Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Transfer Pricing -

As when the factory transfers its product to the warehouse. The warehouse transfers the product to the regional depot. The regional depot transfers the product to the national sales outlet. The national sales outlet transfers the product to the integrator. The integrator transfers the product to the assembler. The assembler transfers the product to the system vendor. The system vendor transfers the product to the client. And, in some instances, the client will transfer the product to its relevant division who will transfer it to its point of use. That, in the real world of cases I have known, is nine transfers. And, in a vertically integrated company, say somebody of the Lockmart variety selling goods and services, all of those transfers can be internal.

Assume that each transfer represents a 33% mark up, or a gross margin of 25%, entirely normal, then your factory produced $100 item will cost

$100x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1,33 = $1302.

And thus your $1300 Golden Hammer supplied by the OEM as a spare part.

As Ballz and DAP note - there is ample room for negotiation in that chain.

 

[Good2Golf]

... Reg F pay as a hidden cost that's utterly ignored enters the discussion ...

By hidden you mean ‘sunk’. So remind me how RegF MILPAY directly impacts a CA base O&M again?

 

[ballz]

By hidden you mean ‘sunk’. So remind me how RegF MILPAY directly impacts a CA base O&M again?

Reg Force pay, and I cannot stress this enough, is not a sunk cost, not by definition or in reality.

 

[Good2Golf]

Reg Force pay, and I cannot stress this enough, is not a sunk cost, not by definition or in reality.

Until the approved manning level of the CAF components is reduced and concomitant Vote 1 allocation reduced, Government has essentially decided that that is what will be allocated to the Department program. Okay, so don’t call it sunk…it is still incurred by the authorized man in level and can’t or won’t be recovered until authorized levels are adjusted. There is not refund that the Department gets that it can reallocate elsewhere, should manning levels be changed.

 

[ballz]

Until the approved manning level of the CAF components is reduced and concomitant Vote 1 allocation reduced, Government has essentially decided that that is what will be allocated to the Department program. Okay, so don’t call it sunk…it is still incurred by the authorized man in level and can’t or won’t be recovered until authorized levels are adjusted. There is not refund that the Department gets that it can reallocate elsewhere, should manning levels be changed.

Reg Force pay is a fixed cost, but you have not yet "incurred" it. You incur it as you use it.

A sunk cost is a cost you've already incurred. If you have 10 troops with nothing to do tomorrow, their costs are not yet incurred. You can task them to do something. You can task them to participate in training. Or you can task them to mow the lawn. Or you can task them to do COMREL.

Viewing it as a "sunk cost" or as "free" is what causes us to have zero regard for what we're actually making people do and how much time we are wasting. Time is money, and it is quantifiable, we even have a Cost Factors Manuel for calculating the cost of a soldier's time. If we started quantifying how much money we waste in time we might finally stop making soldiers do so much stupid shit.

The Department would benefit hugely if it put some basic constraints around time. We don't need to put it under a Commander's budget but we can implement a time-based system, as many professions do, as pointed out earlier by daft. It's just basic governance stuff.

 

[Good2Golf]

You mistake my view of “sunk” as “free.” I do not consider them the same. Where do you believe I did?

As far as incurred, they are incurred right up until the member ceases serving. Assigned tasks have nothing to do with the government’s incurred obligation to pay CAF members.

 

[ballz]

As far as incurred, they are incurred right up until the member ceases serving. Assigned tasks have nothing to do with the government’s incurred obligation to pay CAF members.

No, I'm not sure why we're arguing about this at this point if you agree that the costs are sunk costs, other than me being anal-retentive about terminology and we're talking about accounting terminology. You do not incur a cost until you have received the benefit of the services provided. If we did, when you enrol someone you'd have to book a liability for their entire career's worth of salary / pension / benefits, etc. and reduce that liability as you pay the wages. "Incurring a cost" means there's a corresponding liability. There's no liability on the books until you've worked that day.

A good example of this is SWE... since their cheques are always cut 2 weeks after, at the end of the year there is a liability on the financial statements for up to 2 weeks worth of pay that has not yet been paid. As of 31 Dec, that 2 weeks was an actual incurred cost and is represented by a liability on the balance sheet.

It's not the case for Reg Force because we're paid on 31 Dec, so the DND doesn't "owe us" any money. It hasn't incurred a cost for a "future" days of service.

