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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Okay, I'll play devil's advocate.

The suggested format essentially almost doubles the number of LAVs in a rifle company with a significant supply and maintenance burden. I sometimes marvel at how the Russians manage to have a platoon operate out of three BMPs/BTRs. They do this by reducing the platoon to a total of thirty with ten per vehicle.

In that respect then a Cdn/US platoon already exceeds the combat power of a Russian platoon by 10-15% for manpower and 30% in APCs.

Maybe we should go in a different direction.

I won't advocate for a three-vehicle platoon but do wonder as to whether we need ten or even eight or nine dismounts per section. Maybe we can reduce the actual "section" to a four man brick and maybe take up two more GIB seats with weapon specialists/enablers: GPMG, Javelin, drone operator, CarlG/grenade launcher/mortarman, what have you. A platoon would then have: four three-man crewed LAVs and dismounts of a three-man platoon command element; three four-man "sections"; and four two-man weapon specialist/enabler teams - all for a total of 23 dismounts but with a stronger emphasis on working around the support weapons and LAV support rather than the rifles. The pl comd controls the bricks, the WO the weapons/enablers.

That gives each LAV a total of 8 (for the pl comd veh) or 9 (for each sect carrier) which leaves a little extra room for a ride along or ammo.

IMHO - save the extra LAVs and create another battalion with them.

Same for the medium LAV brigade/battalion.

For light battalions I would stay with a two brick, nine-man section and concentrate the specialist weapons/enablers at the platoon level divided between the pl comds veh and a separate weapons carrier (The extra brick compensates for the lack of the LAV support).

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I specifically chose to not detail how the 10-soldier section was made up because I think that is a whole separate argument.

I think where you and I differ is not on the need for Heavy forces but on how we believe they will be used. I get the strong impression from your posts that you are envisioning maneuver warfare like we were preparing for during the Cold War, while I believe it will be more like Fallujah, Marawi or Grozny.

Tanks are absolutely key for both but for urban combat protected mobility and lots of boots on the ground are also key. 100% agree that the LAV is not a great vehicle for that environment, but it's what we have now so we need to make the best use of it we can. Vehicle losses will be high so we will need lots of LAVs supporting the inventory to be able to maintain that protected mobility. Once your mobility is stripped away the opportunity to maneuver within an urban environment is lost (as well as the ability to counter enemy maneuvers).

Lots of boots on the ground are also needed in cities as casualties will be high. People smarter than me can figure out exactly how those seats in the back of the LAVs (and hopefully eventually HAPCs) are organized and what they are armed with, but in my opinion the more seats available and filled, the better chances we'll have.
 
I specifically chose to not detail how the 10-soldier section was made up because I think that is a whole separate argument.
Even the # is an argument ;)

I think where you and I differ is not on the need for Heavy forces but on how we believe they will be used. I get the strong impression from your posts that you are envisioning maneuver warfare like we were preparing for during the Cold War, while I believe it will be more like Fallujah, Marawi or Grozny.
Only folks with overwhelming artillery and AirPower are going to want to fight in the open - I hate to say it, but the US MDO shift to complex terrain and dispersed operations, is admission that in some theaters will will not have that advantage - hence the city defender - and subterranean operations aspects.
Tanks are absolutely key for both but for urban combat protected mobility and lots of boots on the ground are also key. 100% agree that the LAV is not a great vehicle for that environment, but it's what we have now so we need to make the best use of it we can. Vehicle losses will be high so we will need lots of LAVs supporting the inventory to be able to maintain that protected mobility. Once your mobility is stripped away the opportunity to maneuver within an urban environment is lost (as well as the ability to counter enemy maneuvers).
I'm less enamored with tanks after seeing them in Iraq - I could do a lot more for the $ in an urban defensive setting without tanks, but I agree armor is still needed if for nothing else but the potential to counter attack.

