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Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

It is and isn't. There are a number of projects ongoing. Indirect Fire Modernization targets the close support systems in the division -i.e. the SP gun and mortars.

There are several other projects that tie in and are high priority for the army:

Land ISR Modernization - an army project to modernize CA ISR along 3 Lines of Effort:
– Networking and Integration
– Digital ISR C2 Software Tools
– Sensors

Joint Fires Modernization - an army - arty oriented - project to improve (digitize) the fires decision-action cycle. To acquire a digital joint fires solution to be able to command and control the full spectrum of effects (lethal and non-lethal, via munition and non-munition means) either
mounted or dismounted.
Deliverables:
  • Joint Fires Command and Control Software
  • Bde HQ targeting support capability
  • Modern/future observer tactical kit (mounted and dismounted)
  • Modern and connected Joint Fires Simulation Systems (Reg F and Res Units)

(There is also Long Range Precision Fires [HIMARS} and Ground Based Air Defence [as yet unspecified VSHORAD and SHORAD systems])

Land ISR and JFM slot into where you are thinking.

🍻

Does somebody need to bundle those projects? Or is that in some of those joint management projects?

And I still like the idea of our own national MDTF focused on Canada and manned by Canadians but co-operating/co-ordinating/integrating with NORAD/Northcom
 
Coincidental timing?

"The MoD’s judgment that future lethality will come roughly 80 per cent from drones and autonomous systems, and only 20 per cent from traditional armoured platforms and artillery, is both bold and correct.
I think that is a wishful thinking pipe dream.

"Some traditionalists may recoil at this, but the evidence from Ukraine is overwhelming. The side that can find, identify and destroy targets fastest is the side that survives. The Ukrainians, despite chronic shortages in ammunition and equipment, have become masters of this new form of warfare and remain streets ahead of most Nato armies in understanding its practical application."
All those who believe that are looking at Ukraine and Russia in a vacuum.
1) Neither side has an reliable degree of Air Superiority, let alone Air Supremacy.
2) It entirely ignores the damage that Artillery (both tube and rocket) have done on both sides, and forced great dispersal (also due to numbers and equipment limitations.

Imagine if either side had significant AD and C-UAS capabilities that could provide an "Iron Dome" like bubble around maneuver divisions.
They would be able to roll forward fairly unfettered.


I am bemused / concerned that any arm is publishing its own plan.

There needs to be an Army plan. That's all. Informed by experts around the table, but no RCA plan, No RCE plan. No Airdrop Systems Technician plan Just an Army plan. Perhaps with annexes for the RCA, RCE, RCCS etc etc.
I would go past just the Army (and JArmy) - and suggested there needs to be a lot of conflicts plan for the CAF, and an overarching strategy to guide them.
Which means interlocking RCN, RCAF, and the CA, in tune with the GoC's desires.

From an Army centric side - there needs to be a realistic look at what Canada needs to be able to field and where.
The earlier guidance about available numbers for missions was a weak start - as it assumed that all formations where the same, and all theatre requirement where the same. The CA appears to have finally broken free of the concept of symmetrical Brigades, but most other countries are working on the Divisional scale and beyond.

Something like that would be so refreshing from our end. The RCAC has been lacking good communicators at the high levels for a long time, I daresay since Uncle Walt. In fact, that might be one of the reasons we're in the state we are now, the alarms were never adequately communicated.
A lot of that was budget driven -- the CA has been very myopic about the "need" to retain 9 Infantry BN's, 3 "Armoured" Regiments, 3 CER's, and 3 RCHA's (well 2 and a RALC) without really looking at where one may need to go, and what equipment that could entail.
The Infantry for reasons no adult can truly fathom gutted it's CS Companies to fill Line Companies (where lets face it any swinging dick can fill #1 rifleman in short order), the Artillery self sabotaged Air Defense, and other positions due to PY caps - rather than lose a gun "regiment", although is 6 guns really a Reg't? The Armoured was about to be tankless - and the Army has a wheeled vehicle fetish on top of that.

