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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Admittedly I don’t have all the answers.
Some aspect though I think need to split the trade, which admittedly is an issue when you end up with a small trade in a small Army.

WRT to the FOO/JTAC at the NCO and O levels, having post Reg’t positions at Bde, Div and Schools can help, but it won’t be the be all and end all.

ADA needs to be a different trade, perhaps the Officer stream could be linked with STA/UAS. ...
ADA was a problem when we had over 900 gunners out of 4,000 (RegF and ResF) doing AD. It's going to be even worse when we go back to 2-300.

I think the numbers are so small that this is one of those times where a little fine tuning to the present system is about the best that one can do.

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But it also goes beyond the Artillery, as I think the Amoured Corps is going to have issues with transitioning from Tanks into LAV and TLAV and back and forth
Well we could always go with the M1 Abrams for the heavy Brigades and the MPF for the Light and Medium Brigades.

According to this article from Task & Purpose:

The vehicles are so similar that Abrams tank crew members can be trained to learn how to operate an MPF vehicle very quickly, said Army Lt. Col. Peter George, product manager for Mobile Protected Firepower.

“One of the benefits of this platform is it’s incredibly common with the Abrams,” said George, who also spoke to Task & Purpose at Saturday’s Army-Navy Game. “You take a 19K tank crewman; you train them on an Abrams, you get them set on an Abrams, and then you do a short transition where they can pick this vehicle up, move into the formation, and then work that teaming with infantry soldiers. “

Right now, the Army’s plan is that soldiers who operate MPF vehicles will attend the U.S. Army Armor School at Fort Benning Georgia to train in the same Military Occupational Specialty as M1 Abrams crews, George told Task & Purpose in a follow-up email.
 
Agreed. Funny though that you've stated previously that we should as a nation be able to field two Divisions but then you focus on Brigade Groups in your Napkin Army. I on the other hand have argued that Brigade Groups are likely the most appropriate size for us to deploy (currently and in the near future) but think that the eventual goal should be for Divisional-level capabilities.

For that reason I think we should maintain a Divisional structure even if we don't have all the elements to make a Division at this time. I'd propose that we start with Brigades that are highly interoperable with US forces and could be plugged into a US Division as part of a multi-national deployment. Over time we keep adding the missing building blocks until such time as we can field our own Division.

I can't agree more.

If we created the regular army as a single National Defence Division that focused on growing and maintaining a multi-brigade structure, with brigades that could be detached from the Division and OpCon to the US and other Allied Formations then we would have the best of all worlds. We would have a functional, deployable army positioned to grow and develop new capabilities.

Under one command
 
I'm a two divisions guy. One capable of actual deployment (whether with one or four brigades) and the second as the organization to build and control the follow up force on. I think we need a real functioning and not admin HQ for the primary reason of keeping the skill levels needed for that alive. If you do not have a real division HQ, trained or equipped, you will never be able to create one in a reasonable time. The Army, as it stands, is large enough for two divisions (not 5) regardless how the brigades are organized.


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Would your first, "ready" division be mostly RegF and the second be mostly ResF? Or try to strike a balance?

I'm also curious about geographic disposition of your napkin brigades, both you and @KevinB
 
Considering what the Ukrainians have been doing with HMMWVs and Hit and Run raids.

How about a 200 km/h light armoured recce vehicle? 160 km/h on desert tracks. 3500 kg GVW including the 650 kg turret/rws.


Featured-Image-Cockerill-i-X-Integrated-Combat-Vehicle.jpg



transported by air, sea, and land through platforms such as fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter, truck and train. It can also be air-dropped using a parachute.

The Cockerill i-X vehicle is powered by either a 750hp thermal engine or an 800hp hybrid thermal-electric engine. The drive train enables the vehicle to achieve high speeds on-road and off-road.

The vehicle can achieve a maximum road speed of 200km/h and a desert track speed of 160km/h. It has a range of 600km, while the range in full electric mode is expected to be 30km.

It can accelerate from 0km/h to 100km/h within six seconds. It has a braking distance of 40m at 100km/h.

Level 2 STANAG 4569 protection against ballistic threats and Level 3 STANAG 4569 protection against mines.

a crew of two, including a gunner and a driver.

The Cockerill® Smart Helmet worn by the operator enables human-machine interaction. The interface features an intelligent multimodal engine that will reduce the cognitive load of the operator.

equipped with high-performance sensors to collect data and provide 360° situational awareness. The artificial intelligence (AI)-based embedded algorithms can process data to detect, identify, locate and assess threats.

