Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

I know that a diverse population of people is serving in the Forces. But I doubt if many of them are immigrants unless they, like myself, were brought over as children and raised in Canada. They're parents are considerably less likely to be suitable recruiting fodder. My parents certainly were not. My Dad had done his bit in the UK and had little interest and no time to pursue any endeavours outside of establishing his family securely in this country.

It's not the immigrants themselves that will be the prime recruiting targets. It will be the increasingly Canadianized children of immigrants and their children that will be the targets.

Ignoring the vast majority of the overall population that is concentrated in urban centers and is increasingly from more recent (and largely non-European nations) immigrant stock is definitely NOT the way to solve the CAFs recruitment issues.

 

[tomydoom]

As opposed to all the wars inside Canada?

I and several others here have noted that Canada is in the enviable location of having only one other country it shares a land border with, and that country is also a major security guarantor.

We have a land border with 2 countries now, one can't forgot about those aggressive Danes on Hans Island.

 

[Kirkhill]

As opposed to all the wars inside Canada?

See my response to @FJAG

I and several others here have noted that Canada is in the enviable location of having only one other country it shares a land border with, and that country is also a major security guarantor.

I agree.

But I bring your attention to Adam Smith:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.

To rephrase:

It is not from the benevolence of the United States, that we expect our defence, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.

From here on I find we are in virtual agreement.

My point on the population centers as focus areas doesn’t ignore the smaller towns.

Good.

I just don’t see the ability to put a BN in those towns.

Agreed - and Sam Hughes would have said much the same although he wanted to be able to raise a battalion from a small town in an emergency. A bit different than establishing a permanent battalion. The regimental system appealed to civic pride and fostered competition between towns. And even if only a platoon paraded on a regular basis, in 10 years time a battalion of soldiers had passed through those doors and received some rudimentary training. They were also more engaged taxpayers.

Maybe a company or Platoon, but it needs to tied to a larger entity.

Agreed

As well the PRes weeknight training won’t work in some areas, as while I do think some personnel will put up with a 45min one way drive for 3hrs, not everyone will, and anything longer will see even fewer people have interest.

How about driving two and a half hours each way from Lethbridge to Calgary every Wednesday night? I have personal knowledge of that lifestyle. And I wasn't getting paid for travel hours or gas. There are people that will engage their passions, to use an overused word.

Having said that idiots of that sort are in the minority.

And trips of that sort, to receive a 40 minute lecture from a hockey player on the benefits of brushing my teeth, are totally unnecessary now. Those PER objectives could be managed far more effectively on-line. What can't be managed on-line is the social connections necessary to build a cohesive unit from a group of individuals. That requires meeting physically. And that is the time and place for those activities that can't be reduced to listening to a lecture and writing a test.

That Wednesday night meeting in a local armoury for physical training, for range work, for section battle drills, for cleaning weapons and yes, having a beer and sausage afterwards, is a key part of that effort

I do think Canada’s current basing structure is extremely inadequate. The ‘super base’ concept was significantly selfish to the Regular Army in theory, and in practice just a bad idea.

Agreed.

Edmonton to me sticks out a terrible location. Part of that is I didn’t like the city, but not having a real training area as part of it was also a major annoyance. I accept that Calgary was losing Sarcee, but Petawawa just crosses the Highway, and Valcartier has one integral as well.

Geographically the loss of BC bases made a huge hole. One that I believe needs to be corrected.
Southern Ontario is another area that should have some sort of reasonable base and training area, and I don’t consider Border or Meaford to be significant in that respect.

Saskatchewan is fairly devoid of Army presence, as is Southern Alberta and Western Ontario.

Agreed across the board - especially the bit about Edmonton. There is a reason I picked Calgary over Edmonton when I moved out west.

I’m of the opinion a LIB should be able to find a home somewhere on the BC coast and another near Merritt, with other units as well, that could provide a tether for satellite sub units as spokes around the wagon wheel.

Mech units should have a footprint in Wainwright, Southern Alberta, across the Prairies.

Assuming that 6-7 Maneuver Brigades is what Canada is able to provide using Canada’s geography should be a focus for those - and the related other structures.

Here we seem to be in partial agreement.

I believe that all soldiering starts with Infantry skills and that Infantry skills can be taught locally with very little specialized equipment. Boots, helmet and rifle form the minimum requirements.

I also believe that Mechanized Infantry is/was just Infantry riding in an armoured truck, as opposed to riding in an unarmoured truck, or a boat, or a helicopter. Or even falling out an aircraft. All of those are means to deliver an infantry battalion to battle where the fight is conducted on the same terms in every case.

