Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

So to follow the 3 key questions being asked here...
1. Short of a major war declaration (WW2 level) the largest short notice deployment I can see is being a combat brigade (I don't think I have terminology correct here) based upon two regiments and associated support detachments. This would be paired most likely with a local brigade to flesh out the numbers needed. A good precedent is the Canadian Army units sent in WW1 which deployed as part of the British Army until such numbers were recruited, mobilized, "trained", and formed into the eventual Canadian Divisions and then years into the conflict the Canadian Corp.

Yup, you are off on terminology. To simplify things ignore the term regiment. A Brigade group has roughly 5,000 folks and consists of a headquarters, three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion and a service battalion of around 600 each. We have three such full-time RegF brigade groups albeit they are understrength.

If you take an infantry battalion and add a reconnaissance squadron (company-sized), an engineer squadron and an artillery battery you end up with what we call a battle group. In Afghanistan we essentially deployed a single battle groups in rotation after rotation under a single brigade headquarters.

Neither WW1 nor WW2 are good examples because at the start of each of those we had very few full-time soldiers but a fairly large number of part-time ones who needed training. These days we have three brigades that are capable of much more rapid deployment.

2. If we are assuming that in the case of large scale conflict we would be in a multinational brigade situation I would hope the defending nation (Latvia? Singapore? Jordan?) would be filling in the gaps. This is more like the Canadian Army in WW2 with the addition of British and Polish troops under the Canadian Army. However the capacity that force brings to the brigade is the difference in leadership...if it's just troops and rifles you have much less say than a LAV mobile unit complete with Air Defence, Artillery Support and Field Hospitals. It is the basis of providing the 2/3rd complete (and 100% complete backup often not mentioned logistics and support forces) that allows the Canadian Force to form the Skelton of an international brigade vs. a Korea like situations where we are just a force of many contributing to the Commonwealth Division. (Full disclosure I don't know as much about Korea so definitely not trying to downplay Canadian efforts there...it's just my initial impression).

We currently have a battlegroup headquarters plus a rifle company and an artillery battery and other elements on Latvia. The battle group is fully staffed and equipped by companies from Spain, Italy and Poland as well as several smaller nations. The battle group operates within a multi national NATO structure.

Realistically I think Canada has the ability to deploy one more brigade group and sustain it for a few years or, alternatively, surge a larger force for a shorter term. That is hard to do under the current structure but possible within the number of RegF and ARes positions currently authorized by the Canadian government.

Personally, from a personal point of view we should form a multinational division headquarters with several Canadian brigades and some allied ones in order to make the political statement within NATO that a country of our wealth should be capable of making.

3. This is where I think, under the current manning and taskings there may be a better direction provided. We have a collection of units that range from section to company to regimental size but try to treat as equals regardless of mission and resourcing provided. Instead I view it as a collection of administrative units that provide formed section/platoon (Reserves) that fit into a pre-determined Company contained within a parent Reg. Force Unit. The advantage of Echo Company remaining "unmanned" is that should emergency deployment be required then Bravo Company of Reg Force X can be assigned the mission, as a formed sub unit, until additional mobilization can fill needs. This is more similar to the later Yugoslavia missions where reserve units were providing a much higher percentage of forces (Roto specific) than Reg Force as I understand and in a much more formed structure than what happened with Afghanistan.

Plug and play doesn't work that well at this level. Augmentation by individual soldiers and small teams like a section only works when there is sufficient time to train as a formed element which IMHO is at a minimum the company of roughly 130 people. For Afghanistan we generally took four to six months of predeployment training to get an augmented unit up to snuff for any given roto. If companies have trained together they can be slotted into a battalion more easily.

As you say, if a two company battalion needs a third company in a hurry then this has to come from some other battalion to fill in. But even here, it still takes time to train-up for a mission.

Bosnia was a more permissive environment than Afghanistan and more risks could be taken. The problem with our ARes structure for some time now is that there are no real formed units that have trained together significantly in anything above platoon level at best. This is why we need to change.