The Cockerill i-X provides enhanced stealth capabilities to offer advantage in the battleground.
Its turrets are modular and retractable to provide stealth capabilities during missions. Adaptive camouflage can be used to manage the appearance, while infrared (IR) and acoustic signature can be modified to further increase the vehicle’s stealth.

The weapon station atop the vehicle can be fitted with a 25mm dual feeder automatic cannon or a 30x113mm automatic cannon, with 120 ready-to-fire rounds each, and a secondary 7.62mm machine gun with between 400 and 600 ready rounds.
Another option is to equip the weapon system with two to four ready anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and a 12.7mm machine gun. The vehicle can also be integrated with a rocket launcher with provision for up to seven launch tubes.
The turret can be raised from an elevation of -10° to 60°.


 
Well we could always go with the M1 Abrams for the heavy Brigades and the MPF for the Light and Medium Brigades.

According to this article from Task & Purpose:
The text makes it clear this thing is in the nature of an assault gun. Makes one wonder why they didn't put a bigger gun into the hull and forget about the turret and give all the extra space over to more ammunition.

These things look like a Tank Mini-me. That became a problem with the Stryker MGS as well as COs of Stryker bns ran them as tanks at NTC and kept being blown away.

Never Bring a Stryker to a Tank Fight - Modern War Institute

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ADA was a problem when we had over 900 gunners out of 4,000 (RegF and ResF) doing AD. It's going to be even worse when we go back to 2-300.

I think the numbers are so small that this is one of those times where a little fine tuning to the present system is about the best that one can do.

😖
I thought the 250 number was just to start ADA back up, not a final trade cap.

I don’t think 250 is enough to do what is required by 1-2 Maneuver Bde’s let alone more.

The text makes it clear this thing is in the nature of an assault gun. Makes one wonder why they didn't put a bigger gun into the hull and forget about the turret and give all the extra space over to more ammunition.

These things look like a Tank Mini-me. That became a problem with the Stryker MGS as well as COs of Stryker bns ran them as tanks at NTC and kept being blown away.

Never Bring a Stryker to a Tank Fight - Modern War Institute

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Tankers are going to tank regardless of platform, and Commanders are going to use anything with a gun as a tank until they get educated/corrected about employment of a DFS asset.

The Abrams allows for some relatively sloppy employment due to the Armor/Mobility/Firepower. Things that non MBT’s tend to lack.

It’s one reason why I like to split trades so dangerous activities aren’t promoted in certain platforms.
 
Direct Fire Support Vehicles.



Some observations made by the video.

Stryker MGS originally allocated as a platoon in every Stryker rifle company. Retired concentrated in the Brigade Cavalry Squadron - the main problems were maintenance (readiness) and gunnery.

USMC LAV25s in 82nd Airborne - the LAV Coy took up 25% of the Bde XOs time despite being only one of 40 coys in the Brigade - training and maintenance

WW2 and Korea vintage Tank Coys in Regimental Combat Teams less effective than comparable coys in Tank units - maintenance and training

Each MPF Coy would have 62 troops in 14 AFVs. Hard to maintain currency. Decision made to centralize the MPFs in a Divisional Battalion manned by the Armo(u)red Corps.

Concerns expressed that the MPF will be misused and treated by its crews and its command as a Tank.


French employment of Tanks and Jeeps (VBLs)

How to effectively mix Lt and Heavy assets at the sub-sub-unit level in an expeditionary army for both Anti-Tank, Recce and Scouting operations as well as Direct Fire Support.





So where to go from here?


1 Canadian Division (100% Regular)

1 Cdn Div HQ & Sigs Sqn

8 Bde (Svc - Theater Activation)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng

7 Bde (Svc - Operations)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng

9 Bde (Svc - Div Spt)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng


6 Bde (Combat Spt)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
Int
Influence Activities


4 Bde (Artillery)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR
EW
AD
AT
IDF
LRPF

3 Bde (Cavalry)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Rgt
ISR Rgt
Spt Rgt

1 Bde (Inf)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Bn
Rfl Bn
Rfl Bn

2 Bde (Inf)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Bn
Rfl Bn
Rfl Bn

5 Bde (Inf)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Bn
Rfl Bn
Rfl Bn

10 Bde (Avn)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Sqn
UTTH Sqn
UTTH Sqn
MHLH Sqn
Long Range Sqn



RCAF

7 Wing (Space)
14 Wing (ISR)
22 Wing (NORAD)
3 Wing (NORAD)
4 Wing (NORAD)

2 Wing (Expedition)
8 Wing (Mobility)

Additional wings raised to manage local and theater air defence as well as coastal missile artillery.
 