I make a clear, in my mind, differentiation between Infantry and Armoured Infantry/Dragoons/Panzer Grenadiers. They have always had to work under constraints that the Infantry didn't have to worry about - short carbines for horses and vehicles, small sections for armoured vehicles etc.

So, to my way of thinking, small companies of infantry scattered around the country with an integral transport section/platoon, which in practice results in a range of capabilities not dissimilar to a light cavalry squadron, is a good basis for organizing a Militia which can be used as a Reserve. Paid or Unpaid.

For the more technical trades - their situations are different and I would have said that the Artillery has special needs - but as the trade moves towards "two men and a coffee pot" staring at video screens while playing with their joysticks I question how much range time operators, as opposed to technicians, need to keep up their skills. Perhaps on-line simulators, coupled with a realworld training aid at the armouries and three or four weekend range camps a year would meet the requirement. I don't know but I don't think the gunners need to be pounding rounds down range every Wednesday night and two weekends a month.

Add in containerization of weapons systems, remote control of the weapons and on-board diagnostics and simulations then I think that the 70 to 90% solution for the Artillery is within its grasp. And TEWTs for C2 development are becoming a more realistic alternative.

Beyond that - a tech is a tech in both the civilian and the uniformed world. And they are hired for the skills they acquire from schooling and experience. The CAF needs to bring some of those onboard to manage the equipment. It also needs to prepared to send its equipment to technicians who may or may not be uniformed. And if turnaround times with civilian maintenance is too long then that needs to be managed with inventory control, warehousing and, when necessary, more equipment to make sure that what is necessary is on hand.

 

[Kirkhill]

It's not the immigrants themselves that will be the prime recruiting targets. It will be the increasingly Canadianized children of immigrants and their children that will be the targets.

Ignoring the vast majority of the overall population that is concentrated in urban centers and is increasingly from more recent (and largely non-European nations) immigrant stock is definitely NOT the way to solve the CAFs recruitment issues.

Nobody is saying anything about ignoring anybody.

Although I feel that many people are ignoring everybody outside of those urban centres.

I know it costs money to engage with Canadians outside of the Metropolitan areas. I know. I have spent a lifetime travelling in Canada and the US trying to engage and maintain contact. It costs money to do business in Canada. Any business.

And I most certainly am not ignoring youngsters of any origins. All of them are potential recruits and good troops. Again, I have worked with many of them. Turbans and skean dubhs, pink hair, nose piercings, tattoos and all. As I have worked with competent, trustworthy people who have spent time locked up. Everybody needs to be taken as they come and given the opportunity to stick you with a sucker-punch. I have experienced more of those from the great and the good than from any of the factory floor.

 

[Eaglelord17]

I don’t think those Volunteers are worth much, and I’m equally sure that they won’t bring anyone of much value to the party.


So 200 of those and probably 4+ Majors for each of them, and maybe another 100 Col and above?
Seems about 5% of the PRes by rank are fairly useless to its actual structure.

Even worse using @Fabius data point

Most units have 1-3 majors with it leaning towards the 1-2 mark. Succession planning is a huge issue for the Reserves and many units are now struggling to produce the LCols for the unit due to the limited time they can be CO and the lack of majors and lower rank officers to feed into the positions.

Yes they are over weight on some officers but overall the Reserves has a ratio of about 10:1 for soldier to officer, regs is about 4:1.

Some serious thought needs to be put into all our structures.

We're not trying to build a 1,000,000 man army. All we need is 20 to 30,000 to fill out what's there.

I think your view of immigrants is skewed. Take a look at the nominal rolls of some of the units in Toronto and Vancouver some day. There's plenty of diversity and if you give them a unit to be proud of the numbers will swell.

The point is we need to exploit those population centres. We keep whinging that its too expensive for a soldier there but the urban populations keep swelling at the expense of the rural ones. We just need to offer stability so that people's spouses can have jobs and they can stay near their families. The trick is to design an annual training cycle that works around urban basing. That's easy for reservists and a bit harder but by no means impossible for the regulars.

Keep in mind the rural areas are not shrinking they just aren’t growing at the same rate the urban areas are.

We have more rural Canadians today than any point in Canadian history (a bit over 7 million). In WWI we had 8 million people in country and fielded 650k. So for our substantially reduced CAF our rural population alone should be able to sustain it, let alone when you add in the 33 million other Canadians.

The fact we are failing to speaks volumes about the state of the military.

 

[KevinB]

I suspect a significant lack of focus is major part of the problem.