There is not refund that the Department gets that it can reallocate elsewhere

It can actually. Vote 1 money is "operating costs" and includes salaries but also operational and maintenance expenses. If you, for example, go on Leave Without Pay, the Department can spend that Vote 1 they would have had to pay you on any other Vote 1 item such as an operating or maintenance expense. Because, as I explained, they had not already incurred the costs of your salary, there is no liability to pay you, and since you went on leave without pay they never did end up incurring the cost and can therefore use the Vote 1 money elsewhere.

Reg Force pay is "L114," the "L" means "local," which means they can convert it to other funds, such as L101, at the L1 level. For "C" funds (corporate) such as C127 (PRes O&M), ADM(Fin) is the authority to convert it to something else.

 

[FJAG]

The Department would benefit hugely if it put some basic constraints around time. We don't need to put it under a Commander's budget but we can implement a time-based system, as many professions do, as pointed out earlier by daft. It's just basic governance stuff.

As a long-time sufferer under a "billable hour regime" I'd say that one won't run up the flagpole in the Forces. I must admit though that timesheets were highly useful in allowing me to track activities and measure progress towards financial targets. Unfortunately it would be impractical for many soldiers (although useful for some). Time ticketing only works well for people whose remuneration is based on accurate billing information. For salaried workers its a hated inconvenience.

I've lost touch over the years as to what goes on in the gun park these days but amongst us Cold War combat arms folks (that included gunners and engineers back then) there was a general division of activities: field exercises; regimental schools/individual training; administration; maintenance; sweeping the gun park. The first four were usually pursued in some annual cycle.

Field exercises are limited by resources. Yes you can always have more dry exercises but there comes a time when you are flogging a dead horse with dry training. Exercises need to be meaningful and structured and not just time fillers. That left a lot of time each year for other activities.

The other three activities are generally rank conscious. Various administrative functions take officers and some NCMs away from the troops who are left to conduct some form of training or maintenance under reduced supervision. Regimental schools involved many, but not all members. These activities rarely mesh well and there are inevitably times where various individuals or sometimes whole rafts of folks (usually junior troops) have nothing to do. Hence sweeping the gun park (or painting rocks if you're in the RCR) And don't get me started on the lack of activity that takes place during the APS for those not actually on leave or being posted.

I doubt if managed readiness has changed the basic nature of those activities. My guess is that by taking a one year training cycle and stretching it over 2 or 3 years has probably created more gaps where there is a lack of anything constructive to do so that even more people are standing around with hands in their pockets.

The problem for the Army is that, unlike a factory where underemployed workers effect the bottom line, there is no financial consequence at the unit level arising from underemployed soldiers. If 75% of the unit is busy with something that's usually looked at as a win. One regrets that 25% aren't too busy but how can you fix it besides laying on yet another sports' afternoon trip to a local brewery?

You can't solve that with time sheets.

Comprehensive time/efficiency studies might provide data on how much each portion of the unit spends on productive/nonproductive activities. I think the results might be shocking but at least that would allow adjusting activities so that there is less "wasted time" especially amongst the junior ranks. My fear is that this could become just another case of centralized management dictating to COs how to suck eggs. It could help if there was a lower administrative burden coupled with more funding for useful exercises so that the entire unit spends more of its time working together. But that's highly unlikely to happen.

Yup. There's a lot of benefit for leader/managers who do not need to be concerned about the labour component on the expense column of their balance sheet.

 

[ballz]

As a long-time sufferer under a "billable hour regime" I'd say that one won't run up the flagpole in the Forces. I must admit though that timesheets were highly useful in allowing me to track activities and measure progress towards financial targets. Unfortunately it would be impractical for many soldiers (although useful for some). Time ticketing only works well for people whose remuneration is based on accurate billing information. For salaried workers its a hated inconvenience.

There are other ways to govern the use of time. I.e. a limit on how many soldier days per year can be spent on COMREL activities and other good ideas that GOFOs find to fill our non-existent white space.

I doubt if managed readiness has changed the basic nature of those activities. My guess is that by taking a one year training cycle and stretching it over 2 or 3 years has probably created more gaps where there is a lack of anything constructive to do so that even more people are standing around with hands in their pockets.

Yes, you have definitely lost touch. The "managed readiness" plans have been anything but "managed." They didn't take a one-year training cycle and stretch it out, if anything it's led to us doing the same gateways numerous times per year. If 2VP has to do level 4 again this FY (still up for debate), they'll have gone to Level 4 (or higher) 4x in 18 months. People are jumping through their assholes right now to keep up.

