Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

If we filled every authorized PY and consolidated we would still only be talking about deploying the equivalent of a NATO division ... once ... for a very short time ... with no kit ... and no way to deploy it.

Regular Force and PRes numbers could give 2 Div plus a training cadre.

But not enough equipment for even 1 Bde properly outfitted.

 

[GR66]

Geography isn't a defense strategy in the age of hypersonic missiles and melting Arctic ice. I agree we do need to restructure, but mainly a consolidation vice a total reorg.

Correct. However Infantry Brigades (Light, Medium or Heavy) are no use against missiles directed at North America, hypersonic or not.

Our entire Reg Force would be wiped out within 6 hours of convention war with either of those countries. "Lesser Power" for us is South Sudan or Lesotho at this point. Like @daftandbarmy illustrates, they have personnel and equipment in spades. Doesn't matter if it's Cold War vintage; the still fire very real munitions and dead is dead.

Firstly my catagorization of Iran or North Korea as "Lesser Powers" is in relation to the two major world powers China and Russia, not in terms of their military strength relative to Canada. Also there is no point in making an argument of how Canada's Army would fare on its own against either of those countries as we would never be in that situation. It would obviously be a war where we are part of a coalition of allied forces.

Having the belief we can have a CMBG come in and rule the day is a fallacy.

Of course a CMBG will never come in and rule the day but as noted above it won't be expected to. Even during the Korean War (which of course involved China in addition to North Korea) our land contribution to the conflict was a single Infantry Brigade as part of the 1st Commonwealth Division. I don't expect that during a 2nd Korean War that Canada would choose to mobilize the nation in order to deploy a force larger than that. I don't believe that any Canadian Government will likely see such a war as important enough to our national interest to expend that much blood or treasure. You may disagree with the appropriateness of that thinking but you'd be hard pressed to convince me that our Government would feel otherwise.

Until it isn't. China has made far more strides in amphibious warfare than we give them credit for. They know they need a way to get that million man army around if it's going to be effective.

No argument that they are really pushing their amphibious capability with the obvious objective of being able to take Taiwan if they so choose. The two points that I'd make about that are firstly, that the best way to counter an amphibious invasion is to strike the ships carrying the troops before they have the chance to land rather than trying to insert your own ground forces to counter the invasion after it takes place. I'd contend that investment in our naval and air forces would be the better choice than increasing our land forces. Secondly I have my doubts whether Canada would be willing to deploy ground forces to Taiwan in the case of a Chinese invasion. The status of Taiwan is politically unique in that both Taiwan and the PRC contend that Taiwan is Chinese territory. They however disagree as to which of them is the legitimate party to lead all of China. I don't see a Canadian Government being likely to deploy our Army to take sides in what is essentially the continuation of an unresolved Chinese Civil War. Again, people on this site might have strong feelings about whether Canada SHOULD come to the military defence of Taiwan should China invade, but you'd be hard pressed to convince me that any Canadian Government will make the decision to do so.

In terms of the Chinese military threat to our other Allies in the Pacific like Japan or the Philippines again I'd argue that air and sea power to prevent any invasion happening place in the first place would be the better investment over land forces.

See how well Ukraine is doing pushing back the Russian advance? I commend the UA for being able to halt the Russians, but there has not been a push back or breakthrough of scale because the Russians have had more depth of forces (for now, the cupboard is pretty bare).

I don't believe that what we're seeing in Ukraine is likely what we'd see in a potential Russia/NATO conflict. Firstly, I've stated in the past that I think that any direct invasion of NATO territory by Russia is unlikely for basically the same reason that we're not seeing direct NATO intervention in Ukraine. Both sides are nuclear powers and any war between NATO and Russia will almost certainly turn nuclear the moment that once side or the other feels at risk of decisively losing.

For that reason I believe that Russia is both unlikely to conduct a direct military attack on any NATO nation which would risk an Article 5 response. NATO has seen the recklessness of Putin's Russia and it's members (especially those bordering Russia and its allies) are improving their capabilities and readiness to face any such attack. And as I have noted previously, unlike in Ukraine where Russia has the advantage in terms of military power, economic power and total population, those advantages are reversed when you compare Russian military/economic/demographic strength to that of the NATO alliance. The weaknesses of the Russian military forces in Ukraine (and the corresponding increase in the strength of NATO forces in response) I think has made the idea of a Russian invasion of NATO even less likely.

