That term has been buried for some time. The more current term is Armored Division (Reinforced) albeit things are changing as Transformation in Contact 2.0 examines the ABCTs and supporting div structure and doctrine.
More than 250,000 apparently.
That's not really enough. See below.
Grouping guns in troops and batteries had more to do with locate and oreint guns to a common grid so as to be able to concentrate their fire, having a single command post to produce firing data for the troop, resupply and local defence and security.
The ability of guns to be able to self locate and orient and the ability to pass or self produce firing data takes away one of those requirements to group. It doesn't relieve the other ones and the more that you spread around the guns the harder recce, position preparation, local defence, and resupply become. This is why in the past I've cautioned that reduced detachment size of a single gun is a false economy. Manpower needs go up elsewhere especially in a 24/7 environment.
It's technically feasible and even desirable from a counter battery view to deploy as single guns. (That leaves aside the fact that you are now firing from everywhere in the rear area and drawing fire on other folks who you are sharing space with - they don't like guns near them)
Absolutely. Big, big issue even as low as the regimental issue. Ammo dumps. Break bulk tasks. Forward rearming points Stocks on wheels for emergency resupply. Cover, concealment, local defence.
It's an easy to ignore issue by saying the engineers will do it. I've dug in guns from L5s to M109s. It ain't easy. I'm of the view that you don't need engineers with all the skills that they have. You just need dedicated entrenching systems appropriate for the gun in use and folks who are able to operate the gear and then do all the revetting, overhead protection and camouflage etc etc. Much of that is non complex bull work. But it needs to be done often and quickly.
Again, these are folks with far more skills than are needed. Arty recce is quite different from cavalry-type recce. Local defence doesn't need qualified infantry. CUAS does not need a full blown air defender. BUT - it does need people and the proper weapons and equipment and a certain level of training. On top of that you want your ammo teams, local defenders etc etc gunner qualified because, sure as shooting, some of them will be killed or wounded or just plain exhausted and will need to be replaced by folks that can already operate a gun or an LM launcher or bulk break ammo etc. etc.
Too slow.
Some guns must be concealed in firing positions in order to respond quickly when needed. As they start engaging others can shuttle from a hide to a firing position so that the guns that are firing can move. The key is many more hides, rearming points, firing platforms than you have guns with many also set up as decoys and drone ambushes and EW defences all coupled with a robust counter battery system so that the moment someone starts shooting at your guns you can immediately take them out. The overarching problem is that shooting unmasks guns, but so does moving. LMs are a bit better off as the launch can be concealed to an extent, but LMs can't do it all.
In my mind, divisional artillery is much more an orchestra that operates on a continuous 24/7 symphony than anything else. A whole lot of different skills and capabilities coming together in a continuing orchestrated manner. On top of that there has to be a high level of redundancy and self-healing of the system in order to provide that continuous fire support required.
It's way different than anything that I grew up with and, what's worse, its much different from what any of our higher leadership experienced in Afghanistan. In spite of everything, Afghanistan was a very permissive environment as far as fires was concerned. Any restrictions there were self-imposed. Things have changed dramatically.
$0.02
en.defence-ua.com
www.army.mil
It's an interesting program and I'm wondering where it will go. It's original aim was to replace the 18 M777s in each SBCT but with the change in force structure and the conversion of IBCTs to MBCTs, the scope may widen with respect to their M777s (just speculating here).I apparently missed this one.
The US Army selected the wheeled Hanwha 155 as a Mobile Tactical Cannon prototype. - 18 on order
Army selects Mobile Tactical Cannon prototype system to advance Fires modernization
The Army announced today an agreement with Hanwha Defense USA, for development of prototypes for the Mobile Tactical Cannon program...
en.defence-ua.com
I find the German army's structure a bit strange. You'll recall that during the Cold War there were several NATO forces corps and multiple divisions strung out along the Inner-German border arrayed as a forward defence. Since then Germany has reduced its army to four divisions: 1st and 10th Panzer, the Rapid Reaction division and the Home Guard division. Each of 1, 10 and RRD are large for a division - about 20,000+ people each. Each division has four manoeuvre brigades and the brigades themselves are large as well - anywhere from 4 to 6 manoeuvre battalions plus CS and CSS battalions. Four of those brigades are deployed along the eastern border with Poland Czechia and Austria (some 870 kms). The others in some depth behind.Germany planning a 500 km Division.
What qualifies as long range now?
Germany Wants 100 Jet Shaheds a Day at 500km Range, But Bundeswehr Lacks Tools to Match Its Own Doctrine | Defense Express
Bundeswehr chief wants division strike depth tripled from 150km to 500km using MBDA’s €100K OWE 500+, first drone regiment due in 10th Panzer Division by 2027.
Yes. German brigades are generally what we call brigade groups with engineers, artillery and a CSS element. Units are all termed as battalions, so a regiment is something larger than a battalion and without the same level of CS and CSS as a brigade.
Germany planning a 500 km Division.
What qualifies as long range now?
