Inf Cbt Sp - Which Capability is MOST needed again (split from CASW)

[Infanteer]

Webgear, I think I am tracking what you're saying, but some of it is so cryptic I don't get what you're getting at.

 

[Webgear]

To Good2Good and Infanteer,

I am not saying these are the first time those examples have been discovered or thought of, even captured in doctrine. I am saying we need to build up our current skill sets.

I have seen two Maple Guardians in the last three years, were training was effected because both army and air forces types were not able to integrate effectively to conduct basic operations (number of reasons). At the end of the exercises, the situation was a lot better however senior officers acknowledge there were lessons to be educated across the forces. 

I am saying we need to build upon our success and to look at our failures. We need to balance the capabilities across the army, certain organizations will lose PYs to other organizations due to the lack of funding and resources.

We will no longer just fight the big bear, I think in all future conflicts we will be fighting the bear and the snake at the same time. We should be able to conduct full spectrum operations at all levels with the properly trained personnel. We need to train for various styles of war, with the resources we have.

We need to better educate ourselves, understand each unit's strengths and weakness.

We need to be flexible, just because PYs are being cut from the armoured to the intelligence branch is not necessary a bad thing. It means a certain capability is growing which will likely in the long run better for the military.

In the five eyes community, intelligence function (all trades) averages about 4% of the total strength of each army. In the Canadian army is about 1.4% and this has effected our operations overseas and at home (IMO).

I have done both multiply Bosnian and Afghan tours at both the tactical and operational levels.

I was in TOW, and it was very disappointing when this asset was removed from the battalion. I would like to see the 4th rifle company return to the battalions also.

Sorry if I seem cryptic, it is not my intent. I just do not see as everything as black and white as some posters (IMO). Its a complex discussion with no simple answers.

 

[Good2Golf]

...I have seen two Maple Guardians in the last three years, were training was effected because both army and air forces types were not able to integrate effectively to conduct basic operations (number of reasons). At the end of the exercises, the situation was a lot better however senior officers acknowledge there were lessons to be educated across the forces...

You're saying that there were some deficiencies that were identified in training prior to deployment.  Frankly, I think that's to be expected, even in collective training up to Level 7.  The fact that the shortcomings were identified and used to resolve issues prior to deployment, such that integrated operations once deployed worked well, is a sign that the system is responding pretty well.

I am saying we need to build upon our success and to look at our failures. We need to balance the capabilities across the army, certain organizations will lose PYs to other organizations due to the lack of funding and resources.

We will no longer just fight the big bear, I think in all future conflicts we will be fighting the bear and the snake at the same time. We should be able to conduct full spectrum operations at all levels with the properly trained personnel. We need to train for various styles of war, with the resources we have.

We need to better educate ourselves, understand each unit's strengths and weakness.

We need to be flexible, just because PYs are being cut from the armoured to the intelligence branch is not necessary a bad thing. It means a certain capability is growing which will likely in the long run better for the military.

Not trying to be overly critical, but much of your statements above seem like boilerplate words to me...build success, analyze failures, balance capabilities, train for full spectrum ops, be better educated, be flexible....really?  Aren't we doing this now?  How would doing this be something new?

I think that we should CONTINUE doing these things, but it's not like the Army or the CF is blindly stumbling through operations with the grace of good luck...

Regards
G2G

 

[ArmyRick]

Jim,

Inreference to what your saying, I agree. HQ do not need to grow excessively and have redundant capabilities. I am curious as to how our holyier than though HLTA messes with our numbers in planning (we make an organization say 20-25% larger than it truly needs to be to cover off pers on leave).

 

[Towards_the_gap]

I am curious about these cold war warriors - it is an expression I often hear. 

Are you referring to the CDS, with his experience as DComd of an American Corps in Iraq?  Comd CEFCOM, who has been on the AStan file for some 5 years?  Commander of the Army with his experience as a Bde Comd in AStan and a Deputy Corps Comd in Iraq?  The Assistant CLS, who has Afghanistan experience? The current crop of Area Comds or Brigade Comds, all of whom have AStan experience?  Surely it is not the COs, many of whom are decorated veterans of multiple AStan tours? Surely it is not the RSMs at all levels who have multiple tours in theatre?  Coy / Sqn Comds and their C/SSMs who mostly cut their teeth on ops?

Who exactly are the "cold war warriors at the helm"?

I will admit I threw in the 'cold war warriors' in haste, without thought, and hereby retract it.

 

[McG]

Agree, and I find the whole idea that is pushed from above of 'Afghanistan is over, we need to be ready to do xxxxx' sounding dangerously like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Some very valuable and hard lessons have been learned over the last decade, lessons which we may need more than what some of the cold war warriors at the helm may think. Also, as you say, being tied to TI, FP is now seemingly as much as a priority as the mission itself.