The problem for the Army is that, unlike a factory where underemployed workers effect the bottom line, there is no financial consequence at the unit level arising from underemployed soldiers. If 75% of the unit is busy with something that's usually looked at as a win. One regrets that 25% aren't too busy but how can you fix it besides laying on yet another sports' afternoon trip to a local brewery?

You're off-the-mark on the problem entirely, it's the opposite. The problem isn't underemployed people, it's people being tasked left right and centre to non-value activities because their time is "free," without any regard for the things they actually need to get done and the fact that doing nonsense stuff means either less time spent on the important stuff, or much much longer hours to try and jam it all in.

Comprehensive time/efficiency studies might provide data on how much each portion of the unit spends on productive/nonproductive activities. I think the results might be shocking but at least that would allow adjusting activities so that there is less "wasted time" especially amongst the junior ranks. My fear is that this could become just another case of centralized management dictating to COs how to suck eggs. It could help if there was a lower administrative burden coupled with more funding for useful exercises so that the entire unit spends more of its time working together. But that's highly unlikely to happen.

Actually, I was talking about putting constraints on all of the GOFOs whose clever ideas to boost their own portfolio cost the COs the ability to actually conduct proper training, which causes us to just do some box-checking BS just to say we've met "x" level of foundation training... even though we haven't actually, because in the time we had left, all we could was line up 4x LAVs, walk in a straight line, and call it Level 3 live-fire.

 

[daftandbarmy]

As a long-time sufferer under a "billable hour regime" I'd say that one won't run up the flagpole in the Forces. I must admit though that timesheets were highly useful in allowing me to track activities and measure progress towards financial targets. Unfortunately it would be impractical for many soldiers (although useful for some). Time ticketing only works well for people whose remuneration is based on accurate billing information. For salaried workers its a hated inconvenience.

Which nicely explains the cultural difference between reservists (hourly oppressed proletarians who still sign time constrained pay sheets) and regulars (evil, salaried with perqs, overlords)

 

[FJAG]

Yes, you have definitely lost touch

Yup. That sounds like a whole lot of different problems.

I've railed against managed readiness for some time but primarily on the basis that it leaves 2/3 of the force "not ready" while we in the past, in our own bumbling way, were ready pretty much each year (albeit that some of us sat at shorter notices to move than others with the fan-out list closer at hand). It was more like the unit was ready the whole time and the purpose of the annual training cycle was to take already trained people who had come in on postings that summer and work them into the team and maybe push the yardsticks ahead a little.

It's never been said about me that I lack imagination, but I have a hard time seeing how box checking in today's Army actually functions. It was hard enough just to get everyone through their battle fitness tests and qualified on their personal and crew served weapons without having to pick up stragglers here and there. And that was when we had a fair bit of time, plenty of ammo and the vast majority of our gear was well maintained (even if old) and functioning.

If there's even an ounce of truth in what you say (and I have absolutely zero reason to doubt you) then the problem seems to run much deeper than I thought.

Which nicely explains the cultural difference between reservists (hourly oppressed proletarians who still sign time constrained pay sheets) and regulars (evil, salaried with perqs, overlords)

I know you're being semi-facetious but that never concerned me as either RSS or as a reservist.

The thing that bugged me most was training. Doing individual qualification training in the unit lines was highly inefficient eating up resources and time having to deal with very small courses and having a third to a half of the people showing up whenever they wanted. On the other hand getting people slots on area or nationally run courses in the summer was like playing the lottery. Even when you did pick a winner, chances are the course would be cancelled because there were too few students, instructors, resources, - pick one.

 

[Kirkhill]

Efficiency is over-rated.

Only partially kidding.

Nudder war story. Customer has a plant producing a product from oats via a complex process. The process is inefficient but it produces a very, very high value product at a very, very low yield. Customer wants to increase production. Double it. Options are to make the process more efficient by adding a few more million dollars worth of rare and complex equipment requiring special certifications. OR. Buy 5 more sacks of oats a day. And accept the inefficiency.

Customer is still chasing efficiency.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

In the 1980's I saw the indifference Reg Force soldiers had to good use of time, as a reservist we had a better sense of the cost of time. I not sure if that still holds true today. FJAG is right that stupid/make work is morale sapping after a while, particularly with the level of education you see in private soldiers today. You also have motivated individuals and non-motivated. The motivated ones should have opportunities during slack times/ make work projects to further their careers/education/skills, leaving the non-motivated ones to work on the projects. Occasionally you need to involve the motivated to join the make work, so they remember to share in the suck, particularly if it's a dirty but important job.