Lots of boots on the ground are also needed in cities as casualties will be high. People smarter than me can figure out exactly how those seats in the back of the LAVs (and hopefully eventually HAPCs) are organized and what they are armed with, but in my opinion the more seats available and filled, the better chances we'll have.
I'm significantly less sure of that these days than I once was.
 
Even the # is an argument ;)

The US Marines are going to a 15 pax squad. 12-15 is a good number IMHO...


  • Type: Marine Infantry Platoon
  • Origin: U.S. Marine Corps (United States)
  • Personnel: 1 Officer and 47 Enlisted and 1-3 Usual Enlisted Attachments
→ Platoon Headquarters (1 Officer and 2 Enlisted + 1-3 Attachments)
  • 1× Platoon Commander, Second Lieutenant or First Lieutenant (OF-1), armed with 1 M27 IAR
  • 1× Platoon Sergeant, Staff Sergeant (OR-6), armed with 1 M27 IAR
  • 1× Radiotelephone Operator (RTO), Lance Corporal (OR-3), armed with 1 M27 IAR
  • 1-3× Corpsmen*, Hospitalman or Petty Officer, armed with 1 M27 IAR
* Corpsmen are a U.S. Navy sailor attached to the rifle platoons as combat medics.
→ 3× Rifle Squads (15 Enlisted Each)
  • 1× Squad Leader*, Sergeant (OR-5), armed with 1 M27 IAR
  • 1× Assistant Squad Leader, Corporal (OR-4), armed with 1 M27 IAR
  • 1× Squad Systems Operator, Lance Corporal (OR-3), armed with 1 M27 IAR
  • 3× Fire Teams
    • 1× Team Leader, Corporal (OR-4), armed with 1 M27 IAR
    • 1× Automatic Rifleman, Lance Corporal (OR-3), armed with 1 M27 IAR
    • 1× Grenadier, Lance Corporal (OR-3), armed with 1 M27 IAR and 1 M320 40mm grenade launcher (standalone)
    • 1× Rifleman, Lance Corporal (OR-3)
      • One fire team's Rifleman will be armed with an M38 SDMR
      • One fire team's Rifleman will be armed with an M27 IAR and M3E1 MAAWS (Carl Gustaf)
      • One fire team's Rifleman will be armed with an M27 IAR
* The most senior squad leader acts as assistant platoon sergeant. Under the TO&E the platoon guide takes on this role, although in reality the dedicated platoon guide role is not often used.

 
I specifically chose to not detail how the 10-soldier section was made up because I think that is a whole separate argument.

I think where you and I differ is not on the need for Heavy forces but on how we believe they will be used. I get the strong impression from your posts that you are envisioning maneuver warfare like we were preparing for during the Cold War, while I believe it will be more like Fallujah, Marawi or Grozny.
Yes and no. I do see combined arms units as the most complex organization for the most complex environment. Accordingly, since I believe one should equip and train for the most complex and then everything else is easier. So in that respect Cold War-yes. But our Cold War Army was tanks and non fightable M113s filled with bayonets. I do see the LAV as a firepower contributor while recognizing its not a tank-level IFV. It does have a strong gun (could be stronger) and I think it should have bolt on anti-armour missiles.

My difference is in the reduction of the size of bayonets with an increase of enablers (who in a pinch can be co-opted into bayonets if that's what's needed). So in that respect - Cold War - no.

I see the increase in organic infantry in the mix within the combined arms battalion by way of a ratio of two infantry companies to one tank battalion (which incidentally allows Canada to form a three-combined arms battalion brigade within existing resources.)
Tanks are absolutely key for both but for urban combat protected mobility and lots of boots on the ground are also key. 100% agree that the LAV is not a great vehicle for that environment, but it's what we have now so we need to make the best use of it we can. Vehicle losses will be high so we will need lots of LAVs supporting the inventory to be able to maintain that protected mobility. Once your mobility is stripped away the opportunity to maneuver within an urban environment is lost (as well as the ability to counter enemy maneuvers).
In a situation where even more infantry beyond what the combined arms battalion has is essential, then either a light or medium battalion or companies thereof can be added to the mix. Recall, I favour Canada having a brigade of each: light, medium and heavy with additional Res F infantry.

