Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

I don't disagree with you in the broad strokes, but in the very real "here and now", the current size of the standing full-time forces are not enough to meet the requirements of the GoC. Cutting those numbers to make more "break glass in case of emergency" troops is not the solution.

I don't for one minute deny that this is the thinking that goes on and is the thinking that has gone on for the last fifty years and will continue to go on indefinitely until an MND is put in place with a mandate to reform DND from the top down. Bureaucracies are bureaucracies regardless of the colour of suit that they wear.

It's not the RegF that thinks in terms of "what have you done for me lately?", it's the GoC. If you can find a way to make the GoC think longer than 3-4 years please do so, but until then, we need to work with what we have. Making larger numbers of as @KevinB says "fair weather"* soldiers isn't the solution.

I don't believe that it comes from the GoC. I think its bureaucratic friction that influences political minds.

The RegF of the 50s-60s doesn't exist anymore. It was killed-off by budget cuts, and the "peace dividend". The only reason the RegF seems to expensive is because the GoC invests too little in the CAF overall. If we had a realistic budget for maintenance and life cycling of kit and infrastructure the pers % of the budget would be more realistic. The reason it's skewed so high on pers costs is because the GoC can't stop paying the troops without bad headlines, but cutting maintenance kicks the bad headlines down the road for decades...

It's a chicken and egg argument. Exchanging full-time numbers for equipment and part-timers could be sold as a win-win situation. It won't happen, however, because the military leadership refuses to see it as that and there will always be some admiral flapping his gums. Full-time numbers are our "d*ck measuring" standard. No one cares how many hanger-queens there are as long as we can keep a battle group deployed. The managed readiness plan and whole fleet management plans were the army's acknowledgement that running a shell-game is fine as long as no PYs are cut.

*making the ResF less "fair weather" would require spending more political capital than just spending more of defence, so it's an unrealistic solution at this time.

This gets me back to pejorative language vs true programs to make the reserves more effective. A reserve force which trains for the needs of the country is politically acceptable. The problem is that the full-timers consider the use of reservists to suit their own convenience (think the thousands of Class B's filling cubicles) as the pinnacle of reserve service. Obviously compulsory call-out on less than national emergency levels would be unacceptable. You'd be surprised how much tolerance people have when they aren't lied to.

I keep telling people, our legislation and regulations are every bit as coercive as the US Army's. So the politicians have already made the decision as to where the red line is. The problem is that our military leaders are risk averse pussies when it comes to this area of the law/policy. QR&O 9.04(2) says that a CO can order a reservist to train up to 15 days Class B and 60 days Class A per year. That's an order in council from the government. Show me the general officer that has seen fit to enforce even a part of that. Our reservists are "fair weather" because the army (not the government) allows them to be makes them that way.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm actually a great fan of the National Guard but regrettably have come to the conclusion that it won't work here the way it does in the US.

The first is that leadership and technical knowledge and experience at the major and warrant officer rank and above levels has become too complex to learn on a part-time basis.

Can't that be resolved by limiting the part-timers to the sub-unit level? Captains and W2s?

Leave the direction to full-time Majors and W1s and above?

That is coupled with the CAF's risk aversion to send out anything at a less than 99% solution. In short our reservists can't become good enough to be perfect and the CAF doesn't accept less than that. Americans take risks we don't.

Point taken. But are they good enough to carry the freight on local emergencies?

 

[markppcli]

Can't that be resolved by limiting the part-timers to the sub-unit level? Captains and W2s?

Leave the direction to full-time Majors and W1s and above?

And in the separate worlds you push where do those full timers come from?

Point taken. But are they good enough to carry the freight on local emergencies?

They don’t show up to local emergencies. It took three months to generate 100 bodies from 39 CMBG in 2019… for fires in their own province. That’s why there no effort put into reforms, because that’s the reality of reserve force generation.

 

[daftandbarmy]

And in the separate worlds you push where do those full timers come from?


They don’t show up to local emergencies. It took three months to generate 100 bodies from 39 CMBG in 2019… for fires in their own province. That’s why there no effort put into reforms, because that’s the reality of reserve force generation.

