Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Perrin Beatty's Territorial Defence Force​

Canadian Airborne Regiment
Special Service Force

Create functional Task Forces by
Brigading the Militia
Expanding the Rangers
Adding 90,000 Vital Points Guards
820 Bv206 Northern Terrain Vehicles
199 Bisons

The Wednesday Report - Issue - TWR48V3

TWR48V3 - Issue 48, Volume 3 - The Wednesday Report - Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly - TWR - Editor: Micheal John O'Brien Editorial and news on Canadian aerospace and defence, The Wednesday Report, TWR, Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly, MPRM Group Limited, Micheal John O'Brien...

thewednesdayreport.com

Volume 3, Number 48 November 29,1989

BV-206 NTV PROJECT GETS PROD FROM ACTION-ORIENTED ALBERTA FIRM​

Lack of activity on Mobile Command's Northern Terrain Vehicle (NTV) acquisition programme has prompted Hagglunds Foremost Inc. of Calgary, Alberta to issue a discussion paper in the hope of generating political support for the project. In July 1988, DND approved an acquisition of 820 Swedish BV-206 northern terrain vehicles to be used for territorial defence tasks. The same fiberglass hulled, rubber tracked over-snow vehicles was successfully used by the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade.

Hagglunds Foremost Inc. (HF) was formed in February 1989 as a joint venture between Hagglunds Vehicle AB of Sweden, manufacturer of the BV-206, and Canadian Foremost Ltd. of Calgary, Alberta to produce the vehicle in Canada. By early 1989, the firm had actually started converting Swedish technical drawings to Canadian standards and had sent out a number of information packages to potential subcontractors in expectation of a contract award by March 1990. Then came the April 1989 budget cuts. The NTV programme was reduced by half and delayed indefinitely. The company began to cut its staff. Since April the project has remained frozen. An increasingly uncertain HF is awaiting a contract to begin project definition and the NTV Project Management Office (PMO) is waiting for funding to proceed with a Canadianization study to determine which Canadian parts can be used with the BV-206. HF, on its own initiative, issued its paper.

According to Shari Pusch of Canadian Foremost Ltd., the discussion paper was prepared to update HF's internal management staff, its Board of Directors and any concerned subcontractors. The company also seeks political support. The document reminds its readers that the NTV meets Mobile Command's requirement for a vehicle which can traverse difficult terrain and that the BV-206's low ground pressure minimizes risk of damage to the fragile northern ecology. The paper stresses western industrial diversity for the benefit of any politicians who need to be reminded of this well known political and regional development imperative of the current government.

While the company is conducting its private sector briefings, the NTV PMO is in a continual briefing process of its own, keeping senior DND decision makers informed. An Interdepartmental Senior Review Board (ISRB) is scheduled for today, November 29, at which representatives from DND, DSS and regional development departments will be briefed on project status. There are bright spots to the otherwise irritating situation which are keeping HF guardedly optimistic. DND is experimenting with an air droppable BV prototype which shows promise. Discussions between Hagglunds AB and Canadian Foremost Ltd. may result in HF producing BV-206s in Calgary for the U.S. Army. At present the U.S. buys its BV-206s directly from Hagglunds AB in Sweden. Lastly, the HF paper argues that when an NTV contract is finally awarded, there will be a high degree of Canadian content involved. Svante Andersson, Hagglund's representative in Ottawa, states that as much as 60 percent of the NTV may be made up of Canadian parts.

Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web

publications.gc.ca

 

[KevinB]

Perrin Beatty's Territorial Defence Force​

Canadian Airborne Regiment
Special Service Force

Create functional Task Forces by
Brigading the Militia
Expanding the Rangers
Adding 90,000 Vital Points Guards
820 Bv206 Northern Terrain Vehicles
199 Bisons

The Wednesday Report - Issue - TWR48V3

TWR48V3 - Issue 48, Volume 3 - The Wednesday Report - Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly - TWR - Editor: Micheal John O'Brien Editorial and news on Canadian aerospace and defence, The Wednesday Report, TWR, Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly, MPRM Group Limited, Micheal John O'Brien...

thewednesdayreport.com

View attachment 70166
View attachment 70167
Volume 3, Number 48 November 29,1989

Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web

publications.gc.ca

Pretty telling Canada hasn't had much of a common sense DND Policy review since...