Meanwhile in Poland

US State Dept. clears $15B sale of missile defense system for Poland

Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion of neighboring Ukraine, Poland is clambering to buy high-end defense capabilities.

www.defensenews.com

 

[Halifax Tar]

Most units have 1-3 majors with it leaning towards the 1-2 mark. Succession planning is a huge issue for the Reserves and many units are now struggling to produce the LCols for the unit due to the limited time they can be CO and the lack of majors and lower rank officers to feed into the positions.

Yes they are over weight on some officers but overall the Reserves has a ratio of about 10:1 for soldier to officer, regs is about 4:1.

Some serious thought needs to be put into all our structures.

At the Svc Bn I was/am volunteering with they had almost no Sgts and WOs, 2 MWOs and 1 CWO. Lots of MCpls and below.

The NCM middle is in scary shape as well, from my observations.

 

[Eaglelord17]

At the Svc Bn I was/am volunteering with they had almost no Sgts and WOs, 2 MWOs and 1 CWO. Lots of MCpls and below.

The NCM middle is in scary shape as well, from my observations.

From what I have heard that is universal across the CAF.

The Reserve units I have seen the NCM middle is in the same boat. I know for myself a big part of why I am not farther along is when I had the time for courses the CAF didn’t provide them. Approximately 16 summer months I have had available in my career for training, taskings, etc. they only successfully employed me about 4 months of that in spite of me being available for all that time.

During that time I could have easily gotten PLQ, a Sgts course, more experience in different taskings, etc. Now? I have a civilian career I cannot put on hold for essentially what is a hobby at this point.

They wasted their opportunities to train, and now the units are crying there is no one trained and qualified.

That being said there is more opportunity now than when I joined. I lost a year and a half in the recruiting process, now it takes them a couple months. I lost all that potential training time, they have summer RST which guarantees them training during the summer for the first few years.

What is unfortunate is I don’t see many new recruits taking advantage of the opportunities available.

 

[markppcli]

Most units have 1-3 majors with it leaning towards the 1-2 mark. Succession planning is a huge issue for the Reserves and many units are now struggling to produce the LCols for the unit due to the limited time they can be CO and the lack of majors and lower rank officers to feed into the positions.

The requirement to generate LCols would be solved if we didn’t have 52 positions for them. We’ve created, or rather kept, a structure built on the idea that the CO just had to march his jolly band up on down the main drag once or twice a year. The requirements to make LCol reflect a much newer reality, but our structure doesn’t align to it.

Yes they are over weight on some officers but overall the Reserves has a ratio of about 10:1 for soldier to officer, regs is about 4:1.

Well yes, that’s to be expected when you account for all the higher HQ and School functions.

Some serious thought needs to be put into all our structures.

Completely agree

Keep in mind the rural areas are not shrinking they just aren’t growing at the same rate the urban areas are.

Relative decline in terms of percentage is usually what’s meant.

We have more rural Canadians today than any point in Canadian history (a bit over 7 million). In WWI we had 8 million people in country and fielded 650k. So for our substantially reduced CAF our rural population alone should be able to sustain it, let alone when you add in the 33 million other Canadians.

The fact we are failing to speaks volumes about the state of the military.

I think we’re failing at having a system that really works for folks. Having to drive 45 minutes to an hour for a 3 hour training night spend in half heartedly planned lectures isnt an attractive prospect when the alternative is spending time with your family. We need to look at the concept of the parade night and have a better training concept developed.

I can’t imagine training events being an attractive prospects to a 30 year old reservist with a career and a family, similarly I can’t imagine one being keen for a four month long 5b. These things all have to be addressed. Realistic structure and a training time line that makes it worth it.

 

[McG]

The requirement to generate LCols would be solved if we didn’t have 52 positions for them. We’ve created, or rather kept, a structure built on the idea that the CO just had to march his jolly band up on down the main drag once or twice a year.

Once upon a time, not that long ago, the CAF had many CO positions that were established as majors (and even a few established as captains). Culturally, the CAF has grown more & more ridged in the idea that COs must be established as LCol and majors a sub-unit commanders. The RCN (which doesn’t have sub-units on a ship) seems to remain the most flexible toward establishing CO positions at different ranks commensurate with the task, while CA seems the most strongly wedded to the idea that a CO must be LCol. There are exceptions to this trend. Maybe it is time to consider reversing the trend. Maybe it is time to accept that a company sized organization can be a unit with a CO who is only a major. Then we will not need quite so many jr office & major slots to generate LCols.