Not being able to figure out what is baby and what is bathwater is just as bad as throwing them all out.  We all know what lessons and experiences are important, but we must be careful to sift them from the Afghan-specific context that may not really be applicable outside of the Arghandab Rivershed.

This seems to be the time immemorial problem.  It is said that armies always prepare for the last war.  Preparing for WWII probably would have put us in a good position if the Cold War had turned hot.  Yet, the continuation of some no-longer applicable lessons has lead to the term "cold warrior" as one of derision.  It is the same reason that we heard complaints of "Bosnia mentality" when we started ramping-up in Kandahar.

Distinguishing the lessons unique to a recent theatre from those that will have persistent relevance (or separating the baby from the bathwater) is really a theoretical exercise for anyone other than a clairvoyant and it is a necessary exercise.

My belief is that if we train for the worst possible scenario - a peer running us over with all the assets of modern war - then we'll do fine the next time anything involving shooting and killing rolls along.

I like to look at worst case and most likely ... and both of these would still see us fighting an enemy more dangerous than the TB.  I suspect the developing ASIC structure (and the massive HQs that is supports) would be challenged by an interventionist operation in Libya, Sudan or such as could have happened in Kosovo.  It would probably be even more dysfunctional in a Korea II.

Getting back to Inf Cbt Sp organizations, one could argue that we did not need an AAP because the Taliban had no armour.  This might technically be true.  However, there were times that a inf hy DFS capability was required (such as smashing grapehuts) but was not around.  LAV TUA could have provided this lacking capability, and thus a inf missile pl seems a validated requirement from the worst case to even the relatively permissible environments.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

I will admit I threw in the 'cold war warriors' in haste, without thought, and hereby retract it.

 

[Kirkhill]

Another question from the peanut gallery:  How long does it take to convert a CG-84 team into a Javelin team?  Is it realistic to be able to take a Rifle Platoon (perhaps of experienced soldiers) as that Aussie Owen suggested in the citation by Infanteer?

The Javelin/Milan range of 2000 - 2500 m has been considered by most of our allies as a Battalion level concern while the TOW/Hellfire in the 3500-5000 km range has been considered a Brigade concern.  We did things differently as often seems to be the case.

Does that reliance on heavier weapons at lower command levels impose any burdens on you (logistically, training, deployment) that hinder you?

 

[vonGarvin]

Yet, the continuation of some no-longer applicable lessons has lead to the term "cold warrior" as one of derision. 

I'm just a bit curious here: about which no-longer applicable lessons are you speaking?  The importance of combined arms operations?  The need for Joint Operations?  The requirement to conduct an analysis of the threat and then prepare to counter that threat efficiently?

No, we may not need anti-armour companies to fend off tank regiments attacking in echelon after echelon, but as stated, a heavy DFS element would certainly have been of use for TF 1-06 and early 3-06.  (Latter 3-06 had tanks, so they got that "heavy DFS").

Remember, at one time, tanks were "the millstone around the neck of the army."  In 1989, we knew that "light forces ... do not provide the survivability, lethality, or mobility inherent in heavy forces [such as tanks]. Quite simply, heavy forces reduce operational risks and minimise friendly casualties."  We had to re-learn that lesson, in blood, in 2006.  Why?  Because "Cold War" was a dirty phrase.

There are lessons from the past, be it from ancient Rome to the recent history that still apply.  The Romans facing Hannibal at Zama (in which Scipio Africanus emerged victorious) had combined arms: infantry and cavalry.  Our troops do as well.  The key is to see what lessons from the past apply for this situation and then considering them.

 

[McG]

I'm just a bit curious here: about which no-longer applicable lessons are you speaking?  The importance of combined arms operations?  The need for Joint Operations?  The requirement to conduct an analysis of the threat and then prepare to counter that threat efficiently?

None of the above - those are all "baby." 

But there are lessons from the Cold War and other past operations that are not universally applicable and other lessons are applicable only in the operation where they were leaned.  Lessons like "don't get off the road for anything" that became over-engrained in Bosnia.  Some of the Cold War stuff would be more subtle, such as the debate about AAP vs a Coy for the bde vs dets diffused into every company - what was right then is not necessarily so now.  At the same time, the Cold War may also have assumed lines of communication that were more secure than we should hope for in either our worst case or most likely scenarios. 

The key is to see what lessons from the past apply for this situation and then considering them.

Pretty sure that is what I was saying, except that "this situation" is speculation when it comes to designing the standing force structure.  So, we need to consider what could be - most likely scenarios and the worst scenarios.

Neither the Fulda Gap nor the Arghandab should be our exclusive template.
Both are relevant.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There are alot of similarities with the British experience in NI, not all of them wonderful:

http://www.specialoperations.com/mout/nireland.html

A. Strategic Lessons:

Lesson 1: Military action could not solve deep-seated political problems but did buy time for politicians to search for potential solutions.

