Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Not for being permissive to air mobile operations it doesn’t.

Does it not depend on scale and distance as well as risk appreciation? Is the objective worth the risk? For example resupplying and evacuating Azovstal or Khe San. Are we moving a section or a battle group? Is it a short hop in a brigade's area or is it a corps effort?

What changed wrt to air superiority there ?

The definition of air superiority and the number of tasks that previously were considered to require air superiority to let our aircraft fly. Now there are many tasks (both SA and Strike) that are being handled in the air domain by uninhabited craft - and here I will include smart shells, missiles and loitering munitions. The demands on manned aircraft have been reduced but the jobs still get done.

Concurrently the opposing force has found it expedient to keep its craft on the ground due to the high threat environment resulting from the wide dispersion of ground based anti-air assets. Although the demand is for more even the limited numbers available have had effect across the full spectrum - Bombers, fighters, helicopters, uas as well as cruise missiles. Even the occasional ballistic missile has been reported as intercepted.

What air mobile operations have been successful in an air parity environment ?

Mariupol resupply is one that has been publicly described that I would consider an air mobility operation.
The ability of helicopters, notably cargo carrying, to continue to conduct operations, suggest the possibility of moving and supporting sections and platoons, maybe even companies, from location to location.

I haven't seen anything to suggest Crete, or Arnhem or Ia Drang. But operations on the scale of Bruneval seem not unlikely.

 

[Furniture]

The CAF lacks the Met support to operate helos in remote places efficiently/effectively. If the CAF wants to emphasize helo ops in the BC mountains, they need to invest in support.

Helos and UAVs are awesome, but without good forecasts they are significantly less effective.

 

[markppcli]

Does it not depend on scale and distance as well as risk appreciation? Is the objective worth the risk? For example resupplying and evacuating Azovstal or Khe San. Are we moving a section or a battle group? Is it a short hop in a brigade's area or is it a corps effort?

Having a Sam in the ground doesn’t protect your helicopter pushing forward if there’s air parity. You’re obviously right that risk and reward must be weighed by that’s a massive generalist and doesn’t do much to support your point.

The definition of air superiority and the number of tasks that previously were considered to require air superiority to let our aircraft fly. Now there are many tasks (both SA and Strike) that are being handled in the air domain by uninhabited craft - and here I will include smart shells, missiles and loitering munitions. The demands on manned aircraft have been reduced but the jobs still get done.

Which tasks, considered by whom, what does that have to do with your question about man pads equally air superiority?

Concurrently the opposing force has found it expedient to keep its craft on the ground due to the high threat environment resulting from the wide dispersion of ground based anti-air assets. Although the demand is for more even the limited numbers available have had effect across the full spectrum - Bombers, fighters, helicopters, uas as well as cruise missiles. Even the occasional ballistic missile has been reported as intercepted.

That’s one possible interpretation. But the threat is a series of different tools, not “a man pad in a section.”

Mariupol resupply is one that has been publicly described that I would consider an air mobility operation.
The ability of helicopters, notably cargo carrying, to continue to conduct operations, suggest the possibility of moving and supporting sections and platoons, maybe even companies, from location to location.

They launched seven “runs” and had two helicopters shot down. Super high risk and conducted by their equivalent of CANSOF, not what I’d call a major shift.

I haven't seen anything to suggest Crete, or Arnhem or Ia Drang. But operations on the scale of Bruneval seem not unlikely.

Ask the Russians how that went in Air Parity.

 

[Kirkhill]

Having a Sam in the ground doesn’t protect your helicopter pushing forward if there’s air parity. You’re obviously right that risk and reward must be weighed by that’s a massive generalist and doesn’t do much to support your point.



Which tasks, considered by whom, what does that have to do with your question about man pads equally air superiority?



That’s one possible interpretation. But the threat is a series of different tools, not “a man pad in a section.”



They launched seven “runs” and had two helicopters shot down. Super high risk and conducted by their equivalent of CANSOF, not what I’d call a major shift.


Ask the Russians how that went in Air Parity.

I guess I see movement in the balance. A sway that makes some things more likely than they were. I agree that there has been no clicking of a switch, nor any sign of a magic bullet. I do see signs that, to me, indicate that things are not as they were.

