Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Humphrey Bogart]

But..... Professionals....

My first Platoon Warrant, who served in Somalia with Mortar Platoon, told me "anyone who tells you the Army of 20-30 years ago was more professional and capable than today..... they are a liar".

 

[markppcli]

These two comments got me to thinking about how we organize and equip our Reg Force and Reserve units.

Since our Brigade Groups are technically Force Generation units as opposed to Force Deployment units do we need to equip them as if they are to be deployed the same way they are based?

For example, if 1 Brigade were to be set as our "Heavy" Brigade Group with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions all co-located in Edmonton would we need 2 x full Battalions worth of LAVs in Edmonton/Wainwright to train the two Mech Battalions?

Could we instead base 1 x Battalion worth of LAVs in Wainwright for 1 & 2 PPCLI to train on and split the other Battalion worth of LAVs up to have for example 1 x Company co-located in Saskatoon with 38 Service Battalion/North Saskatchewan Regiment, 1 x Company co-located in Richmond with 39 Service Battalion/The Royal Westminster Regiment/The Seaforth Highlanders and 1 x Company co-located in Calgary with 41 Service Battalion/The Calgary Highlanders?

The Service Battalions could be hybrid staffed with a mix of Reg Force and Reserve maintainers and the Reserve Combat Arms units would have access to the same vehicles/equipment as the Reg Force without having to make any additional vehicle purchases.

Alternately, perhaps a Reg Force/Reserve Force equipment sharing system could be set up somewhat similar to the Blue Team/Gold Team dual-crew system that the USN uses to man their Ballistic Missile Submarines. For example, Lord Strathcona's Horse could have their Leapards maintained by their Regimental maintainers but the vehicles have dual-crew Reg Force/Reserve Force manning.

For example the vehicles of one Tank Squadron might have Blue Team manning by A Sqn, LdSH and Gold Team manning by the South Alberta Light Horse while the vehicles of the next Tank Squadron might have Blue Team manning by B Sqn, LdSH and Gold Team manning by the King's Own Calgary Regiment.

Thoughts?

How do you anticipate gunner grills will be refreshed if 2 VP is 12 hours away from their cars ? Who’s going to teach Gunner / Driver / Crew Commander course that are presently ran in house with the advantage of the Bn being able to run them dependant on the required number of qualifications ?

 

[WestIsle]

Which also goes to prove the fact that the CA really doesn’t give 2 shits about the PRes until they need augmentation…

Which is pretty FUBAR

Which is ironic considering the CA Regular Forces inability to support deployments since WW2.

 

[markppcli]

Which is ironic considering the CA Regular Forces inability to support deployments since WW2.

? Korea, Cyprus, Bosnia. Afghanistan had a mandated 25 percent augmentation but that’s not an inability that’s a policy. Obviously we need reserves for long term operational sustainment but I don’t think that’s really a fair take.

 

[FJAG]

This is a great way to destroy the vehicle fleet, reduced readiness, and limit training. Having 1 PPCLI & 2 PPCLI share a vehicle pool means a barrier to concurrent training.

Does one really need concurrent training with two battalions when our SSE dictates we deploy battlegroup sized formations? The answer is no.

It means there is no sense of vehicle ownership and the resultant level of care and maintenance that crews give when it is their vehicle.

It means one set of vehicles are "owned" and maintained by two sets of maintainers combined to keep the vehicles operational.

It means every training activity (including collective training and operator courses) requires a deployment away from home. It means you are posting a lot of maintaners to Wainwright to babysit an equipment pool (which did not work so well when we tried it 18 years ago).

Not in Pet or Valcartier. The fleet could be kept in Edmonton for routine training and taken out to Wainwright for six weeks for the battalions to train on sequentially.

It means you are doubling the wear rate of the vehicles, but probably not halving the time to seeing a replacement fleet.

The fleet with the reserves would have a lower wear rate and could be rotated to balance the wear.

