- Reaction score
- 12,896
- Points
- 1,160
You can't have one without the other.
It is not the army's job to decide where, when and why to deploy the army.
It hasn't been since Cromwell died.
Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement
- Thread starter MattGotts
- Start date
You can't have one without the other.
It is not the army's job to decide where, when and why to deploy the army.
It hasn't been since Cromwell died.
- Reaction score
- 19,547
- Points
- 1,160
I have no idea where you are going with this.
It's not a political issue. It's internal to the thinking process within the army that favours strategic mobility over tactical mobility. IMHO, the concept of strategic mobility is a chimera.
No it isn't. It's the army's job to be prepared for the most logical missions that the government may require them for.
- Reaction score
- 17,491
- Points
- 1,160
128 SPG's and 120 ammunition carriers, CP's and ARV's. It is to weep for the RCHA/RCADLR 2 - are you paying attention to this?
- Reaction score
- 3,020
- Points
- 1,090
arent we supposed to be getting 90+/-?
- Reaction score
- 12,896
- Points
- 1,160
The simple form is: What job will the government ask you to do that requires 200 howitzers? Or more?
Tactical vs strategic addresses what the government wants you to fight, where and when. The government needs to set the field and give you adquate warning of its intent.
No it isn't. It's the army's job to be prepared for the most logical missions that the government may require them for.
Too broad a range. A variant of trying to defend everything and holding nothing.
- Reaction score
- 19,547
- Points
- 1,160
The current plan calls for 3 x RCHA SP regiments (i.e. 54 guns) and the school and spares and forward deployed (say appx 24) for a total of 78 guns. The RFI calls for 80 to 102. If 80 then none for the ARes. If 102 then conceivably 3 or four batteries of SPs could got to the ARes albeit I consider that doubtful.
The RegF artillery is looking for more PYs. It currently has four regiments (3 CS and one GS) but wants seven (three CS, one rocket, two GBAD, one ISR/STA). That's close to 2,000 PYs.
My guess is that since the CAF leadership can't think beyond todays needs, and have no understanding of how to properly equip a reserve force, the decision will be made to stay at the lower number of guns.
A, as yet, further factor is a pencilled in 10 BGAD regiments in 2 DIV for a contemplated IAMD force and all of which are currently pencilled in as RegF. I wish I knew what those guys are smoking. How do you justify PYs for systems that will, at best, be on stand? Technical complexity?
Here's my answer - make two out of every three batteries in the CS, ISR/STA and GBAD batteries ARes. Make the rocket regiment fully ARes. That leaves enough PYs to create 10-15 additional 30/70 gun and GBAD regiments.
- Reaction score
- 3,020
- Points
- 1,090
i think we were only planning on 24/28 HIMARS?
the PLS trucks will be Zetros? Macks?
- Reaction score
- 19,547
- Points
- 1,160
I'm not sure where things are going right now with the organization. There are folks working on rewriting the doctrine and I'm not sure if its settled enough yet. I do know that each RCHA regt is going back to three gun batteries and eliminating the OP bty and STA battery by reducing the baty FSCC and placing the resulting FOO and BC parties back to an affiliated gun bty (ie the way that its been since circa the dawn of indirect fire to 2010). I disagree with this completely but who listens to me anyway?
Three gun batteries in a CS regiment can at best support two battalions in contact simultaneously.
The question is how many guns per battery and are there troops? The answer is not tactically (lets forget about garrison). There will be one CP (and an alternate) and multiple recce parties. The whole A Ech becomes more complex. (And I'm pretty sure no one has factored in close AD and protective parties for the roaming guns. All that leaves the question of how many guns can one CP and the respective recce, close protection and echelon support. There's a big difference between eight independent roaming guns and two four-gun troops. My guess is six but I would push that to eight if field tests support its viability.
If the answer is 24 guns per regiment then, personally, my preference would be for four six-gun batteries rather than three eight-gun ones. There's more flexibility in that and some additional ability to absorb leadership casualties within the organization.
I'm a bit skimpier on gun regiments than you. Because my divisions only have two brigades I only attach two CS regiments and one HIMARS regiment as GS. But note each of my CS regiments has three gun batteries and an STA/ loitering munition bty capability. So two pocket divisions have 72 guns and two HIMARS regiments. Plus there's an additional GS arty brigade in the combat support division which has a GS SP regiment and another HIMARS regiment.
The original plan in 2009 etc called for two batteries of HIMARS. The current plan calls for one HIMARS regiment which can be anywhere from two batteries of six or eight to three batteries - so somewhere between 12 and 24 is my guess.
I don't know about the chassis but recollect seeing somewhere that we'd be having a small FMV component in our vehicle fleet so who knows.
@Kevin. Personally I think that our HIMARS numbers are out to lunch. My counting goes as such: one regiment of three batteries (18 to 24, I care not which) per each of two manoeuvre division, one regiment (with one or two batteries each) for each of the two Defence of Canada divisions (Yes. I believe the Defence of Canada force need a ground-based long-range area denial capability) and one regiment with three batteries for the general support brigade. That totals anywhere from 11 - 13 batteries in five regiments (That's 66 launchers minimum every one of which is 90% manned by the ARes).
- Reaction score
- 19,547
- Points
- 1,160
That's what I took it as.
Effectively that's what you get in my model. two brigades, three manoeuvre units (tank or armoured infantry) each, six in total.
One CS regiment per brigade (total two) with three gun/one STA/loitering-batteries each. In short, each of the six manoeuvre units is supported by a battery tactical troop (BC and FOOs) habitually assigned to it. The STA/loitering battery provides the brigade with GS.
I'll add one factor to this. The division has a cavalry regiment for the deep fight. It's support comes from the HIMARS regiment which has its own STA/loitering battery. That battery has a tactical troop as well to provide the BC and FOOs and JTACs for the cavalry regiment so that you do not need to rob the manoeuvre units of theirs. Guns can (and most probably will) be assigned to augment the deep fight
I look at the overall division fires resources differently. For starters, because the range has changed dramatically since WW2 and gun positions much more fluid, supporting fires ought to come from any individual gun within range of a target. While I think it is critical that a manoeuvre unit have a dedicated BC and FOOs for the duration of the war, I don't feel that way about the fires deliver assets themselves. The source of fires can and should be more flexible than we have it now in order to bring the fire power of the total division into play at the right place at the right time.
The one thing that I've added to each divisional artillery brigade is what I call a "pan domain" regiment (PDR) which I currently describe as follows:
I've stopped thinking of the battery as a multifunction asset. I see them as discrete functional assets.
I see effector batteries - either a gun line or launcher system with an echelon. Anything that delivers an indirect effect whether kinetic or non kinetic. Guns, rocket launchers, loitering munition launchers, offensive EW even info ops dets are all part of that mix.
I also see ISR/STA batteries which include both forward personnel or devices that find and identify targets for engagement by the effector resources. BCs and FOO tactical groups are included with that with the additional role of liaison/fires advisors to the units they support. Radars and UAVs and EW are all part of this mix as well.
Finally I see "hub" batteries. Those that take input from whatever resource finds and identifies targets and engages them with an appropriate effect.
Amalgamation of functions does not start until the regimental level.
Effectively, the norm for operations within the division is that target identification is digitally fed into/collected by the PDR from all sources including calls for fire from observers, ISR UAV operators, space surveillance, you name it and then it is very rapidly analyzed and targeted with an appropriate lethal or nonlethal effect from the division (AI might be highly useful for that). Nothing stops having a battery to battalion CS/DS relationship operating within that system, if desired. The PDR also has the ability to spin off multifunction subunits to support a brigade deployed independent of the division.