Germany Wants 100 Jet Shaheds a Day at 500km Range, But Bundeswehr Lacks Tools to Match Its Own Doctrine | Defense Express
Bundeswehr chief wants division strike depth tripled from 150km to 500km using MBDA’s €100K OWE 500+, first drone regiment due in 10th Panzer Division by 2027.
news.err.ee
The question isn't really "what qualifies as deep strike" based simply on weapon capabilities. What really matters is: who is responsible for the deep strike at x range?
The question isn't really "what qualifies as deep strike" based simply on weapon capabilities. What really matters is: who is responsible for the deep strike at x range?
Two points.
1) missiles/rockets are able to make precision strikes at ever increasing ranges but with range comes logistic complications and cost. You don't want to waste a $200,000 dollar OWD with 20 kilos of explosives on a single refurbished T62 sitting at a railway siding 500kms away from the front lines.
2) formations have missions and areas of influence commensurate with their role and mission. Divisions can be small highly manoeuvrable tactical formations of 10-11,000 folks or lumbering behemoths of 20,000. The first is good for mobile warfare, the second for relatively stable defensive warfare. In either case they have areas of influence and there will be a formation behind them - the corps - which is structured to provide support that is impractical for the division to handle by itself.
Compare 3 UK Div with two manoeuvre brigades and a deep recce strike brigade (roughly 15,000 folks to 1st Panzer - 2 panzer brigades 2 Panzergrenadier brigades roughly 20,000 folks and 10th Mountain Div (US) - 3 MBCTs roughly 10-11,000 folks. Each of them has different weapons systems and capabilities. Their roles and their "deep areas" and supporting corps enablers vary greatly.
I think in very general terms divisions should be able to influence the area of 60 to 100 kilometres to their front, after that the corps or some theatre assets are employed. The key is to match the weapon capability to the division's particular needs and the logistic burden it places on the division.
I'd put a 250 km range in the corps or theatre role for striking targets more strategic in nature and leave the division with smaller, cheaper tactical systems that can handle a 100 or so km range. Also, when it comes to cheap, there are corps-level long-range systems that rival the Nyan that are much cheaper. And Russia is producing cheap jet ones in mass. It's actually interesting to compare the look of one of these with that of the Nyan. Russia is back to mass produced, inexpensive, slapped together systems that work just as well as the elegant, slow to produce ones that come out of Western industries. We need to change our attitudes. Lord, with printers we ought to be able to put these out in mass at very low costs.
Not in my mind.
ukdefencejournal.org.uk
This isn't any official definition, but in the past the dividing line in systems was indirect v direct;/area neutralization v precision destruction. Artillery was not good at precision but great at indirect area neutralization. That has changed. Precision can happen pretty much anywhere now so IMHO the dividing line between infantry/armour and artillery is more concentrated on the direct v indirect/over-the-horizon delivery of effects.
This isn't any official definition, but in the past the dividing line in systems was indirect v direct;/area neutralization v precision destruction. Artillery was not good at precision but great at indirect area neutralization. That has changed. Precision can happen pretty much anywhere now so IMHO the dividing line between infantry/armour and artillery is more concentrated on the direct v indirect/over-the-horizon delivery of effects.
To an extent, the infantry/armour battle is based on individual crews that locate and engage targets while artillery is a system of separate sensors and command and control and a variety effectors from numerous locations across the battlefield.
There are of course crossover points in that even the lonely infantryman can now fly a FPV drone or missile across the horizon to take out a target and there are some weapon systems which are equally valuable in both the direct and indirect roles. One shouldn't hesitate to assign such a system to both categories.
Just to muddy the waters even more, during WW2 the anti-armour fight was divided between mobile guns (tanks) which were armour and direct fire anti-tank guns, which were artillery. During the post war period infantry started to carve out their place for the direct fire anti-armour battle as recoilless rifles and missiles replaced 6 and 17 pounders as viable direct fire weapons.
ukdefencejournal.org.uk
You aren't getting it.
Armour are not infantry fighting in vehicles. One can go so far as to say that armour fights mounted and infantry fights dismounted (and accompanying armour in IFVs isn't really so much fighting mounted as being forced to fight mounted on occasion when things go wrong). Neither "commands" artillery - its a cooperative process where the supported arm is the dominant partner.
That can happen but isn't the model of employment. Again, why burden the "lonely infanteer" when there is a team of experts supporting her in her fight?
Yeah. That does happen. I must admit we're short of the gold standard in that. While the FSCC at all levels is the hub around which all that ought to happen, it still lacks the necessary automated linkage that should merge all battlefield sensors into a system that automates the appropriate effector response. We're still pretty much operating an analog system in a digital world. Luckily the recognition of that deficiency is there and a project exists (Joint Fires Modernization). Unfortunately I do not know its progress (it ought to be in implementation by now but I don't think it is - FOC was predicted for 29/30). I'll spare everyone my whinging about how the army has shoved the priority on this time and time again but at least now its pretty high to the top.
Welcome to the club!Despite plans to continue L118/L119 105mm operations the immediate support situation is pretty poor.
Light Gun spares hit by obsolescence and supply issues
The Army has assessed that the availability of spares for the L118 Light Gun has been challenged by a combination of obsolescence and supply chain constraints.
