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Never start with an assumption that all PYs in current functions should remain. That way lies stasis.
Informing the Army’s Future Structure
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GR66
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Ahh...you're suggesting that the government will be increasing the current PYs?
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Nope. I'm suggesting that there may be more important capabilities to vest in the full time military than infantry.
GR66
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No disagreement. However I'd suggest that 5200 Infantry positions is probably the bare minimum that an Army can probably get by with and still claim to have a combat capable Army. That's likely just barely enough to field and sustain a single Brigade. Any deployable capability less than a Brigade realistically makes you an auxiliary element of someone else's Army.
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The Canadian Army has not deployed anything close to a brigade in the lifetime of any serving member.
GR66
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So we don't prepare to be able to deploy a nationally independent force if required? The nature of war in 2022 isn't what it was in 1914. We can't quickly build an Army from scratch when required. The technology cost and lead times don't allow for that.
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Infantry training can be managed and maintained in shorter timeframes, and thus can be more heavily weighted to other than full-time service.
CSS activities are those that ensure readiness (available and serviceable equipment and materiel) and thus should be weighted more heavily within the full-time component.
The GoC has given the CAF, all in, caps of 71,500 Reg F and 30,000 P Res personnel. This includes training lists, medical holding lists, and, well, everything. Therefore, there will have to be tradeoffs to remain within those limitations. And deliberate choices about what must be full time, what is good to have as full time, what can be part time, and what is best to have as part time.
The Canadian Army, on the other hand, begins by situating the estimate and declaring without valid rationale or proof, that there Must Be Nine Reg F Inf Bns. From there, with that initial framing assumption demonstrably false, all the other crud and crap gets added.
CSS activities are those that ensure readiness (available and serviceable equipment and materiel) and thus should be weighted more heavily within the full-time component.
The GoC has given the CAF, all in, caps of 71,500 Reg F and 30,000 P Res personnel. This includes training lists, medical holding lists, and, well, everything. Therefore, there will have to be tradeoffs to remain within those limitations. And deliberate choices about what must be full time, what is good to have as full time, what can be part time, and what is best to have as part time.
The Canadian Army, on the other hand, begins by situating the estimate and declaring without valid rationale or proof, that there Must Be Nine Reg F Inf Bns. From there, with that initial framing assumption demonstrably false, all the other crud and crap gets added.
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Well I mean Regimental Mafias feel that is rational...
daftandbarmy
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I believe it's more of a political statement than anything else e.g., West, Central and French Canada each get a regiment with three battalions.
To make any changes will probably be as difficult as changing the articles of Confederation I assume
GK .Dundas
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Probably even harder.I believe it's more of a political statement than anything else e.g., West, Central and French Canada each get a regiment with three battalions.
To make any changes will probably be as difficult as changing the articles of Confederation I assume
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A truly transformational Army Commander would host a dinner with their senior generals to discuss long term transformation with a goat stew and horse tartare.
FJAG
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The eFP battle group already has sufficient mech infantry and tanks from other countries so that it does not need a flyover component. In fact a flyover component would be counterproductive as it would require the existing eFP battle group to be broken up.
You could make an equally strong "political" statement with a brigade in each region with a full-sized 100/0, a 70/30 and a 30/70 battalion. Keeping three small sized 100/0 RegF battalions in each region is more "military politics" than "civilian politics". I fully believe the following from @dapaterson is absolutely true:
In part, the managed readiness concept continues to be used to falsely justify the math long after its need to generate rotations for Afghanistan expired. It always makes me wonder how we made it through the Cold War without managed readiness.
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In part, the managed readiness concept continues to be used to falsely justify the math long after its need to generate rotations for Afghanistan expired. It always makes me wonder how we made it through the Cold War without managed readiness.
Apparently nobody expected more than one track change... Three weeks and done.
How the West is racing to stop Ukraine's guns falling silent
McG
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4 CMBG existed during my lifetime, and it was deployed for the whole of its lifetime.
