especially at DC School and Sea Training.

I know, but it took many years.

 

[Good2Golf]

Ok, but perhaps instead of waiting for final, approved, and fully vetted reports, they could continuously divulge major details as soon as they become available. They could come out and say (as soon as they have the inf) that: "We've established it is not x, so it could still be y or z", or would "y or z" be leaving it open to too much speculation?

DFS will release an Initial Report if they can.  It’s part of the Flight Safety system noted earlier.

See:

And, here is the link: RCAF Flight Safety Investigation Reports

*note* Recent Flight Safety Investigations summaries: Epilogue, and preliminary information about current investigations: From the Investigator, are available on this page. For the full report or any additional queries contact DFS (dfs.dsv@forces.gc.ca).

 

[dimsum]

For the aircrew, the Maritime Warfare Standard course was great. But it seems to be gone now. I have long advocated that one aircrew attend each serial of the ORO course. That would go along way to fixing the knowledge issues on both sides.

Aurora crews (Pilots and TACCOs) could benefit from that as well.

 

[Lumber]

Aurora crews (Pilots and TACCOs) could benefit from that as well.

In addition to that, we need them to sit down and do actually training with the OROs. After learning about ASW tactics and the capabilities of the cyclone, we did a tour of 423 Sqn, and discovered that not only did we have a different idea of tactics, our understanding of cyclone capabilities was off, and in some areas, significantly off.

Mind you, even within 423, we got different answers on some questions between an AESOP, a Capt pilot, and a Maj ACSO.