 

[KevinB]

There are other ways to govern the use of time. I.e. a limit on how many soldier days per year can be spent on COMREL activities and other good ideas that GOFOs find to fill our non-existent white space.

There should be "this space intentionally left blank" areas for that - not operational requirements get shunted aside.

Yes, you have definitely lost touch. The "managed readiness" plans have been anything but "managed." They didn't take a one-year training cycle and stretch it out, if anything it's led to us doing the same gateways numerous times per year. If 2VP has to do level 4 again this FY (still up for debate), they'll have gone to Level 4 (or higher) 4x in 18 months. People are jumping through their assholes right now to keep up.

I don't think many of us think Managed Readiness means it was managed -- it was a simple catechism to justify a rotational schedule for deployed units - and theoretically fit other requirements in the sandwich.

You're off-the-mark on the problem entirely, it's the opposite. The problem isn't underemployed people, it's people being tasked left right and centre to non-value activities because their time is "free," without any regard for the things they actually need to get done and the fact that doing nonsense stuff means either less time spent on the important stuff, or much much longer hours to try and jam it all in.

Again - that time isn't free and should be allocated by the CoC so that sub-unit or unit cannot be made available for dog and ponies.

Actually, I was talking about putting constraints on all of the GOFOs whose clever ideas to boost their own portfolio cost the COs the ability to actually conduct proper training, which causes us to just do some box-checking BS just to say we've met "x" level of foundation training... even though we haven't actually, because in the time we had left, all we could was line up 4x LAVs, walk in a straight line, and call it Level 3 live-fire.

That is a CoC issue - no one should be 'checking the box' for training that isn't being conducted properly -- that is criminal to the troops and the mission, and a career ender for the OIC/RCO who signed off when things go south later (and they always go south).

 

[daftandbarmy]

That is a CoC issue - no one should be 'checking the box' for training that isn't being conducted properly -- that is criminal to the troops and the mission, and a career ender for the OIC/RCO who signed off when things go south later (and they always go south).

But.... but..... but that's the core foundation of most of the rubbish I observed over the course of a decade or so....

 

[ballz]

There should be "this space intentionally left blank" areas for that - not operational requirements get shunted aside.


I don't think many of us think Managed Readiness means it was managed -- it was a simple catechism to justify a rotational schedule for deployed units - and theoretically fit other requirements in the sandwich.

Again - that time isn't free and should be allocated by the CoC so that sub-unit or unit cannot be made available for dog and ponies.

That is a CoC issue - no one should be 'checking the box' for training that isn't being conducted properly -- that is criminal to the troops and the mission, and a career ender for the OIC/RCO who signed off when things go south later (and they always go south).

Of course everything you said is correct..... and exactly opposite of the reality in our units. OCs and COs don't get to tell the Army "sorry, we can't do that, we've got our level 1/2 FTX scheduled during that dog & pony event."

It's either compress the FTX, move it (which means it gets jammed in somewhere and compressed), or have a skeleton crew do the FTX while half the troops are out doing the dog & pony.

And the institution is pleased with that because technically all boxes were checked.

 

[MilEME09]

Of course everything you said is correct..... and exactly opposite of the reality in our units. OCs and COs don't get to tell the Army "sorry, we can't do that, we've got our level 1/2 FTX scheduled during that dog & pony event."

It's either compress the FTX, move it (which means it gets jammed in somewhere and compressed), or have a skeleton crew do the FTX while half the troops are out doing the dog & pony.

And the institution is pleased with that because technically all boxes were checked.

And in the end the troops get sub par training as a result, get pissed off and don't come out next year cause it was a terrible go.

 

[GR66]

Circling back to force structure...

Here's an example of what could be done if we abandon the geographic structure of the Force Generation Brigades.

2 x Reg Force Brigades each with:

• 1 x Cavalry Regiment (adapted from Armoured Recce Regiments....possibly Recce Sqn/AT Sqn/Mech. Inf. Coy?)
• 2 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions
• 2 x Light Infantry Battalions
• 1 x Artillery Regiment (3 x SP 155mm Howitzer Batteries)
• 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
• 1 x Service Battalion

One of the two Reg Force Brigade would also have a Tank Regiment as the 3rd Armoured Regiment

Each Reg Force Brigade would have a mirror Reserve Infantry Brigade:

• Reg Force Brigade HQ w/Class B Reserve augmentation
• 1 x Cavalry Regiment (TAPV or JLTV-like vehicle version of Reg Force Cavalry Regiments)
• 4 x Light Infantry Battalions (4 x Reserve Regiments each being one Company per Battalion)
• 1 x Artillery Regiment (3 x M777 Howitzer Batteries to augment the Reg Force Regiments in deployments)
• 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
• 1 x Service Battalion

Because the Reg Force Brigades are reduced in number from 3 to 2, that would leave one "surplus" Reg Force CER and Service Battalion. These could be split to create two 50/50 units to support each Reserve Brigade giving them much more effective support than the existing all-Reserve Brigades can provide. The remaining Reserve Combat Engineer, Service and Signals units that are not required to fill out the 50/50 units in the Reserve Brigades could be grouped together to provide additional CSS Regiments/Battalions in the Canadian Combat Support Brigade.

