Infantry Tactics

[NavyShooter]

There truly is nothing new under the sun.

M1917 Machine Gun Cart

Picked this up recently as a restoration project. It is a barn find with most of the original wood intact and only minor surface rust on the metal. We have already begun wire wheeling the metal and priming it. We will need to reconstruct the gun and ammo boxes. This is one of two that we will be ...

www.usmilitariaforum.com

 

[Blackadder1916]

There truly is nothing new under the sun.

M1917 Machine Gun Cart

Picked this up recently as a restoration project. It is a barn find with most of the original wood intact and only minor surface rust on the metal. We have already begun wire wheeling the metal and priming it. We will need to reconstruct the gun and ammo boxes. This is one of two that we will be ...

www.usmilitariaforum.com

Ditto

M3A4 Utility Hand Cart

 

[markppcli]

To my eye there is an increasing divergence between Mech Infantry and Light Infantry.

Based on what? Do you think that mechanized infantry try isn’t using SUAS?

I read that article and I don’t see the squad as having some how expanded its area of interest, rather it can observe that distance via a remote sensor instead of with direct EO sensors. We could always see 5 k in front of us, it’s just a) coverage and b) capacity to observe from cover that’s increased.

I don’t know that I see drones as a replacement for for ward observers, I think that’s ignoring 60-70 percent of what the observers are doing and focusing simply on the literal definition.

 

[quadrapiper]

Based on what? Do you think that mechanized infantry try isn’t using SUAS?

I read that article and I don’t see the squad as having some how expanded its area of interest, rather it can observe that distance via a remote sensor instead of with direct EO sensors. We could always see 5 k in front of us, it’s just a) coverage and b) capacity to observe from cover that’s increased.

I don’t know that I see drones as a replacement for for ward observers, I think that’s ignoring 60-70 percent of what the observers are doing and focusing simply on the literal definition.

Is there some hope that forward observers be less detectable than a drone, plus better endurance and a bunch of other things I'm unaware of?

 

[markppcli]

Is there some hope that forward observers be less detectable than a drone, plus better endurance and a bunch of other things I'm unaware of?

No, it’s more that simply seeing a target is 1/10th of forward observer tasks.

 

[Kirkhill]

Bumping this thread ...

Ukrainians teaching Brits how to build and take trenches Ukrainian style... the RCR would not be pleased. Speed over detail.

Ukraine showed the UK its classic 'tactically safe' trench-clearing methods don't work in chaotic, booby-trapped trenches

The UK had thought of trenches as "pretty clean and sort of surgical," an officer said. But in Ukraine, they are chaotic and full of traps.

www.businessinsider.com

 

[Infanteer]

The article is overly complementary towards the Ukrainians.

 

[FJAG]

There's a bit older article here written by a US Captain respecting the MBCT and their experiences with the Multi-Purpose Company which has replaced the weapons company of the prior IBCT.

The Multi-Purpose Company: Shaping the Future Battlefield through Innovation, Sensors, and Destruction

The Maxim machine gun was first introduced to significant combat by the U.S. Army during World War I. In 1912, each regiment received four of these mach...

www.army.mil

 

[FJAG]

And here's another one this time on the MBCT's Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company.

Army puts new unit loaded with cutting-edge tech to the test

The reconnaissance unit is the poster child for Army plans to field more drones, electronic warfare, and communications equipment across the force.

www.defenseone.com

 

[FJAG]

Oh what the hell, one more on the reorganizations to MBCTs. This is a recent line diagram of the reforming 101st Airborne (from Wikipedia) which shows the brigades and the division in their new MBCT structures.

This provides an explanation of why the MBCTs are down to 1,900 all ranks from the previous IBCT's 4,400 folks.

Note that not only has the IBCT's arty battalions moved to the Div Arty Bde (which we expected), but also the brigade support battalions (now renamed light support battalions) have been moved under the command of the div sustainment brigade, their cavalry Squadrons (bn) been eliminated and replaced by the smaller MFRC and their engineer battalions downsized into a single divisional engineer battalion.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Aussies rediscovering the Assult Pioneer Platoon

https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2026-04-29/regiment-restores-assault-pioneer-capability

A renewed focus on mobility and survivability has driven efforts to restore the capability.