 

[FJAG]

I'm not sure where you get your confidence that the US would be happy to gift us an ABCT's worth of equipment for Europe and another for training in Canada.

I'm an eternal optimist and fully believe in the mantra "If you don't try, you won't succeed!"

From the Congressional Budget Office's US Military's Force Structure: A Primer, 2021 Update document you're talking about the US giving us for frree a total of 2,486 military vehicles (1,243 vehicles per ABCT). To a country that in the midst of an actual Russian invasion of a NATO partner country agreed to increase its defence budget from 1.37% of GDP to 1.445% of GDP when the agreed upon NATO commitment is to spend 2% of GDP on defence?

Sure. Why not?

And what would the training and support impact of all of this be on the CAF? Do we divest completely in our existing vehicle fleets so that we only have to supply and maintain the US vehicles?

We have 15,000 unequipped and undertrained reservists.

It's one thing to talk about replacing our Leopard 2s with Abrams or picking a particular US vehicle or piece of kit when we're doing a new procurement anyway, but adopting an entire vehicle set and gear of another military on top of our existing set would likely break the CAF as an organization.

Or force the Army to ramp up the maintenance system to be able to deal with it.

Look, I appreciate the difficulties with maintaining an army as much as anyone, BUT there are solutions. If we emptied 10% of the chairwarmers out of Ottawa you would have more than enough PYs for maintainers to do the job.

I don't want to sound flippant but DND seems to spend more time investigating how we can not do things rather than pushing the envelope on what is possible.

How do we know one way or the other until we try?

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm an eternal optimist and fully believe in the mantra "If you don't try, you won't succeed!"


Sure. Why not?


We have 15,000 unequipped and undertrained reservists.


Or force the Army to ramp up the maintenance system to be able to deal with it.

Look, I appreciate the difficulties with maintaining an army as much as anyone, BUT there are solutions. If we emptied 10% of the chairwarmers out of Ottawa you would have more than enough PYs for maintainers to do the job.

I don't want to sound flippant but DND seems to spend more time investigating how we can not do things rather than pushing the envelope on what is possible.

How do we know one way or the other until we try?

It's OK, they don't seem to care and it's official

Why Bureaucrats Don't Seem to Care​

Frontline bureaucrats are often portrayed as unthinking automata, yet they are in fact vested with a substantial margin of discretion. This is where the challenge of implementing policy starts. It is not that rules are absent; on the contrary, they abound. But they are often sufficiently ambiguous that they lend themselves to various plausible interpretations, or so numerous that they conflict with one another. When this is the case, bureaucrats must exert independent judgment to figure out what to do. If they were to stop doing so and adhere religiously to the scripts provided to them, public-service agencies would come to a halt.

Why Bureaucrats Don't Seem to Care

A researcher’s reflection on eight months of observing workers at an anti-poverty agency

www.theatlantic.com

 

[IKnowNothing]

Did I miss read a chart? Do we have carrier companies now ?

The context of the initial discussion was organizing around the ORBAT of a Marine Regimental Combat Team / the Ground Combat Element of an MEB. The chart that you quoted and challenged as being just another battlegroup was not the entirety of the force, it was a summary of the (Canadianized) vehicle fleet required. What it it excluded from the original post was three battalions of light infantry. The primary listing of 75 LAV's broke down to ~25 to a Light Armored Reconnaissance Coy, ~50 as replacement for an Amphibious Assault Company (LAV Mobility Company (not a Battlegroup based around a LAV Battalion). The rest of the LAV's and TAPV's was assigning vehicles to the 3 Weapon's Coy's.

Why have them driven by reservists ? What’s the benefit there.

