Inf Cbt Sp - Which Capability is MOST needed again (split from CASW)

[vonGarvin]

Here, of course:    ;D ;D ;D

:rofl:
Photoshop that behind a LAV 3 APC, and we have a winner

 

[Infanteer]

Here, of course:    ;D ;D ;D

I wish the Battle Group rifle companies had those so they quit bi**hing about the amenities in KAF....

 

[vonGarvin]

I wish the Battle Group rifle companies had those so they quit bi**hing about the amenities in KAF....

And it would be easier to tell if the TF Comd is doing "extracirricular activities".


("If the trailer is a knockin', and all that jazz)

;D

 

[McG]

... And if they have missile launchers, where do we store the missiles?  Don't forget, we have C-16s in the platoons now, so those carriers are getting full.....

Keep them in the launch tubes.  Across the battalion, you would have more missiles ready to fire than AAP ever carried ready to launch + under armour.  With MSVS, the CQ will have more capacity to carry in the echelon.  If you are the Pl tasked to a flank, then pull the C-16 & Carl G and give these to the CQ along with the bins of the back racks and use this space to carry missiles (don't worry, your stuff will fit in the space that he just emptied of missiles).

So, if we take platoons away from companies to do BG tasks, then those companies are reduced in capability.  ...

That's one of the beauties of the old-school Combat Support Company, an infantry battalion could conduct its own guard for its own covering force (with Anti Armour and Recce Platoons forward of the main defensive area). 

I have not suggested that what I proposed is ideal, but it is middle step between what we have now (no AAP, mortar or Pnr) and the Cbt Sp Coy of 4 CMBG circa 1989. 

Maybe cannibalizing one battalion in each bde is the way to go.  It certainly provides a pool from which to draw all the desired PYs ... and it would mean that every bn would deploy once every 3 years based on our traditional tempo.  However, if we are going to do the exercise of reducing the number of battalions - should we first determine if 6 is any better than 9 a number from a strategic perspective?  What if we are better off having a number of battalions that is not divisible by 3?

 

[vonGarvin]

Maybe cannibalizing one battalion in each bde is the way to go.  It certainly provides a pool from which to draw all the desired PYs ... and it would mean that every bn would deploy once every 3 years based on our traditional tempo.  However, if we are going to do the exercise of reducing the number of battalions - should we first determine if 6 is any better than 9 a number from a strategic perspective?  What if we are better off having a number of battalions that is not divisible by 3?

As it stands now (er...during our time in Kandahar with a BG, etc), the nine battalions "briefed well", but they were all shadows of battalions.  I think politically it would be suicide to recommend that say "x" Regiment were to reduce by one battalion, leaving the others at 3 (as an example, if it went to 8).

Anyway, my opinion right now is that our battalions are anemic versions of real infantry battalions, that we are overtasking the combat support arms when they should be doing bigger and better things, and since we have in the past reduced the regular force order of battle for those combat support arms by a regiment each, why is the infantry still at nine battalions?  (A similar reduction in units for the infantry would have seen us drop to six from nine)


Doing so would mean that we would resurrect our old-school combat support platoons.  And if we're in a stability operation, or domestic operation, those combat support platoons can fill sandbags, patrol Port-Au-Prince, or whatever.  But if we find ourselves in a fight, they can do what they do best.  (OK, second best, after eating all the doughnuts)  >

 

[Infanteer]

I'll concur with the TV - there is a Force Generation/Force Employment gap.  TFK would consume 5+ Infantry Companies; 3 for the BG (except ROTOs 4, 5 and 6), 1 for the PRT and, roughly, one for the OMLT.  The OMLT also had an extra leadership requirement.

As it is now, the Battle Group battalion would traditionally get a company from a sister battalion while the other battalion made up the OMLT.  A full strength Infantry Battalion - meaning the traditional organization we used from the 1940s to the 1990s - would have been able to fill the entire TFK infantry requirement with a little bit of leadership augmentation.

Not that the TFK model should be taken as the template, but having a bigger battalion does seem to make things easier to "task tailor" as you don't have to rip up other elements of the Brigade and leave them in limbo for the sake of filling out a single infantry battle group.

 

[vonGarvin]

And just to add to Infanteer's point about rotos 4, 5 and 6, the companies had four platoons each, and these were drawn from other battalions/companies. 

 

[dapaterson]

The Army's FG for TFK was an abomination.  "Mission Command" does not exist in the Army.  If the Army G3 is managing companies for deployment, they are far, far too deep into the shorts of their subordinates.

TFK = FAIL for the Army HQ as a force generator.

 

[a_majoor]

For tomorrow's army I think the USMC 3+1 idea has many advantages, particularly since platoon level weapons are becoming as powerful today as "battalion" level weapons were only a few decades ago. The +1 support sections/platoons/companies can group increadingly powerful weapons together for mass or disperse among the three subunits for greater flexibility depending on the situation. This includes ATGM's, mortars, automatic grenade launchers, tanks and so on.