What the Ukraine war I think has shown is that high-tech weapons do have the capability to seriously affect the capability of an army to conduct fast paced, deep penetrating offensive operations as ISR capabilities are able to identify large formations on the move and precision weapons have the capability to strike them before they can concentrate on their objectives. When that happens there is a move toward dispersion of forces and increased reliance on fires.

It seems telling to me that the main items that the West are supplying to Ukraine (and that Ukraine is asking for) are weapons to defeat Russian air power (including UAVs), precision anti-armour weapons, UAVs/Loitering Munitions, and indirect fire weapons. I'm suggesting that in a Russia/NATO conflict (or in a West/Iran, West/North Korea, etc. conflict) that the same systems will again be in demand.

I'll contend that since European NATO (plus the US military) have a military manpower advantage over Russia already and that any additional ground forces that Canada can generate (short of national mobilization) would not make a major quantitative difference to the overall balance, that focusing our Reserve "surge" capabilities on those areas noted above would have a greater military contribution to a conflict than any increase in the number of Brigades we are able to generate.

Our Reg Force formations are anemic as they are. We would drain those Reserve Bdes in a matter of months if that were their role in this scheme. Better to have the Command Struture in place to expand out, rather than have a Reservist's sole purpose being to plug holes in a Reg F Bde structure.

Our Reg Force formations ARE anemic and I think that one thing the Russian experience has shown us is that deploying forces at less than full strength is a huge mistake. I think our Battalions should be brought up to full strength and additional Reserve Battalions (10/90 and/or 30/70) should be integrated directly into the Regiments to provide sustainment manpower (and equipment).

Supporting forces are specialized forces. It takes time and experience to have that maintainer or technician be capable of fixing the thing. It's why we have such varied success with Reserve Svc Bns and Sig Regts; those that have the time and ambition are awesome techs and can mesh into a Reg Force support role with little to no issue. Others don't have the experience or training. Add in the transitory nature of the Reserves and ita not a viable option.

The NLOS and Joint Force Arsenal threads are examples of some of the capabilities (along with conventional tube and missile artillery) that I think would be well suited for the Reserves and could in a conflict potentially have more impact than expanding the number of Infantry Brigades we are able to field.

Of course during a major conflict both our Reg Force Brigades and our Reserve capabilities will need technical and logistical support beyond what the peacetime Reg Force is likely able to provide. It's often contended that those technical capabilities are beyond what the Reserves are able to generate, however there are examples South of the border of Reserve forces that are able to exactly that. Yes, achieving that will require a fundamental change to the way the Reserves are structured, trained, organized, equipped and legislated, but if we want an Army capable of warfighting then that is what will have to happen.

What we need to do is consolidate our formations and cut down on HQs. We need to ensure every PY in the CAF is devoted to an operationalnor strategic output. Anything else needs to be looked at really hard with an objective eye.

Agreed. When the leadership (both military and civilian) no longer views the ultimate purpose of the military to fight and win at war then that is when you get organizational drift that leads to the situation where we find ourselves now.

 

[Kirkhill]

Regular Force and PRes numbers could give 2 Div plus a training cadre.

But not enough equipment for even 1 Bde properly outfitted.

But 2 Divisions are a Corps

Do you think there is enough to supply a Division plus the support that Division needs to make it to the field? Let alone a Corps?

We can field one tactical division - on a light scale - maybe.

82nd Airborne - 3 light brigades with a single DFS/MPF battalion held at Division to be penny-packeted out to the Brigades for use in the MGS/StuG/Assault Gun role. I was going to say Infantry Tank but the original Infantry Tanks traded mobility and speed for protection. They were the most heavily protected vehicles. The 82nd also has XVIII Corps to support them along with the entirety of the USAF cargo fleet and escorting fighters.

In the words of that wise old farmer.... you can't get there from here.

 

[Infanteer]

But 2 Divisions are a Corps

2 Division are just 2 Divisions. A Corps requires the Command, Combat Support, and Sustainment elements to build around 2 or more Divisions.

 

[Kirkhill]

2 Division are just 2 Divisions. A Corps requires the Command, Combat Support, and Sustainment elements to build around 2 or more Divisions.

