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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Those Leo1 were old and worn down. Like Keith Richards level old.

Don't be knocking my man Keith. He's not ready for CLAWR yet although he looks as if he has been since we bought the Leos.

KeithSplit.jpg
 
Those Leo1 were old and worn down. Like Keith Richards level old.
a ukrainian holding the line in 2022 with a maxim gun from 1916 has proven old things can still kill you if they work.

Back on topic though, I was thinking about the role of some PRes/ARes units today and realized i missed the obvious point that many of these units worked post WW2 until the 80s because of all the bases we had back then meant we had reg force units close to 90% of the reserves. In the 70s it made sense for the KOCR to be a tank unit because LdSH(RC) was 15 minutes down the road. Today many of the bases that could support the PRes with mutual training are gone, or moved but we never revisited the roles we wanted out of the PRes. Prime example is edmonton, B Sqn of the SALH is there, why not re-roll that squadron (and that one only) into tankers, and have them act as a defacto 4th squadron for LdSH(RC)? once they reach critical mass of say a company size, officially split SALH, and rebadge back to the Alberta Dragoons. We need to act smarter with our reserves, yes some trades have to be reg force only, but if it is only a twenty minute drive to base to use a simulator for example, why not?
 
a ukrainian holding the line in 2022 with a maxim gun from 1916 has proven old things can still kill you if they work.
Key word there is work.
Years ago in Sarcee Trg area we were doing dry drills with the LdSH, in their C1’s and our Grizzlies.
They let us climb around and briefly drive the Leo1’s — you could see the hull move with any bumps, and they admitted they had been scraped to a few MM thickness in some areas - and then showed us one with a hole on the bottom of the hull from a rock puncture.
That was in the Mid 90’s…
Those tanks were absolutely thrashed beyond refurbishing.

Back on topic though, I was thinking about the role of some PRes/ARes units today and realized i missed the obvious point that many of these units worked post WW2 until the 80s because of all the bases we had back then meant we had reg force units close to 90% of the reserves. In the 70s it made sense for the KOCR to be a tank unit because LdSH(RC) was 15 minutes down the road. Today many of the bases that could support the PRes with mutual training are gone, or moved but we never revisited the roles we wanted out of the PRes. Prime example is edmonton, B Sqn of the SALH is there, why not re-roll that squadron (and that one only) into tankers, and have them act as a defacto 4th squadron for LdSH(RC)? once they reach critical mass of say a company size, officially split SALH, and rebadge back to the Alberta Dragoons. We need to act smarter with our reserves, yes some trades have to be reg force only, but if it is only a twenty minute drive to base to use a simulator for example, why not?
The PRes for years has had no equipment.
When the Regular Force doesn’t have enough of some items, I don’t think it matters what one does with the PRes - as even if trained on equipment there won’t be enough for units to actually use. — it just allows for some extra troops for augmentation.

Granted that isn’t necessarily a bad thing, but it doesn’t solve the fact that PRes units are just then really feeder units for Regular units
Then the question is why just not make them part of a Reg unit…
 
a ukrainian holding the line in 2022 with a maxim gun from 1916 has proven old things can still kill you if they work.

Back on topic though, I was thinking about the role of some PRes/ARes units today and realized i missed the obvious point that many of these units worked post WW2 until the 80s because of all the bases we had back then meant we had reg force units close to 90% of the reserves. In the 70s it made sense for the KOCR to be a tank unit because LdSH(RC) was 15 minutes down the road. Today many of the bases that could support the PRes with mutual training are gone, or moved but we never revisited the roles we wanted out of the PRes. Prime example is edmonton, B Sqn of the SALH is there, why not re-roll that squadron (and that one only) into tankers, and have them act as a defacto 4th squadron for LdSH(RC)? once they reach critical mass of say a company size, officially split SALH, and rebadge back to the Alberta Dragoons. We need to act smarter with our reserves, yes some trades have to be reg force only, but if it is only a twenty minute drive to base to use a simulator for example, why not?

FWIW, there was a Reg F Inf unit located about 2 kms from my ARes Inf unit for decades, before they moved it out of the province.

The only interaction that we had with them was... was... nothing. Nothing at all.

Apart from - of course - being regularly belittled by them in various petty ways, as is the time honoured tradition, such as during the FRY deployments of the 90s when they took every opportunity to humiliate the troops we sent there for 'selection' for the various tours. Based on the leadership I saw there, I became convinced that there was no way I would ever strive to coordinate anything with a unit like that again.

In any case, as I recall, we made the occasional attempt to plan out some joint training but there was no interest at all mainly because: weekends.

I guess the message here is that you can co-locate ARes and Reg F units but, without a higher level plan that intentionally integrates their leadership and operations in some way, along the lines of the 10/90 experience for example, nothing much will happen.
 
FWIW, there was a Reg F Inf unit located about 2 kms from my ARes Inf unit for decades, before they moved it out of the province.

The only interaction that we had with them was... was... nothing. Nothing at all.

