Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

Even though I've always been a 'light/airborne' Infantry type guy I'm sad to see too much time being wasted on this light stuff, in any western military.

The real decision maker has always been the 'heavy metal' crew.

But it's expensive and complicated so my guess is that the 'good idea merchants', who want a great performance review followed by a swift promotion, tend to focus on the light stuff because it's easier to get some kind of result within a fairly short timeframe - like their 2 year posting cycle.

True enough.

I think the start of this on the light side is based on two things: First the light side desperately needed fixing and secondly the work done there probably has more relevance to the ABCT as base information. It's a bit iterative because if one had started with the ABCT then not very much of what was learned there would apply to the IBCTs.

My biggest question is still as to whether or not the third brigade in each armored division will become an SBCT as originally forecast? It doesn't matter here because 1st Cavalry Division is earmarked to become an Armor Division (Reinforced) which will require some augmentation (such as an engineer brigade and a protection brigade).

I like the idea of giving an armored division a brigade with a higher infantry ratio for "follow-up" work on bypassed localities or for a temporary defensive foundation, but . . .

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The problem is that your site is static. Once identified via satellite or whatever it can be destroyed. It would need to be mobile which means it would likely have to be under armour to protect it on the move.

So is much of the Ukrainian frontline. The biggest issues with the older forts is the minimal protected firing positions. The role of engineering equipment and lightweight prefab bunker components and trench cover cannot be overstated.

In Kursk, much of the fighting was mobile defense, but eventually the Russians were able to fix and destroy light forces. The Light forces are a screen while you furiously dig in and prepare for the counter offensives with regular troops, then pull you light forces back to recoup and prepare for the next assault.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So is much of the Ukrainian frontline. The biggest issues with the older forts is the minimal protected firing positions. The role of engineering equipment and lightweight prefab bunker components and trench cover cannot be overstated.

In Kursk, much of the fighting was mobile defense, but eventually the Russians were able to fix and destroy light forces. The Light forces are a screen while you furiously dig in and prepare for the counter offensives with regular troops, then pull you light forces back to recoup and prepare for the next assault.

Or the light forces all just get slaughtered because they’ve been sacrificed in contact with a fully tooled up armoured division.

Mountainous terrain? Littoral operations? Behind enemy lines stuff? Sure… that can work with the right support.

 

[GK .Dundas]

The manuals have it wrong , light infantry in contact with heavy formations don't melt away ( fall back ) they just burn .