FJAG
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Mine too but I failed on the "serving" part of the statement.
I look back on the presentations Mike Jeffery, the then CCA, made before various government committees around the turn of the century which all involved the standing commitments of the Army including the deployment of a mech brigade. He consistently said we could, but not within the time frames contemplated in the standing directives. It wasn't until after Mike left that we started turning towards a posture where key units within brigades were told to stop being force employers and only generators of subunits intended for the deployment of battle groups. Once you tell an artillery or engineer regiment that they are only force generators, you seriously degrade the ability to generate a real brigade group.
So while there has been no full brigade group deployment during the service of current members, the capability still existed ... at least for a while. Quite frankly, counting the people available and the equipment available we should still be able to generate and deploy a brigade group and maybe even two. The questions are: for what purpose and for how long? There are clear capability gaps that limit what we can do beyond simply generating the force.
Skysix
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Lack of trust in the chain of command
Despise careerism
Do not belive that vet's are properly looked after medically/psychologically after service
Minimal employer protection/support
Sexual shenannigans in the chain of command
Percieved lack of appropriate and timely discipline of E7/O3 and up
Slow or no recognition of outstanding effort or performance
Pay issues
Poor transferability of skills back and forth fo civilian side
Some of these are issues only discovered after enlistment that cause early release but word if mouth is an equally powerfull in discouraging recruiter as it is in encouraging them.
daftandbarmy
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I've bumped into a fair number of young folks over the past couple of years, (men and women) who are positively ecstatic about their decision to head to the recruiting centre and 'sign their lives away'. I've even coached a couple through the process.
I think the CAF looks really good to young folks, from the outside...
Skysix
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Nothing new. That style of chain has been around for 30 years. For ice, mud less than frame deep, packed snow they are great. Sand they dig in too much.
For light/fresh snow, sand or deep mud you need flotation as well as traction. And proper use of throttle, gears and momentum. As well as appropriate loading and about a 55-60%/45-40% ground pressure ratio rear/front
GR66
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In a strict sense you of course are correct, but the number of Infantry Battalions is not really out of line from what the Government says it expects from the Army. Strong, Secure, Engaged states that:
THE BRIGADE GROUP The Army trains to fight at the brigade group-level. This is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns while integrating various components, be they from another service, government department, non-governmental organization, or coalition partner
If you expect the Brigade to consist of 3 x Infantry Battalions and you expect to be able to deploy your Brigade within a reasonable time frame in a crisis (i.e. keeping a portion of your force at heightened readiness) and if you expect to have enough depth in the Army to sustain that Brigade in combat then an Army consisting of 3 x Brigades (9 x Infantry Battalions) is not out of line for that expectation.
Of course you can adjust the structure of the Brigade which will affect the number of component units you'd need and you can adjust the portion of the Brigade you expect to be available at high readiness for deployment and how quickly you expect to be able to put together the balance of the Brigade (as well as how long you plan to be able to sustain it in combat) which will all affect what portion of the Brigade should be Reg Force and what portion should be Reserves, but overall the basic current structure of the Army broadly reflects the structure you'd need in order to be able to fight a Brigade.
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A detail breakdown of the Brigade Combat Team down here
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3-96-000-WEB-1.pdf
The IBCT's and SBCT's each have 3 Inf Battalions -- the ABCT does not - as it has 3 Combined Arms Battalions, 1 Inf Heavy and 2 Armor Heavy.
When you start to dig into the constructs, once can see that Canada's Army is significantly Infantry heavy compared to the US Army.
- each Bde has 3 x 6 gun close support batteries, the gap widens from there.
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3-96-000-WEB-1.pdf
The IBCT's and SBCT's each have 3 Inf Battalions -- the ABCT does not - as it has 3 Combined Arms Battalions, 1 Inf Heavy and 2 Armor Heavy.
When you start to dig into the constructs, once can see that Canada's Army is significantly Infantry heavy compared to the US Army.
- each Bde has 3 x 6 gun close support batteries, the gap widens from there.
