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Informing the Army’s Future Structure - CAMO Discussion

There is still a large difference between what is actually needed for the current force structure and what is authorized.

We could be at 71,500 and there would still be large gaps. Our structure could absorb another 20,000 without adding any more units or formations.
 
What makes a soldier


Major Olha Bihar - callsign Witch

Made a name for herself at Bakhmut as a mortar platoon commander as the Witch of Bakhmut.

Started the war as a civilian lawyer. Volunteered in 2022.

Now leeds drone ops for the 20th Corps.


More from Maj Bihar (CS Witch)

Re adapting for women in combat.

 

I can tell you, from an MOC management perspective at the tactical level, my S3 to S1 billets are almost completely full.

We've had a massive influx of permanent residents, which, unfortunately, we are unable to employ to their full potential.

My current rate of personnel who are either already deployed or otherwise undeployable was 57.2%. It's probably north of 60% now, given the significant influx of permanent residents. I'll have to rerun the numbers to confirm.

My biggest problem, however, isn't at the junior ranks. It's from PO2 to CPO2, with particular emphasis on PO2s and PO1s.

The AOPs have absolutely decimated the middle of my occupation. That part of the trade has effectively collapsed.
 
Enrolled does not mean trained unfortunately. 27% of the CAF Reg F is not employable of which 14% are still BTL. PRes believe it or not is in better shape 18% not employable with 11% BTL. St Jean is bursting at the seams and they're looking at adding quite a few more serials of 60 pers each. I predict this is going to get worse before it gets better. The same thing happened in 2018 when recruiting went crazy but we couldn't get people trained fast enough so they released over the next couple of years.
 
Enrolled does not mean trained unfortunately. 27% of the CAF Reg F is not employable of which 14% are still BTL. PRes believe it or not is in better shape 18% not employable with 11% BTL. St Jean is bursting at the seams and they're looking at adding quite a few more serials of 60 pers each. I predict this is going to get worse before it gets better. The same thing happened in 2018 when recruiting went crazy but we couldn't get people trained fast enough so they released over the next couple of years.

We do it bass aackwards before we go on a recruiting bonanza we should be getting the infrastructure, materials and people to teach them, and ensure eventual OFP in place first.

Instead we just cram a whole bunch of people in, point and smile at our stats for the politicians, and completely ignore the follow on effects; or what affect is actually gained.

But now some LPC MP can go before parliamentary committee and say look we're fixing it...
 
The CAF should not have to rebuild training infrastructure, it should first and foremost be a training institution.

If push comes to shove, disband units to reinforce the training system so there is always surge capacity, not the ability with great difficulty to trickle through less trained personnel than required by burning out the fleet / field force with continuous augmentation demands.


aka CFTPO is a tool of the devil.
 
The AOPs have absolutely decimated the middle of my occupation. That part of the trade has effectively collapsed.
Why is that?

If push comes to shove, disband units to reinforce the training system so there is always surge capacity, not the ability with great difficulty to trickle through less trained personnel than required by burning out the fleet / field force with continuous augmentation demands.
Units do not need to be disbanded. In the '70s we trained folks to DP 1 at the units. 2 RCHA had the better part of 2 troops in house at all times for a year. The overhead is actually quite small. To do two troops you need 1 Lt, two sergeants and 8 MBdr/Bdr plus access to a BQ and a CP and gun tractor drivers for a week or so every few months for the field training part of the course.

The other 95% of the regiment carried on as per normal.

I may run counter to the prevailing attitude but its not at-unit DP1 & DP2 training that's killing folks (in fact it can give folks some at-home stability for a few months); my guess its the rotations and readiness training that's wearing folks out.

IMHO, the St Jean concept is 100% the wrong way to go and creates a bottleneck. Delivery of One-station DP1 and 2 training ought to be widely decentralized and part of a regional training centre's, battle school's and a unit's bread and butter. By all means centralize training management through an entity like the Army Training Centre but massively decentralize training delivery. The units themselves are your surge capability.

:unsure:
 
Units do need to be disbanded. The CAF has a finite number of positions approved, inclusive of BTL.

The demand signal from extant units outstrips the BTL required to feed it. The training system has been gutted to provide just in time augmentation.

While some occupations can run in unit training, technical and complex occupations demand too much time, and require a breadth that line units cannot deliver.

Not everything is a trivially simple as the combat arms.
 
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