6 months ago, I wrote a paper about A2AD , supply chains and cost asymmetry when the current Iran War broke out. I am considering publishing an update and submitting it publicly.
Recent events provide substantial empirical support for the hypothesis I advanced earlier:
That a technologically inferior adversary can use favourable geography and comparatively inexpensive anti-access/area-denial capabilities to impose disproportionate costs on a conventionally superior Western military.
The disruption of commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, followed by the expansion of Iranian-aligned Houthi forces around the Bab el-Mandeb, constitutes a real-world test of this proposition. The United States retains overwhelming military and technological superiority, yet that superiority has not been sufficient to guarantee routine, low-risk commercial access through these strategic chokepoints.
This does not conclusively prove my hypothesis, but it provides strong empirical evidence for its central mechanism that an inferior adversary does not need to achieve sea control or defeat a superior navy outright; it needs only to maintain sufficient sea-denial capability to make freedom of manoeuvre uncertain, expensive and strategically consequential.
The United States is overwhelmingly more successful militarily and its economic war is having real effects on Iran, but Iran may ultimately prove more successful strategically because its threshold for victory is much lower. Washington must convert battlefield dominance into restored freedom of navigation, regional stability and meaningful Iranian concessions.
Tehran merely has to survive, preserve enough asymmetric capability to keep Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb contested, and impose sufficient economic and political costs to erode American willingness to continue. In that sense, the United States is winning the war of destruction, while Iran may be winning the war of strategic cost imposition.