I agree. If we are talking about administrative divisions. Or for that matter, administrative Corps, like the RCAC, RCIC or the RCCS.

But our discussions always seem to end up prioritizing the tactical over the administrative.

I have no problem with two administrative divisions.

I think one tactical division is a stretch for us.

And two is an impossibility with our current 1% of GDP force.

If pushed these days I would lean towards a Reserve heavy CJOC/JTF Joint structure based around our National Defence / NORAD obligations.

I would have the Regular Army focus on 1 Can Div and being able to rapidly deplo a small Brigade.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Here is your biggest challenge in Ontario in particular and urban Canada in general.

The pool of recruits is not your traditional recruit pool. Many of the potentials are averse to military service and/or service to the Crown. And many of the rest are disinclined and/or incapable of meeting the traditional standards and expectations.

The switch dated from 1972. Britain left the Commonwealth for the EU. Canada left Britain.

Reposting from the recruitment thread:

"Falling into the trap of associating Southern Ontario and the GTA. Yes the GTA/Golden Horseshoe has the majority of the population, but that overshadows that the non-GH part of Southwestern Ontario is more than 2.5 million. Higher than Manitoba and Saskatchewan combined, a lot of it Belleville type small towns, actual small towns, and rural, a lot of it skewing conservative.

Narrowing the view somewhat here to look at Meaford/Borden. There's ~400k people living in rural Grey/Dufferin/Simcoe/Wellington.

Looking away from raw demographics to inplace infrastructure, 31 CBG claims 8 combat arms regiments. Grey Simcoe Highlanders claim one line platoon plus one training. Assume with a little tweaking you could count on 1.5 platoons/troops per reserve regiment. 3 light cavalry troops, 9 light infantry platoons. It it such a stretch to assume that 32 CBG with 4x the population to draw on could do the same, regardless of demographics?

30/70 is not the best use if you scatter the 30 around the whole battalion. If the headquarters is mixed 30/70 and one subunit is 100/0 (while the rest are 5/95 or 10/90) then you have the core of a battalion headquarters capable of deploying and one full company capable of full training and deploying. With our building block system of tailoring task forces for a mission, a 30/70 battalion headquarters as well as the 100/0 company are fully viable and fully trained full-time building blocks.

Regarding the 30/70 best use- I think we have to be willing to drop the "building block" system for some aspects of the force to get the most out of the reserves. For Bde attached reserve battalions that makes sense- to be able to plug and play, have viable units and sub units, but does that hold true if the objective a given reserve unit is to provide an army level capability that requires more "Reg" presence than a pure PRes could deliver?

If we overcome the hurdle of symmetry, why stop at re-roling the Regular Bde's?

2CMBG splits and absorbs 33 CBG to form a "traditional" 70/30 light Bde, roles - COIN, UN, domestic, Arctic, QRF
5CMBG absorbs 35, single "traditional" 70/30 Medium Bde, roles COIN, UN, domestic, ANZAC
1CMBG absorbs 41, Single "traditional 70/30 Heavy Bde, role- NATO

Unallocated-
Reg
"30" each from 1/2/5 CMBG
PRes
31/32/34/36+37/38/39

At the cost of losing plug and play sub-units, is there not a collection of 3-6 worth while taskings for 6x 15/85 task oriented battlegroups
36+37 and 39 -> Littoral Combat / Coastal Defense
34 and 38 -> Air Defense
31 and 32 -> Strike (NLOS / HIMARS / Loitering Munitions

 

[FJAG]

I agree. If we are talking about administrative divisions. Or for that matter, administrative Corps, like the RCAC, RCIC or the RCCS.

But our discussions always seem to end up prioritizing the tactical operational over the administrative.

Prioritizing the administrative over the operational has got us to where we are today.

I have no problem with two administrative divisions.

I think one tactical operational division is a stretch for us.

It really isn't. We have the people and much of the equipment to form one, albeit with some capabilities deficiencies which need rectifying. It's more an attitude and organizational challenge than a practical one. The real issue is post-deployment sustainment.

And two is an impossibility with our current 1% of GDP force.