… of course, that necessitates addressing our institutional want for all those LCol CO positions so that we can generate personnel into the GOFO positions above them.

 

[KevinB]

Part of my questioning of Parade Nights was if one was to toss those in the trash, one could add a second Weekend a month, or longer summer training block.

WRT the longer ‘summer’ block, TBH, I think 2 weeks is pretty much the minimum that the PRes should be committed to for a summer — that also requires legislation to ensure that all members attend.
—> Frankly I’d prefer a 21-28 day period, but I am not sure that Canada would support that amount of unpaid leave for military duty across the country.

The course length is also why I believe that certain ranks at this point in time are beyond the PRes system for the majority of members.

For most PRes members joining at 17, that gives 2 years of HS, and possibly 4 more at University/College. While I don’t think it’s unreasonable to get most Reg Force courses into a 3-4 month summer schedule, for the majority of students that is 6 years max.
Sure some may go on to post Grad work / but by and large most are in the work force by then - and unless they have a government job, or something else that provides a great deal of flexibility, you probably have a 6A NCO at most and a Phase 4 Officer -
Beyond that few will have the available time to progress, without changing the courses significantly, which while I think most of us agree there is a bit of useless time and material in a lot of CAF courses - including advanced courses for SNCO and Officers, I don’t see any viability of a 6 month course chopped into 6-8 3 week blocks.
Those that have the ability to take full regular courses, then by all means course load then on one, provided they meet the prerequisites.

Which is why I think the 30/70, 70/30, 60/40 and 40/60 mixed units of Reg to PRes make a lot of sense.

A PRes Unit parading a Platoon plus really offers nothing to anyone- least of all the Canadian Tax Payer.
A 30/70 Coy Minus with a Reg Force 30% is a valid entity — even more so if 30-45min away is a 30/70 Platoon that makes that Conpany whole.

Or you could have a Infantry Coy HQ there with one Inf platoon, a Armoured Troop and an Engineer Troop, and an hour away the Armoured Squadron has its HQ, and a Troop, plus and Infantry Platoon etc.
(If you don’t want a Lt and Sgt and a few troops without a Maj and CSM around)

The combinations are infinite - and provided there is a training area inside a 4hr drive - I don’t see the problem with that sort of approach

 

[FJAG]

There are two key factors at play when you talk about this topic.

1) with several two month and 4 month summer school breaks you can turn out a very good part-time basic soldier or junior officer for the combat arms. If you combine that with a specific skills oriented community college or university program then you can also turn out a fairly good technician in numerous fields.

2) its very difficult to turn out a part-time senior leader (by which I start at the major level) because even if they have the time to take the requisite training they will not gain the requisite experience for the job. The job has simply become too complex.

The end result is that to create a part-time company that is trained, efficient and capable of rapid mobilization as an entity you need approximately a 10% full time complement as a minimum to fill the key leadership and technical roles (OC, CSM, CQMS, Comms Sgt, Tpt Sgt, clerk, 5 or so others depending on unit function and equipment.

Within a 30/70 battalion with one 100/0 company and two 10/90 companies (plus 30/70 CS and CSS companies) you have a sufficient density of RegF personnel that the battalion can function year round in all the normal training and career development activities needed to progress the RegF elements. In addition there is sufficient full time staff and equipment to lead, administer and train the ResF component.

One thing that I think has to disappear is the weekday parade nights. They are inefficient and a drain on resources. If one goes to a one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer routine then the 10% portion of the 10/90 companies can be involved in normal battalion activities, training, career development etc and still perform leadership and management of their companies. More importantly, it relieves the burden on the captains, senior Lts, WOs and sergeants for constant parading at the point in their lives where they have families and jobs.

One has to balance the attendance profile of the young students who have the time and need for money who should be trained thoroughly and that of the very essential middle level company leadership who no longer have the time but whose experience is valuable. This transfers much of the conduct of training burden onto the full timers where it should be.

 

[Kirkhill]

Once upon a time, not that long ago, the CAF had many CO positions that were established as majors (and even a few established as captains). Culturally, the CAF has grown more & more ridged in the idea that COs must be established as LCol and majors a sub-unit commanders. The RCN (which doesn’t have sub-units on a ship) seems to remain the most flexible toward establishing CO positions at different ranks commensurate with the task, while CA seems the most strongly wedded to the idea that a CO must be LCol. There are exceptions to this trend. Maybe it is time to consider reversing the trend. Maybe it is time to accept that a company sized organization can be a unit with a CO who is only a major. Then we will not need quite so many jr office & major slots to generate LCols.

