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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Certainly tanks have their tactical uses. But does anyone see tanks dominating the way they did in WW2? Or even Gulf War 1?
Tanks only have tactical use. They did not dominate in WW2, nor in the Gulf War. Mechanized combined arms formations did in those conflicts, of which a tank is only a single component. The distinction is important, and I can see a combined arms formation exerting the same level of dominance as it has in previous conflicts.
 
The most effective use of tank-heavy forces (which actually means about 1:2 tank:infantry units) is pursuit and exploitation, or contra same. It's wasteful to employ them as assault/breaching or defensive formations. Administrative operational mobility has always been by transport. Canada does not (and for the foreseeable future will not) have tank formations. The case for our tanks is to hold the advantage in unfair fights during the operations in which we participate. Like everything else, we need more on hand than we actually deploy.
 
And this gets to the heart of what I feel is a fundamental weakness of capability-based planning. Asking "how might we be threatened" can deliver a capability that can never realistically be used. A threat based planning model that asks "who is threatening us and where" forces us to realistically consider how we could fight and win with tools and structures being proposed.

Fighting it out in fake land-locked countries on a mythical continent may cut it for staff college, but it doesn't cut the mustard when considering real problems for force design.
I guess the trick is seeing into the future 5 to 20 years. But yes, we should start with a realistic assessment of where we would be fighting as opposed to a DATE scenario.
 
Which COA are you referring to? Humor me.
Any course of action where Canada is going to be able to effectively contribute a timely force. We ain't talking Gulf War buildup, I am referring to European/Baltic scenarios that will likely be resolved before we can even incorporate/comprehend the Strat sit,
 
Any course of action where Canada is going to be able to effectively contribute a timely force. We ain't talking Gulf War buildup, I am referring to European/Baltic scenarios that will likely be resolved before we can even incorporate/comprehend the Strat sit,
Any course of action where Canada is going to be able to effectively contribute a timely force. We ain't talking Gulf War buildup, I am referring to European/Baltic scenarios that will likely be resolved before we can even incorporate/comprehend the Strat sit,
Ok - I’ve been part of a couple of high level exercises in this context. Some virtual, one live.

How do you think US heavy forces would get to Europe?

The transatlantic bond takes some effort. It’s a planning factor.
 
And this gets to the heart of what I feel is a fundamental weakness of capability-based planning. Asking "how might we be threatened" can deliver a capability that can never realistically be used. A threat based planning model that asks "who is threatening us and where" forces us to realistically consider how we could fight and win with tools and structures being proposed.

Fighting it out in fake land-locked countries on a mythical continent may cut it for staff college, but it doesn't cut the mustard when considering real problems for force design.
For me that is the heart of the question. This tends to get me back to Ian Hope's article "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" written some 20 years ago as he was analyzing the road to transformation that we had embarked on then. I think since then we've gone even further down the rabbit hole.

By having created an agile, modular force where the mass of the Army is relegated simply to force generation roles and our force employer elements are crafted on an as required basis with lengthy periods to cobble together the various disparate elements we are simply conflating the question of "where will we need to fight?" with the questions of "where will we choose to go?"

Expecting the government to tell us that without first educating them heavily in the options, is unrealistic. And, obviously, before we can educate anyone we will need to have first run a very detailed analysis.

For me the rough analysis is that at some point the Army may need to fight (and definitely needs to present a very credible deterrent force in theatre) in Europe and we should firstly develop an overarching doctrine for that. Secondly we may choose to go into lesser, more touchy-feely situations where the anticipated level of conflict may be harsh but isn't a threat to our national security. That force might be more tailored and specifically trained but should also in this day and age be capable of protecting itself robustly.

Am I ignoring China. Yes, for the time being. We are neither threatened heavily by them nor in alliances that might mandate our presence there. On top of that much of the doctrine for dealing with China should mirror that for Europe (albeit elements might vary). If we can get our doctrine right for Europe it should be mostly transferable to China.

🍻
 
Some questions. Isn't the LAV 6 heavier than the current Strykers because of armour differences? Does that change how we use them?

Secondly do tanks not reduce the strategic mobility of the CMBG as everything else is wheeled. Does that combined with the LAV armour improvements make a CMBG a heavier formation than a SBCT or is that dependant on all the other effectors an SBCT has that we don't?
Armour, Hull, but mostly the turret and weapon system. We operate them differently than the US uses Strykers because they bring different capabilities to the fight. A LAV 6 can engage and destroy the En IFV's where as a Stryker realistically cannot, so the risk of moving it up to fire isn't worth it. It will be interesting to see how that changes with the new 30mm equipped Strykers, both the Dragoon and it's newer cousin.



There's been some discussion about ALAWS, but that's wrapped up in the Light Force Enhancement Project is it not? Will that procurement be in numbers that could see all our infantry equipped with Spike / Javelin / MMP / NLAWS / what ever?
 
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There's been some discussion about ALAWS, but that's wrapped up in the Light Force Enhancement Project is it not?
Not anymore. IIRC, the Light Force Enhancement Project was broken down from an omnibus project to one that simply looked at light transport (the UTVs).
 