Don't think of it as 1% - Think of it as $26 billion. Now try to think of one divisional headquarters with a peacetime administrative and war-time operational role and another with a peacetime administrative and war-time administrative force-generating/sustainment role. And while we should strive to be capable of putting a whole division in the field there is nothing to say we couldn't deploy a divisional headquarters, and a brigade and have other NATO brigades plug in. There are numerous possibilities but none of them will work as long as you do not form a deployable divisional headquarters and its basic sustainment elements. That works for $26 billion.

If pushed these days I would lean towards a Reserve heavy CJOC/JTF Joint structure based around our National Defence / NORAD obligations.

This is where we always part the ways. I believe the issue with respect to the defence of Canada is not whether we need to do it but rather when we will need to do it. As northern resources become more exploitable, competition will arise. We do not have the resources to make an effective solitary northern defence. We will always need allied help. The way to get allied help is to contribute to allied defence efforts. We need to be seen as a valued partner and not as a freeloader. To be seen as a valued partner we need to have a presence in our allies forward defence initiatives which, for the time being, are in Europe. Having a credible force deployed in or prepositioned in Europe will firstly help deter aggression there and secondly help us to be seen as a valued partner. Don't think that just because we are sharing a border with the US that they will come and help us for free. They will probably come, but it won't be for free. They'll be looking for or taking payback.

I would have the Regular Army focus on 1 Can Div and being able to rapidly deplo a small Brigade.

I said credible above and I meant credible. In the old days we kept a large brigade there because, quite literally, we wanted be a large enough force where we showed up with a national symbol on all the planning maps. We did the same in taking on Kandahar as a place where our contribution would be noticed by our allies rather than lost in some backwater part of Afghanistan. How much does anyone know about the Italians in Herat other than the Italians? The rule in these games is "go big or go home". We've been staying home for far too long. And, you can't go big just using the RegF - that's exactly where your 1% problem comes in. To go big, at least big enough to be noticed, you need the ResF and, quite frankly looking at Russian preparations for the Ukraine, it won't need to deploy all that rapidly. Mounting onto prepositioned equipment will be fast enough as long as the logistics are all in place and our personnel adequately trained and prepared for the role.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Army doesn't get 26 BCAD. It gets something in the 5 BCAD range?

And I did not say anything about prioritizing. I am simply of the opinion that there I'd nothing wrong with cataloging resources administratively.

Creating operational/tactical solutions from that catalogue I consider a separate task.

 

[IKnowNothing]

The way to get allied help is to contribute to allied defence efforts. We need to be seen as a valued partner and not as a freeloader. To be seen as a valued partner we need to have a presence in our allies forward defence initiatives which, for the time being, are in Europe. Having a credible force deployed in or prepositioned in Europe will firstly help deter aggression there and secondly help us to be seen as a valued partner. Don't think that just because we are sharing a border with the US that they will come and help us for free. They will probably come, but it won't be for free. They'll be looking for or taking payback.

I said credible above and I meant credible. In the old days we kept a large brigade there because, quite literally, we wanted be a large enough force where we showed up with a national symbol on all the planning maps.

Is the only way to accomplish that with a full Bde and heavy metal?
If we were to
-take on eFP Latvia with a permanent combined arms battlegroup
-pre-position equipment etc. for a Response Force commitment of a flyover HQ/CS/CSS to lead a multi-national Bde
-add a Response for commitment of a nordic trained Light Bde to Finland/ Sweden, conduct annual BG size exercises
would that not be credible?

Or, assuming Finland/Sweden get in, would it make sense for us to pull out of Latvia entirely to focus on an expanded and permanent Nordic role?

 

[Kirkhill]

Correct. However Infantry Brigades (Light, Medium or Heavy) are no use against missiles directed at North America, hypersonic or not.

Agree

Firstly my catagorization of Iran or North Korea as "Lesser Powers" is in relation to the two major world powers China and Russia, not in terms of their military strength relative to Canada. Also there is no point in making an argument of how Canada's Army would fare on its own against either of those countries as we would never be in that situation. It would obviously be a war where we are part of a coalition of allied forces.

Agree

Of course a CMBG will never come in and rule the day but as noted above it won't be expected to. Even during the Korean War (which of course involved China in addition to North Korea) our land contribution to the conflict was a single Infantry Brigade as part of the 1st Commonwealth Division. I don't expect that during a 2nd Korean War that Canada would choose to mobilize the nation in order to deploy a force larger than that. I don't believe that any Canadian Government will likely see such a war as important enough to our national interest to expend that much blood or treasure. You may disagree with the appropriateness of that thinking but you'd be hard pressed to convince me that our Government would feel otherwise.