Where my Cold-War bias really stands out is that I'm a firm believer that for just about everything, a battalion is needed to work as an entity within a brigade group framework. I absolutely abhor the concept of our current mix and match battlegroups which we slap together for deployments and where we consider armoured regiments and artillery regiments solely as force generators and not as force employers.

I firmly believe this concept as set out in FM 3-96 re Brigade Combat Teams:
Brigade combat teams (BCTs) organize to conduct decisive action—the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authorities tasks (ADP 3-0). BCTs are the Army’s primary combined arms, close combat force.
One can add or subtract elements to a BCT but inherently the BCT is a balanced force with all requisite elements needed for combat and sustainment. So are our brigade groups. We do not have organic battle groups. We assemble them from scratch but it is a rare situation where a battle group is capable of decisive action. We used to know that during the Cold War. Battle groups were generally the temporary attachment of an infantry company or tank squadron cross attached to an armoured regiment or infantry battalion for a specific task or mission but not a wholesale creation of a mini-1/3rd-brigade designed for independent operations.

IMHO Army transformation and Afghanistan taught us many bad lessons that we need to unlearn even if there are finacial constraints.

Lots of boots on the ground are also needed in cities as casualties will be high. People smarter than me can figure out exactly how those seats in the back of the LAVs (and hopefully eventually HAPCs) are organized and what they are armed with, but in my opinion the more seats available and filled, the better chances we'll have.
True enough although I think one needs to have a general understanding of what you want your force to be configured as at a standard. Modifications are inevitable.

Space in and on a LAV is limited and there needs to be a balance of people and weapon reloads. I spent my "armoured" time in M113s with generally five man crews which left plenty of space for other stuff including luxuries. That was also in the days of our tiny 64 pattern webbing and no vests so we reveled in space. LAV 6.0s not so much. Reducing a LAV to 4 + 2 dismounts does leave some room for expendables but still not much. And yes, I am considering LOBs and casualties but I'd still rather take those 12 extra LAVs per company and form additional companies and battalions out of them. I think that it provides more options and flexibility.


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The US Marines are going to a 15 pax squad. 12-15 is a good number IMHO...
I wonder how much of that has to do with the AAVP holding 21 dismounts.

By the time you take the 50 man platoons and the Coy HQ and weapons platoon you are getting close to a 200 man rifle company. (all run by a captain)

I betcha Marines and the Army debate this a lot.

:unsure:
 
1568719428_image1.jpg


Just a reminder on the Map we are looking at.

Position: CFS Alert
Reference: North Pole

Distance from Forward Edge of Battle Area at North Pole - 845 km or about 20 mins by F35 at full speed. a lot less by hypersonic missile.

Russian Sector - Left of Arc 9 0'Clock, Right of Arc 3 O'Clock
NATO Sector from 3 0'clock to 9 O'Clock

Left Flank - NORAD 9 O'Clock to 6 O'Clock
Right Flank - Nordic Defence 6 O'Clock to 3 O'Clock

Canada's Sector - 6 O'Clock to 8 O'Clock

Points of dispute

Donut Hole
Lomontsov Ridge
Bering Sea
Northwest Passage

Canada's Strategic Position

Right Hand Marker for the Indo-Pacific Theatre - terminating at the North Pole
Left Hand Marker for the European Theatre - terminating at the North Pole
Centre for the Arctic Theatre - facing Russia
First Line of Defence for the US Homeland


Right Flank (Nordics) - 230 Fighters being modernized with 143 F-35s
Left Flank (Alaska) 2 Squadrons of F22 with E-3 AWACs and 2 Squadrons of F35s

Right Flank (Nordics) - GBAD - 1x Patriot and 3x NASAMS systems
Left Flank (Alaska) - GBAD - ABM at Fort Greely (Enhanced by USN systems afloat)

Right Flank (Nordics) - 10x Brigade Groups
Left Flank (Alaska) - 3x BCT (1 Abn, 1 Stryker, 1 NG) - Being formed into a Division and reequipped for Arctic Operations - highly air mobile
In Support (Just South of the 49th) - 7th Inf Div (3x SBCT (1 NG)) 10th Mtn Div (2x Lt Inf) - both also highly air mobile

Canada

3x CBG, no GBAD and 94 F18s.