Which should be shut down completely, and rolled into LVM or LUV, not a small bespoke fleet driving up sustainment cost and complexity.
 
Not anymore. IIRC, the Light Force Enhancement Project was broken down from an omnibus project to one that simply looked at light transport (the UTVs).
Cheers, I was just going off what I saw on the govt projects page. As long as it's following that 2027 ish time line I'm happy to hear it, given TOW's replacement is slated for the 2030s.
 
Given that a CMBG has tanks, was this the excuse/reason to not move forward on an ALAWS capability? STBG as stated earlier have plenty of methods to deal with armour using Javelin etc..., but didn't have a 25mm turret on their LAV's nor tanks attached to their formations.

Was Canada using our vehicles as the anti-armour solution?
 
Given that a CMBG has tanks, was this the excuse/reason to not move forward on an ALAWS capability? STBG as stated earlier have plenty of methods to deal with armour using Javelin etc..., but didn't have a 25mm turret on their LAV's nor tanks attached to their formations.

Was Canada using our vehicles as the anti-armour solution?
I am not a DLR insider, but much of the Canadian Army you see today is because of Kandahar. The irony is that the Taliban saved our tank capability and killed our anti-tank capability. They also finished off our GBAD. I am simplifying, but there it is. They also gave us back our Chinook capability.

To your question, some might look at the Canadian Army and say: "you have Leopard 2A6M with arguably the best tank cannon in the world. What do you need anti-armour for?" At Capability Experiment 10 (back in 2011), the BG that I was a part of did an exercise in JCATS/VBS with anticipated capabilities of 2020. Because the infantry had no real anti-tank capability the Leopard squadron was split up and given to the infantry companies to protect them. Led to defeat in detail. One of the take-aways was the need for integral anti-armour in the infantry.

I am not sure what keeps holding it up. ALAWS (or whatever we decide to call it) wouldn't even need new structures or organizations.
 
Given that a CMBG has tanks, was this the excuse/reason to not move forward on an ALAWS capability? STBG as stated earlier have plenty of methods to deal with armour using Javelin etc..., but didn't have a 25mm turret on their LAV's nor tanks attached to their formations.

Was Canada using our vehicles as the anti-armour solution?

Kind of like we don't need mortars and HMGs because we have the C16 GMGs. We don't need Javelins because we have the Carl G and the tanks.

Well, if the tanks are replacements for the Javelins then we need them allocated to replace the Javelins, or the MGS or the Stryker Brigades. If we are going to concentrate them and hold them in reserve for the counter punch, or the pursuit, then what do we use in their place at the battalion level? I recall that the Horse Cavalry was held in reserve precisely for that exploitation role for 3 years in Flanders during WWI.


Which should be shut down completely, and rolled into LVM or LUV, not a small bespoke fleet driving up sustainment cost and complexity.


The LVM (Light) is calling for 1000 to 1500 unarmoured expeditionary vehicles with 3 tonne payload and 400 to 600 unarmoured domestic vehicles with the equivalent payload. To my eye that looks a lot like a replacement for the MLVW (or the old deuce and a half) instead of the LSVW.

The LUV programme is calling for the delivery of up to 3000 vehicles to replace the G-Wagons and the Milverados. (8000 km per year, 60% on highways, 20% on gravel, 20% cross country)

The Light Force Enhancement - Tactical Mobility Platform is calling for 330 CH-147 transportable vehicles.

In the last couple of years the gap between the LUV and the TMP has been narrowed by the US Army's adoption of the Infantry Squad Vehicle - a chopped and channeled Milverado.

Perhaps those two projects could end up being one after all but I don't know that the ISV could realistically be described as a UTV. At the same time I think it is going to be hard to find a UTV that can keep up with the LAVs on the highway.
 
If we can get our doctrine right for Europe it should be mostly transferable to China.

"Never fight a land war in Asia." Or east of the Vistula. Design accordingly.
 
Meanwhile RUSI offers some insight into UAVs and tanks.

What is on "The other side of the hill"? That has been the age old question (Jerry Potts's answer to Commissioner MacLeod of the NWMP was the classic: "Nudder hill"). The take from the RUSI is that there are no more hills. There are so many eyes in the sky, that the hills have disappeared. There is no more concealment, much less cover. And even field craft is not enough to cover the new gap.







A couple of comments stood out


There is a tendency for Western soldiers to dismiss what can be learned from these incidents because the videos show limited tactical proficiency being displayed by Armenian troops. This is misguided for several reasons. The snippet videos usually show armour manoeuvring, when camouflage is hard to maintain, and which Western forces would equally have to do if they were to affect the outcome of battle. The videos have also been selected as examples of Azerbaijani successes. However, there is actually a lot of evidence of Armenian forces digging in, concealing positions, and deploying decoys, of which at least two were struck by Azerbaijani forces.

More importantly, this dismissal of evidence suggests a lack of appreciation of just how naked the modern battlefield has become.