The other aspect of ensuring as high of caliber smaller unit leadership is looking at what's happening now on the East Coast. 300, now 700 members are deployed to assist in clean up. But any time I've heard of the military showing up it's common to have them split into subunits (company/platoon/section) for taskings with only CO and others remaining at a central point to coordinate with civilian authorities. It's not normally 800 troops of a regiment working on the same street or even neighborhood although it has happened in the past.

That's the nature of domestic operations. The unit still operates as a unit under centralized leadership but can be widely dispersed on taskings.

 

[Skysix]

I'm going to make a couple of assumptions here:

1. The minimum aspiration for the CA should be to have the capability to deploy and sustain a Brigade Group. It's the smallest size unit that will allow for a reasonable level of national autonomy in a major military deployment.
2. Any major combat deployment for the CA will be expeditionary in nature (that includes the Canadian Arctic)
3. We are unlikely to engage in any major Brigade Group level combat deployment outside a coalition.
4. The most likely leader and major contributor to any combat coalition we join is the United States.

Given the above I'd argue that it would make sense to establish a close working relationship with the US forces we would be most likely to deploy with and also as much as possible align our future equipment acquisitions to match what those partners are using so as to take advantage of an integrated logistical pipeline.

Looking at the US Army Reg Force Divisions that are geographically closest to us (and therefore easiest to train with) we have:

11th Airborne Division (Arctic Warfare) in Alaska

• 1st IBCT
• 2nd IBCT (Airborne)

7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington

• 1st SBCT
• 2nd SBCT
• 81st SBCT (WA NG)

10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York

• 1st IBCT
• 2nd IBCT
• 3rd IBCT

That's two Light Infantry Divisions and a Stryker Division.

Would it then make sense for the CA to align itself with those Divisions as follows:

2nd Canadian Division (aligned with 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY)
5 Light Infantry Brigade in Valcartier
51 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 34/35/36/37 Brigades

3rd Canadian Division (aligned with 7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, WA)
1 Mechanized Brigade in Edmonton
11 Mechanized Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 38/39/41 Brigades

4th Canadian Division (aligned with 11th Airborne Division in Alaska)
2 Light Infantry Brigade (Arctic Warfare) in Petawawa
21 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 31/32/33 Brigades

Tank proficiency could be maintained by having a single Reg Force Tank Squadron in Edmonton (with Abrams tanks replacing our Leopards) and the personnel for two additional Squadrons serving on exchange service with US ABCT units (one squadron worth on exchange and one squadron worth manning schools/on individual training/leave/etc.). If in time of war we need to field tanks we can acquire the balance of the Squadrons from the US and have trained personnel to man them.

I'd argue that specialising in Arctic and Mountain ops (with the 86th IBCT, reserve/guard actual mountain ops vs 10th Mountain which is now mostly light infantry feeding the 75th) would be our best contribution to continental defense and an area we USED to excell at.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

It may surprise some to learn that the Canadian Army does indeed train with US units. We validate a Light Battalion from the Div in the Build year as part of a US Brigade at JRTC (Ft Polk). They integrate into that Brigade for the lead-up and execution of the exercise. We also send an infantry company (para last year and this upcoming roto) and an ARCG to JPMRC Alaska who work with a Bde from 11th Airborne during their validation exercise.

We also need to remain flexible and retain our ability to deploy on such operations as we are sent with the partners from those operations. Latvia, for instance, sees us working very closely with a host of NATO allies.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'd argue that specialising in Arctic and Mountain ops (with the 86th IBCT, reserve/guard actual mountain ops vs mostly light infantry feeding the 75th) would be our best contribution to continental defense and an area we USED to excell at.

And it's also in our national interest, big time....

 

[ArmyRick]

And it's also in our national interest, big time....

I know before I jumped my ship, my old unit (Foresters) was big into the ARCG role (arctic response company group). I was in the process of switching to COATS for the last 2 years of my career (thats another jumble of sh*t story for a different thread) so I was kind of distancing myself.

The troops and the NCOs though were getting good at snow mobiling and all that (nick named the snow mobile club).

My one concern I had back in 2015 or so. The Foresters were so focused on arctic stuff October to April that I saw troops and NCOs eroding their basic skills.
A MCPL failed an 84mm handling test on starting his Small Arms course and was sent home (He was excellent at packing a super tobaggan and the all the ARCG stuff though). I didn't blame him as our unit seem to "over focus" on ARCG prep, to the point that regular skill maintenance exercises and training was getting binned to do more ARCG prep.
Several soldiers were getting rusty on patrolling and hasty attacks but had all the ARCG stuff down to a science.