What's the point? Off they go in summer to the various schools; come back clapped out and VOR'ed until sometime in Nov/Dec. I'm trying to picture mounted warfare in Bisons and failing, which leaves battle taxi - training drivers to drive them, and riders to ride in them.

The point is that it's not mounted warfare, it's wartime capability to motorize the two remaining LIB's to provide mobility to the Brigade- exactly that, battle taxi's. The benefit of having them operated by reservists is to make use of the reserves to provide a wartime capability not otherwise needed, stretching RegF PY's to have the three MEB GCE/ RCT Bde's fully manned, the fleet and budget to have all enabler's in place.

And yeah @suffolkowner 's MiSu would do the job. We'd theoretically have enough kit to have the entire Reg force component of that chart in Latvia, with a single battalion on roto. Stage 1 flyover man's it in place, Stage 2 flyover /Sea lift motorizes the two remaining LIB's.

 

[markppcli]

The context of the initial discussion was organizing around the ORBAT of a Marine Regimental Combat Team / the Ground Combat Element of an MEB. The chart that you quoted and challenged as being just another battlegroup was not the entirety of the force, it was a summary of the (Canadianized) vehicle fleet required. What it it excluded from the original post was three battalions of light infantry. The primary listing of 75 LAV's broke down to ~25 to a Light Armored Reconnaissance Coy, ~50 as replacement for an Amphibious Assault Company (LAV Mobility Company (not a Battlegroup based around a LAV Battalion). The rest of the LAV's and TAPV's was assigning vehicles to the 3 Weapon's Coy's.




The point is that it's not mounted warfare, it's wartime capability to motorize the two remaining LIB's to provide mobility to the Brigade- exactly that, battle taxi's. The benefit of having them operated by reservists is to make use of the reserves to provide a wartime capability not otherwise needed, stretching RegF PY's to have the three MEB GCE/ RCT Bde's fully manned, the fleet and budget to have all enabler's in place.

And yeah @suffolkowner 's MiSu would do the job. We'd theoretically have enough kit to have the entire Reg force component of that chart in Latvia, with a single battalion on roto. Stage 1 flyover man's it in place, Stage 2 flyover /Sea lift motorizes the two remaining LIB's.

Ah so mobility for the Light Bns. Gotcha.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I am thinking an armoured truck that would go anywhere.

I'd go with independent transport battalions, or for Res F purpose, independent companies. Not always needed, so not a permanent part of any unit's establishment.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Ah so mobility for the Light Bns. Gotcha.

But under this scenario all 9 of the RegF Bns would technically be light. They'd just be trained to and in all likelihood be deployed in "peacetime" with the RegF LAV based mobility company.

9 Btn's that can form the core of a battle group, 3 battalions worth of permanently attached LAV's (plus LAV/TAPV based Weapon's Coy's). Frees up enough hulls to convert/ mount the missing enablers, and preposition 2 Bde's worth of kit. If it looks like the balloon is going to go up you call up the ResF independent transport companies and attach them to the LIB's to motorize both and have a fully mobile Bde.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'd go with independent transport battalions, or for Res F purpose, independent companies. Not always needed, so not a permanent part of any unit's establishment.

I'd buy that. In a heartbeat.

 

[markppcli]

I'd buy that. In a heartbeat.

In my dreams this is what happens to Armoured Reserve units. Essentially dual rolled as cavalry and mobility.

But under this scenario all 9 of the RegF Bns would technically be light. They'd just be trained to and in all likelihood be deployed in "peacetime" with the RegF LAV based mobility company.

9 Btn's that can form the core of a battle group, 3 battalions worth of permanently attached LAV's (plus LAV/TAPV based Weapon's Coy's). Frees up enough hulls to convert/ mount the missing enablers, and preposition 2 Bde's worth of kit. If it looks like the balloon is going to go up you call up the ResF independent transport companies and attach them to the LIB's to motorize both and have a fully mobile Bde.

This is what I meant, I don’t see your full plan laid out anywhere. So you would strip all armoured vehicles, minus two companies worth per Bn, and pre position them? Or am I just missing your point entirely.