Dude... the 'M' stands for 'Maybe'

 

[FJAG]

Can't that be resolved by limiting the part-timers to the sub-unit level? Captains and W2s?

Leave the direction to full-time Majors and W1s and above?

That's the whole idea behind 30/70 battalions with 1 x 100/0 coy and 2 x 10/90 companies.

Point taken. But are they good enough to carry the freight on local emergencies?

They wouldn't be worse than Lentus. While they're not subject to a call out by a provincial government, s33(2) provides for "called out on service to perform any lawful duty other than training..." S273.6(1) expands on that so that "the Governor in Council or the Minister may authorize the Canadian Forces to perform any duty involving public service". Remember that a call out should be for a defined limited period of time while being placed on active service provides for continuing service (albeit our administrative policies deal with that as well). Bottom line is the province requests and the feds decide what goes. That's the substantive difference from the US NG system (that and the NG has equipment like trucks and bulldozers and other useful things).

 

[FJAG]

And in the separate worlds you push where do those full timers come from?


They don’t show up to local emergencies. It took three months to generate 100 bodies from 39 CMBG in 2019… for fires in their own province. That’s why there no effort put into reforms, because that’s the reality of reserve force generation.

See s33(2) call out on service above. The law is there, the application of it isn't. Much of that, in fairness, has to do with our current crappy job protection legislation. The Americans have that problem too albeit that their legislation is significantly stronger than ours.

Let me simply add that any attempt to reform the ResF without creating a viable job protection scheme will have limited success. You can probably create an obligatory training model that would cater well to maybe 60-70% of reservists without such legislation by limiting the Class A service days to a well preplanned and fixed maximum of roughly 10 weekends during the year and a 16 day annual exercise (and I think we should do that anyway regardless of legislation or not) but you would probably lose 30% of your folks in the latter periods of their service regardless. If your aim is to have a younger force where the individual only serves 4 to 7 years then that might work. But, in fairness to our troops - they deserve decent legislation and protection.

 

[daftandbarmy]

See s33(2) call out on service above. The law is there, the application of it isn't. Much of that, in fairness, has to do with our current crappy job protection legislation. The Americans have that problem too albeit that their legislation is significantly stronger than ours.

Let me simply add that any attempt to reform the ResF without creating a viable job protection scheme will have limited success. You can probably create an obligatory training model that would cater well to maybe 60-70% of reservists without such legislation by limiting the Class A service days to a well preplanned and fixed maximum of roughly 10 weekends during the year and a 16 day annual exercise (and I think we should do that anyway regardless of legislation or not) but you would probably lose 30% of your folks in the latter periods of their service regardless. If your aim is to have a younger force where the individual only serves 4 to 7 years then that might work. But, in fairness to our troops - they deserve decent legislation and protection.

That would be a good way to ensure that reservists have to join the Reg F, because most employers would never hire someone who would be away that long on military service (plus vacation time, sick days etc) if an equivalent civilian new hire were available.

Unless it was a government job, of course

 

[FJAG]

That would be a good way to ensure that reservists have to join the Reg F, because most employers would never hire someone who would be away that long on military service (plus vacation time, sick days etc) if an equivalent civilian new hire were available.

Unless it was a government job, of course

Let's see. The last time I looked weekends were off for the vast number of workers so one out of four for ten months isn't onerous and those that can't do that we don't want anyway.

Every province provides for two weeks minimum vacation time. That puts an onerous responsibility on the soldier who basically needs to screw his family or give up service. And yes, I see that without some form of legislation it would be tough to keep that going year after year for some folks. The aim is to target the young who have no family and who have the time available and are looking for summer job opportunities. The anticipation is that there be a high turnover but that only a handful will be needed at the captain and sergeant level. The turn over is already high if you factor in the ones that give you 12 days a year whenever they feel like it. I doubt that it would be a significant downward change if we create more rigid requirements but upped the game in the quality of the training - in fact the intent is to recruit and train more. On top of that there are still teachers and others with substantially more than two weeks vacation time who can fill in the lower level leadership and experience needed.