Basically I have concerns with the limited time the PRes has to train what extra gucci stuff they try to tackle. I think having cadres of troops in these units who have the time to extra training and qualifications is a good idea (They do their regular soldier skills BEYOND check list IBTS and then dedicate extra time to arctic, mountain, amphibious, whatever).

 

[daftandbarmy]

I know before I jumped my ship, my old unit (Foresters) was big into the ARCG role (arctic response company group). I was in the process of switching to COATS for the last 2 years of my career (thats another jumble of sh*t story for a different thread) so I was kind of distancing myself.

The troops and the NCOs though were getting good at snow mobiling and all that (nick named the snow mobile club).

My one concern I had back in 2015 or so. The Foresters were so focused on arctic stuff October to April that I saw troops and NCOs eroding their basic skills.
A MCPL failed an 84mm handling test on starting his Small Arms course and was sent home (He was excellent at packing a super tobaggan and the all the ARCG stuff though). I didn't blame him as our unit seem to "over focus" on ARCG prep, to the point that regular skill maintenance exercises and training was getting binned to do more ARCG prep.
Several soldiers were getting rusty on patrolling and hasty attacks but had all the ARCG stuff down to a science.

Basically I have concerns with the limited time the PRes has to train what extra gucci stuff they try to tackle. I think having cadres of troops in these units who have the time to extra training and qualifications is a good idea (They do their regular soldier skills BEYOND check list IBTS and then dedicate extra time to arctic, mountain, amphibious, whatever).

You've nicely described the challenges of giving a part time organization a 'full time' operational role.

 

[IRepoCans]

It may surprise some to learn that the Canadian Army does indeed train with US units. We validate a Light Battalion from the Div in the Build year as part of a US Brigade at JRTC (Ft Polk). They integrate into that Brigade for the lead-up and execution of the exercise. We also send an infantry company (para last year and this upcoming roto) and an ARCG to JPMRC Alaska who work with a Bde from 11th Airborne during their validation exercise.

We also need to remain flexible and retain our ability to deploy on such operations as we are sent with the partners from those operations. Latvia, for instance, sees us working very closely with a host of NATO allies.

You say validated light infantry, I say we identified a lot of short falls in training, equipment and logistics... the 3RCR AAR was interesting and the TLDR of it was this: if SFAB wasn't there we wouldn't have even been as marginally useful as we were to the BCT getting validated.

Side note: as it stands, there are five (that I am aware of!) different builds for light inf/light forces employment being put into practice right now so it's kind of hard to validate anything we haven't actually made into a hard doctrinal piece that delineates X, Y and Z.

 

[daftandbarmy]

You say validated light infantry, I say we identified a lot of short falls in training, equipment and logistics... the 3RCR AAR was interesting and the TLDR of it was this: if SFAB wasn't there we wouldn't have even been as marginally useful as we were to the BCT getting validated.

Side note: as it stands, there are five (that I am aware of!) different builds for light inf/light forces employment being put into practice right now so it's kind of hard to validate anything we haven't actually made into a hard doctrinal piece that delineates X, Y and Z.

Thought bubble: "Good thing they've discovered only five ways that light infantry will be employed in battle"

 

[markppcli]

You say validated light infantry, I say we identified a lot of short falls in training, equipment and logistics... the 3RCR AAR was interesting and the TLDR of it was this: if SFAB wasn't there we wouldn't have even been as marginally useful as we were to the BCT getting validated.

Side note: as it stands, there are five (that I am aware of!) different builds for light inf/light forces employment being put into practice right now so it's kind of hard to validate anything we haven't actually made into a hard doctrinal piece that delineates X, Y and Z.

That AAR might be the single most honest thing I’ve read about the CAF.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

You say validated light infantry, I say we identified a lot of short falls in training, equipment and logistics... the 3RCR AAR was interesting and the TLDR of it was this: if SFAB wasn't there we wouldn't have even been as marginally useful as we were to the BCT getting validated.