 

[Kirkhill]

In my dreams this is what happens to Armoured Reserve units. Essentially dual rolled as cavalry and mobility.

I'd also accept that. Maybe the DAME/Northern Terrain Vehicles go to Service Battalions and the Rangers and the Bisons go to the Armoured Reserve for mobility?

 

[FJAG]

I'll take your word on possible previous offers, but I'm thinking that a) offers of subsidized fleet upgrades are a bit different than wholesale equipping of our Army, and b) with the ongoing shirking of our promised defence commitments combined with all the dollars the US is funneling into Ukraine currently (on top of the massive Covid deficits) that "gifting" equipment to a freeloader at this time is highly unlikely. Why would you give all this kit to Canada, a G7 nation when you can instead give it to more grateful nations that need it like Poland, the Baltic States, Czechia, etc.?

Its not really a gift, its more a lend-lease loan. The point though is that the has a catch. The loan requires Canada to commit a flyover brigade to Europe. The second brigade is the tools to train the flyover guys on.

If at the same time Canada argued that it's already heavily in new ships and F35s and will spend new moneys on NORAD, it sweetens the pot considerably and provides a rationale to make the US think favourably.

Regrettably you are right. Our simplemindedness and singlemindedness would prevent us from even making the offer.

Edited to add: You're probably right that 2 ABCT's worth of kit likely isn't enough to sustain the unit in combat. I'm guessing that 3 would be the minimum? Even with Reserves could we do that? Probably why SSE only envisions Battle Group sized deployments...an uncommon lapse of reality in DND planning.

I do not know why we are so fixed on the idea of needed things in three's to sustain them. I know I know its that MRS again, isn't it.

Essentially I proposed two ABCTs. A 70/30 one and a 30/70 one. One deploys, in whole or in part when required and the other trains to augment and replace as required. This is not a full-time continuing deployment and there is no intent to have six month rotations.

During peacetime, both brigades would share the equipment in Canada and deploy regularly to exercise in Europe on the prepositioned equipment.

Again agreed entirely. You are describing the difference between 4 CMBG and the CAST Brigade.

A bit different actually - 4 CMBG was fully deployed permanently while the bulk of CAST was in Canada and needed to be moved.

I'm thinking more along the line of REFORGER or the flyover augmentation to 4 CMBG.

 

[ArmyRick]

Dropping the reality bomb. For you ORBAT wizards, what would you do to re-org the Canadian Army AS IT IS TODAY.

The If we got this, if we got that, is a very moot point.

Should we even try to hold onto the Brigade or ditch it for battle groups permenantly standing? Ideas? Assume no new kit, because this government and its bureaucrats simply do NOT take defence seriously

 

[Ostrozac]

Dropping the reality bomb. For you ORBAT wizards, what would you do to re-org the Canadian Army AS IT IS TODAY.

The If we got this, if we got that, is a very moot point.

Should we even try to hold onto the Brigade or ditch it for battle groups permenantly standing? Ideas? Assume no new kit, because this government and its bureaucrats simply do NOT take defence seriously

As it is now? Without many of the tools of modern war fighting? That’s not a war fighting force, so you don’t need to think about war. And would be more infantry heavy than today. You do need to be to able to rotate battle groups for COIN/low-intensity conflict. So 3 LAV-equipped battalions and 3 light battalions. Possibly another 3 40/60 (deliberately under strength) battalions with a Bn HQ and a single rifle company, specifically to rotate into Latvia for the tripwire/sacrificial lamb role — as we don’t want to give them the tools to fight in the NATO role, they are strictly symbolic.

The other arms? Just enough to provide a toolbox from which to augment rotational battle groups. One tank regiment, one recce regiment. Two arty regiments - one with towed tube artillery, one with STA. One large combat engineer regiment — two if the infantry battalions lack their own pioneers. If you don’t want to deploy brigades on expeditionary operations, you can probably get away with a single deployable brigade headquarters, optimized for domestic operations (Oka, October Crisis…) that can act as a HICON to exercise the battalions but doesn’t administer them in garrison.