But take this into consideration. Take them in during high school at age 16 or 17. Train the hell out of them during the first two summers so that they are DP 1 qualified and then, when they are 18, they serve several more years while going to university or college or learning a trade (funded by the army). The important part is a rigid defined schedule set well in advance that's predictable, not too onerous and everyone can adjust to.

Add to that that full-timers do all admin and provide most of the training and fill the senior coy level and above jobs and you don't need to keep around 50-year-old ResF LCols and CWOs who burn up 70 Class A days a year filling out band uniform reports and organizing military balls.

 

[AmmoTech90]

W2s

In Canada it's Petty Officer 1st Class or Warrant Officer, Master Warrant Officer or Chief Petty Officer 2nd Class, or Chief Warrant Officer or Chief Petty Officer 1st Class.

As I'm sure you are aware.

Despite your demonstrated, fervent, desire to live in the past I would appreciate it if you use Canadian ranks when talking about Canadian military members.

 

[Kirkhill]

Terms of service.
Degree of integration.

Are those the sticking points?

Terms of service.

@markppcli and @daftandbarmy are right that Canadian reservists don't show up when needed. But isn't that due to the terms of service under which they are engaged? Not just the fact that they are called to volunteer for the emergency, which incidentally puts the onus on the reservist and requires her to explain to her employer why filling sandbags was more important than getting those orders out, but the terms under which they are hired in the first place.

The old argument was that the WW2 vets didn't want the buckets and ladders of Civil Defence, despite the fact that the nation needed those buckets and ladders and Civil Defence, and that that was keeping people out of the armouries. But, my opinion, times have changed, people have changed, attitudes to emergencies have changed and the US and every other sentient country in the West have working examples of organizations that regularly cross the boundary between here and now civil emergencies and break glass in time of war. The National Guards, and Home Guards and Militia and Territorials etc are real. They work.

The biggest differences, as @FJAG keeps pointing out, is will. The terms of service are there to be applied. If only someone would apply them.
And, my opinion, I think there is an appetite for the National Guard terms of service in Canada, where there is an emphasis on serving the local community in the here and now while still emphasising the military character and duties.

Degree of integration.

On the sliding scale of integration 100/0 - 90/10 - 70/30 - 50/50 - 30/70 - 10/90 - 0/100 my view of the integration leans more towards 95/5.

A "Militia" that is 95% locals (paid or unpaid is a separate debate) and 5% regulars on the pattern of the old RSS. The failure of the training system and the Inspectors-General can't all be laid at the feet of the volunteers. They have regularly shown willingness to train and be trained. They, equally, have shown great impatience with people wasting their time and not training them effectively.
Some/many/most of these volunteers have shown willingness to join the regular ranks for long and short term engagements only to discover that they have been wasting their time because the training they received was ineffective and didn't prepare them for service alongside the regulars.

A lot try to get on regular force courses, and are willing to disrupt their civilian and family lives to do that, only to discover that that is vewwy, vewwy hard.

I don't want to disrupt the regular forces by taking them away from their critical missions. What I am asking from the regular force is that CADTC do its job effectively and apply itself to the problem of training companies of volunteers locally so that they can manage local emergencies and, with an acceptable training delta, fall in behind the regulars on deployment.

The division between the regulars and the volunteers does not need to be absolute and it should not be absolute. The membrane should be porous and allow for movement between the two culturally distinct organizations.

Examples of the type of support possible?

The training of Danish Homeguards by self-learning and organized training events.
The training of Ukrainian civilians to a minimum individual/platoon standard in a matter of weeks.
CSOR apparently taking direct entry types into their ranks and bypassing the CADTC approved system entirely.
And yes, the old RSS system. As much as we occasionally got unlucky with the RSS allocated I have to say that most of the Warrants that were assigned and that I met on course seemed to want to be there and seemed to enjoy engaging with us Milisha types, despite the Craphat ribbing that went on. And we learned stuff. And a lot of my coursemates went on to help out in places like Medak and Panjwai. Given a little time to adapt.