I have been a fan of the USMC's LAV 25 company (the +1 is actually two platoons strong; a mortar carrier platoon and a TOW platoon, but you get the idea), which seems to be a flexible instrument that we could copy fairly quickly using our own LAV III's. This seems much simpler and easier than the Stryker Brigade Combat Team model with so many elements thrown in the mix down to company level.

 

[Sully]

The Canadian Infantry absolutely needs Mortars, Pioneers, and a TOW capability internal to a Infantry BN. On Operation Archer in 2006 (1 PPCLI - Recce PL) I cannot count how many times internal TOW and Mortar platoons would have had an immediate effect during engagements. Don’t get me wrong, I owe my life to the US Air Force and Canadian Artillery numerous times over.  I am saying that there were times that both of these entities were engaged elsewhere and unable to support our operations (spread too thin/expended ammunition). A Mortar or TOW platoon would have cleaned house! End Rant!

 

[McG]

On Operation Archer in 2006 (1 PPCLI - Recce PL) I cannot count how many times internal TOW and Mortar platoons would have had an immediate effect during engagements. Don’t get me wrong, I owe my life to the US Air Force and Canadian Artillery numerous times over.  I am saying that there were times that both of these entities were engaged elsewhere and unable to support our operations (spread too thin/expended ammunition). A Mortar or TOW platoon would have cleaned house!

It is even more frustrating when one considers that the FGing CMBG had a LAV TUA capability going unused back in Canada.  We could have had heavy missiles for smashing grapehuts the whole time. 

 

[ArmyRick]

I said it before and I will say it again. The Bunker buster missile (which I know the CF at least trialed) would have done wonders for you guys over there in '06.

I am guessing when I say this, but I am thinking that maybe leaders only saw TUA as a ANTI-TANK only weapons system vice a direct fire support system.

 

[a_majoor]

Not having been on that OP, I need to ask, were there not 84mm's with HEDP rounds available? They would have done quite a number on grapehuts etc., and from a pretty decent range as well.

 

[a_majoor]

Moving back a bit on topic, I am wondering which model is favoured:

80's style mech battalion, with a separate combat support company housing the mortars, AAP and Pioneers, or

USMC LAV/SBCT model with assets integrated at the company level.

I am a bit on the fence, since I understand the arguments for keeping assets centralized, but am also thinking of the Distributed Operations model where companies and even platoons are working far beyond the effective range of most battalion/battlegroup assets (obvious exceptions being M777 batteries or air support assets), so having assets directly integrated in the company provides immediate support.

I also realize that if we accept the DO model, there is one asset which has not been mentioned; an integral logistical support element analogous to the "admin troop" in an armoured squadron.

 

[OldSolduer]

Moving back a bit on topic, I am wondering which model is favoured:

80's style mech battalion, with a separate combat support company housing the mortars, AAP and Pioneers, or

USMC LAV/SBCT model with assets integrated at the company level.

I am a bit on the fence, since I understand the arguments for keeping assets centralized, but am also thinking of the Distributed Operations model where companies and even platoons are working far beyond the effective range of most battalion/battlegroup assets (obvious exceptions being M777 batteries or air support assets), so having assets directly integrated in the company provides immediate support.

I also realize that if we accept the DO model, there is one asset which has not been mentioned; an integral logistical support element analogous to the "admin troop" in an armoured squadron.

You have brought up a very good question.  I lean towards the conventional model - where the support platoons are administered by a Cbt Sp HQ - which only adminsters the platoons and does not "command" them.
Niner has the ability - through groupings and taskings - to attach elements of Cbt Sp Pls to Rifle Coys, if that is what the task calls for.

The only Cbt SP  Pl that is rarely broken up is Mortar Pl, as eight tubes of 81 mm HE on a target can ruin someone's day.

 

[ArmyRick]

Interesting to note on Mortars. In the american SBCT infantry battalion, they have a section of 2 x 120mm Mortars in each of the three rifle companies and 4 more mortars at Battalion HQ in a platoon.

This gives each OC a little fire at his finger tips and the battalion commander can mass 4 more mortars with any company that becomes his main effort during an operation.

I do agree with Jim, that combat support is better as a separate company with the platoons for the following reasons
1. It is easier to break down the platoons and attach as required to the various companies/combat teams;
2. It would be too difficult if they do not train in mass and a particular operation called for an entire platoon of anti-armour and/or mortars for example; and
3. The garrison adm will be much easier. If a coy hQ has to administer a 200 man coy, it can be hell (Think PER season!) and training at crew/section/platoon levels easier done this way.

It worked before and I beleive in this case, we threw the baby out with the bath water (I am very familiar with why we dumped pioneers, mortars, AAP).

 

[Spooks]

I was talking to my Int buddy and we got into this discussion actually. We both conclude that you need mortars (even just the 60mm in light role) to bring indirect fire down upon then enemy when it is too hot to poke your head up. His example was a TIC his section was in where they were receiving fire from 3 sides and couldn't poke their heads up above the field's furrows. No one in the section could poke their heads up for any sort of direct fire.