The reduction in Reg Force Brigades would also leave one Reg Force Artillery Regiment uncommitted. This Regiment could give one of its current gun batteries to each of the other two Reg Force Regiments (giving them 3 x Batteries each) and leaving it with a full HQ, FO and STA batteries. This could form the core of a new SHORAD Regiment with the firing batteries being filled by Reserve Regiments.

There are enough Reserve Artillery Regiments that in addition to providing 3 x M777 batteries for each of the two Reserve Brigades and 3 x SHORAD Batteries for 1 RCHA that they could also provide 3 x Regiments to man a 3 Battery Regiment of HIMARS and 2 x 3 Battery Regiments of UAV/Loitering Munition launch vehicles. These batteries could either be directed by 4 RCA (GS) or assigned as additional batteries to the 2 x Reg Force Artillery Regiments for deployments. I'd group these Reserve Artillery Regiments, the SHORAD Regiment and 4 RCA (GS) into a separate Artillery Brigade.

There are enough Reserve Infantry and Armoured Regiments left after creating this structure that you could create a 3 Company Arctic Response Battalion to support each Ranger Patrol Group (1 x Reserve Regiment forming each Company). There would also be several unassigned Regiments that could be formed into Transport Companies (BVs10's or similar?).

This structure would look something like this:

 

[daftandbarmy]

Circling back to force structure...

Here's an example of what could be done if we abandon the geographic structure of the Force Generation Brigades.

2 x Reg Force Brigades each with:

• 1 x Cavalry Regiment (adapted from Armoured Recce Regiments....possibly Recce Sqn/AT Sqn/Mech. Inf. Coy?)
• 2 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions
• 2 x Light Infantry Battalions
• 1 x Artillery Regiment (3 x SP 155mm Howitzer Batteries)
• 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
• 1 x Service Battalion

One of the two Reg Force Brigade would also have a Tank Regiment as the 3rd Armoured Regiment

Each Reg Force Brigade would have a mirror Reserve Infantry Brigade:

• Reg Force Brigade HQ w/Class B Reserve augmentation
• 1 x Cavalry Regiment (TAPV or JLTV-like vehicle version of Reg Force Cavalry Regiments)
• 4 x Light Infantry Battalions (4 x Reserve Regiments each being one Company per Battalion)
• 1 x Artillery Regiment (3 x M777 Howitzer Batteries to augment the Reg Force Regiments in deployments)
• 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
• 1 x Service Battalion

Because the Reg Force Brigades are reduced in number from 3 to 2, that would leave one "surplus" Reg Force CER and Service Battalion. These could be split to create two 50/50 units to support each Reserve Brigade giving them much more effective support than the existing all-Reserve Brigades can provide. The remaining Reserve Combat Engineer, Service and Signals units that are not required to fill out the 50/50 units in the Reserve Brigades could be grouped together to provide additional CSS Regiments/Battalions in the Canadian Combat Support Brigade.

The reduction in Reg Force Brigades would also leave one Reg Force Artillery Regiment uncommitted. This Regiment could give one of its current gun batteries to each of the other two Reg Force Regiments (giving them 3 x Batteries each) and leaving it with a full HQ, FO and STA batteries. This could form the core of a new SHORAD Regiment with the firing batteries being filled by Reserve Regiments.

There are enough Reserve Artillery Regiments that in addition to providing 3 x M777 batteries for each of the two Reserve Brigades and 3 x SHORAD Batteries for 1 RCHA that they could also provide 3 x Regiments to man a 3 Battery Regiment of HIMARS and 2 x 3 Battery Regiments of UAV/Loitering Munition launch vehicles. These batteries could either be directed by 4 RCA (GS) or assigned as additional batteries to the 2 x Reg Force Artillery Regiments for deployments. I'd group these Reserve Artillery Regiments, the SHORAD Regiment and 4 RCA (GS) into a separate Artillery Brigade.