And perhaps more liberal use of the IG's hat across all arms.

 

[Kirkhill]

In Canada it's Petty Officer 1st Class or Warrant Officer, Master Warrant Officer or Chief Petty Officer 2nd Class, or Chief Warrant Officer or Chief Petty Officer 1st Class.

As I'm sure you are aware.

Despite your demonstrated, fervent, desire to live in the past I would appreciate it if you use Canadian ranks when talking about Canadian military members.

You're right. No excuse.

To correct the reference I was talking about the Warrant Officer level as opposed to the MWO/CWO.

In response to @FJAG 's concern about skill sets and what can be handled by the willing and what must be handled by the able I am making the suggestion that the willing can be usefully engaged up to the platoon/troop level with a volunteer Captain in charge of three troops or platoons and that that Captain should be assisted by a Regular force Warrant that wants to be there and in charge of the training of the troops of the Company/Battery/Squadron.

The Regular Force Major's role, working with the volunteers, would be more of a staff role ensuring that the sub-units were being properly trained and were able to slot into existing regular force organisations and keeping track of the deficiencies that would have to be made good.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I think its a lot more two-way than that. I expect that there is a lot of push back coming from the L1s through the CDS as to what we can do with what we got and here are our options if we stay status quo with funding and what will change if funding goes up or down. It covers the broad picture and leaves the details to the L1s once the left and right of arcs are understood by both.


True enough and that gets us to the points I raised about the day-to-day army and how its needs are seen as the priority for the governments needs rather than the tomorrow "break glass" army.


And that's where things go off the rail with the RegF. It's a common misconception amongst the RegF that the ResF thinks in those terms. Which, by the way is a bit condescending. You get exactly the same thought process at the L2 tables when one discusses the issue of where do the tanks go or should the Patricias have a mortar platoon or whose PYs do we cut to create yet another divisional headquarters. Do you really think the government decided it wanted and needed 5 divisional headquarters?

We almost agree on one point at the end there. I do believe that the primary consideration should be "what does the country need?" Governments are too fickle and military leadership is too parochial to make truly dispassionate decisions vis a vis the country's needs.

IMHO, we'd be much better off if existing governments and militaries understood clearly that there will be another war at some point in the future that will involve Canada. We are already a target and the shaping operations have begun. It is time to stop thinking about how to keep the current PYs churning and how to build a viable force for the future. There is a key factor that the RegF dismisses entirely when it makes its little jokes about the Flin Flon Fusiliers - that's the fact that for every RegF PY you can hire and keep 5-6 reservists. It's that equipment kept in reserve lasts substantially longer than equipment which is continuously used. It's an economy of effort/force thing. Those reservists have little or no value for the country if not properly trained or equipped. Whether Canada's ResF is of value to the country is entirely up to Canada's RegF leadership. Their track record is not good. ResF leadership in this country has no power regardless of how much power Reserves 2000 thinks it has or the RegF thinks it might have.


That's parsing the language too literally. Most folks in this discussion are tossing out ideas knowing full well that there are no decision makers to influence in this forum. The point of the matter is that the RegF should be looking beyond using the reserves as Class B office overloads. NDHQ looks at ResF as having value if it is doing something for the CF today - right now. That's missing the point entirely. A ResF is there for tomorrow by definition. It's primary job is to prepare for tomorrow. Again, IMHO, that's what most of the "well the reserves could do this" is about. What are the jobs the reserves should be preparing for that the RegF leadership has its head stuck in the sand about.

Sometimes when I'm feeling a little weak I seem to almost go over to @Kirkhill's dark side and say to myself - right - two defence budgets: a RegF today budget and a ResF tomorrow budget instead of the phoney baloney budgets that we have where the Class A (tomorrow) budgets get eroded by the Class Bs (today folks) that seem to infest every corner of NDHQ and other headquarters.

Rant off.

My friend, you're playing in a fantasy land.