 

[markppcli]

I guess I see movement in the balance. A sway that makes some things more likely than they were. I agree that there has been no clicking of a switch, nor any sign of a magic bullet. I do see signs that, to me, indicate that things are not as they were.

You can’t have things both ways; if a section with a CLU and Stingers can adequately defend the air space, we have to presume the enemy’s manpads are able to do the same. So if anything that kind of operation will become less possible. But no one pushes manpads down to section level because that’s massive over mill and you’d completely erode the ability of the section to do its job. But I digress.

 

[Kirkhill]

You can’t have things both ways; if a section with a CLU and Stingers can adequately defend the air space, we have to presume the enemy’s manpads are able to do the same. So if anything that kind of operation will become less possible. But no one pushes manpads down to section level because that’s massive over mill and you’d completely erode the ability of the section to do its job. But I digress.

But supposing the OC were to task one section in his company to carry a ManPAD?

And is that section defending the airspace or is it supplying a point defence for the company?

 

[markppcli]

But supposing the OC were to task one section in his company to carry a ManPAD?

And is that section defending the airspace or is it supplying a point defence for the company?

Neither; unless they’re being vectored as part of a network they providing pretty minimal value.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The CAF lacks the Met support to operate helos in remote places efficiently/effectively. If the CAF wants to emphasize helo ops in the BC mountains, they need to invest in support.

Helos and UAVs are awesome, but without good forecasts they are significantly less effective.

Like Airborne Armies (OP Market Garden enters the chat)

 

[KevinB]

Airmobile is very weather dependant. Weather in the North is as much or more so, of an opponent as the enemy. I wouldn't want to jump a Javelin or Stinger and rely on the tent group supplies landing anywhere near me in much if the winter weather north if tbe Arctic Circle. Pretty sure you can't LAPSE or airdrop through the clouds and snow squalls effectively.

Airmobile isn’t as weather dependent as people perceive. It’s mostly equipment and risk dependent as one can fly in a lot of conditions that some militaries (or elements thereof) won’t fly.

Also there are GPS guided steerable cargo delivery systems that can be HAHO’s in almost any situation, that will land within 5m of your desired spot in significantly challenging weather conditions.

Back in the 80’s and earliest of the 90’s (probably earlier too) the CAR would jump in with ‘old school’ CT-1 chutes and tent groups into the Arctic — and delivery methods are exponentially better now.

FWIW I’ve never seen anyone (even on the JSOC side) jump a Stinger or Javelin on their person - generally the Mk48, M240 and Mk22 are about the largest items jumped individually either on a free fall or static line rig. Heavier items are cargo, jumped on pallets or bundles.

 

[KevinB]

You can’t have things both ways; if a section with a CLU and Stingers can adequately defend the air space, we have to presume the enemy’s manpads are able to do the same. So if anything that kind of operation will become less possible. But no one pushes manpads down to section level because that’s massive over mill and you’d completely erode the ability of the section to do its job. But I digress.

Actually there are Stinger Dets at the Platoon level in the US Army — they have gone through an AD class, and are networked with the Brigade ADAM Cell.

 

[FJAG]

Also there are GPS guided steerable cargo delivery systems that can be HAHO’s in almost any situation, that will land within 5m of your desired spot in significantly challenging weather conditions.

I've heard a few stories during my interviews on Afghanistan which indicate that such delivery was far from 100% efficient and that was in a very permissive air defence environment.

JPADS does have a standoff capability but the distance of the standoff is determined by the release altitude AGL which makes it very susceptible to a proper AD layered defence.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Airmobile isn’t as weather dependent as people perceive.

If the RNAS is doing the flying, you're probably OK.

RAF? Make sure you bring spare socks

 

[KevinB]

I've heard a few stories during my interviews on Afghanistan which indicate that such delivery was far from 100% efficient and that was in a very permissive air defence environment.

It’s gotten a lot better, Afghanistan was the beta test area

JPADS does have a standoff capability but the distance of the standoff is determined by the release altitude AGL which makes it very susceptible to a proper AD layered defence.

They can be released by Unmanned vehicles
But yes, the assumption is that most Airborne, Airmobile operations including supplying of same that friendly Air has air supremacy and SEAD missions have degraded enemy AD assets.

