Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

Other urban combat facilitator


Mark, I'm going to put this carefully, as an honest question - not trying to stir the pot.

But

Do you need the LAV team to conduct that form of training in complex terrain? I know this comes back to the same point I keep pounding on but a lot of that training may benefit from different ratios of foot to mounted troops.

For example, a platoon of LAVs and a company of dismounts may be a better configuration, or a battalion of dismounts and troop of tanks, than a force with one LAV per section.

There are going to be time, a Section/Squad and 1 tank make sense - there will be times (in the CA context) a Company of LAV's and a Squadron of Tanks makes sense -- the issue is it will come down to both the terrain, and the enemy force disposition.
For a lot of things a 25mm (ideally larger) cannon on a HAPC would be a nice tool too.

Based on my experiences, tracks are better in rubble, but wheels are better for mobility when the city isn't debris strewn - however tank and 25mm casings will tear up some LAV tires when on concrete and pavement at inopportune times.

 

[markppcli]

FWIW, our soldiers can do that stuff very well in my experience.

Many of our leaders are so risk averse though, they shudder at the thought of anyone leaving the pavement or 'rolling plains'.

My issues come down to the fact that we don’t plan to deal with that complex terrain because we don’t include it in those larger muscle movements. I posed the question to an OC of mine about you would make entry to a trench system after the obstacle breach, as an example, and we talked a fair bit about how it’s something no one in the room, CSM included, had ever seen done. It should be assumed that the positions behind an obstacle will be intact trenches. We should expect to deal with those as a matter of course. We also routinely ignore defile drills / woods clearing as a time consideration.

Other urban combat facilitator


Mark, I'm going to put this carefully, as an honest question - not trying to stir the pot.

But

Do you need the LAV team to conduct that form of training in complex terrain? I know this comes back to the same point I keep pounding on but a lot of that training may benefit from different ratios of foot to mounted troops.

In terms of actually kick doors ? Not really no. The crew will probably be training their dismount skills if it’s low level. But there needs to be training done to include those vehicles so everyone is in the same page. See defile drills, or gaining lodgement, a motorized raid. Ect.

For example, a platoon of LAVs and a company of dismounts may be a better configuration, or a battalion of dismounts and troop of tanks, than a force with one LAV per section.

Maybe? It’s sort of a ground will dictate. What we have are mechanized Bns so in that context the whole team needs to be working together.

 

[Infanteer]

Precision Urban Combat is however.

What is "precision urban combat?"

I don’t disagree with anything you said.

The problem is we do not train in any kind of complex terrain. We do not do woods clearings, we do not clear trench lines, we do not clear urban areas in culminating exercises. Certainly not beyond section or, very rarely, platoon level.

That's a shame. I've done all of them, and they can be done in places like Wainwright with a little extra work. What you are speaking to is a failure in imagination, not in CA training objectives or design.

 

[KevinB]

What is "precision urban combat?"

Let's call it non high intensity combined arms usage.
Perhaps COIN in Urban areas may be a better term - but when you have significant civilian population interspersed with hostility combatants, you cannot wade through the city like the Russians do, and your combined arms options are very limited...

That's a shame. I've done all of them, and they can be done in places like Wainwright with a little extra work. What you are speaking to is a failure in imagination, not in CA training objectives or design.

The CA lost any real ability to have an Urban Facility when Griesbach Barracks was shuttered, there was an Urban Ex there prior to closing.
It's not just imagination - it is also a lack of facilities.

 

[markppcli]

What is "precision urban combat?"



That's a shame. I've done all of them, and they can be done in places like Wainwright with a little extra work. What you are speaking to is a failure in imagination, not in CA training objectives or design.

I’d argue that the lack of complex terrain being a requirement in validation is a failure of objectives and design. We don’t need to do any of it to hit IBTS, or for TMST. It’s not a part of combat team commander, so it’s up to the units to find time to do it. The last time 1 VP cleared a trench system was… 2014. In fact to my knowledge none of our courses, beyond the urban ops instructor / operator, have hard assessed portions that require leadership in complex terrain.

To @KevinB ’s point, we built a great facility with Rocky Ford in Wainwright, then some one decided to fence it so vehicles could only approach by road for some reason.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I’d argue that the lack of complex training being a requirement in validation is a failure of objectives and design. In fact to my knowledge none of our courses, beyond the urban ops instructor / operator, have hard assessed portions that require leadership in complex terrain.

Memories of ripping out what was left of my hair trying to explain to a CO (retired RegF Maj commanding an ARes unit as an over promoted LCol) why it was a waste of time doing frontals - as if the troops were dismounting from imaginary APCs - all weekend on a playing field instead of using the excellent and complex infantry terrain God had gifted to us - inlcuding hiils, bush, streams etc - to train them properly.

 

[Kirkhill]

When the enemy is armed with 4 km precision guided munitions shouldn't this be treated as complex terrain? I'm willing to be the guy with the javelin will see the LAV before the LAV sees him. No?

 

[Kirkhill]

Even ground like this yields dead ground for the infantry.

 

[KevinB]

View attachment 74760

Even ground like this yields dead ground for the infantry.

But not for the UAS

 

[Ostrozac]

But not for the UAS

Try to look unimportant, the Hunter/Killer Drones might be low on ammo!

 

[GR66]

View attachment 74760

Even ground like this yields dead ground for the infantry.

With the swarms of UAVs, Loitering Munitions, Indirect Fire units, etc. that you're a fan of this is more likely to be "Dead" ground for the Infantry.

