Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

[FJAG]

Your assertion that there's a lack of urgency. Those delivering on those projects are support occupations and civilians.

Ah. Okay. We're not talking about the line techs then.

Their capacity has been ignored and reduced continually to protect Potemkin paper units.

I appreciate that but unfortunately I think that's a home office view of the world.

The first issue is that the bureaucracy has so complicated and inflated the project review and approval processes that large staffs are needed to wade their way through things. Step one would be to simplify the processes or eliminate them altogether where not needed.

I tend to agree to an extent about Potemkin units. The question is: do you see them in the brigade and below field units or within Ottawa?

Traditionally, "a sense of urgency" is used as an excuse for "I wasted my time and yours, and now expect you to pull off miracles to make up for my lack of planning and preparation."

I've come to believe that "ad hoc" should be the motto of the CAF. I've now seen and heard of so many examples of the lower ranks having to make silk purses out of sows ears that should not have been unnecessary in the first place. We laud our ability to adapt to circumstances to the point where we don't critically question anymore why those circumstances existed in the first place. Again, I think those problems start at the top in home office and trickle down. There are simply too many agencies involved in any one event so that blame can be avoided or spread around.

I don't envy you your job, but let's get back to the question. Is an eight year IOC acceptable for a job as simple as picking a weapon system where there are already multiple in-service choices available? Or are we once again trying to find the perfect solution that's always hiding elusively over the next horizon?

 

[dapaterson]

Far too much to unpack, but let's go for some low hanging fruit:

* The priority of lack thereof is in the Army's court.

* It's the Army, owner of the requirement, who define what IOC is. It will never be something as facile as "pull lanyard, make boom". Integration, test and evaluation, delivery schedules all factor into that decision.

* M109 barns are not adequate infra. They are 40+ years old, likely with lead paint and asbestos, inadequate design for maintenance (we don't pour oil down the drain any more), inadequate utilities provisioning, lack of midlife maintenance, lack of security.

* Bases have not had utility infrastructure maintained. Electric grids are insufficient and failing. There is critical infrastructure running 24/7 on generators, with backup generators on standby, because the CAF leadership repeatedly underfunded infrastructure.

* Increased security requirements are already making the RCAF panic, and are starting to filter down to the Army as well. Most ops activity takes place on secure networks which require secure facilities to operate out of (current workarounds are almost at the point of "la la la I can't hear you everything is secure and fine la la la"); and new equipment is driving much more robust security. In several instances, if the secure facilities and secure systems are not in place the vendors will not deliver equipment.

* Projects that skip adequate definition work fail or run long. Very long. There's an RCAF project running 20+ years late; the Army has one at 12+ and counting, and another that's being cancelled. You can plan upfront or later, but later takes longer and is more costly.

 

[FJAG]

Far too much to unpack, but let's go for some low hanging fruit:

* The priority of lack thereof is in the Army's court.

* It's the Army, owner of the requirement, who define what IOC is. It will never be something as facile as "pull lanyard, make boom". Integration, test and evaluation, delivery schedules all factor into that decision.

I'm not defending the army. "Home Office" is everyone in Ottawa. Eight years! Integration is not a big issue for the initial delivery of the system. It's effectively a stand alone component that connects with numerous communication sources. The integration really comes with the Joint Fires Modernization (JFM) project which needs to be largely equipment agnostic to cater to the wide variety of current equipment and foreseeable future equipment. Testing and evaluation are valid critical path events but the last time I saw a timeline, options analysis was to have happened in the spring of 2023. What has happened in the intervening two years? Potential delivery schedules should have been explored during option analysis and I would suggest any contractor wanting to make a deal would put forward a fairly robust timeline to meet early IOC for a minimum deployable capability even if FOC is necessarily far downstream.

* M109 barns are not adequate infra. They are 40+ years old, likely with lead paint and asbestos, inadequate design for maintenance (we don't pour oil down the drain any more), inadequate utilities provisioning, lack of midlife maintenance, lack of security.

* Bases have not had utility infrastructure maintained. Electric grids are insufficient and failing. There is critical infrastructure running 24/7 on generators, with backup generators on standby, because the CAF leadership repeatedly underfunded infrastructure.