Side note: as it stands, there are five (that I am aware of!) different builds for light inf/light forces employment being put into practice right now so it's kind of hard to validate anything we haven't actually made into a hard doctrinal piece that delineates X, Y and Z.

I said we validate a light infantry battalion each year at JRTC. This refers to the Foundation CAO where validation is how well the organization meets the operational standard (as expressed in Battle Task Standards which in turn are linked with doctrine). You don't fail a unit at validation of its training because it lacks a capability. Divisions in the Build year of the MRP have their battalions and brigade HQ validated against those BTS. The three JRTC rotations thus far have absolutely Validated those light infantry battalions - they go through a grueling exercise where they are not supposed to win. The house (TF Geronimo) always wins at JRTC - the question is how hard they have to push against the training audience to beat them. If you were on one of those rotations I tip my hat to you! The alternative validation venue would be an exercise in Canada. Validating at JRTC has been a huge step forward in that we have access to a training centre designed for light forces in large scale combat operations, never mind the interoperability benefits of integrating into a US infantry brigade for the lead-up to and execution of the exercise.

You are absolutely correct that there are shortfalls in capabilities. A benefit of going to JRTC is that we have another mechanism to highlight those shortfalls and document how they affect the ability of the light battalions (and perhaps light forces writ large). There is no hiding problems at JRTC. This can help feed the force development process.

Ideally we get some bespoke light infantry/light forces doctrine in the coming years. Exercises like JRTC and JPMRC provide a mechanism to explore that space while also validating the training standard of the units.

Maybe I'm just a glass half full kind of guy.

 

[foresterab]

Yup, you are off on terminology. To simplify things ignore the term regiment. A Brigade group has roughly 5,000 folks and consists of a headquarters, three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion and a service battalion of around 600 each. We have three such full-time RegF brigade groups albeit they are understrength.

If you take an infantry battalion and add a reconnaissance squadron (company-sized), an engineer squadron and an artillery battery you end up with what we call a battle group. In Afghanistan we essentially deployed a single battle groups in rotation after rotation under a single brigade headquarters.

Neither WW1 nor WW2 are good examples because at the start of each of those we had very few full-time soldiers but a fairly large number of part-time ones who needed training. These days we have three brigades that are capable of much more rapid deployment.

We currently have a battlegroup headquarters plus a rifle company and an artillery battery and other elements on Latvia. The battle group is fully staffed and equipped by companies from Spain, Italy and Poland as well as several smaller nations. The battle group operates within a multi national NATO structure.

Realistically I think Canada has the ability to deploy one more brigade group and sustain it for a few years or, alternatively, surge a larger force for a shorter term. That is hard to do under the current structure but possible within the number of RegF and ARes positions currently authorized by the Canadian government.

Personally, from a personal point of view we should form a multinational division headquarters with several Canadian brigades and some allied ones in order to make the political statement within NATO that a country of our wealth should be capable of making.

Thanks for the update on the terminology. I wanted to call it a Combat Team but did not think that was the right term as being too small but Brigade -> Division makes more sense now that I think about it. I was definitely under allocating resources mentally to the Recce/Arty etc support roles thinking troops but battalions make much more logical sense. I do think that a two battalion based infantry unit combined with a complete set of artillery/engineers and support should be the immediate surge (think 2 week deployment timeline) force goal but anything longer I view in terms of months/years due to shortages in the ranks currently.

Plug and play doesn't work that well at this level. Augmentation by individual soldiers and small teams like a section only works when there is sufficient time to train as a formed element which IMHO is at a minimum the company of roughly 130 people. For Afghanistan we generally took four to six months of predeployment training to get an augmented unit up to snuff for any given roto. If companies have trained together they can be slotted into a battalion more easily.

As you say, if a two company battalion needs a third company in a hurry then this has to come from some other battalion to fill in. But even here, it still takes time to train-up for a mission.

Bosnia was a more permissive environment than Afghanistan and more risks could be taken. The problem with our ARes structure for some time now is that there are no real formed units that have trained together significantly in anything above platoon level at best. This is why we need to change.


That's the nature of domestic operations. The unit still operates as a unit under centralized leadership but can be widely dispersed on taskings.