 

[markppcli]

Memories of ripping out what was left of my hair trying to explain to a CO (retired RegF Maj commanding an ARes unit as an over promoted LCol) why it was a waste of time doing frontals - as if the troops were dismounting from imaginary APCs - all weekend on a playing field instead of using the excellent and complex infantry terrain God had gifted to us - inlcuding hiils, bush, streams etc - to train them properly.

Eh, there’s a value to doing section frontals. Even if you do flank them, the actual fire and movement is a frontal. My time in the reserves in BC was spent on innumerable patrolling exercises. While I’d love to assume there was some great plan behind it I suspect that cost was more a factor.

View attachment 74759

When the enemy is armed with 4 km precision guided munitions shouldn't this be treated as complex terrain? I'm willing to be the guy with the javelin will see the LAV before the LAV sees him. No?

Oh that’s nice LAV country, gently rolling hills I get roll behind and get hull down? Yes please. I’m not familiar enough with Javelin optics but as a rule anything man portable will be inferior to the heavy, more power hungry vehicle optics.

 

[Kirkhill]

With the swarms of UAVs, Loitering Munitions, Indirect Fire units, etc. that you're a fan of this is more likely to be "Dead" ground for the Infantry.

Fair comment.

 

[KevinB]

Eh, there’s a value to doing section frontals. Even if you do flank them, the actual fire and movement is a frontal. My time in the reserves in BC was spent on innumerable patrolling exercises. While I’d love to assume there was some great plan behind it I suspect that cost was more a factor.



Oh that’s nice LAV country, gently rolling hills I get roll behind and get hull down? Yes please. I’m not familiar enough with Javelin optics but as a rule anything man portable will be inferior to the heavy, more power hungry vehicle optics.

Javelin LWCLU will see a LAV over 5km away if it is just hulldown.
The LAV is extremely unlikely to see the Javelin team until at least half that range.

 

[Kirkhill]

So infantry sections/platoons likely to be less effective than dispersed anti-tank teams and forward observers?

 

[KevinB]

So infantry sections/platoons likely to be less effective than dispersed anti-tank teams and forward observers?

It’s not an either or. You don’t leave two guys out on an OP for days on end.
You can’t attack or advance as a super dispersed entity either.

Plus that one AT team can deal with 1 AFV…

 

[ArmyRick]

It’s not an either or. You don’t leave two guys out on an OP for days on end.
You can’t attack or advance as a super dispersed entity either.

Plus that one AT team can deal with 1 AFV…

We used to get a hoot when teaching reg f DP1 infantry course and one of the EOs was participating in a "tank hunting team".

We would treat it as a go get 'er done quick thing so we could check the box. Using an LSVW to act as a tank and doing the task. What MBT or BMP or BTR is out just bumbling around all by itself on the battlefield. WE fought several times to get rid of this stupid PO/EO.

I use to be in a TOW platoon (or anti-armour platoon for proper terminology), when we did more realistic tactics with TUAs on defeating armour.

 

[MJP]

We would treat it as a go get 'er done quick thing so we could check the box. Using an LSVW to act as a tank and doing the task. What MBT or BMP or BTR is out just bumbling around all by itself on the battlefield.

Well according to Ukraine - Russian War all of them just bumble around the battlefield! Maybe the TP writers knew how bad the Russians were!

 

[daftandbarmy]

We used to get a hoot when teaching reg f DP1 infantry course and one of the EOs was participating in a "tank hunting team".

We would treat it as a go get 'er done quick thing so we could check the box. Using an LSVW to act as a tank and doing the task. What MBT or BMP or BTR is out just bumbling around all by itself on the battlefield. WE fought several times to get rid of this stupid PO/EO.

I use to be in a TOW platoon (or anti-armour platoon for proper terminology), when we did more realistic tactics with TUAs on defeating armour.

Nothing like trying to chase an armoured vehicle at night through the woods with an 84mm, not being able to fire it at anything in the end

 

[Kirkhill]

It’s not an either or. You don’t leave two guys out on an OP for days on end.
You can’t attack or advance as a super dispersed entity either.

Plus that one AT team can deal with 1 AFV…

Understood - I guess what I am picking up from what the Russians and Ukrainians are laying down is that the basic wiring diagrams of teams, sections, platoons, companies, battalions, brigades, divisions, corps are all still valid.

But.

The degree of dispersion has increased putting more reliance on small units, strategic corporals, mission command and wide dispersion. All of those have been necessitated by the wide distribution of novel technologies and forced older technologies to be reapplied.

Kyiv
Kharkiv
Kherson

(This war writes its own chapters)

Kyiv

The Russians concentrated their forces in BTGs and Brigades, marching in columns following their best practice. And got their butts handed to them as the columns were destroyed en masse by light infantry, artillery and engineers (flooding) taking advantage of terrain.

Kharkiv

Russians disperse their forces and the Ukrainians exploit with a mixture of heavy forces for breaching at a couple of key points and exploitation with light "cavalry" forces manoeuvering among the spaces left by the widely dispersed small units of the Russians - many of them recently mobilized

Kherson

Waiting to see - it has been at least a 3 month battle over a wide area, 9 months if we include the defence of Mykolaiv.

Donbas

An 8 year long static defence.


The other interesting bit as far as I'm concerned is the role of the roving "intelligence" teams in their civvy vehicles handing out flags and making propaganda videos. Intelligence, Influence Activities and PsyOps.