And the UK CDS

Gen. Sir Nick Carter said Britain would also like to "co-operate in terms of helping Canada do what Canada needs to do as an Arctic country."

If we're not doing what the Brits, the Americans, the Danes, the Norwegians, Swedes and Finns think we need to do then they will do it for us.

Buy their lawn mowers or have them cut the grass and send us the bill.
 
I wonder how much of that has to do with the AAVP holding 21 dismounts.

By the time you take the 50 man platoons and the Coy HQ and weapons platoon you are getting close to a 200 man rifle company. (all run by a captain)

I betcha Marines and the Army debate this a lot.

:unsure:

Once upon a time I was a Captain in charge of a 200 man (with females attached sometimes) company, from time to time. At the ripe old age of between 25 - 28 years.

It worked great. Mainly because I believe that those who put me in the job had the confidence that I could do it, and I had the right support from a great CSM, Pl Comds, CQMS etc etc ;)
 
I wonder how much of that has to do with the AAVP holding 21 dismounts.

While there may have been some consideration about AAVP size, amtracs are not organic to Marine infantry battalions; they are organized in separate Assault Amphibious Battalions. A company from an AABn can provide the lift for an infantry battalion. As well, while the AAVP is still in service and will probably remain for some years, its already selected replacement is a wheeled vehicle that has a much reduced capacity.

It's been over 40 years since I had the displeasure of bobbing around in high surf in an amtrac (Ex Kernal Potlach 1979 - 3 VP). After the first time, when over half of us (Pioneer Pl and a sect from 1 CER crammed into one trac) got sea sick (once puking started, it was contagious), I snagged scopolamine from the sick bay and gave everyone a shot before the next time we played "The Longest Day". It was thus an uneventful trip to the beach.
 
Just a couple of other points

The Canadian Arc subtends 52W and 142W - 90 degrees. 6 time zones. That is about half of the NATO sector in the Arctic.

1 CBG in Edmonton is responsible for the arc from 142W at the Alaskan Border to the Lakehead at 89W - 43 degrees. 3 Time Zones. Half the Canadian sector. One Quarter of the NATO sector. 25%. The only road to the Arctic is a seasonal one the terminates at the extreme western edge of the Canadian sector at 68N. 2500 km short of CFS Alert.

2 CBG in Petawawa is responsible for the arc from the Lakehead at 89W to the Ontario-Quebec border at 79W - 10 degrees. 1 Time Zone. One Ninth of the Canadian sector. 5% of the NATO sector. Their access to the Arctic terminates at James Bay - 51 N. Edmonton is north of 53 N.

5 CBG in Valcartier is responsible for the arc from the Ontario-Quebec border at 79W to Cape Spear at 52W - 37 degrees - 2-1/2 Time Zones. One third of the Canadian sector. 15% of the NATO sector. Their access to the Arctic terminates at the seasonal Trans-Taiga road at 55N. Fort McMurray is at 57N.

Alert is at 82N.

It is 100 km from Denmark (Greenland)
700 km from the Thule Airbase
800 km from the North Pole
1200 km from Norway (Svalbard)
1800 km from Russia (Franz Josef Land)

4300 km from Trenton

2500 km from the Border shared by Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norway. - 4 to 5 hours by CC-130, 2 to 3 hours by C-17. 8 hours or so by CH-47 unloaded, ferry range.
 
CC-130s, A-400s, CH-147s, F-35s, Patriots, NASAMs, LRPFs. Manportable weapons. Bv206s / BvS10. Lt Helicopters.
 