My background is more wildfire operations so on those operations it's much more common to plug/play different crews into the role. Is there a capacity and skills difference between Mexico vs. the NWT crews? South Africa vs. USFS vs. NFLD? yes...but the basic duties are understood and we occasionally have to train on differences (muskeg vs. mountains are very different fire environments) during operations. I know I am greatly over simplifying the role of a regular force infantry company but also view it that it should be a goal to have complete sub units, well trained that could be plugged in as needed in surge situations. I do struggle with the reserve units due to the limited manning levels (base company sized? ) and while I'd love to mobilize the whole unit similar to the US NG units I just don't see it politically. So then it's a case of can a formed section or platoon being sourced, times X units, to create needed missing company while hopefully cutting down the pre-deployment training delta as it's now about how small teams, used to working together, learn to work in the bigger unit at battalion + deployments.

This is also why I think of Reserve units at no higher than a Captain (preferred) /Major rank (politics might dictate) with the higher ranks being Regular Force members who have the time to a) gain the experience in the larger formation leadership and b) gain the range of experience needed rather than leading a singular common sub-unit. My biggest concern is how to you surge forces, in a high intensity conflict, in numbers and I don't think the current status quo did that well for Afghanistan let alone a Ukraine type invasion scenario.

 

[KevinB]

Yup, you are off on terminology. To simplify things ignore the term regiment. A Brigade group has roughly 5,000 folks and consists of a headquarters, three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion and a service battalion of around 600 each. We have three such full-time RegF brigade groups albeit they are understrength.

Pedantic point, you don't need 3 Inf Bn - just 3 Maneuver Bn, so it could be 2 Inf and 1 Armor, or 2 Armor and 1 Inf, (or Combined Arms BN of Inf and Armor like we do down here) plus your Cav/Recon, Arty, Engineer and other supporting assets.
Canada has for a while had 3 Inf + 1 "Armour" (to which I haven't fully ever understood)

 

[daftandbarmy]

Pedantic point, you don't need 3 Inf Bn - just 3 Maneuver Bn, so it could be 2 Inf and 1 Armor, or 2 Armor and 1 Inf, (or Combined Arms BN of Inf and Armor like we do down here) plus your Cav/Recon, Arty, Engineer and other supporting assets.
Canada has for a while had 3 Inf + 1 "Armour" (to which I haven't fully ever understood)

I think they're rediscovering why 'manoeuvre' is synonymous with 'lots of Engineering resources' in the Ukraine these days.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think they're rediscovering why 'manoeuvre' is synonymous with 'lots of Engineering resources' in the Ukraine these days.

So is the static defence. One needs bridges. The other needs diggers. Both need lots of trucks.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm not an Armd Recce type, but it seems that this encounter is what an Armd Recce vehicle (the Ukrainian one) should be able to do... and the TAPV can't:

https://twitter.com/x/status/1576673479469895680

 

[GR66]

What about something like this for a pragmatic, doable in the short term plan that lays some groundwork for future force enhancements:

1 Brigade becomes our "Heavy" Brigade with all the tanks concentrated in LdSH and two PPCLI LAV Battalions making up the three maneuver units. 1 RCHA would transition from the M777 to a new SP 155mm when that program eventually happens.

2 Brigade (RCR) goes all 3 x Light Battalions and acts as our Rapid Deployment/Arctic Response Brigade. RCD is roled as a light (motorized) Cavalry/Recce element to support the Light Brigade. 2 RCHA would keep the M777.

Realistically we're probably already really stretching to be able to deploy and sustain a single Canadian Brigade Group and don't have the required enablers to deploy a Canadian Division. Therefore we don't really need to have 5 Brigade as a fully deployable Brigade Group. 5 Bde HQ would be maintained for future expansion. 1 & 2 R22eR would be maintained as LAV Battalions. They would be used along with 1 & 2 PPCLI for deployment as part of 1 Bde to provide depth/replacements and to help fulfill other Battle Group sized deployments which may come up.