Take a deep breath, I massive respect for you, but I'm not gonna be nice.

Having now spent time inside the ARes I can tell you there is a ton of heart and no volume of pers. We have regiments and battalions that are really oversized platoons, and lucky to muster a section on a parade night. I SIV'd a unit that regularly paraded 12 people, and that includes RSS and Class B folks. In a year in a CBG HQ I never met the CBG Commander, I couldn't pick the guy out of line up. It looked to me like the CoS ran the show, and the commander was something akin to the GG, a figure head.

We managed much less than 300 people for a CBG wide exercise this passed year. Thats it, all units. I get it Gagetown in Feb sucks, but if you wanna be taken seriously, you have to seriously do serious things... like a CBG wide ex.

Its abysmal. In my completely unedumecated opinion The ARes has no/zero tactical, strategic or institutional value, at the moment, outside FGing individual augmentation to the regular force.

I saw highly motivated but poorly trained and employed troops, led by almost no Snr NCMs or WOs and above and an officer corps that is wildly inexperienced. I saw a force, and I use that term lightly, solely focused on combat arms with no consideration and value given to CS and CSS functions.

This can be changed, but its going to take the willingness of the ARes to champion that change and push for it.

Take my post as the uneducated observations of a Navy Chief marking time in the ARes and just trying leave the place a lil better than I found it. The people I worked with were great. I just want them to be better, and sometimes that takes a honest look.

 

[KevinB]

My friend, you're playing in a fantasy land.

Take a deep breath, I massive respect for you, but I'm not gonna be nice.

Having now spent time inside the ARes I can tell you there is a ton of heart and no volume of pers. We have regiments and battalions that are really oversized platoons, and lucky to muster a section on a parade night. I SIV'd a unit that regularly paraded 12 people, and that includes RSS and Class B folks. In a year in a CBG HQ I never met the CBG Commander, I couldn't pick the guy out of line up. It looked to me like the CoS ran the show, and the commander was something akin to the GG, a figure head.

We managed much less than 300 people for a CBG wide exercise this passed year. Thats it, all units. I get it Gagetown in Feb sucks, but if you wanna be taken seriously, you have to seriously do serious things... like a CBG wide ex.

Its abysmal. In my completely unedumecated opinion The ARes has no/zero tactical, strategic or institutional value, at the moment, outside FGing individual augmentation to the regular force.

I saw highly motivated but poorly trained and employed troops, led by almost no Snr NCMs or WOs and above and an officer corps that is wildly inexperienced. I saw a force, and I use that term lightly, solely focused on combat arms with no consideration and value given to CS and CSS functions.

This can be changed, but its going to take the willingness of the ARes to champion that change and push for it.

Take my post as the uneducated observations of a Navy Chief marking time in the ARes and just trying leave the place a lil better than I found it. The people I worked with were great. I just want them to be better, and sometimes that takes a honest look.

I don’t think @FJAG is under any different illusions.
The point is that to be a viable entity the Army PRes needs massive restructuring and resources (both equipment and training).

 

[FJAG]

... The old argument was that the WW2 vets didn't want the buckets and ladders of Civil Defence, despite the fact that the nation needed those buckets and ladders and Civil Defence, and that that was keeping people out of the armouries. But, my opinion, times have changed, people have changed, attitudes to emergencies have changed and the US and every other sentient country in the West have working examples of organizations that regularly cross the boundary between here and now civil emergencies and break glass in time of war. The National Guards, and Home Guards and Militia and Territorials etc are real. They work.

When I joined the Militia in 65 we had just amalgamated three artillery regiments in Toronto into one and been assigned a "snakes and ladders" role. I would say it decimated the people we had except that "decimated" is entirely undercounting how many people quit. We went from a regimental parade with over 300 all ranks to one with 100 and that's counting the band. It built up slowly after we received a more traditional gunner role. I don't know for a fact, but I think that the young louts that we were in those days, probably still make up the core of the recruits in the PRes today. I have no problem with emergency work as a secondary duty and in fact think that its vital that it be.

