1946 | Canadian Army reduced to 15,563 all ranks |
1946 | Canadian Active Force - 3 Infantry Battalions, 2 Armoured Regiments, 1 Artillery Regiment, 1 Engineering Squadron plus Support |
1946 | Active RRCA - 1 RCHA (renamed 71 RCHA at Shilo), 68 Med Bty, 127 AT Bty, 128 HAA Bty, 129 LAA Bty |
1946 | Canadian Reserve Force - after two years mobilization and training by the Active Force - 4 Infantry Divisions and 2 Armoured Divisions |
1946 | Threat appreciation of October - subversion and sabotage by internal groups; covert biological and chemical attacks; air attacks against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland and the use of airborne irregular forces ranging throughout the continent. |
1946 | By 1952 planners projected the use ofthe atomic bomb delivered by long range aircraft and the occupation of Newfoundland Alaska and Greenland for the forward basing of Soviet bomber aircraft and airborne forces |
1946 | Canada to provide 1 Airborne or Airtransportable Brigade with necessary airlift |
1946 | Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee designated a Mobile Reserve from the Canadian Active Force but provided no organization or funding |
"create to be played with" =/= "eliminated"
The problem with that being the confirmation bias inherent in drone warfare. All we see is the success propaganda because the feeds are already there and it’s easy to post it. Much harder to show the hard fighting in city building blocks where you can’t just hit fortified positions.
Waaaay out of my field, but wonder what difference a) cheapo drones (including the practice of dropping explosives from same) and b) every random with a cell phone being able to stream whatever's in front of them will turn out to have made to that realm.
Cutting the infantry to the bone would seem to be attractive because the infantry has a large reserve structure to fall back on and what we are actually in desperate need of is many more full time technical tradesmen — RCEME, RCCS, CIntC… — if we want to take our army into the 21st century.
The problem being that reservist support is unreliable and not capable or handling the equipment in a regular Bn.
This.
In any credible organization which has goals to achieve, if its subordinate departments were unreliable or not capable of handling the equipment it needs to operate with, a program of corrective actions would be initiated or its chief operations officer and all his staff would be fired and replaced by capable managers.
Well I’d argue that cutting 1/2 your maneuver elements PYs probably isn’t the solution to our problems.In any credible organization which has goals to achieve, if its subordinate departments were unreliable or not capable of handling the equipment it needs to operate with, a program of corrective actions would be initiated or its chief operations officer and all his staff would be fired and replaced by capable managers.
We've had over a half a century of failure. How many more decades of failure will be tolerated?
Is that what comes from 12 line Coy's and 3 CS fully manned, with an 3 HQ's that can split when a tank squadron is attached to fight as two combined arms battalion (-)
Well roughly 140-150 in a rifle company so 600 in 4 companies add a bit more and multiply by three.
Typo, should have read 80 % manned
Fully agree. Whenever I look at the possibilities I use as a starting point that fact that the government has already approved to fund X number of Army PYs and Y number of ResF Army positions. I then look at all the PYs that are all already supporting the ResF and try to figure out what can be done with that to improve things and then look elsewhere.
A fine distinction is that it's not just the reserve system that needs a massive overhaul. Its the entire Army that needs a massive overhaul if one wants to create a system that optimizes what each of the RegF and ResF brings to the table. In very simple terms, the RegF brings expertise and a quick reaction capability while the ResF brings cost efficiency and an ability to create a larger force than the RegF alone can generate. It really is a Total Force issue that needs to be addressed.
A fine distinction is that it's not just the reserve system that needs a massive overhaul. Its the entire Army that needs a massive overhaul if one wants to create a system that optimizes what each of the RegF and ResF brings to the table. In very simple terms, the RegF brings expertise and a quick reaction capability while the ResF brings cost efficiency and an ability to create a larger force than the RegF alone can generate. It really is a Total Force issue that needs to be addressed.
The problem is that no one really care about the reserve.