Agree on blood expenditures. Not so sure about the expenditure of treasure. Remember that we print our own money.

No argument that they are really pushing their amphibious capability with the obvious objective of being able to take Taiwan if they so choose. The two points that I'd make about that are firstly, that the best way to counter an amphibious invasion is to strike the ships carrying the troops before they have the chance to land rather than trying to insert your own ground forces to counter the invasion after it takes place. I'd contend that investment in our naval and air forces would be the better choice than increasing our land forces. Secondly I have my doubts whether Canada would be willing to deploy ground forces to Taiwan in the case of a Chinese invasion. The status of Taiwan is politically unique in that both Taiwan and the PRC contend that Taiwan is Chinese territory. They however disagree as to which of them is the legitimate party to lead all of China. I don't see a Canadian Government being likely to deploy our Army to take sides in what is essentially the continuation of an unresolved Chinese Civil War. Again, people on this site might have strong feelings about whether Canada SHOULD come to the military defence of Taiwan should China invade, but you'd be hard pressed to convince me that any Canadian Government will make the decision to do so.

I can't see the GoC deploying troops to Taiwan or even aircraft. The aircraft would have to be based on the island itself and thus they and their troops would be hostage to events.

I could see, at some distant point in the future, VLS equipped CSCs deploying to the rear of Taiwan to supply a missile umbrella over the island (both SAM and SSMs).

In terms of the Chinese military threat to our other Allies in the Pacific like Japan or the Philippines again I'd argue that air and sea power to prevent any invasion happening place in the first place would be the better investment over land forces.

Agree

I don't believe that what we're seeing in Ukraine is likely what we'd see in a potential Russia/NATO conflict. Firstly, I've stated in the past that I think that any direct invasion of NATO territory by Russia is unlikely for basically the same reason that we're not seeing direct NATO intervention in Ukraine. Both sides are nuclear powers and any war between NATO and Russia will almost certainly turn nuclear the moment that once side or the other feels at risk of decisively losing.

That theory might be tested in the near future.

For that reason I believe that Russia is both unlikely to conduct a direct military attack on any NATO nation which would risk an Article 5 response. NATO has seen the recklessness of Putin's Russia and it's members (especially those bordering Russia and its allies) are improving their capabilities and readiness to face any such attack. And as I have noted previously, unlike in Ukraine where Russia has the advantage in terms of military power, economic power and total population, those advantages are reversed when you compare Russian military/economic/demographic strength to that of the NATO alliance. The weaknesses of the Russian military forces in Ukraine (and the corresponding increase in the strength of NATO forces in response) I think has made the idea of a Russian invasion of NATO even less likely.

General agreement on the weakness issue. I am not convinced Article 5 is a substantive issue at all.

What the Ukraine war I think has shown is that high-tech weapons do have the capability to seriously affect the capability of an army to conduct fast paced, deep penetrating offensive operations as ISR capabilities are able to identify large formations on the move and precision weapons have the capability to strike them before they can concentrate on their objectives. When that happens there is a move toward dispersion of forces and increased reliance on fires.

Agree

It seems telling to me that the main items that the West are supplying to Ukraine (and that Ukraine is asking for) are weapons to defeat Russian air power (including UAVs), precision anti-armour weapons, UAVs/Loitering Munitions, and indirect fire weapons. I'm suggesting that in a Russia/NATO conflict (or in a West/Iran, West/North Korea, etc. conflict) that the same systems will again be in demand.

Agree

I'll contend that since European NATO (plus the US military) have a military manpower advantage over Russia already and that any additional ground forces that Canada can generate (short of national mobilization) would not make a major quantitative difference to the overall balance, that focusing our Reserve "surge" capabilities on those areas noted above would have a greater military contribution to a conflict than any increase in the number of Brigades we are able to generate.

Agree

Our Reg Force formations ARE anemic and I think that one thing the Russian experience has shown us is that deploying forces at less than full strength is a huge mistake. I think our Battalions should be brought up to full strength and additional Reserve Battalions (10/90 and/or 30/70) should be integrated directly into the Regiments to provide sustainment manpower (and equipment).