We ran M109 barns out of N118 in Shilo in a post war building (not sure of exact date - I think early 1950s) up until 1998. It was not luxury but adequate because army equipment is designed to live outdoors. That building still serves as the RCA museum now and has done so since 1998 when 1 RCHA moved into a brand-spanking-new multi-purpose facility. I've never been to 5 RALC but from photos that I've seen their multi-purpose facilities are on a par with 1 RCHA. Same with 2 RCHA. They have a good sized hanger for that but have no idea how old it is (the gun park from my day barely held the L5s and C1s we had and desperately needed upgrading)

What I'm saying is that those facilities would be more than adequate for IOC.

* Increased security requirements are already making the RCAF panic, and are starting to filter down to the Army as well. Most ops activity takes place on secure networks which require secure facilities to operate out of (current workarounds are almost at the point of "la la la I can't hear you everything is secure and fine la la la"); and new equipment is driving much more robust security. In several instances, if the secure facilities and secure systems are not in place the vendors will not deliver equipment.

The last time I looked radios were removeable, and between exercises could easily be secured in armoured and alarmed facilities. I have no idea as to what facilities are in use now but I expect they're accredited for existing system. If JFM needs higher accredited facilities then I presume that will be part of that project's critical path evaluation.

* Projects that skip adequate definition work fail or run long. Very long. There's an RCAF project running 20+ years late; the Army has one at 12+ and counting, and another that's being cancelled. You can plan upfront or later, but later takes longer and is more costly.

I agree. Definition is important. But this isn't rocket science and it should be off-the-shelf technology bought with the realization that within a decade the technology will have changed dramatically. You can wait perpetually for the next best thing or buy in on the best on the shelf today with the greatest ability for upgrades of key system components. For God's sake don't make the ability to shoot on the move part of the SOR - SPs aren't tanks. They can stop for the minute that it takes to fire their mission. From what I understand RCH only does that on low charges and you don't want your SPs cruising around the FEBA waiting for a mission that's within range.

We don't have the technical manufacturing base to design a new and better system from scratch anyway so the SOR should be kept simple and encompassing all the key available systems. Honestly; this project should be a one-year shoot-off between manufacturers that have a system in production or with existing and viable prototypes.

The fact that we have 20+ and 12+ year late projects only confirms that the system isn't working right. It's tantamount to saying that we should set IOC so far down the road so that we can meet it with our calcified system. Report after report says the system is consistently failing and needs to be overhauled to meet customer needs in a timely manner.

I guess procurement should be no different from the lack of speed in the recruiting system or the delay in court martials (I note that herd of judges, prosecutors and defence counsel are doing even less cases now than they did back in my day). I also note that court martial timelines aren't even being reported on in the annual reports like they are for summary hearings. I expect they're still crawling along.

 

[Kirkhill]

Given that this is called the Indirect Fires Modernization thread and that part of that is likely to be targeting and that everybody and his brother is getting their own UAV these days then I thought this could go here.

Watchkeeper is a 485 kg UAV with a 10.9 m wingspan and a 14 hour endurance at 16,000 feet. It is estimated to cost about 5.2 MUKP.

Raybird is a 23 kg UAV with a 3 m wingspan and an 18 to 28 hour endurance at 11,000 feet. It is estimated to cost 1.2 MUSD for 3 UAVs, a catapult launcher, a ground control station with antenna and a mix of camera and radar payloads. Raybirds have given 350,000 hours of service in Ukraine.
Payloads also include a laser designator.

Ukraine’s Raybird Drone, With 350,000 Combat Hours, Pitched to Replace UK Watchkeeper

Ukraine's Raybird drone, with 350K combat hours, emerges as a potential successor to UK's Watchkeeper for surveillance and reconnaissance needs.

united24media.com

"With an endurance of up to 28 hours and a precision laser designator, the drone can guide munitions with up to 80% hit accuracy, according to the manufacturer.

"“We were the first to adopt laser designation on the battlefield in Ukraine, and we are still today the largest platform in terms of the number of laser-guided strikes,” one of the program’s engineers said, noting that the system’s development has been driven by direct combat experience."