Despite 28 years of British military involvement in Northern Ireland the underlying political problems of Catholic-Protestant intolerance and irreconcilable preferences for either union with the Irish Republic or continued membership in the United Kingdom have never been resolved. British military presence, however, was able to reduce the overall level of violence to a point where the civilian police could again operate in so-called “No-Go” areas of Belfast and Londonderry. Senior British military commanders often recognized the limitations of their efforts and were frustrated by a lack of initiative in the political arena. Lt. General Sir Henry Tuzo, General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland, specifically acknowledge this proposition in a BBC television interview in June of 1971.

Lesson 2: It was difficult to get well-defined policy objectives to which the Army could work steadily and logically. When guidance was forthcoming, it often vacillated greatly.

Part of the difficulty in the early days stemmed from the fact that the British Army in Northern Ireland needed policy direction from two sources simultaneously: (1) the Unionist Government of Northern Ireland located in Stormont and (2) the British Government in London. Even after Direct Rule was established by London, Governments’ continued to be torn between the desires of the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland as well as by domestic British political preference to minimize involvement in “the troubles”. For example, Sir Ian Freeland, General Officer Commanding in 1969, repeatedly asked for a statement of policy aims for the security forces under his direction, but was never given one. At about the same time, another senior officer complained: “Politicians and the media often referred to our having ‘softly-softly’ or ‘go in hard’ instructions. No instructions of that sort ever arrived! We worked on our own, knowing damn well that if things went successfully all would be well and if they did not we would carry the can. The one firm guideline we had was the law -- until we tried to get the lawyers to interpret it!” On the whole, officers would have preferred either strong political control or none at all instead of the hesitant direction they got, particularly in the early days.

Lesson 3: Contrary to initial expectations, operations in Northern Ireland were neither short-lived nor low cost.

When the British commenced military operations in Northern Ireland in 1969, British Home Secretary James Callaghan told Parliament: “The General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland has been instructed to take all necessary steps, acting impartially between citizen and citizen, to restore law and order. Troops will be withdrawn as soon as this is accomplished. This is a limited operation... (emphasis added).” Instead, British military presence in Northern Ireland grew from a mere 3,000 prior to Callaghan’s statement to a high of 30,000 in 1972. Overall, 300,000 British soldiers, sailors, and airmen served in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1994. Director General of MI5 (British counterintelligence) also admitted recently that half of MI5’s resources go to countering the threat from Irish terrorism. The death toll over the years was also significant. If the level of violence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1981 were reproduced in a population the size of the United States, there would have been 340,000 deaths over that same period.

Lesson 4: Long-running operations in Northern Ireland elevated overall British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary force levels as well as warped the Army’s overall combat force mix.

British operations in Northern Ireland absorbed between 20% to 33% of all British infantry battalions at any one time between 1969 and 1993; these figures include units in training to deploy to Northern Ireland as well as those already on the ground. This led the British to keep a greater number of infantry battalions within the overall Army combat force mix` than they would have otherwise needed to meet overall operational requirements. These significant manpower requirements also led to larger overall force levels than necessary to meet NATO and other external security requirements. The man-power intensive nature of anti-terrorist operations also ballooned the size of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as well. A White Paper done for the RUC estimates that total police force size could shrink from 12,000 to 5,000 with a political agreement and an end to terrorist violence in Northern Ireland.

 

[Infanteer]

No, we may not need anti-armour companies to fend off tank regiments attacking in echelon after echelon, but as stated, a heavy DFS element would certainly have been of use for TF 1-06 and early 3-06.  (Latter 3-06 had tanks, so they got that "heavy DFS").

All one has to do is simulate, through any means they wish, an OPFOR who can get temporary air superiority and can rush one of our Infantry Battalions with 10-20 T-72s or later varients of tanks and the stark lack of capability becomes apparent.  With over 60,000 tanks estimated worldwide, this isn't far-fetched.

 

[GnyHwy]

It seems we're off topic a bit anyway, so I'll stir the pot.

Would a larger investment in ISTAR (more specifically the I and S) not keep the enemy from rushing or surprising us anyway?  I know it doesn't stop the attack but, I think the whole idea is to know where the enemy is going to be before he does, and use that info to prepare yourself. i.e Identify, fire deep and use a delay to afford you time to shift assets where needed.

I know this is completely hypothetical but in my mind it's a good combo of new and old.

 

[Good2Golf]

It seems we're off topic a bit anyway, so I'll stir the pot.

Would a larger investment in ISTAR (more specifically the I and S) not keep the enemy from rushing or surprising us anyway?  I know it doesn't stop the attack but, I think the whole idea is to know where the enemy is going to be before he does, and use that info to prepare yourself. i.e Identify, fire deep and use a delay to afford you time to shift assets where needed.