There are enough Reserve Infantry and Armoured Regiments left after creating this structure that you could create a 3 Company Arctic Response Battalion to support each Ranger Patrol Group (1 x Reserve Regiment forming each Company). There would also be several unassigned Regiments that could be formed into Transport Companies (BVs10's or similar?).

This structure would look something like this:
View attachment 66369

So the key question here, of course, is how many new 2 star positions will this open up?

 

[FJAG]

Here's an example of what could be done if we abandon the geographic structure of the Force Generation Brigades.

Gutsy move resurrecting that upstart newbie regiment The Canadian Guards but relegating much older and more illustrious reserve units (including all the highland ones) to the dustbin of the supplementary order of battle. That aside, some good ideas though.

I won't reargue the issue of symmetric v asymmetric brigades except to say I'm a diehard asymmetric brigade advocate.

I've long been a fan of a western division and an eastern division and getting rid of two of the existing ones.

It looks to me like all the brigade headquarters and their signals squadrons are Reg F which is a good idea to be able to generate sustainable deployed brigade headquarters. Each of the artillery and CSS brigades could use those and a service battalion as well - there should be enough reserve units and personnel around which those can be formed from. I like the use of hybrid service battalions so that there is a capability within the reserve brigade to provide proper supply and maintenance functions especially if one starts equipping those brigades seriously.

Incidentally I'm vehemently opposed to established Class B positions. If a position merits full-time service it should be a Reg F PY. Class Bs are temporary jobs - or were meant to be. They are being dreadfully abused to create additional full-time positions on a permanent basis over and above the Reg F establishment. Besides, if you contract the 10 Res F brigades and 130 some odd units to four brigade headquarters and 20 - 25 some odd units, you'll have a slew of Reg F RSS to reallocate.

Not sure if the star above the brigade symbols is because you are suggesting they should become a one star command or not. Personally I think that they should remain a colonel's command. Adding a battalion does not merit a rank upgrade. On top of that, if the two divisions are not deployable entities and just force generation formations (which is how I see them) then I think that they do not merit a two star either. A BGen should be more than enough. Leave 1 Cdn Div with a two star because he may actually need to use both of them and is running a proper (more or less) divisional staff structure.

I'll let tankers chime in on whether or not Petawawa is the best place for tanks. In my mind, most of Petawawa is impassable forest whose only value for tanks is as a ricochet trace. One way or the other the tank regiment should be on whatever base that also has two mech battalions and a cavalry regiment because that will give you the ability to train up combined arms battlegroups and a heavy brigade capability. I think that you really need Gagetown or Wainwright/Suffield for tanks and you probably don't want to put a tank regiment and two mech battalions into Gagetown with the schools there. So in that respect I'd put the tank regiment, a cavalry regiment and two mech battalions into Edmonton and move the two light battalions to Petawawa where they can be a bit chummier with the SOF folks. And yes; I'd call the two light battalions PPCLI because "light".

Just another observation. You've allocated four mech battalions but we have gear for six. Any plan for those extra LAVs?

I have this thing for wanting to see BTLs dealt with. I like the term "depot battalion" but "Security Force Capacity Building" is more in vogue. They're obviously not identical but much of what a depot battalion does with recruit intake and BTL training of both regular and reserve personnel could fit into an SFCB's mandate if properly organized, geographically dispersed and augmented by reserve personnel during peak summer training periods. Your elimination of one Reg F infantry battalion (together with PY savings from the two divisional headquarters) should provide enough Reg F PYs to staff the cadre of two (an eastern and a western) hybrid SFCB battalions.

One final note. I think the Prairies would be working flat out to fill the units you've assigned to them. On the other hand, I think Ontario has more to offer. It strikes me that the two reserve infantry brigades are roughly 5,500 each. The arty brigade strikes me as roughly 2,500 - 3,000 reservists if you add a sig sqn and service battalion. The CS brigade appears quite light on reservists. So even if you add in a BTL and SFCB capability, you still seem to be below authorized reserve strength for the Army and what the regions can generate. Personally I'd like to see more CSS/CS - a transport battalion with a HET and POL capability comes to mind; another GS engineer regiment (for that matter I would split 4 ESR into two hybrid ESRs (one in Gagetown and one in Ontario); a CBRN unit; provision for an MP battalion (I know - like field ambulances, not an army resource); maybe a special troops battalion that specialized in theatre level rear area support (financial, personal services, supply, legal etc - basically used to generate NSEs)