Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Honestly, the main flaw of the TAPV IMHO is the lack of internal space. If it had more space to put stuff (whatever that stuff may be), then it would easily find more roles.

I don't think the TAPV lacks interior space. What it does suffer from is one of the world's worst/laziest design teams.

Maintenance Corridor - vacant space
Control Panel on Gunner's left shoulder protruding into cabin space - panels stacked on top of each other
Why isn't that panel tucked into the Maintenance Corridor space. It could still be accessible from the interior.

Despite the Maintenance Corridor the spare is carried on the roof.
Why isn't the spare, perhaps even with a retractable jib, integrated into the maintenance corridor?

The Driver and CC are jammed into the front shoulder to shoulder while the gunner is three miles to the rear hogging the available floor area in what is actually a quite roomy space.

If the Dutch get a crew of three into a Fennek but pushing the driver up front at the apex of the crew triangle while the gunner/cc and the radio operator/obs sit side by side to the rear of the driver.

That Triangle would leave the space to the rear of the crew fully open and well delineated for use as a cargo/pax/auxilliary system area. And the control panel that I suggested could go into the maintenance corridor, could have an alternate home in the centre of the Crew Triangle.

IMHO - somebody just got slack and idle and decided they had a massive space for a small crew and decided that it didn't matter about space utilization and, as I said, allowed the gunner to hog the whole space.

With more thought I think that vehicle could easily be a 3+6 vehicle and with lower profile and centre of mass.

But it would require a ridiculously expensive redesign.

 

[Kirkhill]

An alternative thought for what might have been.

 

[markppcli]

Maintenance corridor isn’t accessible from the inside. I get you mean a redesign but they intended to keep the chassis realistically unchanged

 

[KevinB]

Maintenance corridor isn’t accessible from the inside. I get you mean a redesign but they intended to keep the chassis realistically unchanged

Which meant it wasn’t suitable for the role the CAF envisioned for it - check.

 

[markppcli]

Which meant it wasn’t suitable for the role the CAF envisioned for it - check.

Yup, trust me I’m no great defender of the thing. I’ve posted before about the only real uses I see for it; which is essentially providing a protected mobility element to the reserves. Ideall as a third maneuver Bn in each Bde; but I digress.

 

[McG]

It has the standard SMP pintel clamp hitch system - so I would assume it can tow any medium SMP Trailer - to include a Water Buffalo.

If only life could be so simple. If you have the right pintel at the wrong height then the vehicle & trailer are still incompatible.

 

[Kirkhill]

Maintenance corridor isn’t accessible from the inside. I get you mean a redesign but they intended to keep the chassis realistically unchanged

I'm willing to bet that there is ample space for those panels, or at least the components within them, in the wings and centre of the crew triangle/compartment. A lot of dead space up there as well.

But you're right. A bad idea executed poorly.

A better suite of options, IMO - Panhard VBLs, Fennecs, LAV-LRSS and ACSVs. - and maybe some Heavy Armoured Cars.

 

[KevinB]

If only life could be so simple. If you have the right pintel at the wrong height then the vehicle & trailer are still incompatible.

You can get height adaptors for both though. I'm a bigger fan of the eye loop height adjustment on the trailer - but sometimes that isn't viable.

 

[GR66]

I'm willing to bet that there is ample space for those panels, or at least the components within them, in the wings and centre of the crew triangle/compartment. A lot of dead space up there as well.

But you're right. A bad idea executed poorly.

A better suite of options, IMO - Panhard VBLs, Fennecs, LAV-LRSS and ACSVs. - and maybe some Heavy Armoured Cars.

Maybe all you need is space in the TAPV for a control panel plus a trailer carrying either a multi-canister UAV launcher or a load of UGV recce vehicles to be directed from the "mothership"? Use your tanks when you need to recce in direct contact with the enemy.

 

[Kirkhill]

And before I go... why isn't the height of the suspension adjustable?

It might make the beast a little less tippy on the highways.

 

[Kirkhill]

Maybe all you need is space in the TAPV for a control panel plus a trailer carrying either a multi-canister UAV launcher or a load of UGV recce vehicles to be directed from the "mothership"? Use your tanks when you need to recce in direct contact with the enemy.

Like that one.

 

[Kirkhill]

Maybe all you need is space in the TAPV for a control panel plus a trailer carrying either a multi-canister UAV launcher or a load of UGV recce vehicles to be directed from the "mothership"? Use your tanks when you need to recce in direct contact with the enemy.

This kind of thing?

 

[Skysix]

Those are all interesting solutions and expensive ones. But I was thinking of something which is probably within your own realm of experience. DND tends to think of arms manufacturers and very pricey solutions to every problem. There are other solutions.

I did twenty years of my business supporting a lot of clients in the rural farm economy, like you do. Amongst my clientele were Hutterites and farm machinery manufacturers with small to medium scale machine shops. If you gave any of them a TAPV and a 120mm mortar, a couple of sample drill rounds, a supply of angle iron and a description of the problem, within a month they'd have a working prototype for you and within another month would have a limited assembly line that could probably turn out one vehicle every week or so. Hell, the Army probably has machine shops just as talented.

DND routinely overthinks the problem. Unfortunately it is really limited in finding practical solutions because the government has hamstrung itself so efficiently with its own red tape.

Precisely what is happening in Ukraine. Improvise, adapt and overcome.