… of course, that necessitates addressing our institutional want for all those LCol CO positions so that we can generate personnel into the GOFO positions above them.

Could it be made to work if the local unit were commanded by a local Captain while the Company Major were on the staff of a "regional" Lt Col and responsible for training and performance of the sub unit? More of a QA role than a direct Command role? When the Coy deployed under a Battalion the Major would be responsible for taking the Captain and his company into the field.

That might allow Majors to spend more time at Battalion/Regiment? Maybe?
It might also develop the Captains more...
Just thinkin'.

 

[Kirkhill]

There are two key factors at play when you talk about this topic.

1) with several two month and 4 month summer school breaks you can turn out a very good part-time basic soldier or junior officer for the combat arms. If you combine that with a specific skills oriented community college or university program then you can also turn out a fairly good technician in numerous fields.

2) its very difficult to turn out a part-time senior leader (by which I start at the major level) because even if they have the time to take the requisite training they will not gain the requisite experience for the job. The job has simply become too complex.

The end result is that to create a part-time company that is trained, efficient and capable of rapid mobilization as an entity you need approximately a 10% full time complement as a minimum to fill the key leadership and technical roles (OC, CSM, CQMS, Comms Sgt, Tpt Sgt, clerk, 5 or so others depending on unit function and equipment.

Within a 30/70 battalion with one 100/0 company and two 10/90 companies (plus 30/70 CS and CSS companies) you have a sufficient density of RegF personnel that the battalion can function year round in all the normal training and career development activities needed to progress the RegF elements. In addition there is sufficient full time staff and equipment to lead, administer and train the ResF component.

One thing that I think has to disappear is the weekday parade nights. They are inefficient and a drain on resources. If one goes to a one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer routine then the 10% portion of the 10/90 companies can be involved in normal battalion activities, training, career development etc and still perform leadership and management of their companies. More importantly, it relieves the burden on the captains, senior Lts, WOs and sergeants for constant parading at the point in their lives where they have families and jobs.

One has to balance the attendance profile of the young students who have the time and need for money who should be trained thoroughly and that of the very essential middle level company leadership who no longer have the time but whose experience is valuable. This transfers much of the conduct of training burden onto the full timers where it should be.

For the Young Students cadre - is there a role for a Sr Cadets type commitment based on the Weeknight parading system? No expectations from those youngsters but a more rigorous familiarization programme for those who haven't had previous exposure.

The point about ditching Weeknight commitment makes a lot of sense otherwise. Frankly turning up for dental hygiene lectures on a Wednesday night is more likely to thin the ranks than swell them.

 

[Eaglelord17]

Personally I still think a more Swiss method makes sense for us. I would completely ditch parade nights, weekend exs, etc. and go to a once a year one month commitment with the time guaranteed off work by leglislation.

Have the first week or two be IBTS, range shoots, medicals, etc. second block be a field ex.

Have the training done either as a year or two of full time regular force training or as part time in the summers as currently offered.

No requirement to do the one month ex each year until OFP. Also limited to 5 years to become OFP (very limited exceptions for that).

We could even take this model into the 21st century and get rid of local units and instead have everything completely spread out with some centralized ops warrant sending emails for potential tasks and courses across the country.

Have all the leadership and planning for the units formed out of the Regs, but the planning should be substantial reduced in requirements simply because they only have to plan for one months worth of training as a collective ( as opposed to the very admin heavy planning required for the Reserves currently).

Still have class A, B and C for various small tasks/deployments, etc. but there wouldn’t be as much of a need for it to be used on a regular basis.

Pros of said system would be less admin, more competent soldiers, the ability to hire better for the Reserves (i.e. not limited by what a local unit offers rather what the national availability is), no requirement to maintain expensive and costly armouries across the country, less requirement for class Bs, more ability to include Canadians from everywhere in country (could be middle of nowhere or downtown Toronto, everyone would only have to go to the exercise), and most importantly a more combat capable force which can actually generate full strength units.

Cons would be the death of the locally aligned units and the visibility that comes with that. Would also require substantial Reg force commitment to make it work. That being said it actually might be less commitment than what is currently required with the various spread out units all requiring tons of attached reg support anyways.

 

[markppcli]

Personally I still think a more Swiss method makes sense for us. I would completely ditch parade nights, weekend exs, etc. and go to a once a year one month commitment with the time guaranteed off work by leglislation.

That’s not the Swiss system.

A Swiss soldier will begin their service with a 21 week long basic training period then complete six 3 week long training periods over nine years. Given that they haven’t engaged in a conflict since the invention of the internal combustion engine I don’t know how the results of this can be judged. Personally I think the skill fade must be severe.