 

[FJAG]

They can be released by Unmanned vehicles

That raises an interesting point.

While using an unmanned vehicle eliminates the risk of losing a valuable crew, it nonetheless does not change the vulnerability to interception statistic and loses a valuable, probably hard to replace asset. There is a point where the expenditure of "smart" systems and equipment becomes a factor - usually prewar where high cost $ to stockpile such assets in sufficient numbers to sustain operations takes away from other acquisitions.

Reducing aircrew numbers, however, is a very worthwhile endeavour as they constitute a very high recurring peacetime cost.

In the long run, every weapon system--including trained personnel--becomes part of a cost-benefit analysis. Canada's military is a prime example of what operational capabilities sometimes get thrown under the bus for other operational, and even worse, non operational day to day imperatives.

 

[markppcli]

Actually there are Stinger Dets at the Platoon level in the US Army — they have gone through an AD class, and are networked with the Brigade ADAM Cell.

My understanding was that it’s less a set Stinger det and more some guys in some units are qualified on the stinger. As a stop gap while they build up their ad assets.

But if you go read what I said it was that randomly assigning a section a stinger is not air superiority in anyway shape or form, and is limited air defence to the point of not being air defence. Networked, integrated, overlapping systems are air defence just like any other defence. And lastly that giving sections a stinger means they aren’t going to be able to do their primary job, which probably means the platoon now can’t do their job as 30 percent of their man power is doing AD.

 

[KevinB]

My understanding was that it’s less a set Stinger det and more some guys in some units are qualified on the stinger. As a stop gap while they build up their ad assets.

True - they also have dedicated comms etc to be plugged into the ADAM.
But from what was briefed earlier this year, there is no intent to have MANPADS be operated by AD, just controlled by AD, ADA personnel are better used in ‘real’ AD platforms.

But if you go read what I said it was that randomly assigning a section a stinger is not air superiority in anyway shape or form, and is limited air defence to the point of not being air defence. Networked, integrated, overlapping systems are air defence just like any other defence. And lastly that giving sections a stinger means they aren’t going to be able to do their primary job, which probably means the platoon now can’t do their job as 30 percent of their man power is doing AD.

The goal of the Infantry, Cavalry, Armor and Engineers having the ability to employ MANPADS is just part of the layered AD plan.
The ADA Battalions and Brigades will control the AD fight in conjunction with the Air Force, but MANPADS provide point air defense - and better 20% of the Section/Squad be able to conduct that PAD Role than the entire entity be potentially helpless, and degraded or destroyed without consequence. Honestly it’s much closer to 2-4 guys in a Platoon, and so can be kept at the Pl HQ/Wpn DET level.

It’s designed to be part of the Arms Room concept - that items are used as needed, and if not, then they aren’t used.

I’m always a fan of its better to have and not need, than need and not have.

 

[markppcli]

True - they also have dedicated comms etc to be plugged into the ADAM.
But from what was briefed earlier this year, there is no intent to have MANPADS be operated by AD, just controlled by AD, ADA personnel are better used in ‘real’ AD platforms.



The goal of the Infantry, Cavalry, Armor and Engineers having the ability to employ MANPADS is just part of the layered AD plan.
The ADA Battalions and Brigades will control the AD fight in conjunction with the Air Force, but MANPADS provide point air defense - and better 20% of the Section/Squad be able to conduct that PAD Role than the entire entity be potentially helpless, and degraded or destroyed without consequence. Honestly it’s much closer to 2-4 guys in a Platoon, and so can be kept at the Pl HQ/Wpn DET level.

I’d rather see those 2 guys per platoon in a dedicated platoon with its own logistic supports.

It’s designed to be part of the Arms Room concept - that items are used as needed, and if not, then they aren’t used.

I’m always a fan of its better to have and not need, than need and not have.

Have and not need vs need and not have is great when your doing DA or limited duration missions out of a fob. It’s much harder to sustain when your in a conventional setting and all those “haves” are taking up space in your logistical train.

 

[Kirkhill]

I’d rather see those 2 guys per platoon in a dedicated platoon with its own logistic supports.


Have and not need vs need and not have is great when your doing DA or limited duration missions out of a fob. It’s much harder to sustain when your in a conventional setting and all those “haves” are taking up space in your logistical train.

