Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

This isn't really about Light Forces. My sense of Ukraine is that I am seeing Light, Medium and Heavy forces, Airborne and Leg, Cavalry and Infantry, conducting Dispersed Operations. Heavy forces are being penny-packeted forwards in groups of 3 or 4 vehicles, or 10 to 15 vehicles to deal with objectives that a kilometers from the next contact. Mutual Support doesn't seem to be very likely. That Troop/Platoon Leader is going to have to be very self-reliant and prepared for a variety of possibilities.

Seems to me, anyway.

I'd be careful in extrapolating the Ukraine war to war writ large. The circumstances of each conflict are different and designing your force for a Ukraine conflict may very well be "preparing for the last war" as much as the GWOT led us to many of the bad decisions we're facing with the CAF today.

Ukraine is a small defender with a mish-mash of weapons, vehicles and equipment scraped together from whatever sources they could find against a larger invading force. It does what it does because it must.

The US led West (including junior tag-along Canada) will likely face very different conditions. The air situation may be significantly different and the correlation of forces (both quantity and quality) will be different as well. The strength of the US (and allies) may eliminate the necessity to avoid concentration of forces and permit hard hitting maneuver warfare as per existing doctrine.

That's not to say that we should ignore what we're seeing in Ukraine or that we should not have forces capable of widely dispersed operations and grouping/regrouping of forces into more Combat Team type elements, but we also should not assume that our next war will look just like this current war.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'd be careful in extrapolating the Ukraine war to war writ large. The circumstances of each conflict are different and designing your force for a Ukraine conflict may very well be "preparing for the last war" as much as the GWOT led us to many of the bad decisions we're facing with the CAF today.

Ukraine is a small defender with a mish-mash of weapons, vehicles and equipment scraped together from whatever sources they could find against a larger invading force. It does what it does because it must.

The US led West (including junior tag-along Canada) will likely face very different conditions. The air situation may be significantly different and the correlation of forces (both quantity and quality) will be different as well. The strength of the US (and allies) may eliminate the necessity to avoid concentration of forces and permit hard hitting maneuver warfare as per existing doctrine.

That's not to say that we should ignore what we're seeing in Ukraine or that we should not have forces capable of widely dispersed operations and grouping/regrouping of forces into more Combat Team type elements, but we also should not assume that our next war will look just like this current war.

My sense is that most wars do not involve the major powers and most wars involve forces equipped with a mish mash of modern and ancient weapons from western, eastern and non-aligned sources. Catalogue shopping and stingy treasuries are endemic.

I think that Ukraine is closer to the future than a re-run of the Kuwait War, the last gasp of the Cold War armies.

I just do not believe that the concentration of a Corps, let alone a whole Army, will be possible.
First: I don't think any enemy will make it possible.
Second: I don't think any politician will want to risk a repeat of the Russian experience with the few precious Divisions actually available. At least in the OECD.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am

I try, but in my mind too many things are connected to be able to look at things in isolation.

Sometimes the tail does wag the dog.



All of which is reasonably covered by "It depends." And that, in my confused mind, is a legitimate response.

Am I considering too wide an envelope of possibilities? Or not seeing what you are seeing?

Going back to your 10 to 12 US Divisions, excluding a 2-ish from the USMC,

By my reckoning 12 Div HQs with 29 BCTs of various types among them, 1 BCT being independent, 2nd Inf Div having no troops of its own, 5 Divs only having 2 BCTs and only 6 having 3 BCTs,

11 of the 29 BCTs are Heavy-Combined Arms
18 of the 29 BCTs are Infantry in various transport (6 Leg, 5 Abn, 3 Helo, 4 Motorized (Stryker).

Those are organized under 4 Corps.

And considering a prolonged Ukraine scenario, say an Iraq or Afghanistan commitment but at current Ukrainian tempo, is it beyond reason to suppose that some portion of the force would have to be securing the rear, holding trenches, patrolling and screening large areas, while, at the same time, holding a mobile reserve force - probably heliborne, and a heavy striking force?

Which piece goes where? And how long can they keep it up?



See! Everything is connected.