This is the model for a constabulary force, not a war fighting force. Because a war fighting force requires kit we currently don’t hold in the inventory (ATGM, SHORAD, SPA…)

 

[KevinB]

Dropping the reality bomb. For you ORBAT wizards, what would you do to re-org the Canadian Army AS IT IS TODAY.

The If we got this, if we got that, is a very moot point.

Should we even try to hold onto the Brigade or ditch it for battle groups permenantly standing? Ideas? Assume no new kit, because this government and its bureaucrats simply do NOT take defence seriously

With no new kit - I’d shutter the bulk of the Regular Army to 1 actual Light Bde-ish
1 Airborne Btl Group in Pet
1 Airborne/Airmobile Btl Group in Edmonton
1 Airborne Btl Group in Valcartier

Sell the Leo’s back to Germany
Move the LAV to the reserves.

Focus everything on the Navy and AirForce and hope they would get new kit.

 

[IKnowNothing]

In my dreams this is what happens to Armoured Reserve units. Essentially dual rolled as cavalry and mobility.

This is what I meant, I don’t see your full plan laid out anywhere. So you would strip all armoured vehicles, minus two companies worth per Bn, and pre position them? Or am I just missing your point entirely.

That's fair, I piggy backed off the two posts outlining the RCT and then Canadianizing the fleet. Full plan:
A. Outfit the 3 Bde's as RCT's, infantry Btn's default to light, but trained to fight from LAV's and pure carriers as well
B. Take advantage of the lower number of vehicles per Bde to preposition a full Bde worth.

Under the Canadianized RCT there would be the following permanently mounted in the combat arms

• Tank Coy
• Reinforced LAV Recce/ RSTA Squadron
• 3x Weapon's Coy's with SPM and ATGM

There also be enough LAV's to mount 3x Rifle Coy's. (Either as a manned mobility Coy or a vehicle pool). Enough there to sustain a mounted battlegroup long term, or deploy the Bde with one of the 3 Btn's LAV mobile.

The issue pointed with the original Marine ORBAT is that if we were to deploy as a Bde into a pear/ near pear conflict the lack of mobility for the remaining 2x LIB would significantly reduce their usefulness, which lead to my solution

C. Have a stock of lighter weight vehicles to attach in wartime to motorize them, Bisons/ MiSu's, etc.


I think it's a viable option.
That being said, the easier one (while keeping precious symmetry intact) would be to go to the American's and get everything needed to fill in the gaps to set up the armoured Regiments as US pattern Armoured Cavalry Squadrons, the 6 LAV battalions as Stryker battalions with ATGM platoons, dissolve the LIB's to make sure it's fully manned and stand up one LIB quick reaction force.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The point is that it's not mounted warfare, it's wartime capability to motorize the two remaining LIB's to provide mobility to the Brigade- exactly that, battle taxi's. The benefit of having them operated by reservists is to make use of the reserves to provide a wartime capability not otherwise needed, stretching RegF PY's to have the three MEB GCE/ RCT Bde's fully manned, the fleet and budget to have all enabler's in place.

In its current format the CAF Reserves would fail, in a spectacular fashion, at this task.

OTOH, if it was a Reg F led tasking that the Reserves could augment, they might do OK.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Maybe the DAME/Northern Terrain Vehicles go to Service Battalions and the Rangers and the Bisons go to the Armoured Reserve for mobility?

For Res F, all of the vehicles more complicated than a pickup truck should go to the Res F Svc Bns which have proper maintenance facilities. Might produce a recruitment bump for keeners who want to drive and maintain the beasts. Armoured units can either go on doing Rat Patrol recce, or voluntarily offer to-role if they want to drive and maintain the beasts.

 

[Kirkhill]

Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web

publications.gc.ca

Took another look at the 1987 Challenge and Commitment Paper and compared it to current published info.