I'd rather know there was something in the Canadian system that was available to knock some of the stuff out of the skies some of the time.

 

[Kirkhill]

AEROSPACE & DEFENSE

The Ukrainian Army’s Helicopters Sat Out The Last Campaign. They Sure Aren’t Sitting Out This One.​

David Axe
Forbes Staff
I write about ships, planes, tanks, drones, missiles and satellites.

Nov 19, 2022,08:00am EST

Ukrainian army Mil Mi-8s.
UKRAINIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY PHOTO
It was an open question, as Russian forces massed along Ukraine’s borders in late 2021 and early 2022, whether the Ukrainian army’s helicopter pilots would play any meaningful role in the coming wider war.



There was good reason to believe they wouldn’t. The army’s four helicopter brigades—one each in the north, west, south and east—suffered such heavy casualties in fighting over eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014 that, in 2015, commanders pulled them off the front line.

But as the wider war grinds into its nine months, the aviation brigades not only are playing a huge role in the Ukrainian campaign, they actually are stronger now than they were back in February when Russian battalions rolled across the border.

Ukraine’s four aviation brigades are similar in structure, with each on paper operating around 16 Mil Mi-8 transports and 10 Mil Mi-24 gunships. In practice, the distribution of airframes is uneven. And there are a few Mil Mi-2 training helicopters and Mil Mi-26 heavy transports sprinkled across the brigades.

It’s not a huge rotary-wing force—especially not compared to Russia’s own rotary arsenal, which includes around 400 gunships and some 600 transports.
And it’s vulnerable. The air-defense environment over the Ukrainian front is one of the most dangerous in the world. In 2014 and 2015, the Russians and their separatist allies shot down or badly damaged at least 17 Ukrainian helicopters, killing most of the crews and reducing by nearly a fifth Ukraine’s rotary fleet.

As the war widened in February, it was reasonable to expect the Ukrainian aviation brigades to keep away from the front and instead stick to auxiliary roles safe inside friendly territory. Moving people and supplies between rear bases.

That’s not what happened. Ukraine’s helicopter brigades have been in the fight since the beginning, even as at least one of them—the 11th Separate Army Aviation Brigade—had to evacuate its base in the southern city of Kherson as Russian troops closed in. The brigades have suffered heavy losses. But they’ve inducted enough new equipment to make good their losses.

The Mi-8s have flown resupply and medical-evacuation missions. The Mi-24s have joined the Mi-8s on distinctive bombardment missions, approaching low then angling up to lob rockets at Russian troops from miles away.
The Mi-8 force’s finest hours were this spring, when crews flew daring daylight sorties into Russian-occupied Mariupol on the Black Sea coast in order to bring in supplies and bring out the most grievously wounded members of the tiny garrison holding out in the city’s iconic steel plant. The sorties ended after the Russians shot down three of the Mi-8s, killing many crew and passengers.
In all, the Russians have shot down 19 Ukrainian helicopters that independent analysts can confirm: 16 Mi-8s and variants plus three Mi-24s. But the surviving crews have endured, flying so low to avoid Russian air-defenses that their helicopters’ wheels nearly graze the tops of cars on the roads they follow for navigation.

Nineteen write-offs is a lot for a rotary force that, before the war, probably had no more than 100 airframes. But Ukraine’s foreign allies have stepped up. The United States, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Latvia between them have sent to Ukraine, or soon are sending, 40 Mil Mi-17s and at least two Mi-24s. The Mi-17 is a variant of the Mi-8.
With these new airframes, the Ukrainians actually will have more helicopters than they had in February. And having honed their low-flying tactics and weathered the Mariupol crisis, they’ve brought down the loss-rate to a level that should be sustainable for years.
All that is to say, it was wrong to assume the Ukrainian army’s helicopter brigades would sit out the wider war. They’ve been fighting hard since day one.

The Ukrainian Army’s Helicopters Sat Out The Last Campaign. They Sure Aren’t Sitting Out This One.

With donated airframes, the Ukrainians soon will have more helicopters than they had in February.

www.forbes.com

 

[markppcli]

I'd rather know there was something in the Canadian system that was available to knock some of the stuff out of the skies some of the time.

I mean obviously yes, but that’s not what we were talking about