Fair 'nuff.



My apologies.


I guess my view is that the person in charge sets the Intent and the Course of Action. Everybody else is assisting in the effort to achieve that Intent, subject to the restraints and constraints established by the Commander. In that sense I see all subordinate commanders as assistants.

Notwithstanding that their troops are their troops and directed and controlled under that person's orders.

Stepping back further, my fundamental position, was how to manage the flood of information available in the field today.

My contention is that the best place for that information to be managed is at the lowest level.

Commanders, at all levels, might be better served to focus on the results of their subordinates decisions and their performance rather than worrying about whether or not the subordinate is making the right decision in the instant. This isn't just a military thing. I hold the same view of life in the civilian world.

If the Commander/Manager starts trying to win every contact does he/she have that kind of bandwidth to operate effectively? If he doesn't trust his people in the field and feels the need to have a supervisor in his HQ to manage that person in the field does he need both people? Or should the supervisor replace the man in the field in the field?

This isn't really about Light Forces. My sense of Ukraine is that I am seeing Light, Medium and Heavy forces, Airborne and Leg, Cavalry and Infantry, conducting Dispersed Operations. Heavy forces are being penny-packeted forwards in groups of 3 or 4 vehicles, or 10 to 15 vehicles to deal with objectives that a kilometers from the next contact. Mutual Support doesn't seem to be very likely. That Troop/Platoon Leader is going to have to be very self-reliant and prepared for a variety of possibilities.

Seems to me, anyway.

I am struggling to see what is being argued here, but I will try to clarify the bit about command.

In the Canadian Army we have command and control. Command is the authority invested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. Control is authority exercised over the activities of subordinate formations. The two go together.

An OC of a company is not an assistant to their CO. They are a subordinate commander.

Regarding how we exercise command and control, the Canadian Army employs Mission Command. It includes the concept of delegating authority to subordinate commanders to use their initiative in accordance with the intent of their commander and their superior commander. Mission Command has three tenets: understanding intent; responsibility to fulfill intent; and swift de-centralized decision making.

So we are not supposed to micro-manage our subordinates in battle. Micro-management might happen, perhaps even for good reasons sometimes, but the expectation is that subordinate commanders use their initiative within the framework of intent. Platoon commanders should be using their initiative on the spot to make adjustments, even when comms are down.

Platoon commanders have to be able to work with a degree of independence, but mutual support is still a thing. If you just send all your platoons off "to do great things" without coordination then you are likely going to fail against someone who has orchestrated their battle.

 

[FJAG]

In the US it was more a legitimate creation of a force that bridged light and medium heavy capabilities.

Sorry. Used the wrong word there. Strykers were to bridge the gap between "light" IBCTs and the "heavy" ABCTs.

Don't all forces, light, medium, heavy, airborne, heliborne, cavalry, infantry and artillery need to be regularly re-examined for what they can do as the battlefield constantly changes? Not just in terms of what tools are missing but how the existing tools can be used in the current situation.

Yes, but the concept of the "mediums" lost a lot of gloss when they weren't strong enough to withstand the weaponry used by insurgent forces. That's even more an issue with the prevalence of cheap armed UAVs.

One can also argue about the vulnerability of heavy IFVs. There's a strange little dichotomy working right now between motorizing light infantry on light unarmoured runabouts or armouring their transport. We seem to have this penchant for creating little "Rat Patrols" (read Iltis) and as soon as we lose some people hurrying to armour them up (read G-Wagon, RG-31, TAPV) before the pendulum swings back again (read ISV).

Frankly, while I follow the arguments, I have a hard time deciding which way to go before surrendering to the notion that you need a bit of both so that you can meet changing circumstances. That's not a good strategy.

 

[KevinB]

My sense is that most wars do not involve the major powers and most wars involve forces equipped with a mish mash of modern and ancient weapons from western, eastern and non-aligned sources.

Yah! Let’s have another round of Peace Dividends….
Stop me if you’ve heard that before.

Catalogue shopping and stingy treasuries are endemic.

I think that Ukraine is closer to the future than a re-run of the Kuwait War, the last gasp of the Cold War armies.