For Sergeant Rowan Osland, the course provided an opportunity to build new skills and operate in a role outside his previous experience as a combat radio operator.

“We’ve completed our culminating activity, conducting section battle drills, breaching and clearing multiple buildings,” Sergeant Osland said.

“The training qualifies us not just to conduct breaches, but to manage safety and fulfil all required safety appointments.”

The training has equipped soldiers with the skills to conduct explosive breaching, enabling infantry to maintain momentum during urban operations and reduce delays at obstacles.

....


“Following this, we’ll move into demolitions, watermanship and field engineering to cover a broader range of engineer tasks,

....

It sounds to me as if they are going to be the initial point of contact with any new capabilities.

 

[Kirkhill]

Do or die: why Close Quarter Battle is still an essential skill of the infantry

Although modern warfare is dominated by drones, the last 150 metres of ground will always have to be cleared by an infantry soldier

www.forcesnews.com

CQB in a drone rich environment

"Somebody has to clear that ground..."

CQB - less than 150m in woodlands, urban terrain, trenches and underground.

Brilliant shots at 40 m

Course standard of 1700 pistol magazines and 1400 rifle magazines fired.

6 students per instructor

30% failure rate

80% pass mark.

Offrs and ORs.

 

[Kirkhill]

Intent

Increase lethality by 10

....

A Brick of 4 as lethal as a reinforced Platoon of 40

A Platoon of 24 as lethal as a Combat Team of 240

A Company of 100 as lethal as a Battle Group of 1000

 

[ArmyRick]

A Brick of 4 as lethal as a reinforced Platoon of 40

Not thinking this new CQBI course will make a 4 man assault group (as we call it here) as effective as a platoon.
Platoon usually has 1-2 GPMGs, plus anti-tank weapons, etc.

A Platoon of 24 as lethal as a Combat Team of 240

Nope. A combat team has tanks, IFV, artillery, etc. Not even close.

A Company of 100 as lethal as a Battle Group of 1000

Big nope. A BG BTW is not limited to a 1000. A BG can have so many different structures to it (designed for the mission), not even close. Especially when you factor in how much armour, arty, mortars, missiles, etc are thrown in the mix.

Don't take it the wrong way, but I think your reading into this CQBI incorrectly.

Let me give you MY take away from this.

This CQBI course, may mean that soldiers fighting 150m and less (I used to teach that the assault on the section battle drills begins at grenade throwing range, but that was the Pleistocene era) will go from hitting targets say like 40-60% of their shots (pulling those numbers out of my ass based on having taught many, many DP1 infantry courses and leading trained troops) effectively on target to something more like 80% (which would be awesome).

It would also mean improving reaction time to engage the enemy (and these small drones are excellent for increasing SA big time) the quicker you knw where the enemy is, the faster you can engage). There was an old Rhodesian army video I had seen of RLI soldiers reacting to a surprise contact drill, and their speed using old FN FALs was very impressive. Their fire force operations involved a lot of close quarters fighting in wooded and shrub areas.

I am assuming teaching soldiers how to breath, control emotions (as best as possible), follow on actions, etc will be taught.

 

[ArmyRick]

More info

 

[Kirkhill]

Not thinking this new CQBI course will make a 4 man assault group (as we call it here) as effective as a platoon.
Platoon usually has 1-2 GPMGs, plus anti-tank weapons, etc.

Nope. A combat team has tanks, IFV, artillery, etc. Not even close.

Big nope. A BG BTW is not limited to a 1000. A BG can have so many different structures to it (designed for the mission), not even close. Especially when you factor in how much armour, arty, mortars, missiles, etc are thrown in the mix.

Don't take it the wrong way, but I think your reading into this CQBI incorrectly.

Let me give you MY take away from this.

This CQBI course, may mean that soldiers fighting 150m and less (I used to teach that the assault on the section battle drills begins at grenade throwing range, but that was the Pleistocene era) will go from hitting targets say like 40-60% of their shots (pulling those numbers out of my ass based on having taught many, many DP1 infantry courses and leading trained troops) effectively on target to something more like 80% (which would be awesome).

