Fair enough, I was going off the basis of the 2 non continental US BCT's running with 2 infantry battalions as precedent for "enough"
Challenge, does the Light Brigade need a standing cav unit, or is it's primary purpose to force generate QRF battalions and potentially light based battlegroups? If it does need a Cav capability, wouldn't it make more sense for the LIB -> Cav conversion to happen within the light force? Good geographic location to play with your reserve ideas in PRes rich Ontario, strip a company each from 1,2,3 RCR to form the new RegF Cav, 3RCR becomes a 10/90 reserve LIB.
If so, the math changes to 3 armoured (1 tank and 2 cav) 6 mech. Two symmetrical medium Bde's, one independent/floating tank regiment that can turn either "heavyish" as needed. Or, if we got wild, two 70/30 tank regiments where the 30 trains on the 70's tanks to end up with two heavy-ish Bde's.
I think what matters most about the structure, is what you intend the final structure's capability to be. With a Canadian Army hovering around 20,000 regulars and 15,000 reservists (those are very rough rounded off numbers you might be able to generate for a field force) the most you could ever deploy and marginally sustain would be a single division (say 20 - 23,000 all told). It would be more practical to generate and deploy a brigade (say 5,000) and the SSE, as is written, is for the deployment of battlegroups (1,5 - 2,500). In each of those structures, it doesn't matter how many are regular or reservists as long as you develop a proper training and mobilization structure to complement it. Obviously the more regulars a force has the more rapidly it can be mobilized and the more effective it will be at the time of mobilization albeit that with time effectiveness will reach a level of parity.
If one looks solely at the SSE then brigade and division structures do not matter. What matters is that a core for the battlegroup exists. That equates to at least a trained battalion headquarters. If you want that battlegroup to be able of deploying rapidly then the more of its sub-components (such as rifle companies, CS and CSS) should be organic. If there is time for pre-deployment training and organization before deployment then those sub-components can come from elsewhere. Essentially this is how we did things during Afghanistan. With roughly a years notice and six months of predeployment training we were able to literally cobble together 2 - 2,500 man battlegroups on a continuing basis using both regular and reserve forces (roughly 10-20%) for each roto. For that type of conveyor system of force generation our brigade structures, our reserve structures and our managed readiness and equipment management systems were adequate and still remain adequate.
The problem comes when you want to up the game and send a brigade all at once. None of our brigades are configured or manned to a level where it could be mobilized without very heavy augmentation in both personnel and equipment from the other two brigades and the reserve force. To go one step further, depending on what level of hostilities they are going into, we would need to procure several crucial weapons systems not currently in our inventory and need the time to train their operators. Lastly, we would need to build a CSS structure to be able to support the force. In addition we would need to build a system that generates replacements for casualties of both personnel and equipment and perhaps a rotational system.
The problem with brigades is that we will never send one as currently configured. The LIB is an issue as is the paucity of artillery and the nonexistence of a variety of enabling weapons such as AD and ATGMs. Time is the big factor. The brigade will need to be "rounded-out" from other brigades and reservists and trained and this will take significantly more time to do than a mere battlegroup.
Building and deploying a division confronts us with the same issues but at a significantly greater magnitude to the point where its nigh on impossible to do.
Personally I think that a structure of the size of Canada's current Army, that aims to deploy only battlegroups is aiming far too low.
I think that if all you are planning on sending is a battlegroup, then an Army which actually has enough effectives (both regular and reservists combined) to man that battlegroup is enough for one roto. If more rotos are envisioned then you need some additional cadres to form additional battle groups while filling the ranks with new recruits. A mechanized battalion has roughly 600 all ranks of which roughly 360 are cpls/ptes. Lets up those numbers to a more realistic level of 800 and 500 respectively and set roto lengths as one year. In a year of intensive training the core of 300 should be able to bring 500 new recruits to a level where the battalion is effective. While our risk averse hierarchy might disagree with that, most armies are quite capable of doing it. So effectively, an Army that plans to deploy only battlegroups needs only multiple sets of equipment and personnel to put out a Roto 0 and maybe two sets of cadres to form Rotos 1 and 2 and subsequent ones. If there is a pool of DP1 level trained reservists already available - lets say enough for Roto 1 - then the job becomes even easier. And if the deployments are basically peacetime ones such as the one to Latvia, a newly raised and trained battlegroup has even more time in theatre to hone its skills to a much higher level.
Obviously if we upscale our requirement for deployment to a brigade, then the problem becomes much more complex. Unlike a battlegroup whose equipment and CSS support is relatively modest, a brigade's are increased by a factor of 5-6 at a minimum. Equipping and training a brigade from scratch easily takes more than a year even if you start with a trained cadre as you need to take the first year to get the battalions organized and trained and then take significantly more time to train them to operate as combined arms.
My point with the above is not to urge us to reduce the army to one Roto 0 and several cadres but to say that its critical to understand and fully tailor your army to meet its expected objectives well before the fact. Know how large a force you want to deploy and in what theatre and organize the structure (equipment and personnel) well ahead of the fact. If cost is a consideration (and when isn't it?) then make a part of the force a properly trained reserve force. If time is not a consideration (and in the peacetime past it hasn't been) then include in the plan the recruiting and training of civilians. But. Make sure that you have a solid doctrine and a structure to support that doctrine and to stay with it. We
ad hoc things entirely too much.
What's clear to me is that, having committed to Latvia, we need to sustain a battlegroup in theatre. It's effectively an open ended standing commitment. Under the SSE we need a structure only sufficient in personnel and equipment to sustain it. We do not need a brigade for that. Three, maybe four, battalion cores (1,500 total max) rotating on one year periods could do it. That's significantly less expensive than a whole RegF brigade. If, however, we think that at some point we need to, or want the option to, send a full brigade, then we better have a properly equipped and organized heavy brigade with a proper doctrine available for that. Since that's a contingency, and not a standing commitment, much of it can be a reserve element. If we think that will become a major operation then we better have an additional reserve heavy brigade in the hopper as well.
Over and above Latvia, we need to do that analysis for each and every commitment, whether standing or contingent. Do we want to do security force training? - configure a force for that. Do we want to do UN peacekeeping? - configure a force for that. Do we want an army presence in the Arctic and on our coasts? - configure a force for that. Some of those will be standing commitments requiring a full-time force; others will be contingencies which can get by with a core, reservists and civilians.
In effect this is why I favour restructuring into light, medium and heavy forces - each targeted on a particular class of missions (quick reaction and the North; peacekeeping; and Europe respectively), each equipped and trained to meet those commitments.
I think that our knee jerk response to missions (standing and contingent) in trying to be jacks of all trades are what is burning out the Army as people are shoved around from pillar to post and what is tying us to a large and expensive standing regular force which undermines our ability to obtain proper equipment.
All that to say my whole concept of 30/70 forces comes from the idea of having more full-time "cores" available to build battlegroups or brigades around in sufficient numbers to meet standing commitments and reasonably foreseeable contingencies.
That to say as well, why I'm not in favour of having forces designed to meet a variety of tasks such as a tank regiment that could work with either this brigade or that one or a brigade formed with two battalions and a cavalry regiment. Nor do I know for sure whether the light force needs a cavalry regiment (I suspect it does if it needs to be able to deploy as a brigade as opposed to just light battlegroups).
I certainly am with you on the fact that we need to leverage PRes heavy areas. In fact I think much of the future of the army as a viable and credible force depends on it. I find it regrettable that the Army's leadership hasn't recognized that yet.