And down that the PRes units that now have a sprinkling of AFV, the equipment probably starts suffering the faults that come from under-utilization and from not having the proper infrastructure to park and maintain it.

The whole point in sharing equipment is to stop under utilization.

There is limited amounts of STTE and recovery vehicles capable of handling AFV, so you will have trouble keeping things fixed once they are spread much thiner across much broader geography.

Don't spread them around. Concentrate the bulk of them and their maintainers at training centres and distribute a few as local training aides.

Your LAV fleet in lower mainland BC will have a hard time finding a training area to support live fire.

Hold gun camp concentrations at ranges where you can and bus or fly in the troops.

The CA cannot even figure out how to fully quallify PRes Veh Techs to look after B fleet, so you are dreaming if thinking PRes techs will support AFV maintenance even with increased Reg F Veh Tech posted to these locations.

Then a few folks need firing. Who is saying PRes techs support the fleet. Full timers support the fleet. Part timers learn to support the fleet but aren't the primary maintainers. Anyone who tries to maintain a fleet with part-timers is setting themselves up for failure.

If anyone is so emotionally invested in the idea that PRes needs AFV that they cannot consider any other options, then the supporting course of action must consist of Canada buying more AFV with the intent of equiping the PRes.

It's not emotional involvement. It's the practical necessity of exposing people to and letting them train on the equipment they are meant to fight on. The level to which a force should be equipped to is based on the level that they are to be deployed on operationally. If the Op plan says you need to deploy two brigades then you need two brigades worth of equipment plus enough to train with and for battle loss replacements. If you can train two brigades with one set of kit then do so. A possible example would be preposition one brigade set of equipment for operations and have another set of equipment divided between two brigades with the units inside the brigade sharing that half set.

Not robbing from too-small Reg F vehicle allocations, and not cascading exhausted old Reg F vehicles that are past due for retirement. You are also going to need to by more STTE so that can be sprinkled to all the places you want to put vehicles, and you are going to need a lot more PYs for CSS to support this larger vehicle fleet.

Let's call a spade a spade. What's really going on is that the RegF is glomming on to their equipment while the ResF has none. That's just plain silly when the intent is to train ResF members to a sufficient standard to make them a viable and readily available trained contingent. It leaves half the potential force untrained or undertrained. That has to stop.

I remember that our M109s would spend maybe three months a year actually being used for training (and a third of that is merely driver training and not full field exercising). The other nine months they spent sitting in the gun shed or it's parking lot while the unit did other things. Some of that was maintenance but the bulk was sitting. I'll bet the LAVs are pretty much the same.

One can find a million excuses as to why something shouldn't happen. But when half of your army has little equipment to train on and would use it at best for one or two months a year in the summer, when the RegF doesn't use it then it simply doesn't make sense to not share it. Any given LAV or TAPV or M777 could be trained on by several units and still have sufficient time to be maintained. What it takes is cooperation and planning.

We're smart people; we should be able to figure this out. ... If we really want to.

 

[KevinB]

? Korea, Cyprus, Bosnia. Afghanistan had a mandated 25 percent augmentation but that’s not an inability that’s a policy. Obviously we need reserves for long term operational sustainment but I don’t think that’s really a fair take.

Korea was effectively an all reserve thing -- the Special Force raised for Korea was made for it.

Cyprus wasn't a mandated thing, it was mostly Reg force thing until the very end, and that was due to FYR, and Somalia running at the same time.
FYR, again not mandated - just a running out of folks from burning the candle at both ends.

Afghanistan, none of the first Roto's had any significant Res presence - it wasn't until the bucket was being drained that Res where called in.


Let's face it - until their is a dire need, or perception of a dire need, the Regular Army chooses to ignore the P Res.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Let's face it - until their is a dire need, or perception of a dire need, the Regular Army chooses to ignore the P Res.

And, in all truth based on how we were treated when interacting with them, we were generally thankful that they did

 

[McG]

Does one really need concurrent training with two battalions when our SSE dictates we deploy battlegroup sized formations? The answer is no.