He also noted the importance of the .50Cal HMG. The TB would not think much of 5.56mm fire. When the C6/7.62mm MG came out, they would concentrate on the gunner's location. When the .50 came out, they would bug off. Evidentally, I am told that they really do not like the .50 IRT its range, stopping power, and sound.

He concluded by showing me that in each section, there should be a designated marksman that is capable of touching out to 800m. These gentlemen would be a good shot but not have to worry about the stalking, hiding, or recce aspects of being a sniper. Evidentally the Americans are going back to using the M14 in this role (and developing upgrades to it too). The British are doing the same. The problem with our C7 rifle is that it's effective range is only 300m. Throw in a C9 and you got 600m. The Dragunov is engaging us at 800m with the PKM at similar ranges. They would engage us, take us to ground, and we could not do anything effective until the Pl C6 came in. At least with a designated marksman, we could have one guy putting rounds down the range in an effort to push the enemy back or hunker them down until heavier fire came in.

British DMR (Designated Marksman Rifle)
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/3CA33581-755F-457C-B652-37601012CF0E/0/DES20093560064.jpg

USMC M39 EMR (Enhanced Marksman Rifle)
(No pic initially found of good quality) This weapons is given to marksmen that are not quite good enough to become scout snipers.

 

[Danjanou]

Allow another Dinosaur to weigh in. I agree with Mr Seggie, the old 80's ( I hate writing that) concept of the separate Cbt Support Company that administers the platoons has a couple of advantages to the idea of mini cbt support platoons or sections as part of the rifle companies.

First it gives the Bn (or BG) comd the option and flexibility of deploying these assets where needed to his sub units/companies and/or holding them in his hip pocket as a reserve as the situation needs. 4x 81mm tubes attached to a coy or all 8 under BHQ, ADP grouped together on the most likely enemy armour advance or pneey packeted out to the line companies etc etc.

Secondly, we've already touched on the flexibility of using them in as 4th maneuver (albeit perhaps wasteful considering the skill sets) rifle company, or even 5th if we ever go back to the 4+ companies battalion, in lower intensity operations, say a  old Cyprus style peacekeeping mission.

Finally it's an excellent tool for advancement. Not every infanteer will want to, or should progress up the leadership ladder, or move over to CSOR/JTF2, or remuster. They however will not want to remain in a rifle platoon as a Cpl for life for 5-10 years. Allowing trained senior soldiers to progress over to an infantry support trade, MG, Anti Tank, Mortars, Recce, Pioneers etc. and more importantly  practice on a regular basis said skill sets may retain trained and experienced soldiers with the Bn.

This could even (and has in the past) be used for the reserve units, with a reserved regiment of basically a company having  a 4th specialist Cbt support platoon ( mortars, ADP etc) for their senior soldiers to gravitate to. Divide the type of platoons up evenly across the various militia brigades too to ensure that not all the reservist mortar types are in Toronto and all the Pioneers in Atlantic Canada of course.

When 3-4 reserve units are combined for a CAC/Milcon, major "brigade" FTX etc. the composite Bn Comd would actually have a Cbt Support Company built of the available platoons ( and a composite Coy HQ if needed) and allow said L/Col some practice in using it for real as opposed to the typical notional unit or TEWT.

As for the section designated marksman, I was arguing for that way back in the 1980's as a section commander and being told by the then dinosaurs (CSM/RSM) to shut up be a good little NCO and go memorize 309(3).
ullhair:

 

[vonGarvin]

Secondly, we've already touched on the flexibility of using them in as 4th maneuver (albeit perhaps wasteful considering the skill sets) rifle company, or even 5th if we ever go back to the 4+ companies battalion, in lower intensity operations, say a  old Cyprus style peacekeeping mission.

Remembering that most of our operations are conducted in Canada, either as an IRU or Dom Op, having a fourth company in a battalion, even as Cbt Sp, would allow for more "sandbag fillers".  Let us never forget that they are all infantrymen and infantry officers, who can if needed "close with and destroy the enemy" using machine guns, rifles and bayonets.  Or shovels.  Whatever.


Now, the Infantry in Canada does face the very real limit of PYs.  With 9 battalions, we cannot maintain that which we have.  I would offer going from 9 to 6 battalions, complete with 3 fully manned rifle companies, a fully manned BHQ and a fully manned Cbt Sp Coy.  The numbers don't lie: it can be done.  What it needs is political will to say to the 3rd battalions: you're finished. 

Also, I've heard mention that we need x Sub Unit Commanders, so that we can populate the upper echelons with Infantry Officers.  I checked our doctrine, and this task is listed nowhere, and in fact, doing so only means fewer effectively manned subunits that can close with and destroy the enemy (our stated role). 

But, I digress....

 

[OldSolduer]

Back a number of years ago, PRes regiments were tasked with Cbt Sp roles...The Royal Regina Regiment (The Johns) were the 81 mm Mortar dudes who, in event of war, would man some tubes for Reg Force bns (In theory anyways) I believe the Royal Winnipeg Rifles were anti-tank dudes.
Thoughts?