So a Peer/Near Peer large power war?
Just so I’m following your rather divergent trains of thought.

I just do not believe that the concentration of a Corps, let alone a whole Army, will be possible.

Define concentration.

First: I don't think any enemy will make it possible.

Rock, Paper, Scissors: Your enemy will (or should) prepare to fight you in ways your aren’t prepared for.

Second: I don't think any politician will want to risk a repeat of the Russian experience with the few precious Divisions actually available. At least in the OECD.

The only reason to have a Military is to ensure your interests are looked after. Which really means you need to prepare for a Peer/Near Peer conflict.

Politicians should only commit the Military when National Interests are on the line. (Which can mean supporting allies or just the enemy of your enemy) So your Force needs to be equipped to deal with multiple potential threats and regions.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

We hobbled ourselves by believing the good times would keep rolling after 1989, and that PSO and COIN were the conflicts of the future. It has been prevalent in how we employed and funded projects for the RCN/RCAF, as well as believing we could ad-hoc the CA into larger formations without AFVs, AD, ATGM, or any form of depth.

PSO and COIN are tasks you can give a Peer/Near Peer military while it waits for bad things to happen. A PSO or COIN oriented military doesn't scale up to P/NP conflicts at the same rate.

But ofcourse, grown up nations know that and we still have our heads in the sand thinking Total War ended with the signing of the 3 Treaties we lean on for global security (UN, NATO, and NORAD)

 

[dapaterson]

 

[GR66]

I think that Ukraine is closer to the future than a re-run of the Kuwait War, the last gasp of the Cold War armies.

I just do not believe that the concentration of a Corps, let alone a whole Army, will be possible.
First: I don't think any enemy will make it possible.
Second: I don't think any politician will want to risk a repeat of the Russian experience with the few precious Divisions actually available. At least in the OECD.

I think Kirkhill may actually be a Russian...

The Russian Way of War in Ukraine: A Military Approach Nine Decades in the Making - Modern War Institute

When Ukrainian forces launched offensives last September in both the country’s northeast and the south, retaking six thousand square kilometers of Russian-occupied territory, it reinforced a narrative about the war […]

mwi.usma.edu

 

[KevinB]

I think Kirkhill may actually be a Russian...

The Russian Way of War in Ukraine: A Military Approach Nine Decades in the Making - Modern War Institute

When Ukrainian forces launched offensives last September in both the country’s northeast and the south, retaking six thousand square kilometers of Russian-occupied territory, it reinforced a narrative about the war […]

mwi.usma.edu

To be fair, the current DoD MDO has a lot of that as well, but is not solely committed to Dispersed Operations.

 

[McG]

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc49/sp/Collings.pdf

 

[KevinB]

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc49/sp/Collings.pdf

TBH I don’t think COA 3 made sense.
It still adheres to a Symmetrical CMBG.
Which makes Zero sense as not only does the CA not have Symmetrical CMBG’s due to equipment, but it misses the entire aspect that the Medium LAV Bde’s (inc 1 CMBG with Tanks) can’t do all the required missions of the CA.

While without massive restructuring of the PRes the idea of all the Regular Army under 1 Div makes more sense, I don’t think any of the COA’s is truly viable.

COA 2 in conjunction with a significant restructuring of the CA (Reg and PRes) truly is the only thing that makes sense to me.

The question would be the size, and that isn’t solely about the PY’s but it is significantly impacted by what equipment the GOC will fund the CA with.

 

[daftandbarmy]

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc49/sp/Collings.pdf

A telling observation, without naming names for career preservation purposes no doubt

"Despite the identification of force structure as a major hinderance to Army Modernization, and a subsequent collaborative planning process that led to the proposal of COA3 and its selection, during AC 21-05 it was decided to amend COA 3 so extensively that it no longer, at least from a tangible perspective, has much resemblance to what was deduced and chosen."

 

[Fabius]

From my perspective what’s telling is that COA 3 did not survive Army Council, COA 3.1 and the Army Warning Order to implement it didn’t survive an Army Change of Command.
Now F2025 is effectively dead with a few disjointed items still underway and the Army has actively and openly decided to stay with its status quo force structure.