It would also mean improving reaction time to engage the enemy (and these small drones are excellent for increasing SA big time) the quicker you knw where the enemy is, the faster you can engage). There was an old Rhodesian army video I had seen of RLI soldiers reacting to a surprise contact drill, and their speed using old FN FALs was very impressive. Their fire force operations involved a lot of close quarters fighting in wooded and shrub areas.

I am assuming teaching soldiers how to breath, control emotions (as best as possible), follow on actions, etc will be taught.

The CQBI course doesn't make a Fire Team into a Platoon.

What it does is make fire teams more effective.

On the other hand the overall direction of travel is to make 4 troops in support as lethal as a support platoon freeing up scarce numbers to handle the CQB. And reducing the number of teams that have to be deployed.

 

[ArmyRick]

The CQBI course doesn't make a Fire Team into a Platoon.

What it does is make fire teams more effective.

On the other hand the overall direction of travel is to make 4 troops in support as lethal as a support platoon freeing up scarce numbers to handle the CQB. And reducing the number of teams that have to be deployed.

It was YOU that implied that making a 4-man team into a platoon.

Dude, this is simple improving battel efficiency with Troops. simple. Locate the enemy quicker (and in CQB its lightning fast), engage enemy effectively and quickly as possible, ready for next threat, head on a swivel). Your second line is correct in my opinion.

Your last paragraph, is really awkward to interpret. Your not on the thinking of what this course is about. Or your using wrong terminology. Support platoon? As in a DFS Platoon? Not in a hundred years will 4 dudes be equal to that. Sometimes you have a weird obsession with numbers, I don't get.

Now, I am not up to speed with the latest of what we teach CQB in the CAF, but I got a good dose of it in the 2004-2010 era when the new Urban Ops Instructor course came out (designed by Dwyer Hill cool guys), from time to time like many, had a chance to work some range time with the same Dwyer Hill cool dudes (and the amount of detail they get into is incredible such as breathing, stance, balance, holding weapon, etc). I am sure, CQB knowledge is probably even more advanced by now with the GWOT and the Ukraine war knowledge download.

Watch some of the Ukraine war fighting On Cappy's Army on Youtube, its excellent footage showing trench and bunker clearing and shows where this comes in handy beyond the obvious room clearing.

 

[Kirkhill]

I left this quiet while the focus was rightly on Wainwright but I want to come back to address the issue of lethality.

The 10 fold increase in lethality is as stated British Army goal.

"<iframe src='//players.brightcove.net/2685123856001/Hy7Zehglog_default/index.html?videoId=6374081547112' allowfullscreen frameborder=0></iframe>"
Do or die: why Close Quarter Battle is still an essential skill of the infantry

The intention is to spend 20% of the budget on conventional kit (tanks, artillery and helicopters), 40% on attritable kit that can be lost (RPAS and UGVs etc) and 40% on smart consumables like Quadcopters and Loitering Munitions.

With this kit the Army expects to be 10 time more lethal than it currently is with existing kit while operating with the same manpower.

This is not going to be uniform across the Army; The Army at large will be 10x more lethal, soldier for soldier. The infantry company is expected to be 10x more lethal - hence my company of 100 being as lethal as a battle group of 1000 observation.

At the CQB level the increase in lethality is anticipated to be more modest - only a 30% increase in lethality - largely through hard work and training.

On the other hand the artillery is expected to become considerably more lethal as the large gun crews of relatively short ranged towed field pieces are reallocated to more autonomous systems with longer ranges and greater precision.

More of the artillery is going to look like this




Than this



And just to prevent confusion, I know the picture is of the aging Oerlikon Skyshield GBAD system but the general principle applies, a pair of gunners in a command post netted in to sensors and controlling multiple effectors remotely. Those effectors could be Air Defence guns and missiles, RCH-155 guns, Long Range Missiles, Cruise Missiles or Loitering Munitions. They could be fixed or mobile.

The point is that a small number of gunners will be able to cover, and supply support, more precisely over a much greater area than is possible with legacy systems.

It may even free up more people for the CQB.

At the same time though, if they can regularly take out small targets precisely perhaps they can reduce the number of times that the infantry will have to close that last 150 m against a dug-in enemy.