To conclude from this that the tank’s days are numbered, however, is a serious error. From the videos in Nagorno-Karabakh it is evident that unarmoured vehicles and dismounted infantry are faring no better, even those dug into positions with camouflage screens. Indeed, the lack of protection means they will likely fare worse since there are more kinds of munitions that are lighter and easier to employ that can kill them.

Besides the vulnerability of other kinds of vehicle, the ability to inflict persistent attrition upon an adversary at reach does not change the fact that land warfare is about taking and holding ground, and the ground will still ultimately need to be assaulted. Once committed to an assault on defended positions, armour remains critical to rapid success with acceptable losses. The challenge is to get a combined arms formation within striking distance without it having suffered heavy losses before entering the direct fire zone. Armenia, for instance, has lost the equivalent number of tanks to more than a third of the UK’s heavy armour inventory.


The ubiquitous availability of highly attritable and high-fidelity surveillance and reconnaissance assets, from electronic and multispectral sensing, to video feeds from UAVs, leaves little room to hide. Modern camouflage designed to reduce the electromagnetic signature beyond the visible spectrum can render armored vehicles less obvious to passive surveillance, but generally fall short of concealing vehicles from more determined observation. Turkey’s domestically produced Bayraktar and Anka UAVs had little difficulty in picking out Syrian armour amidst Idlib’s sparse terrain, and then following their movements. Once found, vehicles can also be targeted by increasingly precise and tailored munitions, whether delivered by the UAV, or from afar.

It is fair to say that Western armies have to a large extent been in denial about the impact of these capabilities. Awaiting a revolution in swarm technology and AI, Western forces have largely overlooked the fact that it is the density of sensors that is decisively reshaping the battlefield. Of course, much criticism can be leveled at the Syrian forces for their poor vehicle handling, lack of camouflage, and tendency to bunch up in targetable laagers. However extensive testing in the US and UK has consistently shown that Western vehicles are not much harder to find. The deep and unmistakable tracks that armoured vehicles cut in the ground leave a trail that UAVs can follow, and the fishhook turn leaves little doubt as to which woodblock the vehicle has entered, even if it has subsequently set up multi-spectral screens and camouflage.

Given the range and endurance of modern ISR capabilities, and the distance that armoured forces must traverse under threat before actually coming into the direct fire zone, it must be doubted whether existing concepts of armoured manoeuvre will remain viable, as armoured units face persistent attrition before ever they reach an adversary ground formation.


The suggestions, broadly, are that while Western Armies seek the perfect eye in the sky the enemy is launching hundreds of airborne cellphones.

Those cellphones have stripped the cover from the field and left the advance naked. The modern tactician can no longer count on finding an off-route covered approach. Cross country moves are now easier to detect than road moves - they leave tracks that are observable. The modern general will now find himself confronting the same problems as Churchill moving from the Netherlands to Bavaria. Roadbound with spies everywhere. How do you bring the enemy to battle? Or better yet how do you survive long enough to get to battle? The Indians and Partisans now have an air force.
 
I am not a DLR insider, but much of the Canadian Army you see today is because of Kandahar. The irony is that the Taliban saved our tank capability and killed our anti-tank capability. They also finished off our GBAD. I am simplifying, but there it is. They also gave us back our Chinook capability.

To your question, some might look at the Canadian Army and say: "you have Leopard 2A6M with arguably the best tank cannon in the world. What do you need anti-armour for?" At Capability Experiment 10 (back in 2011), the BG that I was a part of did an exercise in JCATS/VBS with anticipated capabilities of 2020. Because the infantry had no real anti-tank capability the Leopard squadron was split up and given to the infantry companies to protect them. Led to defeat in detail. One of the take-aways was the need for integral anti-armour in the infantry.

I am not sure what keeps holding it up. ALAWS (or whatever we decide to call it) wouldn't even need new structures or organizations.

You answered my question as I was writing it.

Cheers.
 
Meanwhile RUSI offers some insight into UAVs and tanks.

What is on "The other side of the hill"?
In 1916, trenches were observed from air observer planes and could be predictably be destroyed with a known quantity of shells from British artillery.

In 1944, German reinforcements to Normandy could not move to attack the beachheads by day due to the crippling effect of allied air supremacy. This was the crux of Rommel's argument for an operational approach of deploying at the beaches. Movement was largely conducted at night.

Exposure to detection and destruction from aerial sensors is not a new phenomenon. UAVs are simply the new flavour of wine. What's more - this phenomenon isn't undefeatable - armies have been doing it through various methods for a century. Anyone arguing otherwise doesn't have a clue about how land warfare has been fought since 1914.
 
Tanks only have tactical use. They did not dominate in WW2, nor in the Gulf War. Mechanized combined arms formations did in those conflicts, of which a tank is only a single component. The distinction is important, and I can see a combined arms formation exerting the same level of dominance as it has in previous conflicts.
I will argue that tanks indeed dominated the North African battlefield and certain Eastern front battlefields.
 
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