The answer is yes. SSE dictates that we must be able to deploy multiple BG sized organizations concurrently, so those organizations need the ability to prepare and train concurrently.

It means one set of vehicles are "owned" and maintained by two sets of maintainers combined to keep the vehicles operational.

Shared fleets don’t engender a sense of ownership in the crews. The vehicles are “rentals” which only need to be suffered until it is time to be put back in the pool.

Not in Pet or Valcartier.

So what? I was responding to a proposal that specifically suggested the Reg F units in Edmonton & Shilo should share a fleet that would be in Wainwright. “Not in Pet or Valcartier” does nothing to ameliorate the faults of that proposal. That being said, a shared RCR LAV fleet in Petawawa would compel 2 RCR to do all trainIng (including courses) away from home.

Don't spread them around. Concentrate the bulk of them and their maintainers at training centres and distribute a few as local training aides.

Again, I was responding to a proposal that parcelled LAV in little groups about the country. Even coy sized vehicle pools will be problematic because current LAV owning units are not resourced with STTE for divisible A2 & B echelons.

It's not emotional involvement. It's the practical necessity of exposing people to and letting them train on the equipment they are meant to fight on.

If it is necessary for PRes to be mechanized then propose it with the proper resources.

If you can train two brigades with one set of kit then do so. A possible example would be preposition one brigade set of equipment for operations and have another set of equipment divided between two brigades with the units inside the brigade sharing that half set.

If we look at Ukraine right now, it would appear that equipment (not people) is the critical path for war time for force generation. If we don’t have enough equipment for three brigades, why do we need to figure out how to train six brigades worth of crews?

 

[markppcli]

Korea was effectively an all reserve thing -- the Special Force raised for Korea was made for it.

Cyprus wasn't a mandated thing, it was mostly Reg force thing until the very end, and that was due to FYR, and Somalia running at the same time.
FYR, again not mandated - just a running out of folks from burning the candle at both ends.

Afghanistan, none of the first Roto's had any significant Res presence - it wasn't until the bucket was being drained that Res where called in.


Let's face it - until their is a dire need, or perception of a dire need, the Regular Army chooses to ignore the P Res.

Not totally accurate about Korea; the special force was recruited from Active Personnel as much as anything.

In general I agree that the regular force doesn’t care about the reserves.

 

[OldSolduer]

? Korea, Cyprus, Bosnia. Afghanistan had a mandated 25 percent augmentation but that’s not an inability that’s a policy. Obviously we need reserves for long term operational sustainment but I don’t think that’s really a fair take.

Croatia 93 2PPCLI was about 50% PRes folks. In Bosnia 1997 I think the number 45% were PRes.

When you train as a team and don't dis the B Team then you get results.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Hold gun camp concentrations at ranges where you can and bus or fly in the troops.

Vancouver is third largest metro area in Canada, or thereabouts? Past time to have a large base within Canadian borders that doesn't require a whole days' drive.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Vancouver is third largest metro area in Canada, or thereabouts? Past time to have a large base within Canadian borders that doesn't require a whole days' drive.

The best training area for Lower Mainland based troops is in JBLM - Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and Yakima Firing Centre.

We used to go there a fair bit. Not so much recently.

Beyond that, there's nothing apart from CFB Chilliwack. Mainly because people can't be bothered to get the required clearances done to use Crown Land, or so it seems.

 

[GR66]

So what? I was responding to a proposal that specifically suggested the Reg F units in Edmonton & Shilo should share a fleet that would be in Wainwright. “Not in Pet or Valcartier” does nothing to ameliorate the faults of that proposal. That being said, a shared RCR LAV fleet in Petawawa would compel 2 RCR to do all trainIng (including courses) away from home.

Not to be picky, but I specifically noted in my scenario for discussion that you'd co-locate PPCLI's two LAV battalions in Edmonton so that there would be no travel from Shilo to Wainwright for 2 PPCLI. Similarly if you were to do this kind of proposal you would logically co-locate both of RCR's LAV Battalions together in Petawawa and R22eR's LAV Battalions in Valcartier.