I thought the 250 number was just to start ADA back up, not a final trade cap.

I don’t think 250 is enough to do what is required by 1-2 Maneuver Bde’s let alone more.
True enough. There are more folks available, however.

4 RCA (GS) already contains several ASCCs and a bunch of MRR assets which will add in the AD role. Note that the MRR has both a weapon locating capability as well as an air surveillance capability. I don't have any particular insight or background info on this but my guess would be that 4 RCA(GS) will be broadening its current role to add in AD to its existing STA role. There are currently in excess of 400 PYs in it. Essentially much of the C2 and logistics elements are already there.

250 is probably enough for up two AD batteries and a small workshop battery. There is always the possibility too of bringing ResF regiments back into the role of Manpack VLLAD which they did to the tune of 5 troops in the 1990s.

The real question is how much gear will the allocated project funds buy? My guess is that there will be enough to properly cover at least 1 manoeuvre brigade plus have enough for a training and tech spare reserve depending on what gear is bought.

Back to the numbers for a trade of their own - I really don't know. It all depends on how one looks at the gun, STA and AD mix. If 4 RCA (GS) goes multi-purpose AD/STA and one adds in the STA batteries in the Fd Regts, you might be able to swing it.

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I think STA belongs in the Recce/ISR Squadron - I'd kick to that role to MI folks
 
I think STA belongs in the Recce/ISR Squadron - I'd kick to that role to MI folks
They tried running arty STA through an ISTAR system in Afghanistan - first an ISTAR company then a recce squadron. It didn't work. There are issues respecting enemy artillery tactics and sensor shooter links amongst others. It's basically the separation between the deep battle and the close battle.

The brigade recce squadron is and should be focused on the close battle.

There is a place where I see a better meld of recce and artillery STA and that's for something like the Brit's Deep Strike Brigade and to an extent what used to be the US Army's Cavalry Regiments where the role is to look and engage deeper. That doesn't mean the resources go to the recce elements but that you make Arty STA resources available as part of its organic structure.

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They tried running arty STA through an ISTAR system in Afghanistan - first an ISTAR company then a recce squadron. It didn't work. There are issues respecting enemy artillery tactics and sensor shooter links amongst others. It's basically the separation between the deep battle and the close battle.

The brigade recce squadron is and should be focused on the close battle.

There is a place where I see a better meld of recce and artillery STA and that's for something like the Brit's Deep Strike Brigade and to an extent what used to be the US Army's Cavalry Regiments where the role is to look and engage deeper. That doesn't mean the resources go to the recce elements but that you make Arty STA resources available as part of its organic structure.

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I’m having issues with that breakdown.

Mainly because I think STA in terms of Higher level for GS Arty/Deep Strike isn’t really best run with UAS that wouldn’t be an RCAF asset.

Basically you will need a Brigade level (and lower) ISTAR ability, which will help Close/Direct Support missions but ‘true’ STA for Div plus target packages, to me is going to fall into HALE and MALE (and GeoSpacial) territories.
 
I’m having issues with that breakdown.

Mainly because I think STA in terms of Higher level for GS Arty/Deep Strike isn’t really best run with UAS that wouldn’t be an RCAF asset.

Basically you will need a Brigade level (and lower) ISTAR ability, which will help Close/Direct Support missions but ‘true’ STA for Div plus target packages, to me is going to fall into HALE and MALE (and GeoSpacial) territories.
Agree to a point. Our radars, even the LCMR are clearly counterfire assets and should stay STA.

On the other hand our UAVs have been problematic starting with the Sperwer and the Skylark which were more often used in what I would call a recce role rather than an air observation post role although both were used for that as well. I think the real reason the artillery got into the UAV business was because the RCAF had canned the light observation helicopters, wasn't even interested in tactical UAVs (much less mini UAVs) and because the artillery was in the right place and time to champion their use.

Add to that the fact that for much of the shooting part of Afghanistan we downloaded air support and airspace coordination onto the battlegroup during a counterinsurgency war, and so we somewhat lost the plot on the proper divisions of UAVs as between recce and artillery and the proper roles of battle groups, brigades and divisions in the fight. I guess "losing the plot' isn't the right term. We never developed a proper plot beyond counterinsurgency is the better way to look at it.

Our suite of UAVs has gotten better but I think we are still multipurposing them in a way that blurs the line between recce and STA use. Much of that has to do with the fact that we are still dabbling with what we have rather than what we should have. To the best of my knowledge we don't even have a project looking at armed UAVs and loitering munitions except JUSTAS which has taken us twenty years to work out. Don't even get me started on 120mm mortars and C3s.