Have the first week or two be IBTS, range shoots, medicals, etc. second block be a field ex.

Have the training done either as a year or two of full time regular force training or as part time in the summers as currently offered.

No requirement to do the one month ex each year until OFP. Also limited to 5 years to become OFP (very limited exceptions for that).

We could even take this model into the 21st century and get rid of local units and instead have everything completely spread out with some centralized ops warrant sending emails for potential tasks and courses across the country.

If we’re centralizing an Ops WO, who’s going to need some more staff and will probably report to a regional Captain / Major haven’t we really just made local units ?

Have all the leadership and planning for the units formed out of the Regs, but the planning should be substantial reduced in requirements simply because they only have to plan for one months worth of training as a collective ( as opposed to the very admin heavy planning required for the Reserves currently).

Planning a month long ex, with everyone coming from different places and not in formed units, is going to be a fair bit more complex and time consuming frankly. I do think though that if we look at total staffing hours there must be an incredible amount of waste when the Cameron Highlanders and Winnipeg Rifles are off doing separate training (as a hypothetical example).

Still have class A, B and C for various small tasks/deployments, etc. but there wouldn’t be as much of a need for it to be used on a regular basis.

I wouldn’t get rid of the class a commitment. I think once a month gatherings for training are fairly important just to get hands on tools and establish some sense of cohesion.

Pros of said system would be less admin, more competent soldiers, the ability to hire better for the Reserves (i.e. not limited by what a local unit offers rather what the national availability is), no requirement to maintain expensive and costly armouries across the country, less requirement for class Bs, more ability to include Canadians from everywhere in country (could be middle of nowhere or downtown Toronto, everyone would only have to go to the exercise), and most importantly a more combat capable force which can actually generate full strength units.

I don’t see you actually making a point for most of these Pros. One month long exercises seems to me to amount to less training with much longer gaps for skill fade. Additionally it seems to make it more likely that you’ll have a harder time keeping tabs on people and equipping them. With regards to closing armouries, surely we’d still need a bunch of regional depots ?

Cons would be the death of the locally aligned units and the visibility that comes with that. Would also require substantial Reg force commitment to make it work. That being said it actually might be less commitment than what is currently required with the various spread out units all requiring tons of attached reg support anyways.

Death of small units that serve no purpose isn’t a con in my books. I’m unconvinced of these “deep ties to the community that get brought up. I wonder how many people in say Sudbury know about the Canadian Irish Regiment? But I digress. I’m all for folding in a bunch of duplicated functions, but I also believe we need people to report to a structure and a that soldiers meet their leaders and vice versa. Faceless numbers slotting to positions does not sn effective fighting force make. Take a note of the Swiss model you referenced earlier, they actually spend their entire service inside the same units with the same guys from day one till they age out.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Once upon a time, not that long ago, the CAF had many CO positions that were established as majors (and even a few established as captains). Culturally, the CAF has grown more & more ridged in the idea that COs must be established as LCol and majors a sub-unit commanders. The RCN (which doesn’t have sub-units on a ship) seems to remain the most flexible toward establishing CO positions at different ranks commensurate with the task, while CA seems the most strongly wedded to the idea that a CO must be LCol. There are exceptions to this trend. Maybe it is time to consider reversing the trend. Maybe it is time to accept that a company sized organization can be a unit with a CO who is only a major. Then we will not need quite so many jr office & major slots to generate LCols.

… of course, that necessitates addressing our institutional want for all those LCol CO positions so that we can generate personnel into the GOFO positions above them.

You bring up a pretty good point that made me think about another verboten organization to compare our reserves to that had tackled this problem with rank inflation: Cadets.

Now before I get run out of town on the rails, this is more the issue we have with Total Effective Strength and Total Authorized Strength. At least back when I was volunteering with a small corps, the Cadet promotions were based on total effective strength; meaning if you were parading 25 Cadets on average, the highest rank for a Cadet that would be the "SM, Coxswain, Sqn Chief" would be a WO/PO1 equivalent. They still maintained the position, but the rank stayed as such. It also incentivized corps/sqns to recruit and retain members, while also preventing rank inflation.

Perhaps if Unit COs want to be LCols, they need to invest in retention and recruitment. If not, well if you parade at a Coy minus strength; that leads one to believe that's a Major or Senior Captain level of responsibility, and that can be folded into a larger TBG CoC headed by a LCol.

 

[Eaglelord17]

That’s not the Swiss system.