Agree

The NLOS and Joint Force Arsenal threads are examples of some of the capabilities (along with conventional tube and missile artillery) that I think would be well suited for the Reserves and could in a conflict potentially have more impact than expanding the number of Infantry Brigades we are able to field.

Self serving agreement here.

I would add that domestic missile forces would have application in both the NORAD and NATO roles. If we built lots of missiles we might only have to ever use a few domestically but they would be welcomed by any allies to bolster their own defences. That is what I was thinking about when I suggested that a GoC might be willing to spend treasure in support of an alliance.

Of course during a major conflict both our Reg Force Brigades and our Reserve capabilities will need technical and logistical support beyond what the peacetime Reg Force is likely able to provide. It's often contended that those technical capabilities are beyond what the Reserves are able to generate, however there are examples South of the border of Reserve forces that are able to exactly that. Yes, achieving that will require a fundamental change to the way the Reserves are structured, trained, organized, equipped and legislated, but if we want an Army capable of warfighting then that is what will have to happen.

The Reserves may be short of mechanics, electricians and logisticians but the civilian market isn't. If we are not sending brigades overseas to bleed, if we are sending, instead, sensors and missiles, from the North American citadel, then we need factories, warehouses, trucks, planes and ships. And a Navy and Air Force.

Agreed. When the leadership (both military and civilian) no longer views the ultimate purpose of the military to fight and win at war then that is when you get organizational drift that leads to the situation where we find ourselves now.

Agree.

 

[FJAG]

Is the only way to accomplish that with a full Bde and heavy metal?

There are numerous options

If we were to
-take on eFP Latvia with a permanent combined arms battlegroup

I don't see a need to change that commitment upwards. The multinational nature has an impact and at the same time requires a moderate, sustainable manpower commitment. If one goes to "permanent ... battlegroup" you are starting to up the commitment to Afghanistan levels with the concomitant stress back in Canada to keep generating them. I'm not so sure that you want to get into a trhee-year posting scenario for such a force.

-pre-position equipment etc. for a Response Force commitment of a flyover HQ/CS/CSS to lead a multi-national Bde
-add a Response for commitment of a nordic trained Light Bde to Finland/ Sweden, conduct annual BG size exercises
would that not be credible?

Now you're getting to the levels that I'm talking about but with a subtle difference.

Your suggestion is for a MNB headquarters plus CS and CSS and a disassociated flyover battalion for the Nordic front.

My suggestion has all of those flyover commitments teamed up with the current eFP battlegroup into a recognizable CA Bde in Latvia. That's easier to manage logistics wise and has that all-important "Canadian Symbol" on all the NATO maps. This would be even more strengthened with Canadian divisional staff at Multinational Division North. Essentially MND-N is a two country (Latvia and Estonia) AO. A large Canadian flyover presence there would have a big impact.

Or, assuming Finland/Sweden get in, would it make sense for us to pull out of Latvia entirely to focus on an expanded and permanent Nordic role?

Not in my view. We did that already with the CAST. It had too little impact and it was difficult logistically. All the attention was focused on 4 CMBG. Furthermore, IMHO, Norway, Finland and Sweden are a backwater front. When the Soviet Army existed it had sufficient troops to commit there. Much of that Soviet army is now part of NATO and what's left in Russia will not be able to operate on that wide a scope. The Baltic States, on the other hand, are still a strategic nexus for Russia to protect and consolidate its western flank. The need for a strong NATO presence is in the Baltics. Leave Norway, Finland and Sweden to US and UK Marines and the navy and air force.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Baltic States, on the other hand, are still a strategic nexus for Russia to protect and consolidate its western flank. The need for a strong NATO presence is in the Baltics. Leave Norway, Finland and Sweden to US and UK Marines and the navy and air force.

And, you know, Norway, Finland and Sweden's Armed Forces

 

[Brad Sallows]

The difference between population and military in almost every region is so pronounced that worrying about potential to recruit enough reservists is a diversion.

What lacks is the political will to create/update/maintain training areas sufficient to whatever requirements are given to Res F units, close to where the units are; to properly resource those requirements; and to grip the leaders from above to ensure they are competent for the task of meeting those requirements and that they do so.