Since 5 Bde is not a deployable Brigade then it will not require Artillery, Engineer or Service support elements. One gun battery from 5 RAL would go to each of 1 & 2 RCHA to bring them up to full 3 x Battery Regiments. The HQ and remaining elements of 5 RAL would be re-roled into a SHORAD Regiment as part of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB). 5 CER and 5 Service would also be integrated into the CCSB to make it a fully deployable Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.

The PYs from the two Light Battalions which are being eliminated (3 PPCLI and 3 R22eR) would be fed back into the remaining Infantry Battalions to being up their strength (and in particular rebuilding missing CS capabilities). The 2 x Battalions worth of LAVs that are made available by 1 & 2 RCR going Light would be used to provide vehicles for the future SHORAD Regiment (5 RAL) and to be modified into CS variants for use by the remaining four LAV Battalions (ATGM, Mortar, DFS, etc.)

The Reg Force Brigades could be amalgamated into a single Reg Force Division (1 Mech Bde, 2 Lt Bde, 5 Bde and CCSB).

Similarly all of the Reserve units could be combined under a single Reserve Division with the existing Reserve Brigades being amalgamated into three Light Infantry Brigades (38/39/41 Brigade, 31/32/33 Brigade and 34/35/36/37 Brigade).

 

[daftandbarmy]

Similarly all of the Reserve units could be combined under a single Reserve Division with the existing Reserve Brigades being amalgamated into three Light Infantry Brigades (38/39/41 Brigade, 31/32/33 Brigade and 34/35/36/37 Brigade).

And you'd spend a couple of wasted years figuring out who was going to be the next (deeply unqualified) Reservist to command the Division

I like the idea of Reserve units feeding into Reg F formations e.g., 'will provide 1 x dismounted rifle company' etc.

Relying on the Reserves to sustain a stand alone division is probably a big mistake.

 

[GR66]

And you'd spend a couple of wasted years figuring out who was going to be the next (deeply unqualified) Reservist to command the Division

I like the idea of Reserve units feeding into Reg F formations e.g., 'will provide 1 x dismounted rifle company' etc.

Relying on the Reserves to sustain a stand alone division is probably a big mistake.

Sorry for the lack of clarity. We currently have 4 x Divisional HQs in the Canadian Army (#s 2-5). All three Reg Force combat Brigades plus CCSB would be grouped together under 2 Division while all the Reserve Brigades would be grouped under 3 Division.

3 Div HQ would be Reg Force and the majority of the 3 x Reserve Brigade HQs would be Reg Force as well (using the PYs gained from eliminating 2 x Divisional HQs and 7 x Reserve Brigade HQs).

Based on the current capabilities of the Reserves, 3 Division would not be a deployable Division (or even deployable Brigade Groups within the Division). The Reg Force manned Divisional and Brigade HQs would be deployable HQs to give depth of trained personnel beyond the 2 Division HQs.

The Reserve units making up 3 Division would continue to generate individual augmentees as well as STAR assigned sub-units to the Reg Force Units until such time as more substantial changes are made to the Reserves which would allow them to take on an expanded mobilization role.

This should be viewed as a first step towards an eventual goal of creating a deployable Canadian Division (2 x Reg Force Brigades plus 1 x Reserve Brigade).

 

[Ostrozac]

All three Reg Force combat Brigades plus CCSB would be grouped together under 2 Division while all the Reserve Brigades would be grouped under 3 Division.

You had me at the fighting brigades reporting to a staff-heavy headquarters in Montreal. The Canadian Army goes full circle back to where it was when I joined — albeit out of Long Point, since we’ve divested most of Saint Hubert.

 

[McG]

1 Brigade becomes our "Heavy" Brigade

Even with all the tanks, it will not be heavy.

Since 5 Bde is not a deployable Brigade then it will not require Artillery, Engineer or Service support elements. One gun battery from 5 RAL would go to each of 1 & 2 RCHA to bring them up to full 3 x Battery Regiments. The HQ and remaining elements of 5 RAL would be re-roled into a SHORAD Regiment as part of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB). 5 CER and 5 Service would also be integrated into the CCSB to make it a fully deployable Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.

Dissolving the Francophone brigade may do more to alienate a quarter of the potential recruiting pool than any organizational efficiency such a move may offer. You would also be shutting down a brigade HQ that can at least deploy to the field while keeping another that cannot.