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Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

Your assertion that there's a lack of urgency. Those delivering on those projects are support occupations and civilians.
Ah. Okay. We're not talking about the line techs then.
Their capacity has been ignored and reduced continually to protect Potemkin paper units.
I appreciate that but unfortunately I think that's a home office view of the world.

The first issue is that the bureaucracy has so complicated and inflated the project review and approval processes that large staffs are needed to wade their way through things. Step one would be to simplify the processes or eliminate them altogether where not needed.

I tend to agree to an extent about Potemkin units. The question is: do you see them in the brigade and below field units or within Ottawa?
Traditionally, "a sense of urgency" is used as an excuse for "I wasted my time and yours, and now expect you to pull off miracles to make up for my lack of planning and preparation."
I've come to believe that "ad hoc" should be the motto of the CAF. I've now seen and heard of so many examples of the lower ranks having to make silk purses out of sows ears that should not have been unnecessary in the first place. We laud our ability to adapt to circumstances to the point where we don't critically question anymore why those circumstances existed in the first place. Again, I think those problems start at the top in home office and trickle down. There are simply too many agencies involved in any one event so that blame can be avoided or spread around.

I don't envy you your job, but let's get back to the question. Is an eight year IOC acceptable for a job as simple as picking a weapon system where there are already multiple in-service choices available? Or are we once again trying to find the perfect solution that's always hiding elusively over the next horizon?
 
Far too much to unpack, but let's go for some low hanging fruit:

* The priority of lack thereof is in the Army's court.

* It's the Army, owner of the requirement, who define what IOC is. It will never be something as facile as "pull lanyard, make boom". Integration, test and evaluation, delivery schedules all factor into that decision.

* M109 barns are not adequate infra. They are 40+ years old, likely with lead paint and asbestos, inadequate design for maintenance (we don't pour oil down the drain any more), inadequate utilities provisioning, lack of midlife maintenance, lack of security.

* Bases have not had utility infrastructure maintained. Electric grids are insufficient and failing. There is critical infrastructure running 24/7 on generators, with backup generators on standby, because the CAF leadership repeatedly underfunded infrastructure.

* Increased security requirements are already making the RCAF panic, and are starting to filter down to the Army as well. Most ops activity takes place on secure networks which require secure facilities to operate out of (current workarounds are almost at the point of "la la la I can't hear you everything is secure and fine la la la"); and new equipment is driving much more robust security. In several instances, if the secure facilities and secure systems are not in place the vendors will not deliver equipment.

* Projects that skip adequate definition work fail or run long. Very long. There's an RCAF project running 20+ years late; the Army has one at 12+ and counting, and another that's being cancelled. You can plan upfront or later, but later takes longer and is more costly.
 
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