Add: the whole army doesn't need to be committed to a selected 2025 COA all at once. Where is the best mix of: Reg F presence, a couple/handful of healthy Res F units, and suitable training area(s)? Risk a proof-of-concept.

 

[Kirkhill]

My suggestion has all of those flyover commitments teamed up with the current eFP battlegroup into a recognizable CA Bde in Latvia. That's easier to manage logistics wise and has that all-important "Canadian Symbol" on all the NATO maps. This would be even more strengthened with Canadian divisional staff at Multinational Division North. Essentially MND-N is a two country (Latvia and Estonia) AO. A large Canadian flyover presence there would have a big impact.

Not in my view. We did that already with the CAST. It had too little impact and it was difficult logistically. All the attention was focused on 4 CMBG.

We did not do that with CAST. It was difficult logistically because all the attention was focused on 4 CMBG. The effort expended on 4 CMBG could have been expended on CAST. And CAST was an important tasking because Norway protected the flank of the GIUK Gap and also dominated the exit to the Arctic from Murmansk and the Kola Inlet.

Furthermore, IMHO, Norway, Finland and Sweden are a backwater front. When the Soviet Army existed it had sufficient troops to commit there. Much of that Soviet army is now part of NATO and what's left in Russia will not be able to operate on that wide a scope. The Baltic States, on the other hand, are still a strategic nexus for Russia to protect and consolidate its western flank. The need for a strong NATO presence is in the Baltics. Leave Norway, Finland and Sweden to US and UK Marines and the navy and air force.

As to Norway, Sweden and Finland being backwaters, you might have had a better argument when Sweden and Finland were neutral but now that they are actively tied into both NATO and JEF, and Finland and Estonia (one of the countries you would support) have aligned their coastal defence systems so as to blockade St Petersburg - their historical role, they are both central to any Baltic actions. And Finland, Sweden and Norway still are fundamental to containing the Northern Fleet in the Kola.

Scandinavia is not a backwater. It is a key element. It blocks both the Kola and St Petersburg. And it neutralizes Kaliningrad. It is especially critical with a depleted Russia. Russia can't afford a run up the middle. Especially with allies like Belarus in its rear. It could take as swing at the Kola Peninsula and Karelia. And we can get there with supporting air power.

“We can really, in a single fighter sortie, range to just about any AOR in the Northern Hemisphere pretty easily,”

That's US Air Force Col. David “Ajax” Berkland, commander of the 354th Fighter Wing, speaking during an Air & Space Forces Association virtual conversation - commanding 54 F35As at Eielson AFB in Alaska.

The Intricacies Of F-35 Operations Over The Frigid Alaskan Frontier

Now with 54 F-35s on hand, Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska is fine-tuning how it operates its fleet and how it projects power abroad.

www.thedrive.com

Are we any less well positioned to offer deployable support across the Northern Hemisphere pretty easily?

And again - deployable forces are both an international and a domestic asset. One that will fly the flag in the headlines when issues are hot. How many foreigners were even aware that Canada had 4 CMBG in Germany?

 

[FJAG]

Add: the whole army doesn't need to be committed to a selected 2025 COA all at once. Where is the best mix of: Reg F presence, a couple/handful of healthy Res F units, and suitable training area(s)? Risk a proof-of-concept.

There are actually two somewhat countervailing components of business transformation.

One is that one should transform in manageable steps with pilot programs so that one can assess and adjust the process for the full roll-out.

The other one is that one needs to quickly get to a state with the transformation so that the foot-draggers can't easily switch back to the old dysfunctional system.

I sometimes think that with the foot dragging that has gone on with respect to any meaningful transformation of the Army and in particular the ResF, the second needs to be given prominence even if that means a wholesale, externally dictated, all-encompassing event.

In the words of my new favourite saying:

One reason people insist that you use the proper channels to change things is because they have control of the proper channels and they’re confident it won’t work - Jon Stone - Writer Sesame Street

The people who have control over the proper change agenda have been screwing it up for so long that they should no longer have control.

Let chaos reign! Burn it down and let a phoenix rise!

 

[daftandbarmy]

Russia regards its northern approaches to the North Sea as pretty important, and will continue to flex its muscles in response to perceived access threats from NATO.