For me the division comes with those UAVs sent out to gather information quickly and across large areas to develop the tactical picture, and those that are sent out linked to a shooter system that goes out and has the dwell time to sit over found targets and conduct an engagement to completion. The former can and should run from the company level and the battalion and yes, when in close, should include engagement through organic weapon systems such as mortars and loitering munitions. The latter hunt deeper finding headquarters, staging and assembly areas, artillery positions, choke points and the like and engage with heavier guns and long range loitering systems and even air power - if it's flying.

I see an issue too as between MALE and HALE and deep strike. The former is quite clearly have their role in that fight but they are not guaranteed assets being subject to air and anti air countermeasures. That's acceptable if you do not have ground assets committed in the deep. Deep strike organizations are designed to penetrate into gaps and exploit seams and weaknesses. They need appropriate ground support which is why the 1 DRSBCT comes with an arty STA regt, 2 x SP regiments and 2 x MLRS regiments to support its 4 x armoured and light cavalry regiments and why there are 2 x Arty UAV regiments in general support with the UK's Field Army Troops (Div).

In the same way, US Army Fires Brigades each have an organic TA battery and an organic UAV battery to support their counterfires missions. Even US close support battalions have 2 x organic TA radars. I'm not sure that the US Army has really developed their program because of the success of their Predator program and the wealth of Attack Helicopters available to them. Those both need a rethink in light of Ukraine (not abandonment by any stretch of the imagination - just a rethink)

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I guess my issue is if we take HALE and MALE UAS out of the picture - the question comes down to if one will accept that STA for Deep Strike is predominantly an Int function, and once targets are acquired that the Artillery and Air Force come in to align the lists and prosecute the targets.

At lower levels (Bde and lower) the most of the UAS are more individual consumable systems.

Something like this however is where I see a Bde Recce/ISTAR asset



Down here there is a lot of talk of moving most of the Group 2 UAS under Cav units and their MI cells.
 
I guess my issue is if we take HALE and MALE UAS out of the picture - the question comes down to if one will accept that STA for Deep Strike is predominantly an Int function, and once targets are acquired that the Artillery and Air Force come in to align the lists and prosecute the targets.
That would work in a world where Int wasn't the circuit breaker that it is in taking raw data and turning it into actionable info. I keep harping on the sensor-shooter link for a reason It's to take action on a target as soon as practical after acquisition before it changes posture or location. The formal motto for the artillery is "Ubique". Its unofficial one is "24/7 Sense of Urgency"
At lower levels (Bde and lower) the most of the UAS are more individual consumable systems.
100% agree which is why I like loitering munitions. Find a target; kill a target; set out another drone.
Something like this however is where I see a Bde Recce/ISTAR asset

There are lots of products out there. Our current system is the RQ-21 Blackjack flown by 4 RCA(GS) and which (at least according to the brochures) has a longer range and significantly longer endurance than the Alpha. The system isn't so much the issue as its tactical employment.
Down here there is a lot of talk of moving most of the Group 2 UAS under Cav units and their MI cells.
That was the theory up here in the early 2000s. I believe in tiered systems based on tactical employment and functionality. Group 2 is the ScanEagle class. We occupy Gp 1 with Raven and Gp3 with Blackjack. We rented ScanEagles in Afghanistan and ran them in conjunction with the bigger Sperwers and then Herons.

You comment raises an interesting gap in my knowledge of US Army use of UAVs within the BCT. I know they've been running Gp 1 Ravens and smaller drones although not as part of the regular TOE of any unit within the BCT. Again, I think Predator was used quite a bit for surveillance as well as attack in Afghanistan so there was no urgency for Gp2 or Gp3 although the Gp 3 Shadow logged a lot of time in Iraq and Afghanistan but I never knew for certain what organization operated them (I think, but am not sure, they came out of the Div Aviation Brigade's UAV company - which incidentally remains under the new div structures).

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I had an informal discussion with an architect once. I was all about layouts and dimensions and furniture.

He was all about bubbles.

What did I want to do?
How many bubbles did I need or want?
What stuff did I need in them?
How big did the bubbles need to be?

In military terms he was asking what effects did I want.

The organization came next along with the iterative processes of material and budget.

Until we are ready to move out of our Edwardian Mansion and build a new structure fit for this present era most of the questions posed here will go unanswered. Nobody wants their bedroom turned into mum's sewing room to become a sauna.
 