I would much rather see a plan that saw the CA need to provide for instance :
1 Armoured Division to Europe (tanks, tracked IFV's etc)
1 Medium LAV Division for Domestic, and non LSCO contingency operations.
1 Light Division with a RDF Brigade and JFE capability, as well as the ability to assist CANSOFCOM.
As well as Corps Enablers to be able to support a Multinational Corps in terms of C6ISR, Theatre LRP, Theatre AD, and Engineering.

I am not wedded to the above -- but I am wedded to the fact that the CA does need Heavy Armoured formations, as well a the LAV fleet for areas like Africa and potentially Southern Asia. Plus a Light capability that can get to hot spots quickly.


Realistically the CA also need to figure out how to blend a workable Reservist model into the above, as doing all of that with Regular Force personnel is unaffordable even at 5% GDP.
 
I think that is a wishful thinking pipe dream.


All those who believe that are looking at Ukraine and Russia in a vacuum.
1) Neither side has an reliable degree of Air Superiority, let alone Air Supremacy.
2) It entirely ignores the damage that Artillery (both tube and rocket) have done on both sides, and forced great dispersal (also due to numbers and equipment limitations.

Imagine if either side had significant AD and C-UAS capabilities that could provide an "Iron Dome" like bubble around maneuver divisions.
They would be able to roll forward fairly unfettered.



I would go past just the Army (and JArmy) - and suggested there needs to be a lot of conflicts plan for the CAF, and an overarching strategy to guide them.
Which means interlocking RCN, RCAF, and the CA, in tune with the GoC's desires.

From an Army centric side - there needs to be a realistic look at what Canada needs to be able to field and where.
The earlier guidance about available numbers for missions was a weak start - as it assumed that all formations where the same, and all theatre requirement where the same. The CA appears to have finally broken free of the concept of symmetrical Brigades, but most other countries are working on the Divisional scale and beyond.


A lot of that was budget driven -- the CA has been very myopic about the "need" to retain 9 Infantry BN's, 3 "Armoured" Regiments, 3 CER's, and 3 RCHA's (well 2 and a RALC) without really looking at where one may need to go, and what equipment that could entail.
The Infantry for reasons no adult can truly fathom gutted it's CS Companies to fill Line Companies (where lets face it any swinging dick can fill #1 rifleman in short order), the Artillery self sabotaged Air Defense, and other positions due to PY caps - rather than lose a gun "regiment", although is 6 guns really a Reg't? The Armoured was about to be tankless - and the Army has a wheeled vehicle fetish on top of that.

I would much rather see a plan that saw the CA need to provide for instance :
1 Armoured Division to Europe (tanks, tracked IFV's etc)
1 Medium LAV Division for Domestic, and non LSCO contingency operations.
1 Light Division with a RDF Brigade and JFE capability, as well as the ability to assist CANSOFCOM.
As well as Corps Enablers to be able to support a Multinational Corps in terms of C6ISR, Theatre LRP, Theatre AD, and Engineering.

I am not wedded to the above -- but I am wedded to the fact that the CA does need Heavy Armoured formations, as well a the LAV fleet for areas like Africa and potentially Southern Asia. Plus a Light capability that can get to hot spots quickly.


Realistically the CA also need to figure out how to blend a workable Reservist model into the above, as doing all of that with Regular Force personnel is unaffordable even at 5% GDP.

If we want to get in the good books with your President and most of your Senators and Congressman we could start by simply making a 2 brigade Light / LAV division available for Continental Defence as was discussed by the Permanent Joint Board in 1946-1950 era.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1392&context=cmh

Curious fact. When Canada got Newfoundland it also got one of the most strategically important assets of the era to defend - Goose Bay

The requirement was for three American RCTs for Alaska, one for Greenland and one to back up three Mobile Striking Force battalion sized battle groups.

We have been fudging the issue ever since.

It appears to me to be back on the agenda. Along with whatever else we might choose to do internationally.