On the sliding scale of integration 100/0 - 90/10 - 70/30 - 50/50 - 30/70 - 10/90 - 0/100 my view of the integration leans more towards 95/5.

A "Militia" that is 95% locals (paid or unpaid is a separate debate) and 5% regulars on the pattern of the old RSS. The failure of the training system and the Inspectors-General can't all be laid at the feet of the volunteers. They have regularly shown willingness to train and be trained. They, equally, have shown great impatience with people wasting their time and not training them effectively.

I agree on the general principle but diverge on the 5/95 integration and let me tell you why. It goes back to my time in the RSS which was effectively a 5/95 organization. Much of our (the 5% guys) time was wasted with no one around and nothing to do. The 95 paraded every Tue and Thurs and every second weekend. Those days were good ones and we were busy. We full-timers worked every second weekend and in compensation I gave my guys every Monday off so that they alternated from 1-day to 3-day weekends. That seemed to suit them. But still, Wednesdays and most Fridays were a write-off.

The problem that I see with the voluntary parading was that every Tuesday and Thursday night and every second weekend were largely a waste of time. A lot of folks couldn't keep up with that much parading so didn't attend over half of that. That meant most courses needed to jump back and forth in the syllabus to catch up the folks that weren't there the week before. A lot of man-days are wasted in this way. Much of the 10/90 experiment a few decades ago had these problems as well although with the dedicated equipment and RegF folks training was definitely better. But more of the 10% were wasting time.

The one thing to remember is that I do not see the 10/90 in isolation the way it was a couple of decades ago. I see the 10/90 companies as part of 30/70 or 70/30 battalions (mostly in the same urban centres) so that the 10% can and will be used for other purposes than strictly their own companies. With an obligatory schedule for the 90% of training just one day a month, you need something for the 10% to do the rest of the month. That IMHO would include organizing and conducting training for the RegF 30% of the battalion as well as courses run much more frequently for those of the battalion's ResF 70% who truly "volunteer" for extra training over and above the mandated one weekend per month. That could include everything form shifting all DP1 training for the RegF from centralized training establishments to decentralized primary training modules within the 30/70 units. It's not double hatting the units but properly allocating the "spare time" that RSS staff have while ensuring that they are well supervised by their RegF leadership.

And perhaps more liberal use of the IG's hat across all arms.

View attachment 79385

AND AIG hats. The NCO assistant instructors in gunnery (and the master gunners) are, IMHO, even more valuable than the IG and the IG's worth is already unquestionable. This is incidentally why I favour a US Army style warrant officer system which in my mind does the job of the AIG in some (but not all) of their branches and has the advantage of also getting skilled NCMs into leadership positions faster than the regular NCM stream. I can't understand why other branches do not have IG and AIG equivalents. I presume that there are some "unofficial" technical experts in other branches but the "gate-keepers of corporate knowledge" role that IGs, AIGs and master gunners play can't be replicated "unofficially."

 

[Kirkhill]

My friend, you're playing in a fantasy land.

Take a deep breath, I massive respect for you, but I'm not gonna be nice.

Having now spent time inside the ARes I can tell you there is a ton of heart and no volume of pers. We have regiments and battalions that are really oversized platoons, and lucky to muster a section on a parade night. I SIV'd a unit that regularly paraded 12 people, and that includes RSS and Class B folks. In a year in a CBG HQ I never met the CBG Commander, I couldn't pick the guy out of line up. It looked to me like the CoS ran the show, and the commander was something akin to the GG, a figure head.

We managed much less than 300 people for a CBG wide exercise this passed year. Thats it, all units. I get it Gagetown in Feb sucks, but if you wanna be taken seriously, you have to seriously do serious things... like a CBG wide ex.

Its abysmal. In my completely unedumecated opinion The ARes has no/zero tactical, strategic or institutional value, at the moment, outside FGing individual augmentation to the regular force.

I saw highly motivated but poorly trained and employed troops, led by almost no Snr NCMs or WOs and above and an officer corps that is wildly inexperienced. I saw a force, and I use that term lightly, solely focused on combat arms with no consideration and value given to CS and CSS functions.