I know this is completely hypothetical but in my mind it's a good combo of new and old.

Some of us are still in therapy after working on the ISTAR Battalion concept in the early 2000's...... [insert emoticon of smilie curled up in fetal position]

 

[GnyHwy]

Some of us are still in therapy after working on the ISTAR Battalion concept in the early 2000's...... [insert emoticon of smilie curled up in fetal position]

Tee hee.  Roger.  The concept or lack there of certainly didn't prove much validity.  I spent a fair bit of my early time in sand trying to utilize the ISTAR system and thankfully realized early, that it was a waste of my time.  Hopefully, we have learned and don't forget the lessons on how to deal with similar situations in the future.

Like others have posted (and I agree); to focus our efforts towards ragtag "freedom fighters" is shooting to low.


Not meant towards you G2G because I know you understand this but, for others who may not, the amount of coordination involved in Bde+ Ops dwarfs and is much more complicated that any amount of coordination that has been experienced on the last 10 yrs.

With an operation this size, I see the value in the ISTAR system.

 

[Good2Golf]

GnyHwy,

I think the importance is perhaps better characterized as an important placed on effective and timely C2, which solid ISTAR capability is an important enabling capability, so that Command is as informed as possible of all pertinent factors in the battlespace.  The problem with the early 2000's efforts to establish a standing "ISTAR Formation" was the classic IT/technology-related mistake of putting too much emphasis on kit and not enough on a clear understanding of what was to be achieved, how best to determine the most appropriate course of action and how to most effectively command and control the prosecution of the required action.

Cheers
G2G

 

[a_majoor]

There are a few medium and long term changes to capabilities which we need to keep an eye on:

More powerful weapons arriving at lower and lower levels. Weapons like the US Javelin anti armour weapon or the Israeli Gill/Spike FOG-M are small enough to be effectively man portable platoon weapons, yet have the reach of older battalion level weapons like Milan or even higher level weapons like TOW. If we start adopting weapons like this (or manportable AA weapons like Starstreak) do we really need dedicated organizations for this sort of firepower? Even the C-16 provides a vast increase in the amount of available company firepower once someone figures out a means of getting it to the fight, do we revamp platoon and company organizations rather than battalions?

Increasing communications capabilities. Audio and visual data can now be easily transmitted everywhere by devices that can be carried in the pockets of any individual (think of a militarized iPhone or BlackBerry). Unit inter connectivity can be carried up or down to any level.

Increasing breadth and depth of databases which can be accessed by anyone, coupled with access via portable devices. Dedicated military databases coupled with efficient search algorithms would have many of the effects promised by the ASIC. As a side note to that, it is even possible to build a version of the supercomputer device which won "Jeopardy" (by accepting longer turnaround times for the answers you can actually build it for a modest cost, see: here).

Demographics. Will we actually have enough manpower for what we will want/need to do? Canada has a European below replacement fertility rate, and we will start feeling a demographic crunch in the next few decades. When everyone is competing for manpower to fill the factory and showroom floors, will the military be able to attract the right numbers and sorts of people?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Demographics. Will we actually have enough manpower for what we will want/need to do? Canada has a European below replacement fertility rate, and we will start feeling a demographic crunch in the next few decades. When everyone is competing for manpower to fill the factory and showroom floors, will the military be able to attract the right numbers and sorts of people?

Despite what I say in public about my nephews ( :rage I'm a big fan of some of the demographic changes we're seeing right now.

The kids we've got in the units these days are far more flexible and naturally cross functionally networked than we ever were at their age. Not just technically, but socially. I believe that they are better at naturally working as a team and collaborating to solve problems e.g., blowing bad guys up, than we older farts who grew up in an intensely competitive and 'one man expert', individual ego driven environment. Who needs battle drills when you've got a bunch of smart and networked kids around that can rapidly develop and act on an effective COA without having to resort to automatically trying to bludgeon something to death by frontal first (my natural tendency) which may be the wrong COA.

So, regardless of what weapons they'll use, IMHO they'll be more inclined to work across silos to employ them to their best effect, which may mean that fewer numbers won't be as much of an issue. Kind of like the German Blitzkrieg of 1940: fewer troops, some inferior kit, but better teamwork, flexibility and initiative.

 

[vonGarvin]

Kind of like the German Blitzkrieg of 1940: fewer troops, some inferior kit, but better teamwork, flexibility and initiative.

So, we've finally caught up to the Germans of 1940? 

;D

 

[daftandbarmy]

So, we've finally caught up to the Germans of 1940? 

;D

I doubt it... I can't imagine any battlefield reenactment geeks being keen enough to do this with our current gear 70 years from now  :warstory:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHATKxp1EqA&feature=related