 

[FJAG]

Given that this is called the Indirect Fires Modernization thread and that part of that is likely to be targeting and that everybody and his brother is getting their own UAV these days then I thought this could go here.

Canada is already there albeit that this is a field that needs constant upgrading.

Canadian artillery regiments fly two types of drones. The first is the miniature UAV (MUAV or MUAS) CU-179 Raven - B (RQ-11B) which operates with the STA batteries of close support regiments and thereby CMBGs. The second is the small UAV (SUAV or SUAS) CU-172 Blackjack (RQ-21) which operates with 4 Regt (GS).

The placement of the Blackjack with 4 GS is a bit of an issue. It's real purpose is more in the nature of close support for a brigade rather than general support or divisional UAV support. SUAVs were placed with 4 GS more as a PY saver at the time that 4 AD was denuded of AD equipment and it was decided to group the incoming SUAVs, MRRs and existing ASCCs into a new STA regiment.

There is a question for the future as to what the organization and equipment of artillery UAV troops should be for the future. If one looks at the preliminary US Force 2030 organizations you will see a variety of systems with the only constant being the MQ-1 Grey Eagle in the division's aviation brigade's UAS company and which is an armed MALE UAV. (I believe Grey Eagle may be on its way to being replaced) Other notions include SUAV at the brigade level and a tactical UAV (TUAV or TUAS) in the armoured division (reinforced)'s cavalry squadron. We flew the Israeli Heron in Afghanistan albeit that we called it a TUAV while its more in the class of a MALE UAV which is more of an RCAF asset. We did integrate artillery personnel in that organization. There is no current TUAV/MALE in Canada's inventory.

Then there is the whole question of loitering munitions and other one-way attack drones etc.

Raybird appears to be replacing the UK's Watchkeeper which in our lexicon would be a TUAV and should be expected to work at the manoeuvre div level.

Let's just say we're very alive to the issue and are working on it but at Canada's usual pace of procurement.

 

[Kirkhill]

Canada is already there albeit that this is a field that needs constant upgrading.

Canadian artillery regiments fly two types of drones. The first is the miniature UAV (MUAV or MUAS) CU-179 Raven - B (RQ-11B) which operates with the STA batteries of close support regiments and thereby CMBGs. The second is the small UAV (SUAV or SUAS) CU-172 Blackjack (RQ-21) which operates with 4 Regt (GS).

The placement of the Blackjack with 4 GS is a bit of an issue. It's real purpose is more in the nature of close support for a brigade rather than general support or divisional UAV support. SUAVs were placed with 4 GS more as a PY saver at the time that 4 AD was denuded of AD equipment and it was decided to group the incoming SUAVs, MRRs and existing ASCCs into a new STA regiment.

There is a question for the future as to what the organization and equipment of artillery UAV troops should be for the future. If one looks at the preliminary US Force 2030 organizations you will see a variety of systems with the only constant being the MQ-1 Grey Eagle in the division's aviation brigade's UAS company and which is an armed MALE UAV. (I believe Grey Eagle may be on its way to being replaced) Other notions include SUAV at the brigade level and a tactical UAV (TUAV or TUAS) in the armoured division (reinforced)'s cavalry squadron. We flew the Israeli Heron in Afghanistan albeit that we called it a TUAV while its more in the class of a MALE UAV which is more of an RCAF asset. We did integrate artillery personnel in that organization. There is no current TUAV/MALE in Canada's inventory.

Then there is the whole question of loitering munitions and other one-way attack drones etc.

Raybird appears to be replacing the UK's Watchkeeper which in our lexicon would be a TUAV and should be expected to work at the manoeuvre div level.

Let's just say we're very alive to the issue and are working on it but at Canada's usual pace of procurement.

Re pace.

Read my rant on the 2% thread and also the article by the FPV operator on needing direct links from front line to factories by way of competent tactical electrical engineers to manage the pace of the competing constant improvement cycles.

We should be talking to the Ukrainian front lines and building what they are asking for and then trying to figure out what else we can do to help them win.

Then we will be ready for the Indo-Pacific.