That would work in a world where Int wasn't the circuit breaker that it is in taking raw data and turning it into actionable info. I keep harping on the sensor-shooter link for a reason It's to take action on a target as soon as practical after acquisition before it changes posture or location. The formal motto for the artillery is "Ubique". Its unofficial one is "24/7 Sense of Urgency"
There has to be both. As uneducated folks looking at data aren’t going to give a good picture of the ground.
Most of that beyond Bde range data will be collected by H/M ALE systems that aren’t and Arty asset.


There are lots of products out there. Our current system is the RQ-21 Blackjack flown by 4 RCA(GS) and which (at least according to the brochures) has a longer range and significantly longer endurance than the Alpha. The system isn't so much the issue as its tactical employment.
I grabbed Alpha simply as they had a decent PDF and was capable of carrying/dropping munitions.

That’s the segment that is see the biggest problem with deconflicting - ones that have a payload.


That was the theory up here in the early 2000s. I believe in tiered systems based on tactical employment and functionality. Group 2 is the ScanEagle class. We occupy Gp 1 with Raven and Gp3 with Blackjack. We rented ScanEagles in Afghanistan and ran them in conjunction with the bigger Sperwers and then Herons.

You comment raises an interesting gap in my knowledge of US Army use of UAVs within the BCT. I know they've been running Gp 1 Ravens and smaller drones although not as part of the regular TOE of any unit within the BCT.
We have even smaller stuff than Raven now at Squad level. Honestly every time I visit someone there is a new system being played with.
Even Wiki can’t keep up.

Again, I think Predator was used quite a bit for surveillance as well as attack in Afghanistan so there was no urgency for Gp2 or Gp3 although the Gp 3 Shadow logged a lot of time in Iraq and Afghanistan but I never knew for certain what organization operated them (I think, but am not sure, they came out of the Div Aviation Brigade's UAV company - which incidentally remains under the new div structures).

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We returned Armed UAS to the Intelligence community. Right now there are supposed to be no Predator/Reaper/Avenger ER systems in the USAF, but I’m not sure that has been fully implemented, and I don’t think it will continue based on what has occurred in Ukraine.
 
It’s gotten a lot better, Afghanistan was the beta test area ;)


They can be released by Unmanned vehicles
But yes, the assumption is that most Airborne, Airmobile operations including supplying of same that friendly Air has air supremacy and SEAD missions have degraded enemy AD assets.


More on the JPADs topic - Contested logistics

Army Experiments With Next-Gen Aerial Resupply​

12/21/2022
By Mikayla Easley
7470981.jpg

Defense Dept. photo

FORT IRWIN, California — To improve the Army’s ability to move supplies into future battlefields, the service is experimenting with new technologies for its contested logistics strategy.

The Army recently tested how the Joint Precision Aerial Delivery System, or JPADS, could deliver critical supplies directly to soldiers in austere environments where they may be unable to use GPS to locate supply packages. The system was one of two dozen logistics technologies tested
during the service’s annual Project Convergence 2022 experiment in late fall, said Col. Marchant Callis, the Army’s sustainment capabilities development and integration director.

The experiment is helping bring the service’s sustainment efforts into the 21st century by conducting missions “over increasingly dispersed footprints and across contested, degraded or denied environments,” Callis said during a demonstration at Project Convergence.

The services already use JPADS in operations today. The system comes in two variants — one able to carry 2,000 pounds of supplies and a 10,000-pound version — that are typically launched from a C-130 aircraft from altitudes up to 24,500 feet and around 15 miles from the target destination, Callis said.

Once dropped, an onboard computer uses GPS-designated coordinates to autonomously steer a parachute that delivers the palletized load. Multiple JPADS can be launched simultaneously and sent to different waypoints on a battlefield, Callis noted.

“This is key in that it reduces the aircraft’s loitering time, which by extension reduces its exposure to enemy air defense systems,” he said.

At Project Convergence, the Army used JPADS to conduct an aerial resupply mission through congested airspace to a GPS-jammed battlefield. Despite friendly and enemy aircraft crowding the skies, the system delivered 4,000 pounds of supplies so accurately that soldiers didn’t need GPS on the ground to locate it, Callis said.

The experiment reflects an operating environment Army leaders said they believe will be common in the future: one with multiple manned and unmanned systems, as well as cyber and electronic warfare technologies.

The service is evaluating different ways an adversary can contest logistics and how autonomous capabilities could give them an advantage, Lt. Gen. Charles Hamilton, deputy chief of staff for Army logistics, told reporters.

“We’ve gone uncontested in the last 20-plus years now in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Hamilton said. “We know that will not be the case in the next large-scale combat operation.”


 
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