For example, if 1 Brigade were to be set as our "Heavy" Brigade Group with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions all co-located in Edmonton would we need 2 x full Battalions worth of LAVs in Edmonton/Wainwright to train the two Mech Battalions?

I threw that scenario out in response to a couple of comments by others about possible ways to make use of our existing equipment in different ways in order expand our deployment and training options. McG's and others comments about the potential issues in such a system are welcome and exactly what I was looking for. Now that we know what some of the key issues with such an idea are, then what would have to be done to solve these issues? Would those solutions be worth what it would take to implement them? Are there other ideas which would be easier that would achieve the same goals of better preparing the Reserves to integrate with our Reg Force Mechanized Infantry? Is that a goal we should even be working toward, or is there a better role that the Reserves should be training for?

 

[FJAG]

The answer is yes. SSE dictates that we must be able to deploy multiple BG sized organizations concurrently, so those organizations need the ability to prepare and train concurrently.

SSE calls for "two sustained deployments of 500-1,500 personnel in two different theatres of operation". Effectively that means two distinct battlegroups. Your example was "Having 1 PPCLI & 2 PPCLI share a vehicle pool means a barrier to concurrent training." Canada has six LAV equipped battlegroups. It would still have six sets of equipment even if some of those sets are shared between battalions and with the ResF. Nothing anywhere says that two battalions sharing equipment have to train on it "concurrently". It could be sequentially or battlegroups from different brigades go.

Shared fleets don’t engender a sense of ownership in the crews. The vehicles are “rentals” which only need to be suffered until it is time to be put back in the pool.

True enough. But if LAV 33C belongs to the third section of the third platoon of the third company of each of 1 and 3 PPCLI in Edmonton then it belongs to two identified sections who share ownership and have a vested interest in its condition. It's not a true pool vehicle per se; just shared.

So what? I was responding to a proposal that specifically suggested the Reg F units in Edmonton & Shilo should share a fleet that would be in Wainwright. “Not in Pet or Valcartier” does nothing to ameliorate the faults of that proposal. That being said, a shared RCR LAV fleet in Petawawa would compel 2 RCR to do all trainIng (including courses) away from home.

2 PPCLI being a LAV battalion is not written in stone. And even if it was, 1 and 3 PPCLI could share one LAV set and both train to be mech. That wouldn't even need a change in infrastructure in Edmonton which already supports one LAV set. That would give 1 CMBG three trained RegF mech battalions using two sets of LAVs. 1 & 3 PPCLI could also share their LAV set with the ResF infantry units in Edmonton and Calgary. 2 PPCLI could share its LAVs with the ResF units in Winnipeg and Regina. That could provide 3 Div with up to 5 additional trained Res F LAV coys.

Again, I was responding to a proposal that parcelled LAV in little groups about the country. Even coy sized vehicle pools will be problematic because current LAV owning units are not resourced with STTE for divisible A2 & B echelons.

That's true and all I'm saying is that "sharing" equipment doesn't need it to be parceled out to small locations that can't support them. There are other ways that can work.

If it is necessary for PRes to be mechanized then propose it with the proper resources.

I'm not sure what you mean by "proper resources". Afghanistan clearly showed ResF infantry working with LAV battalions, artillery reservists with M777 batteries and I presume the tanks in Afghanistan might also have had some reservists with them. The ResF right now has very few roles outside of augmenting the RegF units. It's obvious that the more that ResF personnel are trained on RegF equipment the more proficient they will be at augmenting their RegF counterparts.

If we look at Ukraine right now, it would appear that equipment (not people) is the critical path for war time for force generation. If we don’t have enough equipment for three brigades, why do we need to figure out how to train six brigades worth of crews?

I guess the reciprocal question is if we don't have enough equipment for the three RegF brigades then why don't we simply lay off all those un- and underequipped RegF as well and concentrate into two equipped and manned brigades?