 

[daftandbarmy]

And before I go... why isn't the height of the suspension adjustable?

It might make the beast a little less tippy on the highways.

Well, you don't want kids trying to climb into the thing do you?

 

[GR66]

This OpEd titled "What NATO's New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong" from Westpoint's Modern Warfare Institute website suggests that "small countries should develop defensive approaches geared less toward fielding a small hyperconventional, NATO-interoperable force—which would likely be significantly degraded in the initial stages of a Russian invasion—and more toward fielding formations customized to their unique operating environments, rationalized for budgetary and manpower considerations, and sustainable with or without the alliance’s conventional might."

While Canada may not meet the technical definition of a "small country" given our population and GDP, a similar argument could possibly be made for our military due to the difficulty of projecting a large conventional military force from Canada to Europe.

If one were to follow this line of thinking what might a "Canadianized" Canadian Army look like?

 

[ArmyRick]

The CAF getting the TAPV for its role in the army is to me as logical as purchasing a cement truck to bale my hay instead of a hay baler.

 

[KevinB]

This OpEd titled "What NATO's New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong" from Westpoint's Modern Warfare Institute website suggests that "small countries should develop defensive approaches geared less toward fielding a small hyperconventional, NATO-interoperable force—which would likely be significantly degraded in the initial stages of a Russian invasion—and more toward fielding formations customized to their unique operating environments, rationalized for budgetary and manpower considerations, and sustainable with or without the alliance’s conventional might."

While Canada may not meet the technical definition of a "small country" given our population and GDP, a similar argument could possibly be made for our military due to the difficulty of projecting a large conventional military force from Canada to Europe.

If one were to follow this line of thinking what might a "Canadianized" Canadian Army look like?

The article made me shudder considerably.
Look at the authors background -- He's indirectly advocating for a SOF led guerilla specific force to be a porcupine.

They must develop asymmetric approaches based on systems that are small, numerous, smart, stealthy, fast, mobile, low-cost, survivable, effective, easy to develop, maintain and preserve, and difficult to detect and counter.

He is asking for the unlikely and more likely impossible. It's got a lot of buzzwords, but...

Simply put, small NATO members must develop technology-enabled, resistance-based porcupine strategies.
Wait - he wanted low cost right?

This approach cannot be ad hoc or haphazard, based on loosely defined amateur homeland defense forces. It demands state-owned, purpose-built, professional military organizations and tailored hardware to succeed.
Again - how is this low cost, or survivable, let alone easy to develop?

Just like prior paradigms, this transformation requires military formations, rank systems, career paths, training and education pipelines, and weapon systems built for a specific type of war. While some foundations will survive, most solutions should radically depart from current approaches. Universally accepted principles that have long shaped conventional militaries should be fundamentally reimagined, if not abandoned entirely. Previously sacred elements of modern military culture should become relics.

Small members could employ more affordable, independently sustainable defense approaches, strategies that would enable their success even if left to fight alone. At the same time, instead of having weak, conventional tripwires along its eastern flank, NATO would have multiple layers of credible, independently capable porcupines supported by the conventional might of larger NATO states. A collective resistance-grounded defense concept would present a stronger deterrent, significantly raising the costs of aggression compared to a resurrected Cold War deterrence paradigm.

I think it's absolute folly, and I am a big fan of SOF applications -- but I fail too see how this would slow Russia at all.
independently sustainable defense approaches : what does this really mean in actuality on the ground?
All Russia is going to see is a weak state - and if noting more it will boost their aggression.

 

[Prairie canuck]

This OpEd titled "What NATO's New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong" from Westpoint's Modern Warfare Institute website suggests that "small countries should develop defensive approaches geared less toward fielding a small hyperconventional, NATO-interoperable force—which would likely be significantly degraded in the initial stages of a Russian invasion—and more toward fielding formations customized to their unique operating environments, rationalized for budgetary and manpower considerations, and sustainable with or without the alliance’s conventional might."

While Canada may not meet the technical definition of a "small country" given our population and GDP, a similar argument could possibly be made for our military due to the difficulty of projecting a large conventional military force from Canada to Europe.

If one were to follow this line of thinking what might a "Canadianized" Canadian Army look like?

Maybe the question could be - What would the CAF be equipped for if the U.S. wasn't an ally?

 

[FJAG]

While Canada may not meet the technical definition of a "small country" given our population and GDP, a similar argument could possibly be made for our military due to the difficulty of projecting a large conventional military force from Canada to Europe.

Canada is essentially a country that needs expeditionary forces. Our defence is, fortunately, based on strengthening the deterrence capabilities of other countries.

Our last real domestic war was 1814 with scares in 1867 and 1870/71 and some internal bothers in 1837/8, 1869/70 and 1885.

The difficulty in "projecting a large conventional force from Canada to Europe" has been solved very well three times (WW1, WW2, and the Cold War). It is merely a problem looking for the right solution.

The real question is: if we're not prepared to project a large force, why do we even bother keeping one? Let's face it, the country is right now paying good dollars for a force that, in payroll numbers, is the size of one average full-time division and one average part-time division. ... And yet it is capability poor to the point where deploying a properly equipped battlegroup is a challenge. Does any of that make sense?

 

[SeaKingTacco]

The CAF getting the TAPV for its role in the army is to me as logical as purchasing a cement truck to bale my hay instead of a hay baler.

I would pay good money to see a cement truck bale hay…