The Canadian Army in 1987 had Regular Strength of 22,500. It currently has 23,000 Regs. ie No Change.

It also had 15,500 Reserves and currently, nominally, 19,000. I would argue that effectively that also is No Change.

Comms was as separate Branch of 3300 Regs and 1600 Reserves. I believe that has been largely absorbed into the Army.

On the other hand CANSOFCOM has been stood up with 2550 Regs.

So Comms PYs have been largely swapped for SOF PYs.

Canadian Rangers are similar in strength to what they were.

In short the Army hasn't actually lost that many authorized bodies since 1987. In fact it has gained Reserve positions. It just doesn't seem to be able to recruit and retain them.



The RCN had 10,000 Regs and 2,300 Reserves for a total force of 12,300.

It has 8,500 Regs and 3,700 Reserves for a total force of 12,200.

The Navy hasn't lost any billets. It has swapped Regs for the Reserves.




The big change since 1987 has been in the RCAF.

In 1987 it had 23,050 Regs, or roughly as many Regs as the Army.

Currently it has 12,074 Regs, or roughly 50% of its 1987 strength and 50% of the Army.

Unlike the RCN the RCAF didn't gain equivalent Reserve billets. Its Reserve strength rose from 950 to 1,969, or about 1000 positions, but its total strength fell from 24,000 to 14,000.

The RCAF lost 10,000 positions, or the majority of the defence reductions since 1987.





So where did the RCAF lose these positions

Challenge and Commitment described the RCAF as having:

8x Ftr Sqns (CF-18s and CF-5s)
9s Maritime Sqns (CP-140s, Sea Kings and Trackers)
11x TacHel Sqns (Kiowa, Iroquois, Chinook)
6x Transport and Rescue Sqns
4x Transport Sqns
19x Radar Sqns.

The stand out elements are the loss of

Fighter Sqns (4 Reg)
Tracker Sqns (4? - 3 Reg and 1 Res?)
TacHel Sqns (5? - 3 Reg and 2 Res?))

But the largest loss is the 19 Radar Squadrons. There are currently 2 Radar Squadrons in service.

The other 17 Squadrons were struck off with the closures of the PineTree and DEW stations and the commissioning of the automated North Warning System.




So, shoulda-woulda-coulda time.

1. Don't eliminate the Radar PYs - transfer them instead to GBAD Sqns, Perhaps some of them could be reallocated to Reserve positions in 10/90 or 30/70 Squadrons.

2. Retain the flying positions but transfer more of them to the Reserves.

3. Exploit Perrin Beatty's proposed addition of 60,000 new Reserve positions, to bring the total Reserve Force, all Services, up to 90,000 in order to create a useful entry level security force with minimal training for Vital Point (Force Protection).

The Vital Point (Force Protection Force) would number something in the 50,000 to 60,000 range. Kind of large. Some transport companies would be useful as well.

The Army would retain its 15-20,000 Reserves but they would be dedicated as a Ready Force to Reg Force augmentation.

The RCAF would retain its numbers but would gain a Ground Based force. That force, dominated by Reservists would supply a domestic and expeditionary GBAD force - reducing pressure on the Army in general and the Artillery in particular - and would also supply a base from which to develop other Ground Based capabilities like Air Space Coordination, UAS-RPAS, Long Range Precision Fires and UCAVs.

Oh. And the CAR/SSF would be retained as a Light Brigade QRF to be used in conjunction with CANSOFCOM.

Resurrection of the Comm Squads would also be a useful idea if we are going to fund those additional 60,000 Reservists.

 

[Kirkhill]

For Res F, all of the vehicles more complicated than a pickup truck should go to the Res F Svc Bns which have proper maintenance facilities. Might produce a recruitment bump for keeners who want to drive and maintain the beasts. Armoured units can either go on doing Rat Patrol recce, or voluntarily offer to-role if they want to drive and maintain the beasts.

OK. Good enough for me.

So long as there is transport available and easily accessible. Draw from the Svc Bn compound one vehicle with Driver/Mechanic and Vehicle Commander.