But it is a fair point; equipment is every bit as vital as people and we're woefully short. My own view is that with the overall RegF and ResF strength of the Army we have the numbers to form five manoeuvre brigades (roughly 25,000 folks) and three support brigades (roughly 12,000 folks). There are two ways forward from this: 1) reduce the RegF and ResF strength to man the three existing manoeuvre and one support brigade or 2) increase the equipment holdings to eight brigades. I personally prefer option 2) and in that respect I can clearly see a path to increasing the capability of the ResF through shared equipment until such time as more equipment suitable for a European theatre (or Asian one) is available.

The one thing that Ukraine is teaching us is that equipment is destroyed in large quantities just as people are. It's meaningless to reinforce a shot up brigade with people if you do not have the equipment to replace the lost equipment. The way it stands, we can replace lost equipment only up to the point of the RegF holdings because we have no reserve equipment holdings.

If we lose equipment and people at an equivalent rate, at the end of the day we'll have a surplus of 15,000 folks, either RegF or ResF or both. That makes little sense. Having an unequipped ResF only worked only while we lived with the delusion that major ground force combat was a thing of the past, believed in only by us old dinosaurs, and that Canada would keep on doing roto after roto in relatively benign scenarios where we wouldn't have to go "all in".

We seem to have decided that Canada's budget can afford the annual cost of the manpower that it now has so there is no real need to cut numbers. That points to acquiring more equipment. Lets face it, buying the equipment to equip two manoeuvre brigades and two support brigades would be peanuts when you compare it to the cost of the F35s and CSC that are coming onstream.

Clearly there is no equipment coming in the near future and we have some 60 years of neglect to fix with the ResF before we can "trust them" to maintain their equipment. That's why I'm utterly convinced that change is needed now which includes RegF and ResF units becoming integrated and sharing equipment for the time being.

 

[Kirkhill]

Vancouver is third largest metro area in Canada, or thereabouts? Past time to have a large base within Canadian borders that doesn't require a whole days' drive.

Strangely enough LAVs are not compatible with the Grouse Grind. On the other hand you could find lots of great light and heliborne training areas close by.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Strangely enough LAVs are not compatible with the Grouse Grind. On the other hand you could find lots of great light and heliborne training areas close by.

I can't tell you how many times, over a couple of decades, that I tried to pitch things like that only to fail on the horns of mediocrity.

After awhile I stopped trying as it just wasn't worth the time and effort to fail continuously, especially for a part timer with a busy 'outside the Army' life.

 

[Infanteer]

I would ask those who advocate sharing LAVs, or any A Fleet, if they've ever managed the training on and maintenance of an A Fleet.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The best training area for Lower Mainland based troops is in JBLM - Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and Yakima Firing Centre.

It is, but absent an agreement for lodging a bunch of stuff and a few people there, it continues to be limited (for the Res F) to what can be moved by advance/rear parties (unemployed people or those able to take extra days off) or loaded up on Fri evening for a long drive by people who probably will have been awake for 18+ hours by the time they reach the biv area.

 

[KevinB]

I would ask those who advocate sharing LAVs, or any A Fleet, if they've ever managed the training on and maintenance of an A Fleet.

Sharing can work, if they are ‘spare’ vehicles and never expected to be truly operational.

NG units do it to reduce wear on Op Stock.
But the locations it’s done at effectively have a neat depot level refurbishment capability

 

[Good2Golf]

The best training area for Lower Mainland based troops is in JBLM - Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and Yakima Firing Centre.

We used to go there a fair bit. Not so much recently.

Beyond that, there's nothing apart from CFB Chilliwack. Mainly because people can't be bothered to get the required clearances done to use Crown Land, or so it seems.

JBLM just keeps getting better…new and improved, best shitters in the Army.

Well played aviators of D-Coy, 2-158th Combat Aviation Brigade, well played!

These Army pilots poop in luxury at Joint Base Lewis-McChord

Army Times exclusively interviewed the former infantry NCO who masterminded the luxury latrine.

www.armytimes.com