To me it’s not whether or not COA3 was the right COA or not, it’s that the Army is institutionally unable to both generate viable COAs for ALL the Army and perhaps worse implement any change outside of small name changes and reshuffling a few dozen people.

That’s telling.

 

[daftandbarmy]

From my perspective what’s telling is that COA 3 did not survive Army Council, COA 3.1 and the Army Warning Order to implement it didn’t survive an Army Change of Command.
Now F2025 is effectively dead with a few disjointed items still underway and the Army has actively and openly decided to stay with its status quo force structure.

To me it’s not whether or not COA3 was the right COA or not, it’s that the Army is institutionally unable to both generate viable COAs for ALL the Army and perhaps worse implement any change outside of small name changes and reshuffling a few dozen people.

That’s telling.

 

[Kirkhill]

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc49/sp/Collings.pdf

A truly powerful force -

LAW I. Every object perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon.

 

[Kirkhill]

Or if you prefer Biology to Physics



Army Council?

 

[FJAG]

While without massive restructuring of the PRes the idea of all the Regular Army under 1 Div makes more sense, I don’t think any of the COA’s is truly viable.

COA 2 in conjunction with a significant restructuring of the CA (Reg and PRes) truly is the only thing that makes sense to me.

I think even COA 2 fell far short of the mark. COA3 is a reshuffling the deck chairs scenario at the best of times and simply a way of putting the reserves so far off to the side that they might as well become a home guard.

From my perspective what’s telling is that COA 3 did not survive Army Council, COA 3.1 and the Army Warning Order to implement it didn’t survive an Army Change of Command.
Now F2025 is effectively dead with a few disjointed items still underway and the Army has actively and openly decided to stay with its status quo force structure.

To me it’s not whether or not COA3 was the right COA or not, it’s that the Army is institutionally unable to both generate viable COAs for ALL the Army and perhaps worse implement any change outside of small name changes and reshuffling a few dozen people.

That’s telling.

Ain't that the truth. My cynicism about how deep the dysfunction has gone gets deeper every day. I think that government transparency (now there's a joke) should extend to publication of the minutes of all Army Council meetings.

 

[KevinB]

I think even COA 2 fell far short of the mark. COA3 is a reshuffling the deck chairs scenario at the best of times and simply a way of putting the reserves so far off to the side that they might as well become a home guard.



Ain't that the truth. My cynicism about how deep the dysfunction has gone gets deeper every day. I think that government transparency (now there's a joke) should extend to publication of the minutes of all Army Council meetings.

What I don’t get is that doesn’t the Army have doctrine? Or what exactly is the function of those doctrine folks in Kingston?

Between the mission given by the Government (still sadly SSE) and Doctine for force structures for those missions the makeup do the CA should be pretty simply.

SSE lays out:

Concurrent operations​

This policy ensures the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously:

• Defend Canada, including responding concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies in support of civilian authorities;
• Meet its NORAD obligations, with new capacity in some areas;
• Meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
• Contribute to international peace and stability through:
  • Two sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel, including one as a lead nation;
  • One time-limited deployment of ~500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
  • Two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel;
  • Two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~100-500 personnel;
  • One Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, with scaleable additional support; and
  • One Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, with scaleable additional support.

We’ve seen the math here before but as I’m one who loves to flog a dead horse…

Just for the International Peace and Security Missions:

2 Sustained missions 1 as lead for up to 1,500 troops each (3k)
Which needs to assume another 3k in ramp up so let’s say 6k requirement and that is just a 1 on 1 off rotation schedule.

1 limited duration deployment up to 1,500
This means a spare high readiness entity
And potentially stealing a ‘replacement’ force from your standing long duration missions.

2 smaller sustained deployments of up to 500, there is 1k more and their rotation for 2k

1 DART - with scalable additional support

1 NEO - with scalable additional support.
Generally this is one of the LIB’s

That doesn’t count the Defence of Canada requirement, nor the NORAD or NATO ALLOCATIONS.