This can be changed, but its going to take the willingness of the ARes to champion that change and push for it.

Take my post as the uneducated observations of a Navy Chief marking time in the ARes and just trying leave the place a lil better than I found it. The people I worked with were great. I just want them to be better, and sometimes that takes a honest look.

I take the liberty of highlighting points of agreement.

And there is that word - champion.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I don’t think @FJAG is under any different illusions.
The point is that to be a viable entity the Army PRes needs massive restructuring and resources (both equipment and training).

I wouldn't invest a penny more until its restructured. But were in agreement either way.

 

[Kirkhill]

When I joined the Militia in 65 we had just amalgamated three artillery regiments in Toronto into one and been assigned a "snakes and ladders" role. I would say it decimated the people we had except that "decimated" is entirely undercounting how many people quit. We went from a regimental parade with over 300 all ranks to one with 100 and that's counting the band. It built up slowly after we received a more traditional gunner role. I don't know for a fact, but I think that the young louts that we were in those days, probably still make up the core of the recruits in the PRes today. I have no problem with emergency work as a secondary duty and in fact think that its vital that it be.

But is there another body of potential recruits that could be reached today by changing the emphasis? Could a double win happen by elevating the profile of the Service Battalion and the Engineers, and reforming the Field Ambulances and demonstrating their critical role in civil emergencies as well as in war? And, perhaps, by ensuring that every sub-unit has a well-formed transport section, perhaps under an experienced NCO that would also serve civil needs in crisis?

I agree on the general principle but diverge on the 5/95 integration and let me tell you why. It goes back to my time in the RSS which was effectively a 5/95 organization. Much of our (the 5% guys) time was wasted with no one around and nothing to do. The 95 paraded every Tue and Thurs and every second weekend. Those days were good ones and we were busy. We full-timers worked every second weekend and in compensation I gave my guys every Monday off so that they alternated from 1-day to 3-day weekends. That seemed to suit them. But still, Wednesdays and most Fridays were a write-off.

So does that argue for more or less engagement? Could one RSS team manage 3 units if the 3 units paraded on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday nights?

Isn't there another way to fix that?

The problem that I see with the voluntary parading was that every Tuesday and Thursday night and every second weekend were largely a waste of time. A lot of folks couldn't keep up with that much parading so didn't attend over half of that. That meant most courses needed to jump back and forth in the syllabus to catch up the folks that weren't there the week before. A lot of man-days are wasted in this way. Much of the 10/90 experiment a few decades ago had these problems as well although with the dedicated equipment and RegF folks training was definitely better. But more of the 10% were wasting time.

Do we have to discard the willing help because not all of them can meet the schedule? In a world of work from home, zoom meetings, online courses, podcasts .... can't we devise a better syllabus that reduces the scheduled requirements? Perhaps limits the face to face efforts to TOETs and performance evaluations? How about building field events around 5 day weekends? Many people are on shift work and can adjust schedules.

The one thing to remember is that I do not see the 10/90 in isolation the way it was a couple of decades ago. I see the 10/90 companies as part of 30/70 or 70/30 battalions (mostly in the same urban centres) so that the 10% can and will be used for other purposes than strictly their own companies. With an obligatory schedule for the 90% of training just one day a month, you need something for the 10% to do the rest of the month. That IMHO would include organizing and conducting training for the RegF 30% of the battalion as well as courses run much more frequently for those of the battalion's ResF 70% who truly "volunteer" for extra training over and above the mandated one weekend per month. That could include everything form shifting all DP1 training for the RegF from centralized training establishments to decentralized primary training modules within the 30/70 units. It's not double hatting the units but properly allocating the "spare time" that RSS staff have while ensuring that they are well supervised by their RegF leadership.