Apart from - of course - being regularly belittled by them in various petty ways, as is the time honoured tradition, such as during the FRY deployments of the 90s when they took every opportunity to humiliate the troops we sent there for 'selection' for the various tours. Based on the leadership I saw there, I became convinced that there was no way I would ever strive to coordinate anything with a unit like that again.

In any case, as I recall, we made the occasional attempt to plan out some joint training but there was no interest at all mainly because: weekends.

I guess the message here is that you can co-locate ARes and Reg F units but, without a higher level plan that intentionally integrates their leadership and operations in some way, along the lines of the 10/90 experience for example, nothing much will happen.

The Res V Reg thing in the Army is very strange from the outside looking in.
 
FWIW, there was a Reg F Inf unit located about 2 kms from my ARes Inf unit for decades, before they moved it out of the province.

The only interaction that we had with them was... was... nothing. Nothing at all.

Apart from - of course - being regularly belittled by them in various petty ways, as is the time honoured tradition, such as during the FRY deployments of the 90s when they took every opportunity to humiliate the troops we sent there for 'selection' for the various tours. Based on the leadership I saw there, I became convinced that there was no way I would ever strive to coordinate anything with a unit like that again.

In any case, as I recall, we made the occasional attempt to plan out some joint training but there was no interest at all mainly because: weekends.

I guess the message here is that you can co-locate ARes and Reg F units but, without a higher level plan that intentionally integrates their leadership and operations in some way, along the lines of the 10/90 experience for example, nothing much will happen.
One of the biggest issues I noticed on both sides of the fence was that for some trades (cough Infantry cough) neither leadership really wanted to work together, while Artillery and Engineers where a lot more inclusive.

I don’t think 10/90 went far enough, and while it was successful for some units, others actively sabotaged it.
30/70 and 70/30 units actually put enough of each to force everyone to have skin in the game.
 
And this one

 
It is clear by a lot of articles that anyone without a brain is allowed to comment on Defense issues.

The Real Clear Defense Article Conclusions are a major miss, as they don't seem to grasp the WHY and HOW that some situations in Ukraine occur - as use them as a "FACT" to prove a point that doesn't actually exist.
 
It is clear by a lot of articles that anyone without a brain is allowed to comment on Defense issues.

The Real Clear Defense Article Conclusions are a major miss, as they don't seem to grasp the WHY and HOW that some situations in Ukraine occur - as use them as a "FACT" to prove a point that doesn't actually exist.

Anyone .....


Matthew Van Wagenen is a major general in the U.S. Army currently serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCOS OPS) in the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Arnel P. David is a colonel in the U.S. Army completing a PhD at King’s College London. He is the cofounder of Fight Club International.

The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect any entity or organization of the U.S. Government or NATO.
 
One of the biggest issues I noticed on both sides of the fence was that for some trades (cough Infantry cough) neither leadership really wanted to work together, while Artillery and Engineers where a lot more inclusive.

I don’t think 10/90 went far enough, and while it was successful for some units, others actively sabotaged it.
30/70 and 70/30 units actually put enough of each to force everyone to have skin in the game.
As a bit of an outsider, I have noticed the same mentality. The RegF guys denigrate the ResF, and the ResF denigrate the RegF. I remember one encounter with a Nav Res sailor who told me that my job was her secondary duty... She was so oblivious to how much she didn't know, that there was no point in discussing things further. She likely walked away thinking she "won" the discussion, and I walked away laughing at the huberis and lack of self-awareness.

I suspect a lot of the Reg vs. Res stupidity comes from not having enough interactions on a regular basis. That's why the 30/70, and 70/30 makes good sense to me as well. Both groups offer something unique and useful to Canada, it's just neither group seems willing to acknowledge that fact.
 
As a bit of an outsider, I have noticed the same mentality. The RegF guys denigrate the ResF, and the ResF denigrate the RegF. I remember one encounter with a Nav Res sailor who told me that my job was her secondary duty... She was so oblivious to how much she didn't know, that there was no point in discussing things further. She likely walked away thinking she "won" the discussion, and I walked away laughing at the huberis and lack of self-awareness.

I suspect a lot of the Reg vs. Res stupidity comes from not having enough interactions on a regular basis. That's why the 30/70, and 70/30 makes good sense to me as well. Both groups offer something unique and useful to Canada, it's just neither group seems willing to acknowledge that fact.

And that's part of the problem. Practicing and preparing to defend ones homeland should never be seen as a hobby.
 
I suspect a lot of the Reg vs. Res stupidity comes from not having enough interactions on a regular basis. That's why the 30/70, and 70/30 makes good sense to me as well. Both groups offer something unique and useful to Canada, it's just neither group seems willing to acknowledge that fact.

Believe me, based on watching RSS staff (embedded with ARes units) operate over the past few decades, the deep disrespect for the Reserves that seems ingrained into the Reg F can not be attributed to 'not having enough interactions'...
 
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