We ignore that at our peril as their Northern Fleet is huge - from last March:

Russian Navy announces firing west of NATO Arctic exercise​

Russian Navy announces firing west of NATO Arctic exercise

Russia’s biggest warship, the nuclear-powered battle cruiser “Pyotr Veliky” and the destroyer “Severomorsk” are sailing towards the activated warning zone halfway between northern Norway and Iceland.

thebarentsobserver.com

 

[GR66]

The difference between population and military in almost every region is so pronounced that worrying about potential to recruit enough reservists is a diversion.

What lacks is the political will to create/update/maintain training areas sufficient to whatever requirements are given to Res F units, close to where the units are; to properly resource those requirements; and to grip the leaders from above to ensure they are competent for the task of meeting those requirements and that they do so.

Add: the whole army doesn't need to be committed to a selected 2025 COA all at once. Where is the best mix of: Reg F presence, a couple/handful of healthy Res F units, and suitable training area(s)? Risk a proof-of-concept.

These two points in particular I believe represent very good first steps toward modernizing the Army and will almost certainly be required regardless of what Force 2025/30/35 eventually ends up looking like.

The Reserves will never be able to transform into a deployable force unless it has the facilities to be able to train properly. And the Reserves will never be able to effectively force generate units as long as its members are split up into a series of independent Company-sized packets.

Step 1 - Take all the Reserve units that are within a reasonable travel distance from the existing Reg Force training areas and group them together into whatever size unit their actual combined strength represents. Ideally these units could be integrated as Reserve elements of a parent Reg Force Regiment .

Step 2 - For all the Reserve units that were not amalgamated in Step 1, identify potential training area locations that would be within reasonable travel distance of as many Reserve units as possible and begin the establishment of new training areas. Yes this will be expensive, but as infrastructure investment it will also have positive impacts on the local economy (and will count toward our 2% Defence spending commitment). Once the training areas are established the units surrounding these new facilities can be amalgamated as well.

Step 3 - For any Reserve units that are still too isolated from a training area then you could look at relocating these units to an under served community that IS within the catchment area of a training base or re-role the unit to a type that doesn't require a large training facility.

 

[Brad Sallows]

There are actually two somewhat countervailing components of business transformation.

It's not a business that can allow itself to risk failure.

 

[IKnowNothing]

There are numerous options

I don't see a need to change that commitment upwards. The multinational nature has an impact and at the same time requires a moderate, sustainable manpower commitment. If one goes to "permanent ... battlegroup" you are starting to up the commitment to Afghanistan levels with the concomitant stress back in Canada to keep generating them. I'm not so sure that you want to get into a trhee-year posting scenario for such a force.

Now you're getting to the levels that I'm talking about but with a subtle difference.

Your suggestion is for a MNB headquarters plus CS and CSS and a disassociated flyover battalion for the Nordic front.

My suggestion has all of those flyover commitments teamed up with the current eFP battlegroup into a recognizable CA Bde in Latvia. That's easier to manage logistics wise and has that all-important "Canadian Symbol" on all the NATO maps. This would be even more strengthened with Canadian divisional staff at Multinational Division North. Essentially MND-N is a two country (Latvia and Estonia) AO. A large Canadian flyover presence there would have a big impact.

I may be completely out to lunch, but I question the ease with which a multinational battlegroup can be surged to a Bde. Does that BG maintain integrity as one of the component battalions, with 2-3 of the contributing nations sending an additional, or is it broken apart with each component company mated to fly over parent unit?

Slight difference, I'm calling for a whole disassociate flyover Bde for the Nordic front. 1CMBG tasked to Latvia, 2 CIBG tasked to Finland.

 

[FJAG]

It's not a business that can allow itself to risk failure.

I agree with you 100%. But ... that's exactly where it is.

I may be completely out to lunch, but I question the ease with which a multinational battlegroup can be surged to a Bde. Does that BG maintain integrity as one of the component battalions, with 2-3 of the contributing nations sending an additional, or is it broken apart with each component company mated to fly over parent unit?

I would think the BG would stay as a multinational force and additional, predesignated elements will in the rest of the Bde.

Slight difference, I'm calling for a whole disassociate flyover Bde for the Nordic front. 1CMBG tasked to Latvia, 2 CIBG tasked to Finland.

Fine, as long as one Bde (at least) is trained for and remains in Canada to deal with multiple territorial incursions.