It feels to me as if the PJB was paused a long time ago.
 
....

PS

If ifs and ands were pots and pans there would be no need for tinkers.

Let me know when you get your Iron Domes established and then we can talk about your three armoured divisions rolling through Rochester.

As me old man said: anything is possible if cash. And you lot seem to be as short of the ready as any these days.

😉
 
Does somebody need to bundle those projects? Or is that in some of those joint management projects?
I can't say for sure specifically but it is not unusual for projects to identify and integrate with related projects as dependencies etc.
And I still like the idea of our own national MDTF focused on Canada and manned by Canadians but co-operating/co-ordinating/integrating with NORAD/Northcom
I do as well albeit not exactly in the same format. The key element that we need is:
  • Multi-Domain Effects Battalion
    • Headquarters and Headquarters Company
    • Signal Company
    • Extended Range Sensing and Effects Company
    • Information Defense Company
    • Military Intelligence Company
    • Space Company
I take a look at that and add a few elements - offensive and defensive EW; loitering munitions; air defence; and missile strike.

The big difference is that I don't think of it as an offensive system to break down A2/AD systems but as the core of an A2/AD brigade.

🍻
 
I can't say for sure specifically but it is not unusual for projects to identify and integrate with related projects as dependencies etc.

I do as well albeit not exactly in the same format. The key element that we need is:
  • Multi-Domain Effects Battalion
    • Headquarters and Headquarters Company
    • Signal Company
    • Extended Range Sensing and Effects Company
    • Information Defense Company
    • Military Intelligence Company
    • Space Company
I take a look at that and add a few elements - offensive and defensive EW; loitering munitions; air defence; and missile strike.

The big difference is that I don't think of it as an offensive system to break down A2/AD systems but as the core of an A2/AD brigade.

🍻

Exactly.

But the funny thing about a defensive system is that it can be used offensively.

A light infantry force has difficulty taking opposed ground. On the other hand if it can secure ground unopposed it can deny the ground to an opposing force.

That is kind of how I have seen the American MDTFs, as means to act offensively strategically but defensively operationally.

In the Canadian context we just need the ability to establish that kind of defence in our own back yard and inform our neighbours they don't have to worry about it.

Up until now I have been focusing on 11th Abn as a model and wondering where the LAVs fit in...

But

7th Inf Div

Two Stryker Brigades and an MDTF.

2nd Can Div

1 Light Brigade (Abn/Airportable)
1 LAV Brigade
1 M777 Regiment
1 Avn Wing
1 MDTF.
 
:giggle:

You're close. Here are several tentative orbats for my revision of "Unsustainable." Phase 3 represents the 80,000 RegF and 100,000 PRes CAF comcept.

The first is an A2/AD division for the west coast. There's a near identical division for the east. The figures at the unit symbols indicate the RegF/PRes personnel numbers (note that I make manoeuvre divisions relatively light with around 10-11,000 personnel each excluding Canadian Ranger personnel). The unit described as 5 PD is the 5th Pan-Domain Regiment, RCA that constitutes something akin to the Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (with the changes I indicated) in the MDF.

3 Ed Figure 15 5 Cdn Div A2AD.png

While 5 and 6 Div cover the east and west coast, 1 Cdn Div (A2/AD) covers the north and other regions in Canada. Note 1) the higher RegF to ARes ratio; the significant airborne/armoured over snow capabilities; the fact that 1 RCHA is a composite unit with M777, HIMARS and TA/LM batteries; 4 AD Regt is an IAMD regiment.

3 Ed Figure 14 1 Cdn Div Reorg A2AD.png

Finally note that there is a 7th Cdn Div (General Support) which provides additional resources to support the three homeland divisions as well as the armoured forces meant for expeditionary deployment. (I've left those - and aviation - out as they aren't relevant to this thread but you should note that each Fires Bde for those divisions also has a Pan-domain Regiment i.e. while the pan-domain regiments in Canada are primarily defensive, the ones for expeditionary operations can swing both ways)

3 Ed Figure 17 7 Cdn Div GS.png

🍻
 


....