And I am not wanting to take those 10% away from their battalions and regiments at all. I am suggesting that the bodies that are allocated to CADTC be better employed

AND AIG hats. The NCO assistant instructors in gunnery (and the master gunners) are, IMHO, even more valuable than the IG and the IG's worth is already unquestionable. This is incidentally why I favour a US Army style warrant officer system which in my mind does the job of the AIG in some (but not all) of their branches and has the advantage of also getting skilled NCMs into leadership positions faster than the regular NCM stream. I can't understand why other branches do not have IG and AIG equivalents. I presume that there are some "unofficial" technical experts in other branches but the "gate-keepers of corporate knowledge" role that IGs, AIGs and master gunners play can't be replicated "unofficially."

Agreement.

 

[daftandbarmy]

My friend, you're playing in a fantasy land.

Take a deep breath, I massive respect for you, but I'm not gonna be nice.

Having now spent time inside the ARes I can tell you there is a ton of heart and no volume of pers. We have regiments and battalions that are really oversized platoons, and lucky to muster a section on a parade night. I SIV'd a unit that regularly paraded 12 people, and that includes RSS and Class B folks. In a year in a CBG HQ I never met the CBG Commander, I couldn't pick the guy out of line up. It looked to me like the CoS ran the show, and the commander was something akin to the GG, a figure head.

We managed much less than 300 people for a CBG wide exercise this passed year. Thats it, all units. I get it Gagetown in Feb sucks, but if you wanna be taken seriously, you have to seriously do serious things... like a CBG wide ex.

Its abysmal. In my completely unedumecated opinion The ARes has no/zero tactical, strategic or institutional value, at the moment, outside FGing individual augmentation to the regular force.

I saw highly motivated but poorly trained and employed troops, led by almost no Snr NCMs or WOs and above and an officer corps that is wildly inexperienced. I saw a force, and I use that term lightly, solely focused on combat arms with no consideration and value given to CS and CSS functions.

This can be changed, but its going to take the willingness of the ARes to champion that change and push for it.

Take my post as the uneducated observations of a Navy Chief marking time in the ARes and just trying leave the place a lil better than I found it. The people I worked with were great. I just want them to be better, and sometimes that takes a honest look.

There you go again, bragging about how much better the units and formations are back East

 

[Halifax Tar]

There you go again, bragging about how much better the units and formations are back East

We are the "right" coast after all

 

[foresterab]

See s33(2) call out on service above. The law is there, the application of it isn't. Much of that, in fairness, has to do with our current crappy job protection legislation. The Americans have that problem too albeit that their legislation is significantly stronger than ours.

Let me simply add that any attempt to reform the ResF without creating a viable job protection scheme will have limited success. You can probably create an obligatory training model that would cater well to maybe 60-70% of reservists without such legislation by limiting the Class A service days to a well preplanned and fixed maximum of roughly 10 weekends during the year and a 16 day annual exercise (and I think we should do that anyway regardless of legislation or not) but you would probably lose 30% of your folks in the latter periods of their service regardless. If your aim is to have a younger force where the individual only serves 4 to 7 years then that might work. But, in fairness to our troops - they deserve decent legislation and protection.

Responding to this one as It's been interesting for me see the number of international resources in Canada this year on Wildfire. Australian and New Zealand resources coming over have had a large number of VOLUNTEERS who receive minimal pay to deploy for weeks on end. The big difference is the CFA/RFS staff who are volunteers are trained to the same standard, fill the same roles, and most importantly have job protection from all levels of their respective state and federal governments to leave their role for wildfire/bush fire duty.

I realize the military is filling a different role (or should be) than emergency service response but when you look at the capacity for bushfire/flooding response in Australia the majority of available bodies are not full time employees but volunteers connected via a local brigade and like our volunteer fire departments tend to represent a wide range of skills and knowledge. Yes...they still need to get employer consent at times to deploy - job protection does not mean unlimited absences allowed - but they all acknowledged it was a key part to getting people to be able to turn out and especially for their families as they knew that even as volunteers they were still covered in the event of tragedy.

I know it's not directly military but definitely some similar feelings and issues. Note they, like everyone else, are also struggling with recruitment especially with younger candidates but they have a clear role which they also market quite well.

foresterab