So basically a ~10k bill for troops that doesn’t even have resources for a better than 1:1 rotation, nor does it really consider the NATO Article 5, which I think we can agree that the other tasks would need to stop to provide assets to NATO.

That also assumes a giant fallacy, in that all the tasks are cookie cutter as well (which the whole symmetric CMBG is based on).

1) The sustained mission rotation can be accepted at cookie cutter for purposes of this discussion.
However that doesn’t mean each sustained mission is the same, especially since one is as ‘Lead’ not sure what sort of leading a 1,500 pers ‘Battle Group’ will be doing in a world that deals with Divisions and Corps these days - but…
Regardless it’s the better part of 2 Brigades
That’s before rotations, and Canada only has 3 CMBG’s and a CSSB.

2) Limited Duration Missions of up to 1,500
This sounds like an awesome idea - but where is it going and what are the needs?
The logical approach would be to have a Heavy, Medium and Light Battle Group tagged for High Readiness for this — but Canada can’t really get a Heavy or Medium BattleGroup anywhere fast - so Light BattleGroup it is
Wait, Canada doesn’t have a Light Bde, so where is it finding the BattleGroup?

3) 2 Smaller BN- Sized sustained deployments. Well you better hope this is farmed off to the RCN, RCAF or PRes, as you’ve already run out of Regular Army bodies…



Quite honestly if I was the GOC, I’d be looking for some heads - even given the vagueness of SSE, the CA has failed miserably at providing any sort of force to meet the given mandate.

 

[Fabius]

Its not necessarily a question of doctrine for the Canadian Army although I would agree its part of it.

I have a lot of disagreement with SSE and how it was written. Couple items specific to Concurrent Operations and its last item, Contribute to international peace and stability.

• The Army has seized on Concurrency to the abandonment of any idea of mobilization or deployment of the entire Reg Force Army until the mission is done. This has follow on effects with the desire to maintain symmetrical Bdes and a focus on churing out BGs.
• The Government in the Contribute to international peace and stability bullets did not specify those items to any one element therefore its unclear as to if the RCN,CA and RCAF and CANSOF are supposed to provide all of those items themselves or in conjunction or which ones are an Air Wing and which ones are a Naval Task Group and which ones are a SOTF.
• The word deployment. That is just pure BS, you don't assign deployments you assign Tasks. To get to the assignment of a Task you need to figure out a few other items that are all related to strategic military readiness.
  • Readiness for "What". What do we see our Forces needing to do? PSO,COIN, LSCO in Europe, LSCO in the Pacific, Air Policing etc. etc. A PSO deployment is not a LSCO in Europe Deployment so we need to figure that out.
  • Readiness for "When". When do we see this conflict occuring and our forces to be ready for it? This turns into a balance of R&D with Modernization and Current Force structure.
  • Readiness of "What". If we pick LSCO in the Pacific, what does Canada see as necessary to WIN, or if you want what does Canada need to provide to help our allies and ourselves WIN? We need to put in place the resources and personnel to ensure that the "Of What" is of sufficient Mass and efficiency in line with the timeline we forsee for when we expect the conflict.

SSE did not provide any help in answering any of those questions and the CAF has done an equal job in ignoring them. The CA is realizing this but I think as an organization its still struggling to understand that Readiness is NOT merely Operational Readiness but also Structural Readiness and the fact that our Structural Readiness is abysmal is now impacting our Operational Readiness.

While I don't know I suspect the RCN and the RCAF are no better off in terms of Structural Readiness.

Final point is the in laying out these "deployments" vs using missions or tasks our forces continue to operate in relative silos vs operating in an actual joint manner to achieve a Canadian Task or Mission.

Maybe the Defence Policy Update will actually do a proper job of articulating our strategic vision and policy. I would hope it will although I won't be placing any bets on that.

 

[markppcli]

What I don’t get is that doesn’t the Army have doctrine? Or what exactly is the function of those doctrine folks in Kingston?

Between the mission given by the Government (still sadly SSE) and Doctine for force structures for those missions the makeup do the CA should be pretty simply.

We do have doctrine for force structure but it’s become so disconnected from our reality as to be meaningless.