"Ukraine is rapidly deploying AI-guided systems to control FPV (First-Person View) interceptor drones, specifically to counter enemy kamikaze drones like the Russian Shahed and fiber-optic UAVs. These systems use onboard machine vision to autonomously lock onto and track targets, bypassing heavy electronic warfare (EW) jamming.

How the AI Interceptor System Works

Terminal Guidance: Once the operator designates an enemy target, the onboard AI's computer vision takes over. The drone uses stored visual data to match the target and compute an optimal intercept path, flying autonomously even if the pilot's connection is severed by EW.

Speed and Maneuverability: FPV interceptor drones (such as the Zerov-8 by The Fourth Law and the Shvidun) use speed and net-capture or kinetic impacts to neutralize targets mid-flight. Some platforms can reach speeds of up to 450 km/h to catch fast-moving targets.

Acoustic and Visual Tracking: Interceptor programs utilize mounted arrays and beamforming to separate a target's motor noise from ambient wind. These systems can also map out 3D terrain to operate independent of GPS.

Key Platforms and InnovatorsThe Fourth Law: Provides scalable, autonomous terminal guidance modules (e.g., the TFL-1 module) integrated into modular FPVs to boost strike efficiency."

....

"The TFL-1 autonomous terminal guidance module (developed by The Fourth Law) costs between $50 and $150 USD standalone, with a required software license typically adding another $50 USD.

Pricing variations generally depend on the hardware configurations:

Standalone TFL-1 Module: ~$150 USD

Module with Camera: Complete camera and module kits range from $300 to $800 USD, depending on optical or thermal imaging specs.

Complete AI-Guided Drones: Pre-built, autonomous FPV drones (such as the Vyriy-10-TFL-1) cost approximately $440 to $450 USD complete.

The system—which allows a drone to automatically lock onto and strike targets during the "last mile" to defeat electronic warfare—increases the cost of a standard FPV drone by only 10%. It is officially codified by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and has received NATO codification."


....

A proximity (or airburst) fuse for a Ukrainian First-Person View (FPV) drone costs less than \(\$40\).

Developed through Ukraine’s Brave1 defense accelerator, these hand-assembled devices allow drone bombs to detonate just above the ground or a target to maximize shrapnel damage.

Cost & Technology Details

The Device: The inexpensive airburst fuzes are assembled in small workshops using imported commercial components.

Impact & Warheads: These fuzes are designed to be compatible with a wide array of munitions—like standard RPG grenades—and trigger explosions at about 6 to 10 feet above the ground.

Total FPV Cost: The proximity fuze is a massive force multiplier for a weapon system that already boasts extreme cost asymmetry; basic FPVs typically cost between \(\$350\) and \(\$800\) to produce, while taking out multimillion-dollar armored vehicles or air defense systems.

....


....

The Anarchist's Cookbook just gained a companion volume.

$96 DIY guided missiles

$40 proximity fuses
$150 AI seekers
$150 cameras and microphones
$500 TI imagers

$1000-2500 for a Fourth Law Zerov-8 or Wild Hornets Sting CUAS Interceptor

Zerov-8

Weight
Payload 0.5 kg
Combat Radius 20 km
Time to Altiitude 30 secs
Loiter Time 20 minutes
Sprint Speed 326 kmh


Wild Hornets Sting

Weight 4 kg
Payload 0.5 kg
Combat Radius 20 km
Time to Altiitude 30 secs
Loiter Time 20 minutes
Sprint Speed 315 kmh


Get the round within 500 m of the target it will do the rest itself, jam resistant.

.....

The M888 HE shell (for the M224 60mm mortar) has 0.79 lb (0.36 kg) of Composition B explosive filler.[3] and weighs 1.76 kg with a unit cost of $100-200.

The M224 Mortar has a cost of $10,000-12,000.

....

How scalable are those prices for larger payloads and longer ranges?
 
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