A Swiss soldier will begin their service with a 21 week long basic training period then complete six 3 week long training periods over nine years. Given that they haven’t engaged in a conflict since the invention of the internal combustion engine I don’t know how the results of this can be judged. Personally I think the skill fade must be severe.



If we’re centralizing an Ops WO, who’s going to need some more staff and will probably report to a regional Captain / Major haven’t we really just made local units ?



Planning a month long ex, with everyone coming from different places and not in formed units, is going to be a fair bit more complex and time consuming frankly. I do think though that if we look at total staffing hours there must be an incredible amount of waste when the Cameron Highlanders and Winnipeg Rifles are off doing separate training (as a hypothetical example).


I wouldn’t get rid of the class a commitment. I think once a month gatherings for training are fairly important just to get hands on tools and establish some sense of cohesion.



I don’t see you actually making a point for most of these Pros. One month long exercises seems to me to amount to less training with much longer gaps for skill fade. Additionally it seems to make it more likely that you’ll have a harder time keeping tabs on people and equipping them. With regards to closing armouries, surely we’d still need a bunch of regional depots ?



Death of small units that serve no purpose isn’t a con in my books. I’m unconvinced of these “deep ties to the community that get brought up. I wonder how many people in say Sudbury know about the Canadian Irish Regiment? But I digress. I’m all for folding in a bunch of duplicated functions, but I also believe we need people to report to a structure and a that soldiers meet their leaders and vice versa. Faceless numbers slotting to positions does not sn effective fighting force make. Take a note of the Swiss model you referenced earlier, they actually spend their entire service inside the same units with the same guys from day one till they age out.

Swiss like, not their exact system itself.

Your assuming the training done on parade nights and weekends is inherently valuable. Most of it is not. Your going to end up with more capable soldiers doing a 1 month a year of actual field work than the hodgepodge of training which is currently done. I have been on a few really good weekend exs, I have been on substantially more which I strongly question why we even bothered showing up.

Many parade nights are wasted going over the same material constantly due to the requirements to get everyone done their IBTS.

Not to mention with the current commitment requirements you only have to show up approximately 8 half days a year which really isn’t much, especially when you consider many of those can be things like the Christmas dinner or remembrance day. So how much actual training is really done under the current system?

In comparison there would be 1 month of training and field time, on a full scale exercise. Doing more than section/platoon sized, but actual regiment and brigade work.

I am not saying it would completely get rid of planning requirements but I feel they would be substantially reduced. When you actually think about the amount of admin a Reserve unit generates currently just to barely function reducing things to a 1 month planning span should substantially reduce the burden.

Another thing to consider is the amount of admin which is spent on things which bring dubious value to the military but still needs to be done currently such as NPF and building maintenance.

No more concerns about NES troops. No more concerns about trying to get people to show up.

There would have to be several regional depots, basically one per division which the equipment can be maintained and stored at.

There still would be more than one Ops warrant and some level of leadership above them, but how many is really needed when we get rid of the generic class A work which goes with maintaining a unit year round? How many would be needed when we have full strength units? Right now there is tons of duplication of purpose with small units each needing to have ‘xyz’ to function but if they were larger in number would still have the same amount of people doing those jobs.
I see it as listing the taskings available with it being up to the individual soldiers to volunteer for taskings when emailed for them, or to email the Ops warrant with their potential availability for courses/taskings. If the CAF was smart they could possibly even do it with a website which members update their status and availability on.

With the closing our current year round system most the taskings would end up being training, Class B filling in the Reg Force, or deployments.

This whole system would be much more individual focused in terms of soldiers planning their careers. It also would create some actual full strength units and allow us to get away from the costly and inefficient system we currently run on.

There would still be units, and you still would be serving with the same people, just those units would now be able to take people from a wider spread area and not be tied down to localized manning limitations.

 

[Kirkhill]

Personally I still think a more Swiss method makes sense for us. I would completely ditch parade nights, weekend exs, etc. and go to a once a year one month commitment with the time guaranteed off work by leglislation.

Have the first week or two be IBTS, range shoots, medicals, etc. second block be a field ex.

Have the training done either as a year or two of full time regular force training or as part time in the summers as currently offered.

No requirement to do the one month ex each year until OFP. Also limited to 5 years to become OFP (very limited exceptions for that).

We could even take this model into the 21st century and get rid of local units and instead have everything completely spread out with some centralized ops warrant sending emails for potential tasks and courses across the country.

Have all the leadership and planning for the units formed out of the Regs, but the planning should be substantial reduced in requirements simply because they only have to plan for one months worth of training as a collective ( as opposed to the very admin heavy planning required for the Reserves currently).