Three U.S. and British Submarines Meet at the North Pole


Three U.S. and British Submarines Meet at the North Pole​

ICEX 2018 involved live torpedo-firing​


Two American submarines and one British boat gathered near the North Pole in mid-March 2018 for one of the biggest Arctic undersea exercises in decades.

ICEX 2018, the 27th in a series of roughly biennial exercises dating back to 1959, kicked off in early March, when aircraft from the Alaska Air National Guard and the Canadian air force began delivering supplies to an ice floe inside the Arctic Circle.

The supplies allowed a military-civilian team to begin building Camp Skate. The camp boasted accommodations for around 50 people and the infrastructure for a wide range of civilian scientific experiments and military training events spanning five weeks.


What would be the strategic impact of actively defending CFS Alert with a NASAMS battery?

Or filling the GBAD requirement with 3 air deployable NASAMS batteries? One for Alert. One for Thule. One for Reykjavik.

Militia Troops for Home Defence.
 
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What would be the strategic impact of actively defending CFS Alert with a NASAMS battery?
Purely symbolic, I’d say. NASAMS, with its short range, wouldn’t be my first choice against stand off cruise missiles, which have been the standard armament of the Russian bomber force since the 1980’s.

The sole US Army Air Defense unit in Alaska doesn’t even have an anti-aircraft role — it’s a ballistic missile defense unit oriented more against North Korea than Russia.
 
But strategy is all about symbolism.

Norway is constantly being pressured over Svalbard by Russia. Are the Russians really happy to have us sit undisturbed in Alert? Or would it be a useful symbolic gesture to take Alert off line?

I think it would be an interesting statement of intent to procure the means to deploy by air an air defence system equivalent to that deployed by a Halifax or CSC. And to be able to assist NATO and NORAD by covering Thule and Reykjavik would also be diplomatically advantageous.

The defence of Iceland is one of the jobs to which Canada has been assigned in the past.
 
Russian Base at Nagorskoye in Alexandra Land, Franz Josef Land
80N. 1500 km from Alert 2100 km from Thule 1000 km from the North Pole 1200 km from the Finnmark Border, 400 km from Svalbard

Kara sea ZFJAL.PNG
Alexandra Land is located in Russia


BBC Report


Can we get any volunteers for Northern Duty?
 
But strategy is all about symbolism.

Norway is constantly being pressured over Svalbard by Russia. Are the Russians really happy to have us sit undisturbed in Alert? Or would it be a useful symbolic gesture to take Alert off line?
Like they potentially have done in the past to NORAD capability?

cough…PIN-3…cough
 

Littoral Regiment

The basic idea for the MLR is about 1,800 to 2,000 Marines and sailors – smaller than the 3,400-strong 3rd Marine Regiment operating out of Hawaii today – that would include three main elements: a Littoral Combat Team, a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, and a Littoral Logistics Battalion, spokesman Maj. Josh Benson told USNI News.

“The Littoral Combat Team (LCT) is task-organized around an infantry battalion along with a long-range anti-ship missile battery. The LCT is designed to provide the basis for employing multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base (EAB) sites that can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) of key maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning,” he said.

“The Littoral Anti-Air Battalion is designed to train and employ air defense, air surveillance and early warning, air control, and forward rearming and refueling capabilities.

The Littoral Logistics Battalion provides tactical logistics support to the MLR by resupplying expeditionary advance base sites, managing cache sites, and connecting to higher-level logistics providers,” along with also providing for medical and maintenance capabilities.

A regimental headquarters would supplement these organizations with “enhanced signals and human intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, logistics planning, civil affairs, cyber, and information operations capabilities.”

3 of them. - 5400 PY.
 

Littoral Regiment









3 of them. - 5400 PY.

Too bad they can't find a more aggressive term than 'Littoral'.

Like, you know, 'The Water Rats' or something like that :)
 
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