Still have class A, B and C for various small tasks/deployments, etc. but there wouldn’t be as much of a need for it to be used on a regular basis.

Pros of said system would be less admin, more competent soldiers, the ability to hire better for the Reserves (i.e. not limited by what a local unit offers rather what the national availability is), no requirement to maintain expensive and costly armouries across the country, less requirement for class Bs, more ability to include Canadians from everywhere in country (could be middle of nowhere or downtown Toronto, everyone would only have to go to the exercise), and most importantly a more combat capable force which can actually generate full strength units.

Cons would be the death of the locally aligned units and the visibility that comes with that. Would also require substantial Reg force commitment to make it work. That being said it actually might be less commitment than what is currently required with the various spread out units all requiring tons of attached reg support anyways.

That’s not the Swiss system.

A Swiss soldier will begin their service with a 21 week long basic training period then complete six 3 week long training periods over nine years. Given that they haven’t engaged in a conflict since the invention of the internal combustion engine I don’t know how the results of this can be judged. Personally I think the skill fade must be severe.



If we’re centralizing an Ops WO, who’s going to need some more staff and will probably report to a regional Captain / Major haven’t we really just made local units ?



Planning a month long ex, with everyone coming from different places and not in formed units, is going to be a fair bit more complex and time consuming frankly. I do think though that if we look at total staffing hours there must be an incredible amount of waste when the Cameron Highlanders and Winnipeg Rifles are off doing separate training (as a hypothetical example).


I wouldn’t get rid of the class a commitment. I think once a month gatherings for training are fairly important just to get hands on tools and establish some sense of cohesion.



I don’t see you actually making a point for most of these Pros. One month long exercises seems to me to amount to less training with much longer gaps for skill fade. Additionally it seems to make it more likely that you’ll have a harder time keeping tabs on people and equipping them. With regards to closing armouries, surely we’d still need a bunch of regional depots ?



Death of small units that serve no purpose isn’t a con in my books. I’m unconvinced of these “deep ties to the community that get brought up. I wonder how many people in say Sudbury know about the Canadian Irish Regiment? But I digress. I’m all for folding in a bunch of duplicated functions, but I also believe we need people to report to a structure and a that soldiers meet their leaders and vice versa. Faceless numbers slotting to positions does not sn effective fighting force make. Take a note of the Swiss model you referenced earlier, they actually spend their entire service inside the same units with the same guys from day one till they age out.

As both of you say.... "Something must be done."

I think a lot more can be accomplished with individual on-line training. But I also think learning how to operate as a team is also important. That might be especially true these days with so many people living lives of physical isolation and connecting to the world via electrons than handshakes. There needs to be some sort of socialization component in the structure. Does that mean gathering to wear orange kilts or badger heads? Absolutely not. Personally I would be quite happy to follow the example of the Royal Australian Regiment, the Royal Regiment of Scotland and The Rifles. Choose either the RCR or the RRC , number every unit and make the uniform uniform. Nicknames could be noted in brackets and badges worn like morale patches. Keep the pipes though. Have to have the skirl.

Beyond that - what range work and field work and direct contact assessment needs to be done to create and sustain a credible force?

I dunno.

But CADTC needs to be looking at doing a job to meet that requirement, independent of the taskings of the operational force.

Before there was the RCR there was the School of Infantry whose whole purpose was to try and make something out of nothing.

Cheers.

 

[Kirkhill]

You bring up a pretty good point that made me think about another verboten organization to compare our reserves to that had tackled this problem with rank inflation: Cadets.

Now before I get run out of town on the rails, this is more the issue we have with Total Effective Strength and Total Authorized Strength. At least back when I was volunteering with a small corps, the Cadet promotions were based on total effective strength; meaning if you were parading 25 Cadets on average, the highest rank for a Cadet that would be the "SM, Coxswain, Sqn Chief" would be a WO/PO1 equivalent. They still maintained the position, but the rank stayed as such. It also incentivized corps/sqns to recruit and retain members, while also preventing rank inflation.

Perhaps if Unit COs want to be LCols, they need to invest in retention and recruitment. If not, well if you parade at a Coy minus strength; that leads one to believe that's a Major or Senior Captain level of responsibility, and that can be folded into a larger TBG CoC headed by a LCol.

Careful with that. You are coming perilously close to commissioning officers to raise their commands. Next thing you know you will be paying them based on the number of troops they parade and authorizing X number of dollars per pair of boots per year.

It is a workable concept though.